- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

POTP critques?
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

An acquaintence of mine works at a firm with little cryptography experience. They are thinking of including cryptography in a future product, and Elementrix's Power One Time Pad is a serious contestant. I'm looking for independent critiques of the system, something better than 'it's not really a one-time pad.' Is the cryptosystem which is actually implemented worth a damn? Does their claim to have solved the key distribution problem hold water? I seem to remember something about them wanting to generate keys for you, and ship them to the customer. Is this correct? Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Peter Trei Senior Software Engineer Purveyor Development Team Process Software Corporation http://www.process.com trei(a)process.com

3 2

FDA Net-regulations -- "Drug Lords" from HotWired
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 18 Oct 1996 05:20:19 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: FDA Net-regulations -- "Drug Lords" from HotWired http://www.netizen.com/netizen/96/42/global4a.html HotWired The Netizen "Drug Lords" Global Network by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Washington, DC, 17 October Forget the Communications Decency Act and the censor-happy Clinton administration. Instead, it now seems like we have to keep an eye on the pinstriped bureaucrats at the US Food and Drug Administration, who are hatching their own schemes to regulate the Net. I just got back from the agency's two-day conference in the Maryland suburbs, entitled "FDA and the Internet: Advertising and Promotion of Medical Products." Discussions drifted from troublesome-to-the-Feds notions of drug use in America Online chat rooms to emerging international Net-regulatory agreements, but all the talk shared a kind of benevolent paternalism. Consumers can't be trusted to make their own choices. The Federal government must protect us from reading what only doctors are allowed to see. Netizens can't even be trusted to figure out when they're leaving a Web site after they click on a link. Drug industry representatives on the panel this morning appeared less than overly concerned with regulatory threats to free speech. Jamie Marks from Body Health Resources said: "It's very important that drug companies police the sites they link to." The panel also discussed how to prevent sites that celebrate or even talk about illicit drug use from linking to sites operated by pharmaceutical companies. Even search engines like AltaVista could be hit by FDA regulations. Sara Stein from Stanford University noted, "Search engines have begun to sell links ... that's another area of disclosure that's required." Translation: the FDA is looking to have a say in how to label medical advertisements on Web sites. The FDA's also working the international angle. They brought in to the conference speakers from France, Britain, Switzerland, Brazil, and the Netherlands - all of whom were particularly interested in online drug promotion, since US advertising laws are currently so permissive. J. Idanpaan-Heikkila, the World Health Organization's director of drug management and policies, said that real-world claims promoting pharmaceuticals should be "in good taste," adding, "I think this is applicable to the Internet." Cedric Allenou, the French Embassy's health attache, predicted more controls: "In France, as in the United States, there is a lack of regulation on the Internet. But these issues will soon be discussed by the French government." When asked what his country would do if a US server distributes information banned in France, he replied: "If your Web site is not in France, you're not under French rule. This is a problem with French Internet regulation." John Rothchild, an attorney from the Federal Trade Commission - which will announce its own Net-regulation plan later this year - said: "Based on some hasty research I did last night, I can report it is feasible to control access to our Web site based on what country the accesser is in.... I don't know the technical details, but according to the technical people at the FTC, non-US domain names have a two-letter suffix." Rothchild apparently didn't realize that many companies outside the United States have domain names ending in nothing but .com. At the end of the two-day conference, meanwhile, the one question left unanswered by attendees was not whether the FDA should regulate the Net, but how long it will take them, and how far they'll go. ###

1 0

Re: DES cracker.
by Geoffrey C. Grabow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 13:54 10/18/96 +0200, Gary Howland wrote: >Geoffrey C. Grabow wrote: >> > >> Tell me what you need. A large part of my job is providing hardware >> security modules to banks to secure (among other things) their ATM networks >> (Automated Teller MAchines, not Async Transfer Mode). Do you need PIN >> encryption formats, transmission message protocols, or what? Just LMK. > >It would be nice to get some confirmation that PINs are generated using >a DES encryption of the account number. > Actually, there are several methods. The most common one by far is called IBM3624. That uses 12 digits of the Primary Account Number (PAN), which in most cases is the card number, and encrypts it with DES. That result is then "decimalized" to change all hex letters to numbers. The first n digits of that result are then used to perform a MOD10 subtract from the customers selected PIN. That result is called an offset and is stored on track 2 of the card, the bank's database or both. G.C.G. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ | Geoffrey C. Grabow | Great people talk about ideas. | | Oyster Bay, New York | Average people talk about things. | | gcg(a)pb.net | Small people talk about people. | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | PGP 2.6.2 public key available at http://www.pb.net/~wizard | | and on a plethora of key servers around the world. | | Key ID = 0E818EC1 | | Fingerprint = A6 7B 67 D7 E9 96 37 7D E7 16 BD 5E F4 5A B2 E4 | |----------------------------------------------------------------------| | That which does not kill us, makes us stranger. - Trevor Goodchild | ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1 0

Re: More threats from FOTM (Friends of Timmy May)
by bdolan＠USIT.NET 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Something like "ne(o)cultorney," I think. bd On Tue, 15 Oct 1996, Sandy Sandfort wrote: > > Does anyone remember the Russian word for "uncultured"? It was > in one or two of Tom Clancy's books. > > > S a n d y > > ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ > > >

3 2

Re: Anonymous Auth Certificates [was: Re: Blinded Identities]
by Hal Finney 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: azur(a)netcom.com (Steve Schear) > It seems that one crux of the problem revolves around the CA and its method > of certificate issuance. A CA which uses biometric data to > reduce/eliminate the chance that an applicant could get several, unrelated, > certificates issued would provide a basis for negative authentication > (similar to a negative credit file). Yes, biometric data is another way of preventing multiple credentials. However it will not work well in electronic form. What you'd need would be a network of stations to take fingerprints and give credentials, ("is a person" credentials) which would then be used for getting access to other services where you're supposed to only use them once (voting for example). This requires a fairly elaborate infrastructure and social commitment to this solution to the problem. Somehow too it is hard to see how to sell a system as a privacy enhancement when its first step is to take fingerprints of the whole country. "But we're not saving your names, honest!" I don't know if it would fly. Tim May argues that alternative solutions which are more local will be better. In the case of the abuse situation, maybe you could just have people put down a deposit of $100 or so. Then they get an anonymous credential which they can use for access. If they abuse their access, their credential gets disabled. As long as their abuse is worth less than the deposit you'll be OK. And at any point they can turn in their valid credential and get their money back. No identities are needed at any point in the scheme. > A one-way function performed, by the client, on their certificate from this > CA would yield a token which unambiguously binds it to a valid certificate > of the CA (and therefore uniquely identifies them) w/o revealing the > certificate itself. Actually I think you need to use a blinding protocol when you acquire the certificate, rather than trying to run a one-way function on the unblinded cert. The output of a one-way function looks random and meaningless unless you supply the input. And if the input identifies the user then you've lost the anonymity. Hal

2 2

Re: GET ME OUT OF HERE
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:24 AM -0700 10/18/96, crumrig(a)us-state.gov wrote: >UNSUBSCIBE You have been unsubscibed. For good measure, you have also been unscribed, unsubsribed, and unsuscribed. In the event that you wished to be _unsubscribed_, only you can do that. Directions follow at the end of this message. --Unsubsciber To subscribe to the Cypherpunks mailing list: -send a message to: majordomo(a)toad.com -body message of: subscribe cypherpunks To unsubscribe from the Cypherpunks mailing list: -send a message to: majordomo(a)toad.com -body message of: unsubscribe cypherpunks

1 0

No Subject
by Alexander.Kvache 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

unsibscribe

1 0

Re: is there no end to AP & Creative Wiretap Arguments?
by Hallam-Baker 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Steve Schear wrote: > How about as a means of coercing war criminals ethnic purgers, as those in > Bosnia/Serbia, to turn themselves in to proper tribunals for judging. > Having AP bettors wager $100,000s on your untimely retirement, unless you > turn yourself in, could induce one to consider conventional justice. On the other hand it would provide said war criminals with a convenient mechanism for carrying out their crimes. It does not work for Bell and his appologists to wave their hands and say "trust me it will be better". There is absolutely no reason to believe that AP markets would be used by anyone but psychopaths. No mechanism is proposed which restricts the purposes to which the AP markets can be put. They would inevitably be used by the KKK and neo-NAZI groups for hate-crimes. > All human rights are Naturally derived as are the 'Laws of the Jungle'. > Governments instituted among men should derive their rights from the > soverignty of its citizens. Unfortunately, many countries choose to ignore > this. AP should serve an occassionally competitive system to keep the > 'duly consistuted' system on its toes lest those in authority reap the law > of the jungle. Rights do not exist outside a legal framework that supports them. Arguments from natural law have been discredited for 300+ years. Such arguments merely reify the prejudices of one society into axiomatic rights without the bother of having to justify them. There is no logical basis to prefer the "rights" of th US constitution over the "rights" recognised by the Islamic Jihad. If you read the US declaration of Independence it is very clear that its authors rejected natural law arguments. The rights that they hold to be "self evident" are extreemly abstract principles which could be justified within almost any ethical system. The removal of the word "God" was deliberate and reflects a concious rejection of the natural law argument. AP is self-contradictory. It claims to uphold "rights" by infringing them massively and disproportionately and in such a way that no rights would remain. It is impossible to justify AP except in extreeme authoritarian terms that could be used to justify any system of government. Phill

1 0

Kantor Mischaracterizes
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The Washington Post, October 18, 1996, p. A26. The Administration's Encryption Plan I write in response to The Post's Oct. 4 editorial [below] that mischaracterizes the administration's recent encryption plan. The administration's encryption plan is reasonable, workable, fair and coherent. It addresses the critical issues of promoting the export of encryption products and protecting the public safety and our national security. The administration's objective is to put forth a balanced plan that promotes commerce and protects people. And that's exactly what we've done. The proof that our plan will work is with the critical mass of industry that has announced its intention to work with the administration to develop a key recovery system, which will allow law enforcement, under proper court order, to have access to encrypted data. In fact, many of these companies have products they will soon market that both safeguard information and protect society, and more are expected to follow. The National Research Council (NRC) report to which the editorial referred recommended allowing the export of encryption up to the strength of 56 bits. Contrary to the editorial, the president has not "embraced a looser form of licensure" than this report. Instead, this administration's plan allows the export of encryption up to 56 bits so long as industry commits to build and market products that support a key recovery system. This is, in fact, a stronger form of licensure not called for by the NRC report. The Post's editorial conveniently ignores the critical role encrypted products play in protecting businesses against illegal activity and the privacy rights of individuals. This is a disturbing omission that avoids critical concerns that can only be advanced by the administration's plan. Finally, this administration takes seriously its responsibility to protect its citizens and our national security. That's why we are not lifting all restrictions on the export of encryption products, and why there is a two-year deadline on the export of 56-bit encryption products. The administration's plan will accelerate the development of a market-driven, global key management system. That will provide the best security of all. Michael Kantor Secretary of Commerce Washington [End] ---------- The Washington Post, October 4, 1996, p. A22. Crypto Politics [Editorial] The Clinton administration once had a coherent, if unpopular, position on encryption software, the stuff that allows you to encode your email messages or other data so that no one can read it en route without a key. Now, in the wake of word that the president will sign an executive order, the position is no longer coherent, nor discernibly more popular with the high-tech audience it attempts to mollify. People and companies doing international financial business are highly interested in this kind of software, the more powerfully "uncrackable" the better. The U.S. software industry thinks there's a lot of money in it, especially if encryption becomes routine. The administration position till recently was that, much as U.S. software companies might profit from being able to market "uncrackable" encryption software freely, national security and law enforcement considerations dictated that such exports be controlled by license. Powerful encryption, like arms, could be dangerous in the hands of terrorists, rogue governments or international criminals. The software was classed as a munition; software above a certain uncrackability level could not be exported unless law enforcement authorities could get access somehow to the "key" after obtaining the proper warrants. Unbreakable codes on the loose strike us as a real danger, a legitimate reason for tight export controls. But if the administration really believes this, you'd think it would stick with steps that can plausibly meet the goal of control. Instead, trying to please, it has been splitting and splitting the difference between itself and the largely unmoved industry, which argues that no one will buy an encryption product that a government can decrypt at will. As with arms sales, the companies also argue that if they don't sell it, somebody else will, and that anyway it's far too late to fence off rogues. The national security people respond that there is still a "window," perhaps two years, in which they can prevent, if not all leaks of unauthorized crypto technology, at least its off-the-shelf use and wide adoption as the international standard. The administration initially proposed, then repeatedly refined, the concept of key "escrow" -- depositing a copy of the code with trusted third parties -- but never came up with a version the industry would accept. It commissioned a National Research Council report, which recommended a significant easing of restrictions. Now the president appears to have embraced a yet looser form of licensure upon declaration by a company that it will develop a plan within two years for key recovery. Also, the technology no longer will be considered munitions. What kind of plan? Nobody can quite say. What if the plans aren't acceptable? Licensing will revert to the old rule in two years. Will the security issue be moot by then? Probably. Barring some burst of clarity, one is left wondering whether the administration has compromised or caved, and what it now believes about the dangers of exporting uncrackable software. [End] See the National Research Council report: http://jya.com/nrcindex.htm

1 0

Real Meaning of "Key Recovery" (was Re: DES cracker...)
by Andrew Loewenstern 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Peter Trei, whilst talking about a key cracking effort, said: > For the Key Recovery effort (please call it Key Recovery - > this has important psychological implications in the US) Yes yes! What a great way to "reclaim" this term... CC'ed to cypherpunks for all to see. No longer is it "Key Cracking" it is now "Key Recovery" ... andrew

1 0