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Re: [liberationtech] Exactly how are satellite transmissions tapped/intercepted, in Syria and elsewhere?
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 11/28/2011 08:46 PM, Brian Conley wrote: > I'm also trying to determine whether iridium phones may be any > "better" than Inmarsat, and how much better, etc. it's clear thurayas > are no longer an acceptable option by any regard. I nearly forgot to mention this really great project by Harald and friends: http://gmr.osmocom.org/trac/ To quote his page entirely: "This is the homepage of the Osmocom sub-project GEO Mobile Radio. It is collecting information and software related to the ETSI GEO Mobile Radio specification and its practical implementations like the Thuraya satellite phone network GEO Mobile Radio is a set of specifications describing a satellite based mobile phone network. Radio aspects It uses the L-band frequencies 1634 to 1656 MHz (earth to space) and 1532.5 to 1554.5 MHz (space to earth) for communication between mobile phones and the respective satellites. The polarization is circular (left) and the modulation is pi/4 QPSK, using a channel spacing of 31.25 kHz" Here's a guide for doing your own Thuraya interception: http://gmr.osmocom.org/trac/wiki/Receiver_Setup All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [p2p-hackers] Distributed identity, chat, publishing, and sharing
by Tony Arcieri 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Thu, Jan 10, 2013 at 6:49 PM, Sean Lynch <seanl(a)literati.org> wrote: > Hi, folks. I'm sure similar ideas to this have been discussed on this > list before, but I wanted to talk about an application that's been > living in my head for years and that I keep working on in fits and > starts, in the hopes that either someone will "steal" the idea or decide > to work on it with me to keep me motivated even when the goal seems so > far away. > For what it's worth, this sounds an awfully lot like what I have envisioned for the Cryptosphere: https://github.com/tarcieri/cryptosphere Contacts would be identified by their (Ed25519) public key. When you add > someone, you just paste their public key and type a "pet name" for them, > which is what would be shown in your contact list. Really close to what I had in mind, and I plan on using Ed25519. This is actually an approach that forces you to do more than take a fleeing glance at a given user's public key thumbprint/ID and I feel that's missing from many similar systems (e.g. OTR) > People could also associate various metadata with their public key in a > very similar way > to how they do with PGP keys: with metadata packets signed by themselves > and other people, thus establishing a web of trust that would enable > search, the same way we can reliably search for PGP keys but with an > easier-to-use interface that will always show someone's relationship to > your current trusted contacts. > My goal was to collect metadata about content transfers in the system by having all participants in file transfers sign a client-specific long chain which serves as a record of who has transferred what. Through the course of normal system operation any given peer will collect a number of these long chains, which can be run through a collaborative filtering algorithm (e.g. singular value decomposition) in order to make an educated guess about the properties of peers you've never interacted with based on their collective similarity to peers you have interacted with directly. Here are some possible implementation strategies. The only one I've made > any progress on so far is uTP: > > 1. uTP with our own DHT implementation for bootstrapping, lookup, and > storage of published stuff > My plan was to use CurveCP with the Ed25519 private scalar as the CurveCP private key. This allows you to set up secure channels which are based on the same identities as the other signatures in the system. CurveCP presently has some issues with embedding and congestion control but I hope if people actually start using it these problems will get resolved. I guess you could call this a p2p, pseudonymous version of Facebook, > with all the same functionality and none of the privacy problems because > privacy would always be defined by encryption. If you want something > public, you post it in the clear. If you want something seen by only > your friends, you encrypt the encryption key with each of their > curve25519 keys. > A crypto capability-based access control scheme comes to mind here. -- Tony Arcieri _______________________________________________ p2p-hackers mailing list p2p-hackers(a)lists.zooko.com http://lists.zooko.com/mailman/listinfo/p2p-hackers ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [E-PRV] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is
by Seth David Schoen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15) David Farber writes: >Can I get a copy for IP > The original article is at http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1090908,00.html (subscription required) Here's the letter we sent: Your account of FBI efforts to embed wiretapping into the design of new Internet communication technologies ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on the Line," Notebook, August 15) is in error. You claim that police "can't tap into [Internet] conversations or identify the location of callers, even with court orders." That is false. Internet service providers and VoIP companies have consistently responded to such orders and turned over information in their possession. There is no evidence that law enforcement is having any trouble obtaining compliance. But more disturbingly, you omit entirely any reference to the grave threat these FBI initiatives pose to the personal privacy and security of innocent Americans. The technologies currently used to create wiretap-friendly computer networks make the people on those networks more pregnable to attackers who want to steal their data or personal information. And at a time when many of our most fundamental consititutional rights are being stripped away in the name of fighting terrorism, you implicitly endorse opening yet another channel for potential government abuse. The legislative history of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) shows that Congress recognized the danger of giving law enforcement this kind of surveillance power "in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies" (H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3493 [1994] [House Report]). The law explicitly exempts so-called information services; law enforcement repeatedly assured civil libertarians that the Internet would be excluded. Yet the FBI and FCC have now betrayed that promise and stepped beyond the law, demanding that Internet software be redesigned to facilitate eavesdropping. In the coming months, we expect the federal courts to rein in these dangerously expansive legal intepretations. -- Seth Schoen Staff Technologist schoen(a)eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 1 415 436 9333 x107 ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

the Line", Aug. 15) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [Dewayne-Net] America's robot army
by DSwee34359＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Good piece, I have been following such developments from a distance for some time, and in fact I won a journalism award for a piece I composed four years ago on this subject. One begins to understand if not approve the actions of moralistic atomic traitors like Ted Hall who gave away atomic secrets because they sincerely believed that no one nation should command such power. Unless one believes that the intentions of the current and future conservative administrations in Washington are wholly benign in the developing world, one cannot but shudder to contemplate Robocop writ large. For those for whom the power motive is paramount the thought of such weapons systems must be as intoxicating as a blast of methamphetamine. For not only can military omniscience provide the basis for annihilating force projection against foreign insurgents, it can offer the means of utterly neutralizing principled political opposition at home. That such technology will not be used in that matter is hardly certain in the light of recent NSA abuses. There is however, some reason to believe that the nation may be roused from this particular wet dream before reaching climax. The manufacture of semiconductors has already fled abroad to nations not disposed to favor such an expansion of U.S. military capabilities, and increasingly the design of semiconductors is fleeing to the same places. The relatively small size of the U.S. engineering community compared to those of certain Asian nations might also work against such a profound military asymmetry ultimately occurring. In other words, the U.S. might be losing the technology base to support such a grand scheme. Imagine if a Dominion Theology regime ascended to power in Washington and thought to utilize armies of Golem against the infidel. The ironies are profound. Daniel Sweeney Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Dewayne-Net] re: America's robot army
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: This comment comes from reader Dan Sweeney. DLH]

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Re: [E-PRV] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is
by Seth David Schoen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Having Trouble on the Line", Aug. 15) David Farber writes: >Can I get a copy for IP > The original article is at http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,1090908,00.html (subscription required) Here's the letter we sent: Your account of FBI efforts to embed wiretapping into the design of new Internet communication technologies ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on the Line," Notebook, August 15) is in error. You claim that police "can't tap into [Internet] conversations or identify the location of callers, even with court orders." That is false. Internet service providers and VoIP companies have consistently responded to such orders and turned over information in their possession. There is no evidence that law enforcement is having any trouble obtaining compliance. But more disturbingly, you omit entirely any reference to the grave threat these FBI initiatives pose to the personal privacy and security of innocent Americans. The technologies currently used to create wiretap-friendly computer networks make the people on those networks more pregnable to attackers who want to steal their data or personal information. And at a time when many of our most fundamental consititutional rights are being stripped away in the name of fighting terrorism, you implicitly endorse opening yet another channel for potential government abuse. The legislative history of the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) shows that Congress recognized the danger of giving law enforcement this kind of surveillance power "in the face of increasingly powerful and personally revealing technologies" (H.R. Rep. No. 103-827, 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489, 3493 [1994] [House Report]). The law explicitly exempts so-called information services; law enforcement repeatedly assured civil libertarians that the Internet would be excluded. Yet the FBI and FCC have now betrayed that promise and stepped beyond the law, demanding that Internet software be redesigned to facilitate eavesdropping. In the coming months, we expect the federal courts to rein in these dangerously expansive legal intepretations. -- Seth Schoen Staff Technologist schoen(a)eff.org Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org/ 454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA 94110 1 415 436 9333 x107 ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Internet phone wiretapping ("Psst! The FBI is Having Trouble on
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

the Line", Aug. 15) X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.734) Reply-To: dave(a)farber.net Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [Dewayne-Net] America's robot army
by DSwee34359＠aol.com 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Good piece, I have been following such developments from a distance for some time, and in fact I won a journalism award for a piece I composed four years ago on this subject. One begins to understand if not approve the actions of moralistic atomic traitors like Ted Hall who gave away atomic secrets because they sincerely believed that no one nation should command such power. Unless one believes that the intentions of the current and future conservative administrations in Washington are wholly benign in the developing world, one cannot but shudder to contemplate Robocop writ large. For those for whom the power motive is paramount the thought of such weapons systems must be as intoxicating as a blast of methamphetamine. For not only can military omniscience provide the basis for annihilating force projection against foreign insurgents, it can offer the means of utterly neutralizing principled political opposition at home. That such technology will not be used in that matter is hardly certain in the light of recent NSA abuses. There is however, some reason to believe that the nation may be roused from this particular wet dream before reaching climax. The manufacture of semiconductors has already fled abroad to nations not disposed to favor such an expansion of U.S. military capabilities, and increasingly the design of semiconductors is fleeing to the same places. The relatively small size of the U.S. engineering community compared to those of certain Asian nations might also work against such a profound military asymmetry ultimately occurring. In other words, the U.S. might be losing the technology base to support such a grand scheme. Imagine if a Dominion Theology regime ascended to power in Washington and thought to utilize armies of Golem against the infidel. The ironies are profound. Daniel Sweeney Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[Dewayne-Net] re: America's robot army
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[Note: This comment comes from reader Dan Sweeney. DLH]

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