- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Lucrative update
by Patrick 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Lucrative release 4 is out. I know many people are used to seeing releases numbered like "0.000001", "0.000002", "2.0.3.0.14.657" etc. but release numbering systems are essentially arbitrary in nature so don't get excited as Lucrative goes toward version 50+. This release is a fairly minor one, but included some changes such as the client name that I wanted to get out as soon as possible. There is also a new development weblog at http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/weblog/. I went through an install with someone over IRC last night and made a blog entry summarizing the install notes. I recommend reading the notes before attempting an install. I am glad to help with an install, drop me a note at patrick(a)lfcgate.com if you have trouble. Some documentation on the various entities in the Lucrative system is now available on the website, http://lucrative.thirdhost.com/documentation.php but more is needed and coming. If Lucrative is interesting to you, please consider helping in any way you can: Feedback Installation reports Suggestions Comments Criticism Feature requests Source code patches Donations Are all very much welcomed. And criticism is more useful to me than praise. My sincere thanks to everyone who has participated so far by installing, testing, providing feedback, spreading the word, and donating. And finally I just received word from SourceForge that the project registration for Lucrative has been approved. Regards, Patrick -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: PGPfreeware 6.5.3 for non-commercial use <http://www.pgp.com> mQGiBD5ECKcRBADUvjXHwLtxIyS4AyjBs/dFtN6rdeP18Fhzh1hD5fJwkFevqY9Z I1ASROTh6eXYF7pU5sEvbcPshHyTB41ZtTqZvQvpwWN0fUzOuutuI0mtC5UPp9Rz j47SdWLdEXNHjwnHDCYSyqtqZu8GujGRQybR0eP3NIh/NwbSDUKdgz7IjwCg//Jo UtjP3zUFobm/0UYA+CJ5krED/091x9Js0gwNwvjbzM8DqO+r8qNz0kXI13FkrPRk QNd37lxt6m2m8HZD1WYM2wKwtMzHSwJcWzaDZ/tNc+ppYjzpw0EQCh9FqjGs8Vau guF6PA1M8lJTCcLKaL4e7ynic+PAw5Xa/tdOYgFCG+eLMU5RLvzRCYoOLIjgMJLJ yG98BACAMlDmFVYgC/UKvzZmHfZ5CtCKd8sPfCXrYLu5NeFRE0LR6D6zjzmhi1xX okfreR5o3T/y78VBM98js+m2/+7Z0AElqydeW/RnV1zqwDGjDr9z2MgARf3yLAbs n3BU8Fz61RwvHy6cRkT+2dR2f69QQUSpkupvLwZIGX/iwm4uKLQdUGF0cmljayA8 cGF0cmlja0BsZmNnYXRlLmNvbT6JAE4EEBECAA4FAj5ECKcECwMCAQIZAQAKCRBb mvb9yuOVfaA2AKDAu5tDj9F2KI8cJMrKKkQRAcUyxACg6/bei7lUJH+E5igJqGRx SjKrRA65BA0EPkQIpxAQAPkYoH5aBmF6Q5CV3AVsh4bsYezNRR8O2OCjecbJ3HoL rOQ/40aUtjBKU9d8AhZIgLUV5SmZqZ8HdNP/46HFliBOmGW42A3uEF2rthccUdhQ yiJXQym+lehWKzh4XAvb+ExN1eOqRsz7zhfoKp0UYeOEqU/Rg4Soebbvj6dDRgjG zB13VyQ4SuLE8OiOE2eXTpITYfbb6yUOF/32mPfIfHmwch04dfv2wXPEgxEmK0Ng w+Po1gr9oSgmC66prrNlD6IAUwGgfNaroxIe+g8qzh90hE/K8xfzpEDp19J3tkIt AjbBJstoXp18mAkKjX4t7eRdefXUkk+bGI78KqdLfDL2Qle3CH8IF3KiutapQvMF 6PlTETlPtvFuuUs4INoBp1ajFOmPQFXz0AfGy0OplK33TGSGSfgMg71l6RfUodNQ +PVZX9x2Uk89PY3bzpnhV5JZzf24rnRPxfx2vIPFRzBhznzJZv8V+bv9kV7HAarT W56NoKVyOtQa8L9GAFgr5fSI/VhOSdvNILSd5JEHNmszbDgNRR0PfIizHHxbLY72 88kjwEPwpVsYjY67VYy4XTjTNP18F1dDox0YbN4zISy1Kv884bEpQBgRjXyEpwpy 1obEAxnIByl6ypUM2Zafq9AKUJsCRtMIPWakXUGfnHy9iUsiGSa6q6Jew1XrPdYX AAICD/wKwtF7Y4NKBe8PQ6jDbjWziiTv9Ac/EnRTJDQEoqgLa2LyE+6Ahw/VPGvp mfxkD2MKxC9E7kYVmasn6sHnSpvAv3e7O1Bqbo/qLzzCcJQ5VCurZ+elRM1GZ4Oc fM19FPKutb0/JFEv0nrqS4BGkF7WFBbu5dKYl/GIO7Co1mAerFIb719dOwMPVEIz OT08u8uB9jyR8gEElf+CVuNfOUkrUGg4HS4SbmTTrCSz3/8n5PkquSuAyjCB/dwM ZsZwA0/TTR8sDYlmlf9xPj5PGpGnV9OUwfig6eE0eWtRFeasmz0uiX+yp45ABtNh 6EXP/PFaBgXi9omXXjeeFYfpDvmfA6izvTIQfXTV6V9ZWrBfXarM+GQ+6guXWVbd 9fXvmCr982LkzuKQrK1OpRXBMUapXL+tOy/LYzz91InqKKhgPNGa12fvotZ4LzlM iqoM+Hpz5L9B5We1Ph0lD6RBVXDCqd+P8extnY/7AaDy7tC0UghaAaUuEZXJQPIc oQ3QGbpjM0nGe/VZN5EZhljau0NNENFaU56cOpvOhcO04gLGNNc2NS+rIpTMsaHh o1CG90c5zZZJuUbyx0mIHriNQXDgEwunSZPQorKK9KSppyyjeuOyi5F/mBBPXeyT weLhLqLvAr9se/+Z3aQvMADJi8zUZtGggLTw+N9R5XSwtSh2R4kARgQYEQIABgUC PkQIpwAKCRBbmvb9yuOVfWayAKC+mBhHdn1XZ5uH0RocAyJ32hx2kgCePyhB+IqM TjWLDLarQxcPYhbkFi4= =nx1M -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com

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[FoRK] X.509 certificate collision via MD5 collisions
by Jeffrey Kay 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

This is a pretty interesting paper -- worth reading. >Colliding X.509 Certificates version 1.0 >1st March 2005 >Arjen Lenstra, Xiaoyun Wang, and Benne de Weger > >http://eprint.iacr.org/2005/067 > >We announce a method for the construction of pairs of valid X.509 >certificates in which the ?to be signed? parts form a collision for >the MD5 hash function. As a result the issuer signatures in the >certificates will be the same when the issuer uses MD5 as its hash >function. It seems that the approach was to generate two RSA moduli that could be swapped but still produce the same MD5, hence the same signature. Another interesting question is whether, given an arbitrary modulus, another can be generated that produces the same MD5. It almost seems like the same problem to me, so I must be missing something here. The attack isn't on the public key itself since the factors necessary to generate the private key are still computationally hard to obtain but rather on the content of the certificate. The key assumption is that the certificate is signed by a third party signer, which supplies the public key for verification. Even as posed, this is a pretty scary paper. You could generate a certificate with your legitimate content in it (distinguished name, etc.), get that signed by a TTP and reuse that signature on another certificate with content in it that masqueraded as someone else. You could also conceivable just recode parts of the certificate (such as the length of issue) and be safe. Since you generated the pair of keys that causes this to happen, you could masquerade as anyone you wanted as long as you got your initial certificate signed. Pretty interesting attack. Computationally intense in some areas, but definitely a viable attack particularly against downloadable browser plug-ins. It reminds me of when Verisign signed a fraudulent Microsoft certificate; this attack makes that much more possible. This attack could end the usefulness of TTPs in many circumstances. -- jeff jeffrey kay weblog <k2.com> pgp key <www.k2.com/keys.htm> aim <jkayk2> share files with me -- get shinkuro -- <www.shinkuro.com> "first get your facts, then you can distort them at your leisure" -- mark twain "if the person in the next lane at the stoplight rolls up the window and locks the door, support their view of life by snarling at them" -- a biker's guide to life "if A equals success, then the formula is A equals X plus Y plus Z. X is work. Y is play. Z is keep your mouth shut." -- albert einstein _______________________________________________ FoRK mailing list http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[liberationtech] Who killed Aaron Swartz?
by Shava Nerad 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Aaron's parents have implicated the prosecutors and MIT in Aaron's death, and I don't mean to disrespect them in this, but I'd like to speculate a little more on all of this, because I've been plagued a bit by this for days. It churns my stomach to think that part of what went into Aaron's thoughts on his death might be a media calculation -- he was so good with that sort of thing -- that his work would benefit better from his death than from his life at this point in time. And that really does make me feel ill, literally. That part of that decision might have been coldly rational, not entirely out of depression, but actually looking at the media map of his work, how the feds were going to work to discredit him and the movement, and where the tipping point might have been -- not knowing exactly what the spin the feds might have had to control the media circus at their end. But think about the parallels on say, Tarek Mehanna ( http://www.civilfreedoms.org/?p=11749) who was convicted for "material support" to terrorism for translating web pages from Arabic to English, 17.5 years of hard time, felony terrorism charges. I have no doubt that the charges against Aaron could be made to stick, much to the harm to hacker culture and so on. I can simulate that in my head. Can y'all? Aaron thinking about the harm done to the cause he cares about if this comes to court vs. if he martyrs himself now? I am in a very very dark mood myself. Not in any danger of suicide -- thanks if any are concerned -- but in the mood to organize and teach and take these people down a few pegs before more young people fall. We need to get out of our desk chairs a bit more, don't you think? Just a bit? And show that we are not so laughably easy targets, or we will be taken down like this, one by one, unless we can show that we can work the system in a way that is effective. And I'm afraid that does not mean filing internet petitions to have people removed from office. It means working social capital within the system, working with groups that have that kind of social capital already (some of our groups in DC have those "ins" like EFF, or even Tor when I was there; not so much now, CDT perhaps, some of the larger foundations have good connections). It means playing politics. It means doing the righteous good nonprofit side of lobbying that doesn't pay off Congress but really does educate them and petition them for redress of grievances -- work I've done on behalf of digital divide interests, and hardly anyone does any more -- you don't even hear the word "lobbyist" used that way any more although it's the original definition of the word. And all of these things can be done *facilitated* by technology but by GOD they have to be done face to face and they need money and they require bodies willing to take risks and get out from behind the keyboard and to do those ikky things like deal with politicians and compromises and ikky people your friends think have "germs" and aren't part of the cool kids. And when you go to parties, people will think you are too sincere about your work, make too little money, and are obviously making bad decisions, and are probably a little paranoid about life because you are dealing with all these things that involve stuff they'd just rather not hear about. (Which is, by the way, very much like what military people feel like among civilians, who they also believe they are in the business of protecting.) We are in the business of watching the watchers. Of safeguarding justice and liberties. That is what I believe. And although some of you are academics, and study this from offices where you write reports on some of us, some of us are hybrids or activists, and we are on the line, and likely to have shorter less pleasant lives. It makes for an interesting little social dynamic here. Titularly, I am supposed to be pleasant about this, because often enough, activists are petitioning the people reading this list who are not activists for support, places to publish, or grants or recommendations. But mostly these days I am retired, so I get to be a bit of the crone goddess of this list. It's a bit like having tenure in a way. It can seem very frustrating to those of us in the field to see so many so totally risk averse, where "support" means nothing more than to publish a blog article, signing an ineffective petition, or symbolically rsvp YES to an event with no intent to attend, or send a few dollars to MoveOn when MoveOn does very little except continue MoveOn's work of continuing MoveOn's work of continuing MoveOn's work. But when it comes to attending a meeting, taking an action that would disrupt a routine or risk a blot on an otherwise spotless permanent record, leaving a comfort zone or even a living room, or working with strangers on a project where the suffering-fools-gladly nerves might be a bit abraded -- idealism goes quickly into the crapper. Most people want to *think* of themselves as idealists and in favor of social change. And if someone like Anonymous tells them "Push this button on this HUD and you can change the world!" they will, without question (which scares the crap out of me). But if they have to actually work to deal with unfamiliar things and unfamiliar people and more evident risks to change the world, they quickly withdrawal, because it is outside their comfort zones. And unless we can solve that with liberation technologies -- as apparently Anonymous has, through sheer coyote duplicity -- we can't solve problems such as those that led to Aaron's suicide, or solve those that we are faced with to prevent the next one, or to continue his work effectively. Because this is an asymmetrical war, and the liberation technologies we have do not stack up to the arsenal of government, and never have. We will always have to supplement them with people power on the ground, with politics, with human organizing. I can't see the way around that. And online means are only seducing people away from effective engagement in the real world at this point. Morosov and Putnam have us by the short hairs and we have yet to answer them effectively. Who killed Aaron Swartz? Maybe in a way it was all of us, too. Because all of us contribute to the environment where -- if I'm right and he might have calculated his media impact -- the government could credibly destroy his work and the movement around it in the popular press around his trial, and he knew that none of us could counter it or save him. I can teach people to be clever and full of tricks -- but I can teach, what, fifteen, thirty at a time at most? How deep? How long? Teaching people skills has never been well adapted to automation; ymmv. I could teach a couple in depth as shadows, padawans. Most of us are not even doing that (I'm not, now -- I don't even have funding for me, much less for me and staff or teaching). So where do we go with this? Where have intellectuals ever gone with this? Isn't this, dare I say, a perennial problem? yrs, -- Shava Nerad shava23(a)gmail.com -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Piercing network anonymity in real time
by Ivan Krstic 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

leichter_jerrold(a)emc.com wrote: > The Locate appliance sits passively on the network and > analyzes packets in real time to garner ID info from sources > like Active Directory, IM and e-mail traffic, then associates > this data with network information. This is really nothing new -- I've been seeing systems like these, though home brewed, in use for years. The availability of good tools as a foundation (things like Snort, the layer7 iptables patch, and so on) makes building decent layer 8 inference not far from trivial. Calling this "piercing network anonymity in real time" is highly misleading; in reality, it's more like "making it bloody obvious that there's no such thing as network anonymity". The best one can hope for today is a bit of anonymous browsing and IM with Tor, and that only insofar as you can trust a system whose single point of failure -- the directory service -- was, at least until recently, Roger's personal machine sitting in an MIT dorm room. -- Ivan Krstic <krstic(a)fas.harvard.edu> | GPG: 0x147C722D --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[bitcoin-list] Bitcoin version 0.3.20.01 released
by Gavin Andresen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Binaries for Bitcoin version 0.3.20.01 are available at: https://sourceforge.net/projects/bitcoin/files/Bitcoin/bitcoin-0.3.20/ There were several changes and additions to the JSON remote-procedure-call interface; there are no significant user interface changes. See: http://www.bitcoin.org/smf/index.php?topic=3473.msg48839#msg48839 ... for details. This version does fix one significant denial-of-service attack (earlier versions of bitcoin could be caused to crash due to running out of memory by a remote attacker). SHA1-checksums for the binary files are: 7dfbc05b36112f59886a29f044cfd21c6c253169 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-linux.tar.gz 3fe4c5f2a5406322a2f116b30aefbd402b079940 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-win32-setup.exe dffb709a90a7abcff08c2ef1e79d3f9b54751786 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-win32.zip b540825d864e7561cc21465ad072fb299e0d817a bitcoin-0.3.20.01-macosx.zip Gavin Andresen gavinandresen(a)gmail.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Free Software Download: Index, Search & Analyze Logs and other IT data in Real-Time with Splunk. Collect, index and harness all the fast moving IT data generated by your applications, servers and devices whether physical, virtual or in the cloud. Deliver compliance at lower cost and gain new business insights. http://p.sf.net/sfu/splunk-dev2dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-list mailing list bitcoin-list(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-list ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[bitcoin-list] Bitcoin version 0.3.20.01 released
by Gavin Andresen 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Binaries for Bitcoin version 0.3.20.01 are available at: https://sourceforge.net/projects/bitcoin/files/Bitcoin/bitcoin-0.3.20/ There were several changes and additions to the JSON remote-procedure-call interface; there are no significant user interface changes. See: http://www.bitcoin.org/smf/index.php?topic=3473.msg48839#msg48839 ... for details. This version does fix one significant denial-of-service attack (earlier versions of bitcoin could be caused to crash due to running out of memory by a remote attacker). SHA1-checksums for the binary files are: 7dfbc05b36112f59886a29f044cfd21c6c253169 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-linux.tar.gz 3fe4c5f2a5406322a2f116b30aefbd402b079940 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-win32-setup.exe dffb709a90a7abcff08c2ef1e79d3f9b54751786 bitcoin-0.3.20.01-win32.zip b540825d864e7561cc21465ad072fb299e0d817a bitcoin-0.3.20.01-macosx.zip Gavin Andresen gavinandresen(a)gmail.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Free Software Download: Index, Search & Analyze Logs and other IT data in Real-Time with Splunk. Collect, index and harness all the fast moving IT data generated by your applications, servers and devices whether physical, virtual or in the cloud. Deliver compliance at lower cost and gain new business insights. http://p.sf.net/sfu/splunk-dev2dev _______________________________________________ bitcoin-list mailing list bitcoin-list(a)lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/bitcoin-list ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Piercing network anonymity in real time
by Ivan Krstic 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

leichter_jerrold(a)emc.com wrote: > The Locate appliance sits passively on the network and > analyzes packets in real time to garner ID info from sources > like Active Directory, IM and e-mail traffic, then associates > this data with network information. This is really nothing new -- I've been seeing systems like these, though home brewed, in use for years. The availability of good tools as a foundation (things like Snort, the layer7 iptables patch, and so on) makes building decent layer 8 inference not far from trivial. Calling this "piercing network anonymity in real time" is highly misleading; in reality, it's more like "making it bloody obvious that there's no such thing as network anonymity". The best one can hope for today is a bit of anonymous browsing and IM with Tor, and that only insofar as you can trust a system whose single point of failure -- the directory service -- was, at least until recently, Roger's personal machine sitting in an MIT dorm room. -- Ivan Krstic <krstic(a)fas.harvard.edu> | GPG: 0x147C722D --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[FYI] Dutch Government wants to regulate strong cryptography
by Axel H Horns 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/9763/1.html ----------------------------- CUT --------------------------------- Dutch Government wants to regulate strong cryptography Jelle van Buuren 09.10.2001 Action plan to combat terrorism targets modern communication technologies The Dutch Government announced Friday it wants to regulate the public use of strong cryptography. The regulation of cryptography is one of the measures the government is proposing in its action plan to combat terrorism. [...] ----------------------------- CUT ---------------------------------

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Re: [gsc] Fwd: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon
by R.A. Hettinga 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Jan 27, 2009, at 3:48 PM, info wrote: > There's also the concept of charging to receive e-mails. Yup. Sender pays, a whitelist for my friends, all others pay cash. Nothing new under the sun. The agorics guys prolly claim it :-), but I was one of those "people" Zooko talks about on cypherpunks. > Can you feed this message back their way, Robert? To paraphrase Telulah Bankhead to Chico Marx, and so I shall... Cheers, RAH

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Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd)
by Jason Holt 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 23:32:24 +0000 (UTC) From: Jason Holt <jason(a)lunkwill.org> To: Ian G <iang(a)systemics.com> Cc: cryptography(a)metzdowd.com Subject: Re: Pseudonymity for tor: nym-0.1 (fwd) On Thu, 29 Sep 2005, Ian G wrote: >Couple of points of clarification - you mean here >CA as certificate authority? Normally I've seen >"Mint" as the term of art for the "center" in a >blinded token issuing system, and I'm wondering >what the relationship here is ... is this something >in the 1990 paper? Actually, it was just the closest paper at hand for what I was trying to do, which is "nymous accounts", just as you say. So I probably shouldn't have referred to "spending" at all. My thinking is that if all Wikipedia is trying to do is enforce a low barrier of pseudonymity (where we can shut off access to persons, based on a rough assumption of scarce IPs or email addresses), a trivial blind signature system should be easy to implement. No certs, no roles, no CRLs, just a simple blindly issued token. And in fact it took me about 4 hours (while the conversation on or-talk has been going on for several days...) There are two problems with what I wrote. First, the original system is intended for cash instead of pseudonymity, and thus leaves the spender a disincentive to duplicate other serial numbers (since you'd just be accused of double spending); this is a problem since if an attacker sees you use your token, he can get the same token signed for himself and besmirch your nym. And second, it would be a pain to glue my scripts into an existing authentication system. Both problems are overcome if, instead of a random token, the client blinds the hash of an X.509 client cert. Then the returned signature gives you a complete client cert you can plug into your web browser (and which web servers can easily demand). Of course, you can put anything you want in the cert, since the servers know that my CA only certifies 1 bit of data about users (namely, that they only get one cert per scarce resource). But the public key (and verification mechanisms built in to TLS) keeps abusers from being able to pretend they're other users, since they won't have the users' private keys. <rant> The frustrating part about this is the same reason why I'm getting out of the credential research business. People have solved this problem before (although I didn't know of any Free solutions; ADDS and SOX are hard to google -- are they Free?). I even came up with at least a proof of concept in an afternoon. And yet the argument on the list went on and on, /without even an acknowledgement of my solution/. Everybody just kept debating the definitions of anonymity and identity, and accusing each other of anarchy and tyranny. We go round and round when we talk about authentication systems, but never get off the merry-go-round. Contrast that with Debevec's work at Berkeley; Ph.D in 1996 on "virtual cinematography", then The Matrix comes out in 1999 using his techniques and revolutionizes action movies. Sure, graphics is easier because it doesn't require everyone to agree on an /infrastructure/, but then, neither does the tor/wikipedia problem. I'm grateful for guys like Roger Dingledine and Phil Zimmerman who actually make a difference with a privacy system, but they seem to be the exception, rather than the rule. </rant> So thanks for at least taking notice. -J ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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