- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Moderation [Tim,Sandy]
by Adam Back 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green <shamrock(a)netcom.com> writes: > I believe that Cypherpunks is beyond hope of recovery. In fact, each day > Cypherpunk (as in cypherpunks(a)toad.com) lives on, it does damage to the > cause. Let's kill the list. Once and for all. Let the hard core crypto go > to Coderpunks, the politics to Cryptography, and the garbage into the void. What about the leaks? (rc4.c, Mykotronics dumpster contents, etc) Where do they go? You expect Perry to stick his neck out and approve them? (Perry Metzger is the moderator of cryptography(a)c2.net, started recently as a moderated version of cypherpunks for those who don't know what the `cryptography' list is). The existance of cryptography argues against the need for `cypherpunks' to be moderated. Why two competing moderated lists? Secondly the status of garbage is in the eye of the beholder. There are a few posts which are probably considered garbage by near everyone, but lots of other stuff which really just depends on what the reader is interested in. The problem with censorship or moderation is that it waters down the absolutism of free speech. Free speech in electronic media, with cypherpunks type I, and type II remailers, is the closest thing to truly free speech yet. A lot of people seem to regard Jim Bell's assasination politics as suitable material for censoring. Yet it is pretty crypto relevant. Sandy's job is pretty hard to do. For instance I recently posted this, which ended up in cpunks-flames, due to being in a thread which contained a mild flame 2 messages back: : Diffie-Hellman key generation, there are two main ways of generating : the diffie-hellman prime modulus, method 1: : : p = 2q+1 : : where q is a prime also. : : And method 2: : : p = r.2q+1 : : where q is a prime and r is a randomly generated number. : : With method 1, the security parameter is the size of p in bits (or : size of q, as they are related). : : With method 2, there are two security parameters, size of q and size : of p in bits. : : Method 2 has the advantage that key generation is faster as it is : quicker to generate new random numbers r, than to repeatedly generate : trial prime q as you have to do in method 1. However is the security : weaker in method 2? What size of p and q do you have to use to get : the same security as for same size of p in bits as in method 1? What : should be the relationship between the size of p and q? (I freely admit to injecting additional crypto relevance just for the fun of seeing it be filtered cpunks-flames -- though I was interested in discussion also). > I am well aware of the name recognition and reputation capital associated > with CP, still I believe it best to *kill the list*. I'd prefer to see various filtering services offered, and the list retained. My main objection with the moderation experiment is that the main list was renamed. Adam -- print pack"C*",split/\D+/,`echo "16iII*o\U@{$/=$z;[(pop,pop,unpack"H*",<> )]}\EsMsKsN0[lN*1lK[d2%Sa2/d0<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<J]dsJxp"|dc`

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points (fwd)
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: ####### ### <###(a)###.com> > To: ichudov(a)algebra.com > Subject: Re: Dissolving Choke Points > > ichudov(a)algebra.com writes: > > i do have unix (linux) and stuff, but i can't take a lot of subscribers > > -- maybe 200-300 or so. > > > > i actually wrote a proposal for a mailing list without a central control > > point, with several advantages being impossibility of control, absense > > of a single point of failure, and cryptographic verification of honesty > > of moderators. > > > > if there is any interest, i will post it here. > > Please do. > > Regards, > > ####### ### Here, I propose a new scheme for the Cypherpunks mailing list that would 1) Ensure that no one person is able to take over the control over the list 2) Ensure that there will be no single point of failure, i.e., shutdown of any single computer will not kill the list 3) Ensure that even people with relatively small Net resources can help keep the list afloat. The idea is as follows: even though Cypherpunks is one group, the group will be based on multiple mailing lists with identical content. These lists may be named, for example, cypherpunks(a)algebra.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, and cypherpunks(a)netcom.com (obviously, these names are used as an example only). Any user is free to subscribe to any of these lists. All of these lists will interact with each other in the following way: 1) Each node would forward ALL incoming submissions to a) all other nodes and b) to all subscribers "attached" to the node 2) Each node will send information about all new subscriptions to each other node. The following procmail recipes for cypherpunks@ accounts may be used to ensure quick forwarding: # is it sent to cypherpunks (some spams will be trashed here) # and is it not a mail loop? :0 * ^TOcypherpunks * !^X-Loop: { # # This recipe removes duplicates! # :0 Wh: msgid.lock | formail -D 32768 msgid.cache # forward it to other cypherpunks lists :0 c !cypherpunks(a)netcom.com cypherpunks(a)toad.com # send it to all local subscribers :0 c !majordomo -some -arguments # store the checksum and message-id for honesty verification (see below) :0 |accounting } # suSCRibe/unsuSCRibe recipes go here This scheme ensures that the list is run in a cooperative fashion and can be maintained by a number of individuals without any one of them having an expensive internet connection or being "in charge". It also ensures that even if one node fails, traffic can be re-routed to other nodes. Just as well, it ensures that any attempts of cheating will be noticed: it is easy to write a bot that would subscribe to all of these lists and see if any messages get "lost". Users can send their articles to only one node, or, if they feel paranoid, to several nodes at once. All we need is to make sure that all Message-IDs of outgoing messages are unique at every node. Honesty verification: I suppose that there may be some more elaborate, crypto-based schemes to control and monitor article distribution. For example, there can be another list, cypherpunks-control, where each of the nodes posts a publicly available signed summary of checksums of articles that went through, and individual users would be able (with the help of s simple client program) to verify that 1) They received these articles 2) That summaries received from all nodes are identical 3) That all articles were received by all nodes They do not HAVE to do it, but they can if they want. If they do, there will be no way for list maintainers to censor anything. If a node goes down or if the users' verification scripts indicate a potential for cheating, they can resubscribe to some other node and let everyone else know what's going on. My proposal strikes me as fairly simple and potentially workable. Even though 90% of the users will never get to usnig the verification mechanism, it will ensure honesty. Note also that this mechanism is a gross simplification of the way USENET works, so some may vouch for a usenet group instead. Your opinions will be appreciated. - Igor.

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:55 AM 2/3/97 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ... >Another lesson is the danger of choke points. We can see how >tempting it is for people to exercise their control. Even John Gilmore >was unable to restrain himself from involuntary social engineering >experiments. Who would we have considered to be more trustworthy? > >Toad.com is a choke point, not just in terms of moderation but in >terms of the rate at which it can distribute messages. Let's >replace it. > >What we want are many machines carrying the cypherpunks list. A >message posted to any machine goes to all of the others. Each >machine sends messages to its subscribers only once. Some of >these machines should be across borders. > >The mail loop and multiple posting problems are solved by observing >the message IDs. > >Fast implementation: use moderated mailing list software. Put a >filter in the .forward file of the "moderator" account which looks >at the message ID and forwards the message if it hasn't been seen >already. The mailing list machines all subscribe each other. ... What you are suggesting is reminiscent of IRC. Except, I think that each IRC network has a central computer which could be controlled. On your idea for fast implementation, this could be hacked by would-be censors. A message comes into the list, the censor sees that the post is from a regular enemy. The censor then copies the header information onto a new message, one containing garbage, or snippets from old posts, reads the new post to see if it is acceptable, and if it is, adds a new header, probably only the time would be changed, and transmits it out. If the would be censor was the sysop of a machine near the origin of the message, and if the censor operated the censorship either by bots, or monitored the feed 24 hours a day, (not likely), then the actual message would get to few.

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More Hacking of the Mykotronx Site!
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, d00dz, remember the dumpster diving at Mykotronx facilities in Torrance? Where they dumped their secret plans for the Clipper chip in the dumpsters right outside their little building in Torrance? Where guys like me could find their spreadsheets for budget planning, production run rates, deals with VLSI Technology, Sandia, and the other NSA stooges? Remember how they suddenly started shredding their papers? Well, it's been 3 years, and apparently the new guys at Rainbow (the parent company) have forgotten their lesson! So, here's the latest stuff: >>>quote * INTERNAL USE ONLY * COMINT-restricted, limited to M3 classifications Distribution beyond M3 a national security felony Mykotronx has agreed to provide to the Estonian government 79.000 MYK-82 processors for its Personnel Surveillance System, as part of the negotiations to provide Observer Status for Estonia in NATO. Negotiations continue between Ambassador Aaron and the NATO nations have established as a minimum that new entrants into the NATO community adhere to the Unified Cryptography Initiative, initialed by NATO ministers in Bruxelles, 10-13-96. Estonia has signified compliance, as noted by their Internal Security Directorate: "Kiipe valimistatakse praegu Californias asuvas firmas MYKOTRONX Ltd. ja ta hind kõigub 10 kuni 30 dollarini olenevalt konkreetsest tüübist ning ta on võimline krüpteerima/deshifreerima 15-20 MB/s." Spysrus agrees to integrate into Personel Surveillance System (PSS) modules for Internal Security Service (ISS) use.for over 79,000 of Mykotronx's new Capstone encryption processor (MYK-82). The devices will be used to build part of the Estonian government's order of Fortezza Cryptographic Cards for the PSS awarded November 1996. Initial delivery of the new cryptographic processor will begin June 1997. The MYK-82, developed by Mykotronx and fabricated by VLSI Technology, Inc., is the first of a series of security products to be developed as part of an alliance with the NSA, targeting both Government and commercial citizen monitoring markets. --

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Re: Govt & cyberspace
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[snip] >"tech envy"-- what impact is this going to have on our >government? it's becoming a huge issue. it may be a >really great opportunity for a populist movement to >truly reform the government in the process of upgrading >their computers. Even better, this is an opportunity to choke off all, or certainly increased, funding in order to hasten its collapse. >I suspect that the "groupware" technology >that is just getting started will have major influence >in these areas. as private companies find increasingly >sophisticated ways of managing themselves, the obvious >question will arise, "why can't we have an efficient govt >when our private industries are"? the answer is, we >can!! Don't improve it, remove it! > >I've written about "electronic democracy" repeatedly. many >people object to the idea. but when it is phrased in terms >of groupware, it becomes more palatable. imagine a small >company humming along with its groupware application that >allows it to make company-wide decisions using a democratic >process. moreover, the software is robust and scales well. >why can't the same principles be scaled up, up, up? I predict >that they will be in a rather extraordinary revolution. > >a new "velvet revolution"? comments anyone? Democracy is not without its significant shortcomings. If you doubt this read Tocquevelle. --Steve

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More Hacking of the Mykotronx Site!
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hey, d00dz, remember the dumpster diving at Mykotronx facilities in Torrance? Where they dumped their secret plans for the Clipper chip in the dumpsters right outside their little building in Torrance? Where guys like me could find their spreadsheets for budget planning, production run rates, deals with VLSI Technology, Sandia, and the other NSA stooges? Remember how they suddenly started shredding their papers? Well, it's been 3 years, and apparently the new guys at Rainbow (the parent company) have forgotten their lesson! So, here's the latest stuff: >>>quote * INTERNAL USE ONLY * COMINT-restricted, limited to M3 classifications Distribution beyond M3 a national security felony Mykotronx has agreed to provide to the Estonian government 79.000 MYK-82 processors for its Personnel Surveillance System, as part of the negotiations to provide Observer Status for Estonia in NATO. Negotiations continue between Ambassador Aaron and the NATO nations have established as a minimum that new entrants into the NATO community adhere to the Unified Cryptography Initiative, initialed by NATO ministers in Bruxelles, 10-13-96. Estonia has signified compliance, as noted by their Internal Security Directorate: "Kiipe valimistatakse praegu Californias asuvas firmas MYKOTRONX Ltd. ja ta hind kuigub 10 kuni 30 dollarini olenevalt konkreetsest t||bist ning ta on vuimline kr|pteerima/deshifreerima 15-20 MB/s." Spysrus agrees to integrate into Personel Surveillance System (PSS) modules for Internal Security Service (ISS) use.for over 79,000 of Mykotronx's new Capstone encryption processor (MYK-82). The devices will be used to build part of the Estonian government's order of Fortezza Cryptographic Cards for the PSS awarded November 1996. Initial delivery of the new cryptographic processor will begin June 1997. The MYK-82, developed by Mykotronx and fabricated by VLSI Technology, Inc., is the first of a series of security products to be developed as part of an alliance with the NSA, targeting both Government and commercial citizen monitoring markets. --

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points (fwd)
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: ####### ### <###(a)###.com> > To: ichudov(a)algebra.com > Subject: Re: Dissolving Choke Points > > ichudov(a)algebra.com writes: > > i do have unix (linux) and stuff, but i can't take a lot of subscribers > > -- maybe 200-300 or so. > > > > i actually wrote a proposal for a mailing list without a central control > > point, with several advantages being impossibility of control, absense > > of a single point of failure, and cryptographic verification of honesty > > of moderators. > > > > if there is any interest, i will post it here. > > Please do. > > Regards, > > ####### ### Here, I propose a new scheme for the Cypherpunks mailing list that would 1) Ensure that no one person is able to take over the control over the list 2) Ensure that there will be no single point of failure, i.e., shutdown of any single computer will not kill the list 3) Ensure that even people with relatively small Net resources can help keep the list afloat. The idea is as follows: even though Cypherpunks is one group, the group will be based on multiple mailing lists with identical content. These lists may be named, for example, cypherpunks(a)algebra.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, and cypherpunks(a)netcom.com (obviously, these names are used as an example only). Any user is free to subscribe to any of these lists. All of these lists will interact with each other in the following way: 1) Each node would forward ALL incoming submissions to a) all other nodes and b) to all subscribers "attached" to the node 2) Each node will send information about all new subscriptions to each other node. The following procmail recipes for cypherpunks@ accounts may be used to ensure quick forwarding: # is it sent to cypherpunks (some spams will be trashed here) # and is it not a mail loop? :0 * ^TOcypherpunks * !^X-Loop: { # # This recipe removes duplicates! # :0 Wh: msgid.lock | formail -D 32768 msgid.cache # forward it to other cypherpunks lists :0 c !cypherpunks(a)netcom.com cypherpunks(a)toad.com # send it to all local subscribers :0 c !majordomo -some -arguments # store the checksum and message-id for honesty verification (see below) :0 |accounting } # suSCRibe/unsuSCRibe recipes go here This scheme ensures that the list is run in a cooperative fashion and can be maintained by a number of individuals without any one of them having an expensive internet connection or being "in charge". It also ensures that even if one node fails, traffic can be re-routed to other nodes. Just as well, it ensures that any attempts of cheating will be noticed: it is easy to write a bot that would subscribe to all of these lists and see if any messages get "lost". Users can send their articles to only one node, or, if they feel paranoid, to several nodes at once. All we need is to make sure that all Message-IDs of outgoing messages are unique at every node. Honesty verification: I suppose that there may be some more elaborate, crypto-based schemes to control and monitor article distribution. For example, there can be another list, cypherpunks-control, where each of the nodes posts a publicly available signed summary of checksums of articles that went through, and individual users would be able (with the help of s simple client program) to verify that 1) They received these articles 2) That summaries received from all nodes are identical 3) That all articles were received by all nodes They do not HAVE to do it, but they can if they want. If they do, there will be no way for list maintainers to censor anything. If a node goes down or if the users' verification scripts indicate a potential for cheating, they can resubscribe to some other node and let everyone else know what's going on. My proposal strikes me as fairly simple and potentially workable. Even though 90% of the users will never get to usnig the verification mechanism, it will ensure honesty. Note also that this mechanism is a gross simplification of the way USENET works, so some may vouch for a usenet group instead. Your opinions will be appreciated. - Igor.

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Re: Dissolving Choke Points
by Sean Roach 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:55 AM 2/3/97 -0800, Peter Hendrickson wrote: ... >Another lesson is the danger of choke points. We can see how >tempting it is for people to exercise their control. Even John Gilmore >was unable to restrain himself from involuntary social engineering >experiments. Who would we have considered to be more trustworthy? > >Toad.com is a choke point, not just in terms of moderation but in >terms of the rate at which it can distribute messages. Let's >replace it. > >What we want are many machines carrying the cypherpunks list. A >message posted to any machine goes to all of the others. Each >machine sends messages to its subscribers only once. Some of >these machines should be across borders. > >The mail loop and multiple posting problems are solved by observing >the message IDs. > >Fast implementation: use moderated mailing list software. Put a >filter in the .forward file of the "moderator" account which looks >at the message ID and forwards the message if it hasn't been seen >already. The mailing list machines all subscribe each other. ... What you are suggesting is reminiscent of IRC. Except, I think that each IRC network has a central computer which could be controlled. On your idea for fast implementation, this could be hacked by would-be censors. A message comes into the list, the censor sees that the post is from a regular enemy. The censor then copies the header information onto a new message, one containing garbage, or snippets from old posts, reads the new post to see if it is acceptable, and if it is, adds a new header, probably only the time would be changed, and transmits it out. If the would be censor was the sysop of a machine near the origin of the message, and if the censor operated the censorship either by bots, or monitored the feed 24 hours a day, (not likely), then the actual message would get to few.

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Re: GAK cracking?
by thad＠hammerhead.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TIS's press releases, and the article in the paper, imply that TIS has been approved for 128 bit (uncrackable, except by prior arrangement) cryptography...not just 56 bit. They say, and they should know, that you can export 56 bits now with just a "plan" of key escrow, and that you can export more if you have a system... which, what do you know, they have! thad -- Thaddeus Beier thad(a)hammerhead.com Visual Effects Supervisor 408) 287-6770 Hammerhead Productions http://www.got.net/people/thad

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Re: Embarrass a Marylander, Go to Jail
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 08:04 PM 2/3/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: > >--- begin forwarded text > Excerpted from... > > ============================================================= > AOP Bulletin Friday, February 3, 1997 Volume 97:05 > ============================================================= > > The following is information distributed to members of the > Association of Online Professionals and others involved in the > online communications industry. Contacts and other information > about AOP may be found at http://www.aop.org. > > > ***************************************************** > Maryland Recycles Law On "Annoying" E-Mail > ***************************************************** > > A Maryland bill that would make it illegal to send "annoying" or > "embarrassing" e-mail was introduced this week by Democratic General > Assembly member Samuel Rosenberg. I would find any email "annoying" that supported such a bill. Maybe we ought to send emails to Rosenberg, stating that we find his entire proposal "annoying," and ask him when he's going to turn himself in for his misdeeds. Another good argument for AP. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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