- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Interesting ressource
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text X-Sender: leroux(a)mail.vdl2.ca Date: Mon, 10 Feb 1997 13:05:08 -0500 To: dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu From: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> Subject: Interesting ressource Mime-Version: 1.0 Sender: bounce-dcsb(a)ai.mit.edu Precedence: bulk Reply-To: Philippe Le Roux <leroux(a)vdl2.ca> The IEEE published a special issue of Spectrum (http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/contents/) about digital commerce and ecash. This is the index : Electronic money: toward a virtual wallet By Tekla S. Perry Hard currency is disappearing from many everyday transactions along the road to electronic money. Future of electronic money: a regulator's perspective By Edward W. Kelley Jr. The way electronics will fit into the evolution of money--from acting as a niche player to wreaking major changes in payment systems--has yet to be determined. Credits and debits on the Internet By Marvin A. Sirbu CyberCash, First Virtual, GC Tech, NetBill--these and other systems have been developed to enable electronic transfers of payments across the Internet. 'Minting' electronic cash By David Chaum & Stefan Brands Electronic cash can offer transaction privacy to honest users, affords convenient storage and transportation, and protects against loss. Traceable e-cash By Peter S. Gemmell One method of making electronic cash transactions private for honest users but traceable by law enforcement agencies involves the use of trustees. Crime and prevention: a Treasury viewpoint By Stanley E. Morris The speed and anonymity of electronic payment systems make them attractive to those pursuing illicit activities. Locking the e-safe By Robert W. Baldwin & C. Victor Chang Existing encryption-based security mechanisms can be combined to minimize a wide range of threats to electronic commerce. In your pocket: smartcards By Carol Hovenga Fancher A wallet full of cash, credit, and identification cards may, in the future, be replaced with two or three smartcards, each containing an IC, as a recent flurry of market tests and smartcard rollouts demonstrates. Banking in cyberspace: an investment in itself By Michael C. McChesney While home banking has been around for some time, Internet banking is a new concept, and has a number of advantages. Technology takes to securities trading By Steven M. H. Wallman >From stock offerings conducted entirely over the Internet, to the automation of traditional exchanges, technology is changing the way stock markets work. Nasdaq's technology floor: its president takes stock By Alfred R. Berkeley III This screen-based stock market has been particularly sensitive to the effects of new computer and communications capabilities. The economics of e-cash By Mike Ter Maat Electronic cash can create profits for its issuers, and launch competition for today's government-controlled currency systems. Money and the Internet: a strange new relationship By Howard Anderson This visionary sees the e-money revolution as inevitable, with "e-mail for money" becoming as ubiquitous in the future as e-mail messages are already today. *PLR! ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Philippe Le Roux Associe de V(DL)2 Inc. Membre du SCIP (Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals) Co-Auteur d'Internet Secrets (IDG - 95) Chroniqueur a Benefice.Net -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.6.3i Comment: Requires PGP version 2.6 or later. mQBNAjLyVpEAAAECAKiVNKY2l2moieX3JsvrXKSvHqwF0Hq24cKh1p1VDaFEwWPs /C6fMmo47FZIpV6xC/uRBiHVfW5d26AvJz1Ww7EABRG0IVBoaWxpcHBlIExlIFJv dXggPGxlcm91eEB2ZGwyLmNhPokAVQIFEDLyVpHboC8nPVbDsQEBtwcB/An4zBwC g9e1lFsVhVgmplxfUYAv3T7D7fAdCTeD51cJjns+Yh/3MoZQa7zns0BQFtRLoInL HY4WrDBs9wSXZ70= =tEnk -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ To unsubscribe from the dcsb list, send a letter to: Majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu In the body of the message, write: unsubscribe dcsb Or, to subscribe, write: subscribe dcsb If you have questions, write to me at Owner-DCSB(a)ai.mit.edu --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle

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Re: 40-bit RC5 crack meaningless??
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[Excerpts from Winn Schwartau's 2/9 "InfoWar Digest," with responses to Paul Strassmann's diatribe on the RSADS Secret-Key Challenge. Burt Kaliski, Tim May, Padgett Peterson -- among others -- toss in their two bits. Longish. [FYI: RSADS still has 12 open Challenges pending, offering cash rewards for anyone who can decrypt 56-bit DES -- or any of eleven _other_ RC5 cyphertext samples, encrypted with keys of varied lengths, ranging from 48-bit through 128-bits. Details somewhere on the RSA site: <http://www.rsa.com> ] ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ From: Burt Kaliski <burt(a)RSA.COM> To: "'infowar(a)infowar.com'" <infowar(a)infowar.com> Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments Date: Wed, 5 Feb 1997 13:58:53 -0800 Paul A. Strassmann <paul(a)strassmann.com> quoted a UC Berkeley press release on Ian Goldberg's successful effort to discover the unknown 40-bit key to an RC5 ciphertext offered in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and raised a number of justifiable concerns about whether a contest like the Challenge is an appropriate measure of the security of a 40-bit encryption algorithm in an InfoWar environment. >>As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >>highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >>a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >>volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >>IW Defense teams. >> >>These clues made the cracking significantly easier, >>because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous >>range of possible searches. Mr. Strassmann is a well known scholar of the InfoWar threat environment. I am not, so I cannot address those specific concerns directly -- but I would like to offer some rationale as to why the Challenge was structured as it was. The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>, started last week, is an open contest sponsored by RSA Laboratories that offers cash prizes for the successful recovery of encryption keys for the DES and RC5 block ciphers. Following the model of the RSA Factoring Challenge which for several years has provided an assessment of the security of the RSA public-key algorithm at various key sizes, the Secret-Key Challenge is intended to measure of the security of secret-key algorithms at various key sizes. As was the case with the Factoring Challenge, full details of the algorithms and key sizes are provided. In addition, three plaintext-ciphertext pairs (the ciphertext encrypted with the key of interest) are provided for each key to be recovered. Last week, the first of the keys in the Challenge, a 40-bit RC5 key, was recovered by Ian Goldberg, a U.C. Berkeley graduate student. His effort involved about 250 workstations and took 3.5 hours. When I called Mr. Goldberg to congratulate him in a teleconference during the RSA Data Security Conference last week, he explained that he had discovered the valid key with a search of about 350 billion keys, using a university computer network to search at a rate of 100 billion keys/hour. There are about 1 trillion 40-bit keys, for any algorithm. Mr. Goldberg's search method involved simple brute-force; that is, the known plaintext was encrypted with each key, and then compared to the available ciphertext, looking for a match. The overall effort was essentially what was expected for the 40-bit key size, and as one would expect, the recovery of a key for the other RC5 key sizes (from 48 bits to 128 bit), or for DES (56 bits), will involve much more work. With the same "brute force" method employed by Mr. Goldberg last week, one would expect a 256-fold increase in effort for each eight-bit increase in key size. Special-purpose hardware may reduce the actual time, of course, but the total number of possible keys to be tested will grow at that rate. Mr. Strassman expressed concern as to whether the successful recovery of a 40-bit key in 3.5 hours is a realistic measure of the strength of 40-bit keys in an InfoWar environment, where full details of the algorithm and plaintext blocks are not necessarily known. Again, not being acquainted with the threat environment, I cannot address his concerns directly. Nevertheless, RSA Laboratories does consider this type of contest to be appropriate as a general measure of cryptographic strength -- for RSA's products and those of any other vendor in the international crytographic community. The information provided to RSA Secret-Key Challenge contestants is no more than is common and conventional for any open contest to test the strength of a cryptographic algorithm. These conventions have evolved within the international community of cryptographers seeking, on the basis of several acknowledged principles, to develop common criteria for measuring the relative strength or security of any particular cryptographic algorithm with a given key size. Our rationale for the structure of the Challenge is reflected in the following observations: * Knowledge of the algorithm and key size (as per Kerchoffs' principle), as well as the availability of known plaintext, are standard assumptions in modern cryptanalysis. Since an opponent may obtain this information eventually, it is preferable not to rely on its secrecy when assessing cryptographic strength. * The implementation of large-scale key-search engines is simplified under the standard assumptions. This makes the contest accessible to a wider variety of contributors, than if we required contributors to know, for instance, a particular language, or language statistics, or other characteristics of the plaintext. (Perhaps another challenge where we didn't provide plaintext samples would be a worthwhile follow-up.) * In practice -- even if the plaintext is not known -- significant information about it is likely to be, such as character distributions (ASCII, English), header values (e.g., BER tag and length), or padding. The cost (in time, effort, and computing resources) of a key search with even a small amount of information of this kind is not significantly more than the cost with known plaintext. For instance, if it is known that the characters are represented in ASCII, for instance, then one can decrypt available ciphertext with each key and check that the recovered plaintext follows ASCII conventions (most significant bit of each byte 0). The chance that an incorrect key produces plaintext that passes the test is 1/2^k where k is the number of plaintext bytes recovered. This means, for example, that of 2^40 keys tried, we expect only 2^32 to pass the check for a single eight-byte block. The 2^32 keys must then be tested further against other ciphertext blocks. So instead of 2^40 encryptions -- as in the case when the plaintext is known -- a cryptanalyst would need to search within 2^40+2^32+2^24+2^16+2^8+1 (roughly) keys, to find the correct key. But this represents an increase in effort of less than 0.5 percent. RSA Laboratories appreciates the InfoWar Community's interest in the RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge, and Mr. Strassmann's comments in particular. We look forward to further suggestions and critiques of our efforts. -- Burt Kaliski >Chief Scientist >RSA Laboratories ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Mon, 3 Feb 1997 21:42:24 -0800 To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> Subject: Re: Infowar Digest Volume 02: Number 04 - Crypto and Goldberg I seldom read your newsletter carefully. I did tonight, and discovered two of the items you included contain serious errors. (Of course, as a strong advocate of "infowar" I suppose I'm pleased to see your subscribers in the government misled by these errors...it makes our job a little easier in the long run.) >To: infowar(a)infowar.com >From: Patrick Galley <Patrick.Galley(a)studi.epfl.ch >Subject: New crypto attack >Date: Mon, 27 Jan 1997 07:56:39 +0000 > >Hello > >A friend of mine told me to look at the WWW site "John Douglass' >CryptoMaverick Page"). > >There I've found a paper from John Douglass which says that if RSA >products are sold worldwide it because there is a backdoor inside. He >said the same thing for DES and PGP. ..... >If this guy is right. It would be better for is security that everybody >knows the truth. > >I think it would be nice if you could look at this doc and talk about it >in infowar.com. I looked at the site and it's a mixture of conspiracy theory rantings and misinformation. As to the security of various RSA algorithms (and PGP, for example), the security of many of these algorithms lies in the publishing of the source code, with digital signatures on the released binaries to allow independent verification. If a real security hole is found in, say, PGP or Netscape, expect it to be publicized loudly and quickly. (Indeed, certain flaws have been found, and quickly publicized. The same Ian Goldberg involved in later message was one of those who isolated a flaw in the random number generator used in an earlier version of Netscape.) The web site mentioned here doesn't cut it, and this message here is just more "disinformation" (itself a part of infowar, so I guess the author is practicing his skills). >Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 >To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> >From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> >Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments >Gentlemen: > >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. Paul Strassmann is simply missing the central point of cracking the 40-bit export-allowed version. It is not based on a known plaintext attack, but on exhaustive search of the 40-bit keyspace. What Goldberg and his colleagues who contributed CPU time on the "NOW" (Network of Workstations) did was to search approximately 100 billion keys per hour. As there are about a trillion keys in the 40-bit keyspace, it was a foregone conclusion they would find the key within 10 hours (modulo any screwups at their end), with about half the time being the most likely time. As it was, they found the key a tad bit early, by the luck of the draw (so to speak). RSA certainly knows how long it takes to brute force the keyspace. They just didn't know who would find the key first. (And at least one other group reported a solution within minutes of Goldberg's report.) So, Paul is simply throwing disinformation--or lack of understanding--into the air by claiming that this crack does not mean a 40-bit key is "weak." Simply put, it is. Anyone who looks at the math understands this. The keyspace is simply too small for real security. (Does the NSA use 40-bit keys? Of course not. Hmmmhhh.) As the select panel of cryptographers empaneled to study key lengths concluded, 56 bits is already too weak, 80 bits is better and should be adopted forthwith for export, and >96 bits is preferable. As an "infowarrior" of sorts myself, I can assure you that we don't give a hoot in hell what the regs say is "allowed." When any tourist on his way to Europe can carry as many CD-ROMSs and DAT tapes in his luggage as he wishes, with absolutely no "exit checks," who really cares what the "export laws" allow? (I carried 5 gigabytes of data, some of it crypto-related, to a meeting with cryptographers and crypto anarchists in Monte Carlo a while back. Obviously I was not searched or even glanced at on my way out, nor on my arrival at Charles de Gaulle airport, etc. Only upon my return to San Francisco was I asked what my business had been. The Customs Officer gave me a blank look when I told him I was meeting with cryptographers in Monte Carlo (I told him the truth, knowing I was breaking no laws whatsoever). He had no idea what I was talking about, and was bored. He then asked me if I was bringing back any stuff I bought in shops over there. "No," I told him. He just waved me through.) Not to mention the ease with which stuff is shipped out over the Internet. (I made a bet a couple of years ago that each major new cipher would arrive at offshore non-U.S. sites within 3 hours of release in the U.S. Remailers make it so easy to bounce stuff around.) And of course I was the one in 1988 who first proposed the now-popular method of using the least significant bits (LSBs) of CDs and DATs filled with music, and LSBs of GIF images, to transparently export megabytes of data undetectably. (To any sniffers, the LSBs are formally and statistically identical to the ordinary noise of microphones and recording electronics.) A normal 2-hour DAT tape of a recording I made off the radio or off of one of my CDs can carry 160 megabytes of "data" riding in just the LSBs alone. That's equivalent to 16 copies of the Bible, or a significant chunk of the B-2 Stealth bomber CAD database. I'd like to see your list get involved in more accurate and less scare-mongering discussions. --Tim May Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway." ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 00:52:28 -0500 (EST) From: "Craig H. Rowland" <crowland(a)psionic.com> To: "Betty G. O'Hearn" <betty(a)infowar.com> Subject: RSA > Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 20:10:36 -0500 > To: "Wright Larry" <Wright_Larry(a)bah.com> > From: "Paul A. Strassmann" <paul(a)strassmann.com> > Subject: Further to Goldberg's Cracking Accomplishments > Gentlemen: > > As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the > highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered > a number of clues that ordinarly would not be > volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to > IW Defense teams. > > These clues made the cracking significantly easier, > because it made it possible to eliminate an enormous > range of possible searches. You are talking about implementing security through obscurity. You can never assume that an enemy does not know what security precautions are in place to protect information, or in this case, what cipher you have chosen to protect your data. The security of your in-place mechanisms should be able to stand on their own merits under a worst case scenario of full public disclosure. > > The following was extracted verbatim from the > <The RSA Data Security Secret-Key Challenge> > posted on <http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/>: > > Clue #1: > > " ...all the RC5 contests posted as part of the RSA Secret-Key Challenge > will use > 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size. " > > Clue #2: > > " ...The first RC5 contest will consist of some unknown plaintext > encrypted using a 40-bit key;." > > Clue #3: (a giveway!) > > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Let me address 1, 2, and 3 all together as they all suffer from the same flaw in logic as discussed above. First, the ciphers in this contest includes more than RC5, the main point of the contest is not to illustrate the security of a particular cipher from cryptanalytic attack, but rather to show that key lengths that are too short are insecure against a brute force attack. The fact that the cipher is known does not affect the overall purpose of the contest. Second, you are again assuming the cipher is unknown by your enemy. Suppose you are a financial institution, I can be almost 100% assured that your communications are protected with DES as the cipher. If I can discover what equipment you are using and what modes the cipher runs in (CBC, ECB, etc) I can then attempt a similiar brute-force attack using the widely available DES specifications. Commercial organizations using exportable software systems suffer the same fate. You are also assuming that a mathmatical analysis of the encrypted data stream will not reveal what cipher is being used. Various statistical attacks could reveal key pieces of information that could quickly unveil what cipher you are using and what mode it is being run in. Third, just because part of a message is known does not mean the contest is invalid. Many network communication protocols use a fixed set of characters to establish and end communication sessions. An attacker, aware of how the protocols work, can often discern what a message may contain when it is initiated. An example of this could include SMTP traffic which includes a standard set of protocol keywords, or an electronic funds transfer which includes unique bank identification numbers or other similar data. This is called a known plaintext attack and is very common. > > In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally > insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not > realistic. The three clues announced in the contest > would not apply under infowar conditions. Again, this is not correct. You are assuming total ignorance by the enemy which is rarely the case. > > What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg > to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines > is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. Why does one even need a "clue" about this key size? It should be obvious to anyone remotely educated/interested in the field of cryptography that the reason the NSA limits exportable key length to 40 bits or less to begin with is so they can do the same thing at Ft. Meade on their internal computers that was done here publically. The whole debate over exportable encryption rarely rests on the cipher, but rather on the *length* of the keys used. This *alone* should be enough to convince the reader that key length is in fact a very vital issue for both the NSA and the Internet community. > I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. > However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims > offer full and appropriate disclosure. Nonsense..RSA sells cipher technology that uses both 40 bit encryption and higher, they make their money either way...their only bias in this area is that they have their exportable software crippled in such a way as to make it useless to foreign buyers. Luckily companies in Finland, Switzerland, and Germany are starting to take up the slack and provide strong cryptographic products of their own. -- Craig ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 12:49:25 -0500 (EST) To: infowar(a)infowar.com From: Bob Stratton <strat(a)wheelgroup.com> Subject: RSA's Challenge Claims and the Real World In Infowar Digest Volume 02, Number 04, Paul Strassman writes: >In summary: The claim of exportable cryptography being totally >insecure, because it can be cracked in 3.5 hours is not >realistic. The three clues announced in the contest >would not apply under infowar conditions. > >What other clues may have been provided to Goldberg >to support private agendas and gain shrill headlines >is also a matter of speculation, but I rest my case. > >I certainly cannot assert that a 40 bit key cannot be decyphered. >However, I do not think that the RSA unqualified claims >offer full and appropriate disclosure. I feel compelled to respectfully submit what may be considered a rebuttal. In general, I tend to dismiss claims of anything being "totally" anything, but in this particular instance, I think further discussion may be warranted. I admit to being a little surprised by this tack on the part of RSA. RSA Labs (the research side of that house) has earned my respect over time by doing serious cryptological work and publishing it in a thoughtful, academic manner worthy of note. The histrionics of press releases notwithstanding, I think these comments merit further examination: I may concede that the "three clues...would not apply under infowar conditions". In doing so, I must also ask for further clarification as to exactly which infowar Mr.Strassman is referring. Given this forum's consideration of the national security implications of attack on the financial infrastructure, it seems a fair question. In any event, I question whether this is relevant within the context of the challenge, and the purposes behind it. RSA's purpose in posting this challenge was presumably to enlighten the public and others as to the _relative_ strength of currently exportable cryptosystems. I have no doubt that the agenda behind this is to encourage resistance to current U.S. policies on cryptographic export, a stance designed to maximize share value in what is admittedly a commercial venture. I'm also willing to note that I have a general distaste for INFOSEC "challenges" of any sort. I would, however, like to explore the assertion that the clues posted in the challenge were not offered in the spirit of full and fair disclosure. I will concede in any case that this was not an exhaustive, controlled study. "Challenges" such as these have a place. Within the INFOSEC environment, cryptanalytic attack appears to be one of the more reasonable areas for them. Compared to "challenges" against network "firewalls", for example, cryptanalysis is an area where there is the opportunity to adequately define the goal and to measure the result. In this case, RSA was not attempting to prove a negative, as have so many (too many) other firms offering so-called "challenges". If we restrict our focus for purposes of argument to commercially available cryptographic software, the clues become significantly less onerous and mysterious. Clue #1, the disclosure of 12-round RC5 with a 32-bit word size, is certainly the most arcane of the lot. Speaking as a former commercial software developer, I would be quite surprised if vendors would not routinely disclose information of this sort. Certainly vendors using standard algorithms would tend to be more willing to do so than those using proprietary ones, which only bolsters my later arguments, as you will see below. If we may depart for just a moment to other algorithms, almost any _standard_ implementation of an algorithm which is interoperable with other implementations would, by definition, disclose or facilitate disclosure of this sort of information, by its very nature. Again, in a commercial environment, interoperability is key (no pun intended), so it's likely that implementation details are either available, or readily deducible. Clue 2, the disclosure of key size, again meets the standards just discussed. In the case of products recently exportable from the U.S., one of two things is generally true. Either the key size is actually 40 bits, or the key size is larger than 40 bits, but steps are taken to make all key information beyond 40 bits accessible to observers of the tool. Again, in a commercial environment, this is no secret. Clue 3 is perhaps where I'm most inclined to agree with Mr. Strassman. Disclosure of known plaintext, in this case the phrase "The unknown message is:" is certainly quite serious in that it may significantly aid cryptanalytic attack. My only comment here is that in the commercial arena, interoperability demands standards, and standards define consistent protocols. Those protocols will almost always result in some manner of reproducible content, most readily exemplified by message headers in electronic mail systems. While mechanisms exist for enhanced cryptographic protection of said content, in general the commercial environment has lagged behind the military, and perhaps rightly so. In none of the aforementioned cases, however, do I see information that fundamentally invalidates the significance of RSA's Challenge TO THE CIVILIAN COMMERCIAL INFOSEC COMMUNITY. That community has serious, current INFOSEC needs, and one must question (as I know many of us do every day) to what degree we're willing to lay our economic fabric open to subversion in order to lessen the cost of intelligence collection. --Bob Stratton ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Date: Tue, 4 Feb 1997 9:25:21 -0500 (EST) From: "A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT(a)hobbes.orl.mmc.com> To: infowar(a)infowar.com Subject: RSA challenge Paul rote: >As I suspected (see earlier private comment), the >highly promoted RSA cracking contest offered >a number of clues that ordinarly would not be >volunteered by info-terrorists or info-criminals to >IW Defense teams. ... >Clue #3: (a giveway!) > " ... For each contest, the unknown plaintext message is preceded by three > known blocks of text that contain the 24-character phrase "The > unknown message is: .....". Those who follow my hobby may have noticed that about two years ago I began using the "3.5 hour" figure to assign a maximun value of $250 to any information sent via a 40 bit code. The advent of multiple parallel machines (via networks) capable of operating entirely out of L1 cache just made the technology available. However, such attacks do rely on known plain text for speed (final test is a simple XOR/alarm if zero. The same technology was used in Colossis back in 1944. It was just a touch slower. The simle answer is message compression prior to encryption which would make deciding when the message was broken much more difficult. Naysayers claim "there is always KPT" but this does not need to be true. - whole months of Enigma traffic went undecoded because there was no crib available but eventually human error gave the BP team a clue. Today, electronic systems can remove such errors from human hands. Personally believe that 56 bits is "good enough" today though it makes little sense from a programming standpoint not to use 64 *so long as a different key is used for every message and every message, no matter how trivial, is encrypted*. Or you could use a "shared secret" book code: a simple XOR with a digital satellite data stream transmitting compressed video should do nicely. All that is needed is to know which stream and when to start. I call that an "unwitting key provider". So as Paul says, the contest proves little except to confirm my 3.5 hour estimate (remember the gentleman in France who broke the 40 bit NS code last year and what his time was...) - but that was for equipment available several years ago. Today I use the figure of one gig kps (keys per second) for 1997 equipment per seive. A single one would break 40 bits in an average of under 10 min. DES would fall in a day to 400 in parallel. But the question remains: without KPT, how can you tell when the break occured ? Is a world of difference between an XOR and decompression. And if every message uses a differnt key... Warmly, Padgett ps WORD virus anti-virus macro is avaliable: http://www.netmind.com/~padgett/ under "Anti-Virus hobby". FreeWare. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Cryptography WWW Siteguide wanted.
by Carol Anne Cypherpunk 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Mining Co. (http://www.miningco.com) is looking for "siteguides". There will surely be a guide needed for cryptography. Pay is commensurate with hit volume, but it isn't too shabby, at about 3K per month after about a year. There is the original posting from Sideman's Online Insider following this post to acquaint you with the particulars. Good Luck to whomever from this list (for I'm sure someone will) takes the aformentioned position. I would, but I'm applying for a different site in the Culture/Beliefs section. On one other note, the PGP Plugin for Eudora is MARVELOUS! THIS I can even teach a clueless newbie! Carol Anne Cypherpunk -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Uncensored from heavily.censored.org iQCVAwUBMwAfd4rpjEWs1wBlAQG3YwP/XXgJfqD06KTLfdDfj2mAweBrFAASsRR8 q37l43InJU/AVhRJ0MKkcmxto7sfO1jHNW6O0+0HjrnMRZAmnw7YH806+mCCerUG CeTT5U97Cp/V5Yud6r6f0vqP/BPk8etGIZnGgWKajJ49rFTGlk01AgQz1xE49mmI i962UdPbyVs= =69D8 -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ========================================================================== Seidman's Online Insider - Vol. 4, Issue 6 Brought to you by NetGuide Magazine< http://www.netguide.com > ========================================================================== Copyright (C) 1997 Robert Seidman and CMP Media Inc. All rights reserved. May be reproduced in any medium for noncommercial purposes as long as attribution is given. Kurnit is Back and Mining the Internet ====================================== "Like Arnold, he'll be back. I've been listening to what he has to say for a long time. If you listen to him, you'll hear how the Web is the way and that the proprietary services are a dead model. If you listen between-the-lines, you'll hear a modified version of that vision. A best of both worlds vision. You'll hear that he wants to develop easy to use, functional services on the Web. Like easy to use chat. Like easy to use bulletin boards. Like AOL, but on the Web." -Thoughts on Scott Kurnit in a piece regarding the failed MCI/News Corp joint venture from Seidman's Online Insider for the Week Ending February 9, 1996. Kurnit's back, and almost exactly a year to the day since the clip above was written. On Monday February 10, the new company Kurnit founded, The Mining Company, will announce their plans to basically build AOL on the Web. I'm not sure about the choice of February 10 as the day to announce this. It is a day with special significance for me. On February 10, 1972 I had a dilemma. I was hungry for breakfast and wanted some cereal. I had cereal, but no milk. So I called my mom at work and asked her if I could run across the street to the convenience store. My mom said no because "the street" was more like a highway and because I was 9 years old. "You'll get hit by a car," my mom said. As you might imagine, I went anyway. And as you also might have guessed by now my mother was right, except no car was good enough for me. I had to face off with a ten-wheeler (it was an Amoco < http://www.amoco.com > Oil tanker.) Twenty-two stitches in the head, a healed broken wrist and 25 years later, I'm still hanging in there. I don't remember anything about it, including seeing the truck. I've always wondered if I was pushed. What I do remember was waking up in the ambulance with quite a headache. But since then, seeing how I lived and all, I've always viewed February 10 as a GOOD day. The Mining Company may not be a truck setting its sights on running down AOL or even other Web content aggregators (even to some degree NetGuide Live), but it is an interesting model. *What It Is* In effect, The Mining Company wants to be the biggest online service on the Web, ultimately offering 4,000 special-interest areas in an integrated, easy-to-use interface. Whether you call these special areas channels, departments or categories -- it's all the same thing. Kurnit wants to capitalize on the fact that it takes too long to find what you want on the Net. He wants to put it all in one place with one consistent interface so that you can easily find what you're looking for and interact with those who have common interests. Each "channel" will have content, bulletin boards, online chats, links to other good stuff on the Web in the particular area of interest. You'll also be able to search a site via Verity's search engine or search the entire Net via Digital's Alta Vista. While they are currently testing another chat product, they have decided to move to the iChat chat client. In the test system I had access to, the bulletin board system was very easy to use, but painfully slow. I'll cut them some slack since they are still in beta, but users will need to be able to move around the boards quicker than what I experienced or they will likely be put off. *And Now for Something Really Different* When Kurnit first ran the vision by me a couple of weeks ago, I said "To me it seems like this is..." "AOL on the Web," Kurnit interrupted. "Not exactly," I said, "It's like AOL on the Web with a hint of Amway thrown in." One of the problems with providing editorial context for the Net is that it winds up costing a lot of money. Kurnit's previous venture with MCI/Newscorp was iGuide. They built a great guide to the Net, but ultimately they scaled it back to just become a guide to entertainment on the Net. You've read the reports all over the place about scaled back editorial efforts and rightsizing. Good editorial doesn't come cheap, at least not when done traditionally. The Mining Company isn't going after the traditional model of hiring a bunch of full-time editors and bringing them in house. They plan to use folks already out there on the Net. Once upon a time while I was at IBM, I helped recruit Chris Locke, of MecklerWeb notoriety away from the MCI/News Corp effort Kurnit was running. While there are many things Chris and I do not agree on, I was very much in synch with Chris when it came to the idea of communities of interest on the Web. Give remote people the tools to produce the content, Locke would say, and you'd be able to easily build hundreds if not thousands of communities of interest very inexpensively. Locke who is now with a hardware company in Colorado will no doubt take interest in what Kurnit and the gang at The Mining Company are up to, because they are all about providing the tools to produce the communities of interest inexpensively! If your chosen as one of its forum moderators (they call them Guides), you'll be given access to all the tools you need to build a site on the service. Now you may be thinking, "Ah, GeoCities does that already!" GeoCities < http://www.geocities.com > gives free web pages and is organized around certain communities of interest. But their homesteader program is not about setting up an all-encompassing online service. And while it is a great place to create a free web page, there's no real business model for the person creating the page. If you build a great site there, GeoCities gets the revenue on all the traffic that goes there. Because it has a lot of traffic, GeoCities can send some traffic to your Web site. But in the end, the model for GeoCities is one to give you a free page on the Web. This is good for you if you're just in it for the fun of it, and good for GeoCities too. I think GeoCities is great, but if I am looking for something in particular, I wouldn't think to look there first. The Mining Company wants to create a space that no matter what it is you hope to find, you'll look there first. *They Call them Guides* The Mining Company wants to create quality communities of interest. And for every community (channel) created, there will be a unique moderator/editor. The Mining Company calls them Guides. It's looking for more than just a few quality folks to become Guides and form their service. Starting Monday, they will begin accepting applications to become Guides on the service. There could be multiple sites about the same thing during the start-up phase, but ultimately it will be whittled down to one Guide/site per special interest. To ensure quality, they'll be a review committee set-up to make sure quality standards are up to snuff, including some folks from the community of Guides. Kurnit believes between that, the natural inclination for other Guides to point out areas of, um, weakness and user feedback, they'll have a good handle on quality. Additionally, there will be some in-house editorial to oversee major groupings (like Technology, Personal Finance, etc.) "The Mining Company is dedicated to serving the needs of its Guides and users," said Kurnit. "We give the tools and support to the Guides to help users find what they want, trust what they find, and connect them with the most valuable sites on the Net and with other interesting people." "This model is now only possible because of the team effort at The Mining Company to integrate the latest improvements in Internet technology and the newly identified needs of users and independent Web producers," adds Kurnit. *Getting the Guides* Will it be easy to get the ultimately thousands of Guides necessary to run this service? "How much talent is out there," asks Kurnit. "We look at the thousands of pages out there on AOL, GeoCities, etc., and the rest of the Internet," Kurnit said. "All we think we need to get is 2%-3% of the talent pool." In certain areas it will likely be very competitive. Everyone will want to get there first. "First there's the application process," said Scott Kurnit in a phone Interview. "You're going to show us your bio and you're going to write some columns so we can see your writing style. If you make the grade, you make it to our orientation process," Kurnit said. The Mining Company places its focus on training the Guides and giving them the tools they need to make a site. If you "make the grade" you basically have 3 weeks (2 of which are the "orientation") to get a site up-and-running on the service. "The fact is, if you can't get it done in a reasonable time then you probably don't have the dedication or time to get it done," says Kurnit. Just how much time will it take for Guides to put together sites? "We're not looking for anyone to quite their day jobs," said Kurnit. "We're looking at about a 10 hour a week commitment to produce the sites." But Kurnit also says that though there will be only one Guide per site, the Guides will be able to line up assistants. *What's in it for You?* So why The Mining Company then? Why not GeoCities or doing it on your own? Well, there are a couple of reasons. One is the promise of exposure, the other is the promise of MONEY. There is a model here, especially if you're not looking to quit your day job. While I imagine it will have to shift its model somewhat, there are some opportunities to make a buck or two for the Guides. It might not be much money, but if you're already throwing 10 hours or so a week towards maintaining a Web page that lines up around a special interest or two, any money is better than what you're probably getting now. Basically, The Mining Company is looking to allocate 40% of all advertising revenues back to the Guides themselves. The real pool here is 30%, with the additional 10% being used for things like bonuses. So, how does it work? Kurnit is looking to get quickly to a million or so page views a day (each of the pages I saw had 2 advertisements. By the end of the year, Kurnit hopes to be in the 10 million - 15 million page views. It sounds a little ambitious, but if they're successful lining up quality Guides, it could become a reality. So let's say they're getting 5 million page views per day. Based on what I saw, that would net out to be about 300 million ads running per month. Lets say ad sales average out to $30/1000 (a $30 CPM). Based on that, you're looking at a cool $9 million a month in advertising revenue. So $3.6 million is in the Guide pool, but only $2.7 million is for the true revenue split. Now, let's say you're a Guide who got one-tenth of 1 percent of The Mining Company's overall traffic. You'd make a cool $2,700 a month for your efforts. If you happen to be a guide in one of the "killer categories" whether it be a parents site or a kids site or a computing site, it's not unreasonable to think that you might get as much as 1%. That would be $27,000 per month!! Some people will balk at the 40%-60% share, but I think that's pretty fair. Where I'd predict the model will have to change, however, is in the cases where the cost per thousand (CPM) view being charged the advertisers is much higher than the average of the overall site. If the overall site average is $30/1000, but your site is generating a CPM of around $90, you're probably not going to want to be paid based on averages. *Will it Work?* In short, I think this could work quite nicely. The premise of a front door that links to content that is all packaged with a consistent look and feel is a winning premise. With AOL's recent move to flat-fee, one big advantage a Net service has over a proprietary model like AOL is the ability to create content far more easily and inexpensively. Much coverage has been given this week regarding AOL beginning to charge its partners in its Company Connection a $55,000 fee each year to participate. Some in AOL are saying its reasonable since the areas amount to "free" advertising for the companies, but realistically speaking, I think it is a maintenance fee AOL is charging to offset the cost of dealing with these forums. I think it is reasonable to expect to see AOL begin to charge similar fees for any content that isn't "must have" for them, now that the hourly charges that once subsidized these areas are gone. There is a cost of throwing in-house support at these online areas and much of the cost is due to the fact that it's a proprietary system. Setting up new "forms" and new looks just isn't easily accomplished by the content providers themselves. So, the timing may be good for The Mining Company. There are at least two tricks Kurnit and Co. must pull off. First, they have to get the Guides. That starts on Monday, when they begin accepting applications. The next will be to market the site in a way that gets people to the front door. Internet of the people, for the people and by the people, it has a nice ring to it... I'm sure we'll hear more about this when the site officially launches in April. For more info, check out < http://www.miningco.com >, sometime on Monday, they will make a lot more information available there than the "coming soon" that was there as of this writing. Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc ***********************************************************************

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Military/Intelligence URL
by harka＠nycmetro.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Here an page, that deals with various intelligence and military institutions... In> Subject: GOVT> AJAX, Government and Military Intelligence In> http://204.180.198.56:80/ajax/ajax.htm In> United States and International Government Military and Intelligence In> Agency Access In> Certain Locations Or Sections Thereof May Be Closed To In> Unauthorized Use. In> PLEASE READ ACCESS WARNINGS, IF ANY, AND ABIDE BY THEM. In> (If You Prefer A Frameless Environment, Click HERE.) In> Last update: 7 FEBRUARY 1997. All accesses verified at In> time of inclusion. In> CIA Central Intelligence Agency In> DIA Defense Intelligence Agency In> NRO National Reconnaissance Office In> NSA National Security Agency In> SS Secret Service In> USCSOI U.S. Customs Service Office of Investigation In> ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms In> BOP Federal Bureau of Prisons In> CID U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command In> COURTS U.S. Federal Courts In> FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation In> FINCEN Financial Crimes Enforcement Network In> FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center In> MARSHALS U.S. Marshals Service In> NIJ National Institute of Justice In> ACC Air Combat Command In> AFSPC Air Force Space Command In> BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization In> DEFENSE Defense Department In> DISA Defense Information Systems Agency In> DRMS Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service In> DTIC Defense Technical Information Center In> JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff In> NAVWAN Naval Aviation Systems Team Wide Area Network In> NAWCWPNS Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division In> NSWC Naval Surface Warfare Center In> USAFA United States Air Force Academy In> AHPCRC Army High Performance Computing Research Center In> ARPA Advanced Research Projects Agency In> LABLINK U.S. Department of Defense Laboratory System In> NRL The Naval Research Laboratory RL In> USAF Rome Laboratory for C41 Technology In> USACIL U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory In> NATGUARD Army and Air National Guards In> USA United States Army In> USAF United States Air Force In> USCG United States Coast Guard In> USMC United States Marine Corps In> USN United States Navy In> EPA U.S. Environmental Protection Agency In> FAA Federal Aviation Administration Technical Center In> FCC Federal Communications Commission In> FTC Federal Trade Commission In> NMFS National Marine Fisheries Service In> NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission In> SEC Securities and Exchange Commission In> CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention In> CENSUS U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census In> CONGRESS U.S. House of Representatives In> CUSTOMS U.S. Customs Service In> DOE U.S. Department of Energy National Laboratories In> & Programs In> EXECUTIVE The White House In> FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation In> FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency In> FMS Financial Management Service In> GPO U.S. Government Printing Office In> GSA U.S. General Services Administration In> HHS U.S. Department of Health and Human Services In> HPCC NOAA High Performance Computing and In> Communications IRS Internal Revenue Service In> JUSTICE Justice Department In> NARA National Archives and Records Administration In> NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration In> NCDC National Climatic Data Center In> NIMH National Institute of Mental Health In> NOAA National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration In> NSF National Science Foundation In> NTIS National Technical Information Service In> SBA Small Business Administration In> SEL Space Environment Laboratory In> STATE State Department In> TREASURY Treasury Department In> USCODE U.S. House of Representatives In> Internet Law Library U.S. Code In> CANADA In> CSE Communications Security Establishment In> CISC Criminal Intelligence Service Canada In> CSIS Canadian Security Intelligence Service In> SIRC Security Intelligence Review Committee In> UNITED KINGDOM CIM Central Intelligence Machinery In> CANADA In> DJC Department of Justice of Canada In> FORENSIC The Forensic Web In> RCMP Royal Canadian Mounted Police In> SGC Solicitor General of Canada In> UNITED NATIONS UNCPCJ United Nations Crime Prevention & In> Criminal Justice In> CANADA In> CFC Canadian Forces College In> DREO Defense Research Establishment, Ottawa In> UNITED KINGDOM In> ARMY The British Army In> CDA Centre for Defence Analysis In> DRA Defence Research Agency In> NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization In> SACLANT Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic In> SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe In> BECCA Business Espionage Controls & Countermeasures In> Association In> CRYPTOLOG Internet Guide to Cryptography In> DCJFTF Washington, D.C. Joint Fugitive Task Force In> WANTED "The World's Most Wanted" (Fugitives and In> Unsolved Crimes) Ciao Harka /*************************************************************/ /* This user supports FREE SPEECH ONLINE ...more info at */ /* and PRIVATE ONLINE COMMUNICATIONS! --> http://www.eff.org */ /* E-mail: harka(a)nycmetro.com (PGP-encrypted mail preferred) */ /* PGP public key available upon request. [KeyID: 04174301] */ /* F-print: FD E4 F8 6D C1 6A 44 F5 28 9C 40 6E B8 94 78 E8 */ /*<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>*/ /* May there be peace in this world, may all anger dissolve */ /* and may all living beings find the way to happiness... */ /*************************************************************/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAgUBMv7aGjltEBIEF0MBAQF1CAf+MyLUa3sBKCAuxhzCZ0tQqP3jxAjQpIuV WdsTCW9L3jPwLdZ9BmqeqAuaIU4JQzCpEx5bgKdzGThF5mG2U4XaeOcD4gBpWZyz sYOZzcoYNe6CX6m55a9UqiEpZu4mK9TBkO7OXSfV3J3CygVAbo7zjC+lW2r7L9F8 3vTqrxbOCb3SMEl4k3L5QVtKOGVSh7MMIesBtmQ2SNhhvSfrdFYBnCcvtmnvYi8j 6YpI5wrkiNzueuFwoD9YoRR7UugE5kcCyJ3FFHym7RzQUL8XsHRhsk1XoTBHvXni 2Tfno7DH5+T4FuVZTWeaAVhD7OTfK2n0lBCf0x2I5F1iEUurbdddig== =s4om -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- If encryption is outlawed, only outlaws will have encryption...

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{'alpha'} = '<alias(a)alpha.c2.org> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'nymrod'} = '<nymrod(a)nym.jpunix.com> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"lead"} = "<mix(a)zifi.genetics.utah.edu> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle ?"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"death"} = "<x(a)deathsdoor.com> cpunk pgp hash latent post"; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<mix(a)mix.nymserver.com> cpunk mix pgp. hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 10 Feb 97 6:46:24 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net **-#+*#*#*## 1:59 100.00% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ****** 8:22 99.98% wazoo remailer(a)wazoo.com *+++++ 33:48 99.97% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++++-++++ 1:05:51 99.84% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++++++++++++ 37:45 99.78% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ----+-- .+++ 2:42:13 99.65% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com +-- **### *# 2:12 99.60% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++*+++*** *+ 30:13 99.59% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net *#-+###*##* 4:06 99.42% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++ +++-+ ++ 1:05:29 99.26% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* * ## **# 1:21 99.18% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ---+-. +++ 2:51:34 98.78% replay remailer(a)replay.com +-***+*---+* 27:45 98.57% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com .- ------- 4:46:55 98.08% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net --+- .++ 1:27:14 96.63% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +_ __.-*+ 22:42:38 93.53% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----.--- + 5:48:14 75.89% shaman mix(a)mix.nymserver.com 2:46 9.00% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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DCSB: Online Government & Electronic Commerce - Legislation andPublic Sector Initiatives
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The Digital Commerce Society of Boston Presents Daniel Greenwood, Esq. Deputy General Counsel Information Technology Division Commonwealth of Massachusetts "Online Government & Electronic Commerce - Legislation and Public Sector Initiatives" Tuesday, March 4, 1997 12 - 2 PM The Downtown Harvard Club of Boston One Federal Street, Boston, MA Dan will give us an update on recent information age legislative and operational developments in the public sector. Special attention will be paid to: Electronic Signature and Record Legislation; Joint Government/Private Sector Attempts to Set Certification Authority Standards; Cutting Edge Public Sector PKI Projects; Recent Coordinated State-Federal-Foreign Electronic Commerce Policy Initiatives; and much, much more . . . Speaker: Daniel Greenwood, Esq. Information Technology Division, Deputy General Counsel Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office: http://www.state.ma.us/itd/legal home: http://www.tiac.net/biz/danielg Mr. Greenwood practices information technology law for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Recent relevant activities include: * Co-Author of the Draft 1997 Mass. Electronic Records and Signature Act * Chairman of the Commonwealth of Mass. PKI Task Force * Chairman of the ABA Info. Security Comm., Legislative Sub-Committee * Co-Chair of the ABA Cyberspace Law Comm., Legislative Work Group * Contributing Author: ABA Digital Signature Guidelines * Negotiator of Contracts for Internet Security and Payment Systems * Board Member of SigNet.Org and Chair of Legal Special Interest Group * Director of the Virtual State House Project (MIT/Stanford Law School) * Faculty Member: MCLE Health Care & Info. Technology Program * Guest Lecturer for Suffolk Law School High Tech. Symposium * Selection Board Chairman for First Commonwealth of Mass. C/A Business This meeting of the Digital Commerce Society of Boston will be held on Tuesday, March 4, 1997 from 12pm - 2pm at the Downtown Branch of the Harvard Club of Boston, One Federal Street. The price for lunch is $27.50. This price includes lunch, room rental, and the speaker's lunch. ;-). The Harvard Club *does* have dress code: jackets and ties for men, and "appropriate business attire" for women. We will attempt to record this meeting and put it on the web in RealAudio format at some future date We need to receive a company check, or money order, (or, if we *really* know you, a personal check) payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston", by Saturday, March 1, or you won't be on the list for lunch. Checks payable to anyone else but The Harvard Club of Boston will have to be sent back. Checks should be sent to Robert Hettinga, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, Massachusetts, 02131. Again, they *must* be made payable to "The Harvard Club of Boston". If anyone has questions, or has a problem with these arrangements (We've had to work with glacial A/P departments more than once, for instance), please let us know via e-mail, and we'll see if we can work something out. Planned speakers for DCSB are: March Daniel Greenwood The Role of State Government in Digital Commerce April Stewart Baker Encryption Policy and Digital Commerce We are actively searching for future speakers. If you are in Boston on the first Tuesday of the month, and you would like to make a presentation to the Society, please send e-mail to the DCSB Program Commmittee, care of Robert Hettinga, <mailto: rah(a)shipwright.com> . For more information about the Digital Commerce Society of Boston, send "info dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . If you want to subscribe to the DCSB e-mail list, send "subscribe dcsb" in the body of a message to <mailto: majordomo(a)ai.mit.edu> . Looking forward to seeing you there! Cheers, Robert Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMwB+VvgyLN8bw6ZVAQEsRAQAiInZXDXlzdMn0B+b9A6zgWHH5POJku5v k9HIZK286Paw1KWKYsw8VyYjUoG4vq/LAh1CagWkwL4EN9Ysg7kbU+LP0W4u04vb /QoKk5rWpmXuplXx1Fp9IhIe2O6oV0vTInJqPV3zkXk4qGzYUrQ0bqLbQn769iMO 7pwwVbkioSc= =m5Pz -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Re: mail-to-news fun
by Lance Cottrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

It would be a trivial hack for Mixmaster. It allways knows if a message if going to another remailer, or if this is the last hop, so it can add the disclaimer only on the last hop. -Lance At 4:06 PM -0800 2/6/97, Bill Stewart wrote: >At 01:01 PM 2/6/97 -0500, Scott V. McGuire wrote: >>On Wed, 5 Feb 1997 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com wrote: >>> People don't read mail headers or disclaimers at the bottom, >>> and putting disclaimers like that into message text for >>> email exposes the message to traffic analysis.) > >>How does putting it in the message expose it to traffic analysis but not >>putting it in a header? > >Suppose you're sending a message on a remailer chain of >you -> Alice->Bob->Charlie->Dave->Eve->Fred--> target >and Bob puts lots of disclaimers in his remailer's outgoing messages. >Anything Bob puts in a header will get stripped out by Charlie, >so it's no problem. However, if Bob tacks a disclaimer >as the bottom text in the outgoing message, when Eve sends >mail to Fred she'll also see the disclaimer that > The message was sent by an anonymous user > through the remailer at Bob's Remailer Shack. > Bob doesn't know who sent it, and doesn't keep records, > so he can't squash the user, but he can block mail to you > if you don't want any more anonymous email. > Don't believe everything you read! >so she'll know to check the FBI Illegal Wiretap files for Bob. > >Some comments and backtracking >0) Of course, if you want to avoid traffic analysis, >sending unencrypted email is pretty stupid, and only the >next hop is going to see a disclaimer that you append >after the encrypted part of the message. > >1) Prepending the disclaimer to the message body is >pretty unfriendly to the :: syntax, and not all that >great for PGP encrypted messages either. Pretend I >really just suggested appending it at the end, >since that's what I would have said if I'd been thinking :-) > >On the other hand, I suppose that you can see whether the >next hop is a Type I remailer by looking for the :: or ##. > >2) Cutmarks would be a nice fix, but they require too much >attention to detail to get right, in case the next hop >is a remailer. > >So maybe you _should_ always put in the disclaimer, >at the end, with a reminder to always encrypt your >remailer-chain mail if you want to avoid traffic analysis :-) > > > > > ># Thanks; Bill ># Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com ># You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp ># (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.) ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. http://www.obscura.com/~loki/ "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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My messages not appearing on either of the lists?
by Timothy C. May 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Cypherpunks, My posting seem to be going into Limbo, being sent neither to the Cypherpunks Heaven Sandy administers nor to the flames of the Cypherpunks Hell. At least this is how things now appear. I sent the message below to the list this morning (Thursday) at 8:43 a.m. PST. As of tonight, 12 hours later, I haven't seen it on either the Singapore Web site--last archived 30 minutes ago--or on the "Flames" list to which I have temporarily subscribed (to see what Sandy counts as a "flame"). Has anyone else seen it? I've looked, but there's always a chance I somehow spaced out and missed it. (I doubt it though.) If I have missed it, despite carefully scanning for it for the past 8-12 hours, my apologies. If it has not appeared on either the Censored list or the Flames list, then something is rotten in the state of Denmark. By the way, I noted that many of the messages which appeared at the Singapore Web archive site have dates much later than mine, including several dated at least 8-10 hours after my message. Likewise, some of the Flames messages are dated much later than my message. (Bill Stewart got a message through dated Thu, 06 Feb 1997 16:06:06 -0800, Mark Henderson got one through at Thu, 6 Feb 1997 15:56:19 PST, and so on. One would thus have thought that my message, dated Thu, 6 Feb 1997 08:43:35 -0800, would by now either have been approved and hence on the Censored list, or rejected as unfit for Cypherpunks to sully their neurons with, and hence passed on to the Flames list. By the way, some of the "Flames" messages are also dated late afternoon or evening.) So, is my message just sitting around someplace, awaiting some final decision? What's the basis of this decision? (Perhaps Sandy has "kicked it upstairs" to John for him to decide on? Just a hypothesis....) I will repeat my message below. As you will be able to see, my message contains no "flames" of its own, and the messages it quotes do not seem flamish to me, either. (It is true that Vulis uses the phrase "Limey faggots," in reference to beer-serving habits, but he does not directly insult any list members with this phrase. If Sandy is calling this phrase a flame, then Cypherpunks will be blocked from their usual characterizations of Congresscritters and NSA stooges.) I think a delay of greater than 11 hours in being distributed on one of the two lists (even if my message is sent out in the next hour or so) is unacceptable. If a moderator cannot get to traffic in the order in which it was received and disposition it promptly, he or she has no business being a moderator of a high-volume list. (Eric Blossom's and Ray Arachelian's "best of" compilations are a different matter, for reasons discussed many times here.) So, why hasn't this message appeared on one of the two lists? --Tim May >Date: Thu, 6 Feb 1997 08:43:35 -0800 >To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com >From: "Timothy C. May" <tcmay(a)got.net> >Subject: Re: Moderation [Tim,Sandy] >Cc: >Bcc: >X-Attachments: > > >I decided to subscribe only to the "cypherpunks flames" list, just to see >what was being filtered into it. > >The message below is one example of what is going there. I received it, >and the header includes the line: "Sender: >owner-cypherpunks-unedited(a)toad.com", so I am surmising that it was indeed >filtered into the flames list. > >Now, admittedly, the _content_ of this kind of post is "off-topic," but I >sure don't see any evidence of _flames_. > >Is Sandy now filtering based on his notions of list relevance, and not >just on the basis of insults, jabs, flames, and "lack of comity"? While >lack of relevance may be a criterion for someone to filter by, it doesn't >square with anything I recall Sandy citing, and it introduces a new and >dimension to the debate. > >--Tim May > >(The entire post is included, to ensure that no one claims I am editing >out any flames, insults, etc.) > > >At 11:06 PM -0800 2/5/97, Dale Thorn wrote: >>Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM wrote: >>> Dale Thorn <dthorn(a)gte.net> writes: >> >>> > > > The drunk can be excluded, but when someone wants to use the drunk as >>> > > > an example to escalate the exclusion to other persons who are not in >>> > > > fact drunk, watch out! >> >>> > > If I get really really drunk, which happens very seldom, then I'm >>> > > too drunk to post. I don't mind an occasional beer, though. >> >>> > > Oksas, have you ever tried beer? :-) >> >>> > I had my first beer(s) in three years at one of those industrial >>> > parties last night. It made the craps table action seem a bit >>> > merrier, and the girls were friendlier too. >> >>> I like an occasional Coors Lite. BTW I think Limey Faggots are right about >>> one think: I like room-temperature beer better than cold beer. YMMV. >> >>Interesting coincidence for people on opposite coasts - the bar at >>the hotel had two choices: Bud regular and Coors light. I took the >>Coors. > > > > > Just say "No" to "Big Brother Inside" We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, I know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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World's first Ecash note
by Jeremey Barrett 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- The world's first Ecash note has been printed! A USD 0.01 note made out to anyone can be found at: http://www.veriweb.com/people/jeremey/ecash/1_cent.html The data portion of the note is a PDF417 2-D barcode, containing a standard ecash payment of 1 US cent. The source code for the general PDF417 encoding and the ecash conversion will be published as soon as I clean it up and come up with a somewhat nicer interface. The PDF417 code should be useful for non-ecash stuff as well, it will encode anything. I will be bringing a bunch of notes to the bay-area cypherpunks meeting Saturday. Suggestions/comments appreciated. - -- =-----------------------------------------------------------------------= Jeremey Barrett VeriWeb Internet Corp. Senior Software Engineer http://www.veriweb.com/ PGP Key fingerprint = 3B 42 1E D4 4B 17 0D 80 DC 59 6F 59 04 C3 83 64 =-----------------------------------------------------------------------= -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.4, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBMvq83i/fy+vkqMxNAQH/tQP/fSgEQ8K0BQcwTJxnaF7aKg1LzNshMdey A8MH67Uv8zfv9cQTD0+g/JO4x64Ina5ZcMqn4IoHNOybqfvrR4ZepDLa+SsX2hhU 2xdmgf452OEhVpjSYoNnDMKoKAUUbfIlApu7W/9M/Ecx3vbT0cq4dxVF2zzcmJsy nhEPFe2iSc4= =v84p -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Which list am I on?
by Against Moderation 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I thought I was on the cypherpunks edited list. However, I appear to have seen some of the messages that Tim says got lost. Moreover, I keep getting ASCII art messages flaming someone with the initials DLV (though I haven't seen any more of the TCM flames [I haven't looked too hard, either]). My mail headers have: >From cypherpunks-errors(a)toad.com <date> >Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)toad.com Now I'm really confused. Which list am I on?

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