- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: STE_pup
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Lucky Green wrote: >Fingerprint readers tend to work regardless if the finger is attached to a >body or not. All that fingerprint readers will do is increase the damage to >those relying on ever increasing, but misguided, methods of authentication. >See the rise in "identity theft" since SSN's began to be used for >identification. Oracle claims they've solved the lopped or faked pinkie problem by verifying other biometry. One device IDs BO. None invade privacy the snakes hiss. What next, BS detectors? Nah, that'd kill commerce and law and government and true love and blind faith in supreme-gold-fool.

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Re: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up"
by Kent Crispin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sandy Sandfort allegedly said: > [...] > Finally, if anyone wants to discuss why the Cypherpunk list has > come to this, or what I did right or wrong as a moderator, let's > talk about--on the new list(s) YOU create. For now, though, it's > off-topic. We have work to do. If a scheme can be worked out for a distributed list, I am willing to support maybe 100 users at songbird. -- Kent Crispin "No reason to get excited", kent@songbird.com,kc@llnl.gov the thief he kindly spoke... PGP fingerprint: 5A 16 DA 04 31 33 40 1E 87 DA 29 02 97 A3 46 2F

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Re: NETLINK_IPSEC
by Bryce 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Has anyone tried IPSEC with the 2.1.x kernels? Are there a logcation that > describes the differences between 2.0.x and 2.1.x? (I have not been able to > find one...) Then again, I have yet to find a list of what was fixed from > kernel to kernel... (Probibly in some directory of the tar file...) Source 1: ftp://ftp.shout.net/pub/users/mec/kcs Source 2: The patch files. :-) Regards, Bryce, not a kernel hacker PGP sig follows -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2i Comment: Auto-signed under Unix with 'BAP' Easy-PGP v1.1b2 iQB1AwUBMwDzRUjbHy8sKZitAQE5OQL/X/Uv6oIJTQqWsVzRVTF8slnMBZa9sByj ld4mHGvfn7lwQXmdWk7OOngRWum38ZysjRxRk7R5OtULhRsUxRjIe2FhTXFn3v/O nKxHOTmbbwvz/flovkg7cUFeIk/7iCEl =ucy1 -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up" (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 11 Feb 1997 08:30:54 -0800 > From: Alan Olsen <alan(a)ctrl-alt-del.com> > >offered nothing in the past but criticism, it's now time to get a > >bit more real. What will it be, your money, time, equipment? > > What kind of memory requirements/machine load does the list eat up? I have a > machine that may fit this purpose... (Need to know if I need to upgrade the > box though.) A minimum standard for a useable remailer (YMMV): 486DX(blah) 16M 1G IDE Mitsumi CD Rom (very widely supported) VGA 1M NE2000 x 2 (Internet & Intranet) High-speed serial ports x 3 (Mouse, Modems x 2) [optional] ISDN Bridge (incl. NT-1, no POTS) ISDN Line (contact business office) Internet Provider (commercial service, nameservice, news, etc.) 10BaseT Bridge [optional, depends on Bridge] Registration of domain name [optional, suggested] Linux (WinNT if clueless) For a full-time commercial feed in Austin, Tx. your talking about: Startup: $600 Machine $100 VGA Monitor $100 Computer accessories $400 28.8 Modems ($200 x2) $150 ISDN install $1k ISDN Bridge $500 ISP setup & init (this is commercial, not hobby) $100 Initial name registry $300 UPS $3,250 Monthlies: $50 Phones ($25 x2) $25 Utilities $75 ISDN $400 ISP connection $550 Note: * This machine can't be your personal workstation. It will be entirely too busy. * Learn shell, c, Pearl to start. * O'Reilly makes very useful books. * Such a machine will handle from between 100 to 500 accounts depending on how you set up your system. * If you have the money, put it in the bandwidth first. * I would very strongly suggest against using your employers resources for such activities. * You will want at least one dedicated dial-in, no matter what. This is a good place for distinctive ring and a line splitter. Consider this when buying the modem, it will raise the price of the modem. Also consider the personal 800 numbers that are available. * Consider strongly the use of an encrypted file system. While they make automated re-boots impossible their security can be quite appealing. (This is an issue that somebody who is already designing encrypted file systems should look into, how to allow automated reboots w/o manual entry of the key(s).) * Anonymous remailer extensions would not be a major resource hog. * If you are going to consider allowing general access by your users via dial-in use 10 - 15 users per line per day, assuming no enforced quota. Hope this helps anyone who might be interested in starting up such a beast. Jim Choate CyberTects ravage(a)ssz.com When I was a kid, I lived in Pasadena, Tx. just down the street from the Washburn Tunnel. There was a big sign going from Pasadena to the Houston side that said "The grass is greener in Pasadena". This sentiment is the true liberator of the human spirit. Keeping up with the Joneses is burned into our genes.

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Re: NSA Rainbow Series.
by Moroni 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

1-800-688-6115 press 0 or just wait for the operator. My second order consisting of posters and video has not arrived either. It has been about 6 weeks. The Rainbow order was only 2 weeks. Be prepared that when you order the Rainbow series you will be getting a large box.Their are something like 30+ booklets in the series. There is a set of security posters that include a Santa poster.And there is also a video with two films on it (Acess Ins and outs adb Acess Control). Good luck on your mission Mr. Phelps, moroni On Thu, 30 Jan 1997, Genocide wrote: > Date: Thu, 30 Jan 1997 12:42:08 -0800 (PST) > From: Genocide <gen2600(a)aracnet.com> > To: Cypherpunks Mailing List <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Subject: NSA Rainbow Series. > > > A while back someone posted the 1-800 number for the NSA to call > in and get the Rainbow series delivered.... well, I called and put in an > order and it never came, I need to call them again... I don't have the > phone numbere number anymore...does anyone have it? Can someone > email me the number again? > > Genocide > Head of the Genocide2600 Group > > > ============================================================================ > **Coming soon! www.Genocide2600.com! > ____________________ > *---===| |===---* > *---===| Genocide |===---* "You can be a king or a street > *---===| 2600 |===---* sweeper, but everyone dances with the > *---===|__________________|===---* Grim Reaper." > > Email: gen2600(a)aracnet.com Web: http://www.aracnet.com/~gen2600 > > ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ > It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. > It is by the Mountain Dew that the thoughts acquire speed, > the lips acquire stains, the stains become a warning. > It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. > ================================================================================ > > > xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx x No success can compensate for failure in the home. x x x xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

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Re: Moderation experiment almost over; "put up or shut up"
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

John Gilmore wrote: > A pentium is definitely up to this task. I've been running it the > whole time on a slower 40MB SPARCstation-2 (that also runs netnews and > general computing). Give it a big /var/spool partition (mine is 60MB) > because every message will sit in the queue for days (*somebody* on > the list will have an unreachable name server or MX server until the > msg times out). Give it lots of RAM and paging space, since each > sendmail process takes about 2MB virtual, 1.4MB physical, and you will > have dozens running at the same time. > > The new version of majordomo (that allows confirmation of > subscriptions) will help a lot. It needs a small patch though, to do > exponential backoff on the lock file, or when you get a flood of > messages, thirty majordomo processes will burn up the whole machine > trying and failing to get the lock file. > > You'll need a BIG mailbox for the bounce messages, and someone (or > some unwritten software) to scan it every day or two and delete the > lusers whose mailboxes are full or who dumped their account without > unsubscribing. The bounce mailbox on toad gets between 1 and 4MB of > email a day; more when the list is under attack. > > You'll want to run the latest version of BIND on the machine, too, > since doing DNS name-lookups on a thousand email addresses is expensive. > You want them all in the in-memory cache on the same machine. The > name daemon burns about 7MB virtual, 5MB real RAM once its cache > gets loaded. > > Make sure that every message sent to the list gets into at least > two logfiles -- on separate partitions, in case one fills up. At > least if you want to have an archive of what's been sent. > > > I can provide a pentium box running Linux with a T1 connection to > > MAE-West to host the list, if there is still interest. > > Make sure you are getting "transit" service to the Internet, instead > of trying to cheap out with "peering" to a few major networks. > Without transit service ("we'll carry your packets to anywhere even if > the destination is not on our network") you won't be able to route > packets to some places on the net. This will cause mail to those > subscribers to sit in the queue for days and then bounce. > > The real issue is how willing you are to put your own time into > dealing with problems. Not only do things go wrong by themselves, but > there are malicious assholes in the world who will deliberately make > trouble for you just because they like to. Spending a day or two > cleaning up the mess is just part of the job. Check your level of > committment two or three times before taking on the task -- so you > won't end up getting disgusted after a month or two and putting the > list's existence into crisis again. It's not a "set it up and forget > it" kind of operation. Listen to it, John is absolutely right. Running a big mailing list is an incredible commitment and it is important to realize what you are getting into. Another suggestion may be to set sendmail expire option to one day instead of five so that messages that cannot be delivered would bounce faster and not clog the queue. - Igor.

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Re: STE_pup
by Lucky Green 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 11:39 AM 2/11/97 -0500, John Young wrote: > Oracle's new fingerprint checking device to assure bona fide > log-on privileges. Covers other such devices, quotes a maker: > "if criminals or hackers get through these, industry will > step up one more level." Fingerprint readers tend to work regardless if the finger is attached to a body or not. All that fingerprint readers will do is increase the damage to those relying on ever increasing, but misguided, methods of authentication. See the rise in "identity theft" since SSN's began to be used for identification. -- Lucky Green <mailto:shamrock@netcom.com> PGP encrypted mail preferred "I do believe that where there is a choice only between cowardice and violence, I would advise violence." Mahatma Gandhi

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http:--cnnfn.com-digitaljam-wires-9702-11-hackers_wg-
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Click here to download the shareware YOU want at ZDNet [INLINE] Digital Jam hackers graphic Hackers victimize firms Experts tell House panel breaking into networks is too simple February 11, 1997: 6:17 p.m. ET [INLINE] Hackers and Feds in Vegas - July 31, 1996 Internet firms make hacking pay - April 12, 1996 WASHINGTON (Reuter) -- Hackers are finding it easier to break into computer networks and steal money, partly because companies are reluctant to admit that they are vulnerable, security experts said Tuesday. [INLINE] "If I want to steal money a computer is a much better tool than a handgun," Daniel Geer, engineering director for Open Market, Inc., told a House of Representatives technology subcommittee hearing on computer security. "They start out stealing $1,000 a day and figure they can get away with $2,000 a day and then they get greedy and hit some figure which sets off alarm bells." [INLINE] A panel of experts assembled by the subcommittee said many companies refuse to report breaches in their security because they want to avoid negative publicity and embarrassment. [INLINE] "Most computer crimes are not reported," Eugene Spafford of Purdue University told the panel. He estimated losses run into "hundreds of millions of dollars" but said no one really knows since so much goes unreported. [INLINE] Daniel Farmer, a security consultant, said penetrating a computer system is relatively easy. "Just using simple tests, I could break into two-thirds of the systems I tried," he said, adding that he could easily raise that figure to three-quarters if he wanted. [INLINE] Farmer said that during his tests he even discovered a problem with the White House World Wide Web site and told the system manager about it. He said he never received a reply. [INLINE] "Defensive programs have been overtaken by offensive programs" developed by hackers, he said. [INLINE] Spafford said law enforcement has kept pace with advances made by hackers who are able essentially to take over entire networks and run them by remote control. [INLINE] In addition to banks and corporations, the experts said, government secrets can be stolen and used to threaten national security. They cited recent computer network tampering at the Justice Department and the CIA. [INLINE] A General Accounting Office study recently found that there were 250,000 "hits" aimed at the Defense Department's computer networks last year and 65 percent were successful. Link to top home | digitaljam | contents | search | stock quotes | help Copyright 1997 Reuters. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. Copyright © 1997 Cable News Network, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.

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Computer break-ins
by Lynne L. Harrison 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com Date: Tue Feb 11 22:14:30 1997 U.S. Experts: Computer Break-Ins Go Unreported U.S. Experts: Computer Break-Ins Go Unreported February 11, 1997, 4:19 PM EST WASHINGTON (Reuter) - Security experts said on Tuesday hackers are finding it easier to break into computer networks and steal money, partly because companies are reluctant to admit that they are vulnerable. ``If I want to steal money a computer is a much better tool than a handgun,'' Daniel Geer, Director of Engineering for Open Market, Inc., told a House of Representatives technology subcommittee hearing on computer security. ``The only way they get caught is if they cross some threshold,'' he said. ``They start out stealing $1,000 a day and figure they can get away with $2,000 a day and then they get greedy and hit some figure which sets off alarm bells.'' A panel of experts assembled by the subcommittee said many companies refuse to report breaches in their security because of they want to avoid negative publicity and embarassment. ``Most computer crimes are not reported,'' Eugene Spafford of Purdue University told the panel. He estimated losses run into ``hundreds of millions of dollars'' but said no one really knows since so much goes unreported. Daniel Farmer, a security consultant, said penetrating a computer system was relatively easy. ``Just using simple tests, I could break into two-thirds of the systems I tried,'' he said, adding that he could easily raise that figure to three-quarters if he wanted. Farmer said that during his tests he even discovered a problem with the White House World Wide Web site and told the system manager about it, but never received a reply. ``Defensive programs have been overtaken by offensive programs'' developed by hackers, he said. Spafford said law enforcement had not been able to keep up with advances made by hackers who are able essentially to take over entire networks and run them by remote control. In addition to banks and corporations, the experts said, government secrets can be stolen and threaten national security. They cited recent computer network tampering at the Justice Department and the CIA. A General Accounting Office study found that there were 250,000 ``hits'' aimed at the Defense Department's computer networks last year and 65 percent were successful. =A9 Reuters Ltd. All rights reserved. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMwE1lz5A4+Z4Wnt9AQHlrAQAi4X7MTb8CbWTaQZfdLIfwzkMkzT1g/gi QPcdaPedbgG6tU8SBS5trqyXu5JvwaVomEUpW+qrKT0JzD8a1Lyf23dgK5qLM+/+ fDWz08KaxsW3uymTRNBZo2gl/ZwpdU7DeQoReOkAqQyBXPWeoBRwYbyGu1pDlHBB yK3hRY2MrEk= =Ht0R -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: whois cypherpunks.org ?
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

cypherpunks (REMAILER-DOM) 1819 Woolsey St. Berkeley, CA 94703 Domain Name: REMAILER.NET Administrative Contact: Hughes, Eric (EH9) eric(a)SAC.NET (415) 392-0526 Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Levy, Elias M. (EML2) aleph1(a)DFW.NET 619-794-8383 (FAX) (619) 794-8373 Billing Contact: Hughes, Eric (EH9) eric(a)SAC.NET (415) 392-0526 Record last updated on 17-Oct-96. Record created on 09-Nov-94. Domain servers in listed order: FLYING.FISH.COM 140.174.97.13 NS1.SAC.NET 208.146.161.2 ---------- CypherPunks (CYPHERPUNKS-DOM) 9705 Standford Road Ft. Meade, MD 20755 Domain Name: CYPHERPUNKS.COM Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Levy, Elias M. (EML2) aleph1(a)DFW.NET 619-794-8383 (FAX) (619) 794-8373 Record last updated on 14-Sep-95. Record created on 14-Sep-95. Domain servers in listed order: NS1.CYBERWORKS.NET 206.170.116.21 NS2.PARANOIA.COM 207.239.130.25 WKP.COM 205.199.64.11 ---------- CypherPunks Group (CYPHERPUNKS3-DOM) 9705 Standford Road Ft. Meade, MD 20755 Domain Name: CYPHERPUNKS.ORG Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Levy, Elias M. (EML2) aleph1(a)DFW.NET 619-794-8383 (FAX) (619) 794-8373 Record last updated on 03-Oct-95. Record created on 03-Oct-95. Domain servers in listed order: NS1.CYBERWORKS.NET 206.170.116.21 NS2.PARANOIA.COM 207.239.130.25 WKP.COM 205.199.64.11 ---------- Cypherpunks (ANONYMOUS-DOM) PO Box 170608 San Francisco, CA 94117-0608 Domain Name: ANONYMOUS.NET Administrative Contact, Technical Contact, Zone Contact: Gilmore, John (JG150) gnu(a)TOAD.COM +1 415 221 6524 (FAX) +1 415 221 7251 Record last updated on 24-Jun-93. Record created on 24-Jun-93. Domain servers in listed order: CYGNUS.COM 205.180.230.20 RTL.CYGNUS.COM 205.180.230.21 ----------

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