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'Jim Beam' me up, Scotty!
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

scribve cypherpunks-thenextgeneration "Dr. Spook" <6UALDV8(a)cyberspace.9>

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Re: FBI_100
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

# Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Printed Ecash decoder now available
by Marc Briceno 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ian Goldberg <iang(a)cs.berkeley.edu> won the second part of the "turn Ecash into 2-D bar code and back into an Ecash payment" contest. Building on Jeremey Barrett's Ecash -> PDF417 encoder, Ian wrote an Ecash PDF417 encoder and decoder. http://www.isaac.cs.berkeley.edu/tools/pdf417-1.0.tar.gz It is now possible to print Ecash on a laser printer and scan it back in on a standard flat bed scanner. Possible applications include sending Ecash by fax or mail. Ian notes the following: "Also: these are general PDF417 tools; they can be used to encode any binary data, not just ecash (the decoder will _not_ be able to decode arbitrary barcodes; it doesn't know about "numeric compaction" mode and other things in the spec that the encoder doesn't actually use)." Congratulations to Ian for this accomplishment! -- Marc Briceno <mailto:marc@digicash.com> Ecash(tm) Electronic Cash Evangelist/Developers Support <http://www.digicash.com/>

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We're in Anguilla! Comon down!!!
by Bill Clinton 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

My fellow cypherpunks, I wanted to let you all know, we are having a great time, building a router to the 21st Century, down here in sunny Anguilla. Al and I will be wiring Anguilla's great high school for the internet. Afterwards, we'll meet with some longtime supporters of the democratic party for a beer. Spaces at the conference are still available, I didn't let those folks at American strike, so you have no excuses to be anywhere else next week. Willy Citizen Unit 429-92-9947

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test ping - cypherpunks@toad.com 12:32pm PST - ignore
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi! This is a test ping to verify whether mail to cypherpunks(a)toad.com gets forwarded successfully to one of the other cypherpunks lists, and how fast. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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Re: Excerpt on SPAM from Edupage, 11 February 1997
by ichudov＠algebra.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sean Roach wrote: > > At 04:45 PM 2/15/97 -0600, Igor Chudov wrote: > >Roy M. Silvernail wrote: > ... > >> Or that the money wasn't there in the first place (absent a trusted > >> signature system), or the key doesn't exist, or the wrong key is > >> offered, or the sender put the same e-dollar on all 60000 mails sie > >> sent and it's already been redeemed. > > > >Well, if the trusted party performs the encryption by both recipient's > >public key and the "retrieval key", the problem that you mention can > >be avoided. > Yeah. I as a spam artist send the "proof" message through the e-cash > verification center with the Send To: field returning it to a mail exploder. > Each receipient gets the same dollar. > This assumes that the To: field is not hashed into the verification > signature, and that the verification works like a glorified remailer. (cash > added on a separate channel). > Sean, No, it works the other way. The verification center gets $1000, creates 1000 $1 coins, signs them and encrypts each with the given recipients' public keys. The spammers gets these signed and encrypted coins, may superencrypt them and sends them to the recipients. As long as the trusted party is honest, there is no way to cheat. - Igor.

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ANNOUNCE:- RSAEuro
by RSAEuro General 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

ANNOUNCE:- RSAEuro Version 1.04 (Internet) and 1.10 (Commercial) ================================================================ What is RSAEuro? ---------------- RSAEuro is a cryptographic toolkit providing various functions for the use of digital signatures, data encryption and supporting areas (PEM encoding, random number generation etc). To aid compatibility with existing software, RSAEuro is call-compatible with RSADSI's "RSAREF(tm)" toolkit. RSAEuro allows non-US residents to make use of much of the cryptographic software previously only (legally) available in the US. RSAEuro contains support for the following: * RSA encryption, decryption and key generation. Compatible with 'RSA Laboratories' Public-Key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1. * Generation and verification of message digests using MD2, MD4, MD5 and SHS (SHS currently not implemented in higher-level functions to maintain compatibility with PKCS). * DES encryption and decryption using CBC (1, 2 or 3 keys using Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt) and DESX(tm), RSADSI's secure DES enhancement. Blowfish and RRC.2 encryption and decryption using CBC (available in commercial versions only). * Diffie-Hellman key agreement as defined in PKCS #3. * PEM support support for RFC 1421 encoded ASCII data with all main functions. * Key routines implemented in assembler for speed (80386 and 680x0 currently supported). * Much improved library documentation with code samples. International Use ----------------- IMPORTANT NOTICE: Please do not distribute or use this software in the US it is 'illegal' to use this toolkit in the US, as RSADSI and Cylink hold patents relating to public-key cryptography. If you are a US resident, please use the RSAREF toolkit instead. On The Web ---------- RSAEuro can now be found at http://www.sourcery.demon.co.uk/RSAEuro.html Author Details -------------- With comments and suggestions, please address them to Stephen Kapp, at 'rsaeuro(a)sourcery.demon.co.uk', for documentation comments suggestions please address them to Nick Barron, at 'nikb(a)sourcery.demon.co.uk' ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- RSAEURO: rsaeuro(a)sourcery.demon.co.uk RSAEURO Bugs: rsaeuro-bugs(a)sourcery.demon.co.uk Tel: +44 (0) 468 286034 Http: http://www.sourcery.demon.co.uk/rsaann.html RSAEURO - Copyright (c) J.S.A.Kapp 1994-1996. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: Questions about Naughty Robot (fwd)
by Genocide 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I got this message (on a system that I am webmaster on) regarding something that sounded so stupid it made me chuckle...Naughty Robot...I have enclosed the message below. If any of you have any idea what this user is talking about, any info would be appreciated. Personally it sounds like another "GoodTimes Virus" again... Genocide Head of the Genocide2600 Group ============================================================================ **Coming soon! www.Genocide2600.com! ____________________ *---===| |===---* *---===| Genocide |===---* "Courage is not defined by those who *---===| 2600 |===---* fought and did not fall, but by those *---===|__________________|===---* who fought, fell, and and rose again." Email: gen2600(a)aracnet.com Web: http://www.aracnet.com/~gen2600 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. It is by the Mountain Dew that the thoughts acquire speed, the lips acquire stains, the stains become a warning. It is by caffeine alone that I set my mind in motion. ================================================================================ Date: Sun, 16 Feb 1997 10:30:37 -0800 (PST) Subject: Re: Questions about Naughty Robot Resent-Date: Sun, 16 Feb 1997 12:10:54 -0800 (PST) >> Don't wanna bug ya too much, but I was wondering if you have ever heard >> of Naughty Robot, and whether or not if it is a hoax or Real? >> >> I had a customer in Tennesee who got an E-Mail saying that Naughty Robot >> has infected your host computer and consider all your credit cards >> stolen. >> >> I think it's a hoax, but the Admins at VR-NET Cafe say that they have >> been hit with it and say that it's a script that does hack into the >> IPS's server and sits back and watches the users browse the web and take >> the info they see on there screen and dump to some remote server?? >> >> I was wondering if you have heard about it...and if so can you direct to >> the right locations on the web to get the "Official" Scoop on it?

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*Really* Shameless, Gratuitous, FC97 DFA Hucksterism (Was Re: DFA)
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 1:29 pm -0500 on 2/16/97, John Young wrote: > Paul Bell wrote: > >does anyone know what has happened to DFA, and the people who > >just a few months ago were publishing such encouraging results? > > There seems be sustained investigation of DFA, offensive and defensive, > by Biham and Shamir, by Anderson and Kuhn, by the Bellcore team, by > Quisquater and others. > > However, the smartcard manufacturers appear to have a role in dampening > publicity about the ongoing research, or at least diminishing the claims of > effectiveness of DFA. At FC97 <http://www.offhsore.com.ai/fc97/> ;-), we have the following paper at 10:45 on Tuesday February 22nd: > Fault Induction Attacks, Tamper Resistance, and Hostile Reverse > Engineering in Perspective > David P. Maher (AT&T Labs--Research, Murray Hill, NJ, USA) I'm not sure whether which side of the fight this paper will be on, but it could be easy to speculate from the title. :-). On the other side of the coin, we invited Shamir to come talk about his DFA work, but eventually it turned out that he couldn't make the trip. Maybe next year. We *did* get Ron Rivest, though. (Shameless plug: Our *other* invited speakers are Simon L. Lelieveldt of the Dutch central bank, who'll talk about the security of electronic money, and Peter Wayner, the author of "Digital Cash", who'll talk about money laundering.) (*Really* shameless hucksterism: Since AA *didn't* strike, they're offering mucho cheapseat deals to places like Anguilla and St. Maarten, a short ferry ride away, even if you make your reservations on really short notice. Like, maybe to go to FC97? Nudge, Nudge. We can also get you *cheap* hotel rooms when you get there... Wink, wink, wink.) Meanwhile, the FC97 workshop (which runs the week prior to the conference itself) starts on Monday, and, having weathered the American Airlines non-strike, Ian Goldberg, Adam Shostack and Gary Howland are now all down in Anguilla getting things set up. I don't think people can get to *that* in time, but, hey, you could *try*, I suppose. Better get packing, though, 'cause time is running out. The workshop starts at 09:00 tomorrow. <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/> ;-). Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/ FC97: Anguilla, anyone? http://www.ai/fc97/

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Re: Query on "secure databases"
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Peter - here's my previous posting, with an addendum, Cc: cypherpunks At 04:43 PM 2/11/97 -0500, Peter Swire <swire.1(a)osu.edu> wrote: > Can you point me to anything I can read on "secure databases"? I >hadn't hit that term before. I am curious to what extent they are secure >due to cryptographic approaches, or to what extent you rely on other >mechanisms for keeping out unauthorized users. It's been a long time since I've looked much into it, since I was getting out of phone-company-defense-contractor mode at the time the field was developing. I think the NCSC Rainbow Book that deals with secure databases is the Purple Book, though it might be the Gray. Oracle and/or Sybase have done some work trying to do databases at the B1 or B2 level, but I don't know details. I'll talk about secure databases a bit, but for the real world there's more useful stuff that isn't related to them. =================== Begin "Secure Database" Section ============== At the time, the Orange Book (security for standalone computers) was well-understood, though there weren't really any systems above B2 level, and the Red Book was written, but nobody really had a clue how to implement multi-level machines on a multi-level LAN, though you could use encrypting Ethernet cards to get single-level machines of different levels on the same LAN, if they were all administered by the same group of people (so user-IDs and security levels worked across the entire system.) At the lower security levels, Orange Book techniques mainly involve removing bugs and adding accounting features. At the higher levels, the key is to come up with a good mathematical/logical model of interactions in your computer system, and then design a computer system that only does the things permitted by the model and prove it does that. Some of these systems use cryptographic techniques, including some of the capability-based systems - see Bill Frantz's KeyKOS work, which he's referred to on Cypherpunks occasionally. The objective is to have databases that can be accessed by multiple users with different sets of security permissions. In the military vernacular, this mainly means having UNCLASSIFIED, CONFIDENTIAL, SECRET, and maybe TOP SECRET data in the database, where not all users are cleared to the highest security level, and maybe projects X, Y, and Z, where users of project X may not have a need to know for project Y, etc. The easy problems are probably solved by now - either you do a good job of verifying the design and bug-free-ness of your database software so you can be sure that each request includes, and obeys, security levels, or you use crypto to encrypt the data items for each security level (e.g. everybody with a SECRET or PROJECT Z clearance shares a key for that data, which isn't really ideal for non-small groups of people, the database just tries to do a good job, and you only do operations in the database that make sense when the data is encrypted, though that's annoyingly restrictive for many applications.) The sticky problems are aggregation-related. It may be ok if an uncleared person knows that military base A has missile types 1, 3, and 5, and if the uncleared person knows where all your military bases are. But is it ok if the uncleared person knows about _all_ the missiles at _all_ the bases, and can tell that nobody's using Type 2 missiles any more, and that all the Type 4 missiles got moved to New Jersey last week? =============== End "Secure Database" section ================= =============== Begin "Real-World and Crypto" section ========= For the average person, though, the simple military models aren't really useful. You really care more about groups of people, though the multi-level stuff is sometimes a good way to keep machines from being hacked. But the real problem is that computers are very good at correlating information - if two different companies know your Social Security Number, and they share their data with each other (maybe for a price), then they can all tie together everything they each know about you. And there's no way to stop it, except by limiting the information you give people (which limits the transactions they'll do with you), or contractually limiting what they can do with it (good luck), or using multiple identities - and even then, computers are often good at guessing that the John Doe at 1234 Main Street is the related to Jane Smith at 1234 Main Street, and maybe the foreign car parts Jane bought on her American Express are for the Porsche registered to John, so there's a junk-mail opportunity. There's really only one technology that lets you avoid this, which is crypto and its relatives - though you still have to get people you use business with to use it, which is an uphill game. Some of the fundamental work on this is David Chaum's papers on Credentials without Identity (or something about like that, from ~1985.) For instance, you can have a voter registration number that's cryptographically signed by the voting bureau, but uses blinded signatures so they can't correlate the known good unique number with the Peter Swire who walked in and showed a picture ID one day. A driver's license smartcard could keep a pointer to your driving records, but wouldn't give your True Name, and would only show a cop that the person whose picture is on the front is a Licensed Driver, and maybe could demonstrate that the bearer knows the card's PIN. One big issue is that the government is pushing banks to demand SSNs, and requiring employers to demand SSNs (makes them easy Employee IDs), and pushing medical insurers and providers to use SSNs (makes it easy to collect Medicare data.) You can gain a lot of privacy just by having employers use their own employee-ID numbering system, so the travel agent subcontracting to Corporate Travel doesn't need your SSN on every form they fill out. But suppose the Social Security Administration and IRS issued you a bunch of separate numbers, that were either related using a cryptographic key, or just randomly picked and kept in a big database (maybe pointing to your old SSN), so you could give everybody who needs a Tax ID a different number, and only you and the IRS could correlate them. (To some extent, you can do this yourself by creating lots of companies, but it's a real pain and costs a certain amount of money.) =============== addendum ===================== Of course, for many transactions, the way to reduce the privacy problems is to use bearer certificates rather than book-entry approaches - pay cash, or digicash, rather than credit cards, use on-line anonymous delivery of bits, or picking up stuff in person, rather than mailing stuff to a snail address, etc. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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