- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

PGP as disinformation
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sergey Goldgaber wrote: >This is only a practical problem related to PGP's lack of popularity. >The proposed solution will work in the long run, assuming PGP achieves >great popularity. Thus, education of the public concerning PGP and remailers >will help make this solution more effective. > Has this list not considered the very real possibility that PGP is itself a rogue program released by the intelligence apparatus to detour we cyberpunks? As I have been arguing, the obvious is often false. While certain statists on this list are arguing in vain that I lack expertise in cryptographic matters, the truth is apposite this. Ask not for whom Bell toils, Dr. Roberts -- --

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the "Great Society". I *love* this list. Absolutely love it. Cheers, Bob Hettinga ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "Never attribute to conspiracy what can be explained by stupidity." -- Jerry Pournelle The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/rah/

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 10:55 PM 3/23/97 -0500, Robert Hettinga wrote: >Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it >makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, >whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest >welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative >act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration >camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > >Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that >is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take >what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > >In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal >freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist >Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from >productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which >in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People >who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the >"Great Society". Which is yet another of the many reasons I can espouse an "extreme" solution to the problem, but one that I can honestly claim to not consider "extreme" at all! The way I see it, the lives of these thugs are not sufficiently valuable to lose sleep over their loss, when to keep them around means the kinds of abuse society has suffered for many generations. Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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Re: "why privacy" revisited
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Robert Hettinga wrote: > At 8:48 pm -0500 on 3/23/97, Peter D. Junger wrote: > > On the other hand the strongest proponent of interning the Japanese > > was the governor of California: Earl Warren. > Thank you, Peter, for what I believe is the most singular example of the > two sides of the statism coin I've ever seen. > Seen with the traditional liberal/conservative political worldview, it > makes no sense for the famous compassionate liberal judge Earl Warren, > whose supreme court presided over the creation of the world's largest > welfare state, to advocate what is on its face an extremely conservative > act -- the internment of thousands of Japanese Americans in concentration > camps -- in his earlier role as a state governor. > Viewed from the statism/freedom standpoint, it is completely logical, that > is, "We're your nation-state. We're stronger than you are, and we'll take > what we damn well please from you, including your life, if necessary." > In the case of the Japanese concentration camps, it was taking the personal > freedom of Japanese Americans. In the case of the judicially activist > Warren court's welfare state, it was the confiscation of assets from > productive members of society in violation of the laws of economics, which > in turn caused misery for the increasing dole-dependant millions. People > who are now much less free than they ever were before the creation of the > "Great Society". Bob, It humbles me to realize that I had completely overlooked this example of the evil forces lurking in the background (and under the bed) being involved in the duplicity of even using the bleeding heart liberals to imprison and slowly bleed us of both our wealth and our freedom. If you wish to devote more of your time to exposing these types of dark undercurrents to those on the CypherPunks list, then Dale and I would be more than happy to run the eca$h lists for a while, to free up your time. (What are friends for, eh?) -- Toto "The Xenix Chainsaw Massacre" http://bureau42.base.org/public/xenix/xenbody.html

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I want to see your paper " A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices".
by Yu-Hyun Kim 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Dear Sir, Would you send me the full paper "A New Attack to RSA on Tamperproof Devices"? Yu-Hyun Kim yhkim(a)dingo.etri.re.kr

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Re: UK to ban free use of crypto?
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The document is at http://dtiinfo1.dti.gov.uk/pubs/ At 08:01 AM 3/23/97 -0500, Peter D. Junger wrote: >After a very quick reading of this proposal I am convinced that all it >would do if implemented by legislation that follows its recommendations >would be to forbid those who are in the UK from using an unlicensed >key escrow services. > >It quite clearly does not intend to ban the use of cryptography or the >publication of cryptographic software. And Michael Froomkin offers similar sentiments. They're both lawyers, and I'm not (:-), so they're expected to do a better job of reading the legal parts of it. On the other hand, the DTI says: 57.The legislation will provide that bodies wishing to offer or provide encryption services to the public in the UK will be required to obtain a licence. The legislation will give the Secretary of State discretion to determine appropriate licence conditions. and it's got a really broad definition of "encryption services", including even things such as time-stamping. The big problem is that the document has a really warped view of the cryptographic and business services that a "Trusted Third Party" would provide, and some parts are expressed in quite broad language. For instance, it implies that the TTP is being trusted with private keys, otherwise there would be no way for it to recover anything. On the other hand, from their Q&A: Q: Will a TTP be able to access an encrypted message ? A: No. It is important to be clear that it is not envisaged that the encrypted communication would be routed via the TTP. Nor will the TTP encrypt the message, it will merely assist (depending on the service offered) in the very complex area of key management or Key Certification. If the TTP is not encrypting the data, they don't need the secret key or your private key. They DO need your public key, to sign it, so a second party can trust that a key they have is really yours. But you and the second party can use the signed keys to exchange a secret session key, or to sign documents, without the TTP's help.* So their primary description of what a TTP would do does not involve escrow. Keys are used for three things - communications, signatures, and storage. As discussed above, for communications, the TTP doesn't need your private key, and there's no business need for anyone to have the keys to decode a communication unless they already have the cyphertext. Business applications that do require a third party to have a copy of your _message_ can be met by sending them a copy of your message, encrypted with their key, and the document explicitly says it's not talking about them. Similarly, cell-phone companies are providing encryption and routing, so this document claims not to be about them, though it regulates them. The only third parties who need just the session key itself are eavesdroppers and forgers, who are Untrusted Third Parties. For signatures, there's also _never_ a need for the third party to have the private keys - the function you Trust the Third Party to do is to certify that the holder of the key either is who he claims to be or has the permissions he claims to have (e.g. to write purchase orders or sign contracts for Company X.) And the document even states that "There is, of course no intention for the Government to access private keys used for only integrity functions." The main time you want another party to have a copy of your keys is for stored data: to cover the "employee dies" case (the document explicitly permits companies to handle their own keys without regulation, so no TTP is needed here), and the "you die, and your family digicash is in your encrypted file system" case, for which you can give a copy of your key to your spouse or solicitor, or keep it on a floppy in your bank safe deposit box, all of which cases are presumably covered by current law in the UK just as they are in the US. SO - what _is_ all this malarkey about "legal access" and "key recovery" and "key escrow" systems? The document claims repeatedly that it's not purporting to regulate any of the conditions under which a Third Party would ever be Trusted with the keys you actually encrypted something with. There's a whole lot of material about restricting who can be in the business and offer these services, seemingly designed to either restrict the emergence of new services or to be later expanded to cover other parts of the encryption business, such as supplying encryption software. And it's very unclear about whether it covers the encryption services used in inter-corporate projects such as Mondex - as a stockholder and customer of some of those companies, this concerns me. In particular, the expansion appears to be targeted specifically at the UK end of the Stronghold Apache-SSL web server, Adam Back's RSA Munitions Shirts, the PGP and Crypto Software distribution site at Oxford, and Ross Anderson. [*There are non-public-key systems where the TTP handles the secret keys, but they're typically older or specialized military or banking systems, where the TTP isn't an independent party, and are generally superseded by public-key systems now that the technology is practical.] # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

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UK TTP regs
by Greg Broiles 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Have spent some time reading over the paper re TTP/CA regulation in the UK. I don't think the paper is exactly a model of clarity, but my impression (from a few passes over it) is that it isn't intended to affect the distribution of software but is intended to affect people acting as CA's (including signing a friend's key) or as key escrow agents. But both this document and two of the three bills in the US Congress (Goodlatte and Leahy) look to me like "first shoes" which precede "the other shoe dropping", e.g., making use of a TTP/key escrow agent mandatory once there's a reasonable infrastructure in place. Regulating essentially informal and private transactions like key signing between associates strikes me as absurd - but not much more absurd than things done on this side of the Atlantic, of course. I do think there are interesting issues around certifying CA's and CA liability, but it seems like they can be addressed using existing legal theories/strategies - some mix of tort law and contract law should be sufficient. Criminalizing a PGP key-signing party is almost as stupid as threatening to criminalize PGP. My hunch is that legislatures in Europe as well as Congress are going to get around to trying that within a few years. All it's going to take is repeating the phrase "legitimate needs of law enforcement" and "a fair balance between law enforcement needs and industry needs" a few thousand more times and it'll all seem perfectly rational. Last week's hearing for the ProCODE bill totally ignored the right of individuals to be free from interception/eavesdropping, and seemed to focus on some sort of compromise between business (who's perceived as wanting to make money from exporting strong crypto, but the argument is structurally the same whether we're talking about export/import controls on wheat or cars or on crypto) and law enforcement (who's perceived as being, at worst, slightly overzealous in their pursuit of safety & tranquility for each and every American, perhaps to the detriment of business interests, apologies to those fine businesses & their investors, etc.) (* I missed the first 20 minutes or so, perhaps that's when this was discussed, but I'll bet not.) I don't think I heard the Fourth Amendment (or any similar concerns) mentioned even once, nor the consistent pattern (across tens of years, subject matter, internal jurisdictions, national boundaries, and ideology of the government in power) by which law enforcement grows contemptuous of the law itself and begins using its power to perpetuate itself and in various flavors of political or personal repression. I suppose it would have been impolite to mention the various Red Squads, the COINTELPRO operation against domestic dissident groups, harassment of antinuclear and anti-Contra activists, local police spying in Pittsburgh and Los Angeles and San Francisco (and surely many other places I haven't heard about, too), Ruby Ridge, Waco, Operation MOVE, and recent revelations that the FBI crime lab has been altering lab reports and offering perjured testimony against criminal defendants. Law enforcement abuses are not "aberrations" nor "unfortunate incidents" which could not be predicted nor are they unlikely to recur. The only real question is whether or not we want to give law enforcement tools which can only be misused in obvious ways (like guns, which make noise, or tanks or helicopters, which are easy to see/hear) or if we're going to give them tools (like secret wiretaps and access to crypto keys) which are very difficult to track or detect when used illegitimately. Between cops who fuck up for political reasons (see above) and spooks/cops who sell out just for money (Ames, Lonetree, and the rest of the sad parade I've already forgotten who've been willing to sell "top secret" material which they knew put their colleagues' lives in danger, as well as street-level corrupt cops who "look the other way", steal from suspects/defendants, "borrow" from evidence lockers, carry "throw-down" guns and the rest), it's hard to feel like this is an institution that deserves any real trust. It may be that society ends up with less net brutality and corruption if we let the SFPD or the LAPD or the FBI drive around with guns & radios than if we allowed the Mafia or the Crips or the Bloods to do that .. but it's really just "more brutality" or "less brutality". The lesser of two evils is still evil. Which is a lot of rant to say that I don't think the sky is falling in the UK just yet. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 4.5 iQEVAgUBMzZU2f37pMWUJFlhAQEO2wf+Lmuc6t8m1pdvcFt3EKsG6UEKoSIV9SUn e8QYrj2FFkCYUMS4Oh/FZ8T+wtgLRZ/z1eZQs5KUU1GMpP58j1KLS6K859Y9rvQs kFZqVwXzoLrD06Dn7Vr9AOxcqx0VC/692jEBoMsuqCjfL9VGDjIPFJFbPN900QQn mbbU5eL5567YGnYYd2Xe25zPDS4UWUiF7HKxgZF+mt619wOBVMRf9h8A853iA9h5 as156RPh1t5R4NGKwfGb+b8S5vmB5+tbTkFNLcPv2gcTl4xUHMnUST0I5BG6ww9C aV1Ove4muVg/Dw/vhbWixjGKI312uWQ+4lcRSaUOJ9j6XsKGUzxFEw== =Gnfa -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Greg Broiles | US crypto export control policy in a nutshell: gbroiles(a)netbox.com | http://www.io.com/~gbroiles | Export jobs, not crypto. |

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INFO: Pro-CODE hearing (photo, audio, & text) available online!
by Shabbir Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

========================================================================== _ _ __| | ___ _ __ ___ ___ ___ _ __ __ _ ___ _ _ _ __ ___| |_ / _` |/ _ \ '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / __| '__/ _` |/ __| | | | | '_ \ / _ \ __| | (_| | __/ | | | | | (_) | (__| | | (_| | (__| |_| |_| | | | __/ |_ \__,_|\___|_| |_| |_|\___/ \___|_| \__,_|\___|\__, (_)_| |_|\___|\__| |___/ Enhancing Participation in the Democratic Process Through the Internet _________________________________________________________________________ Update No.2 http://democracy.net/ March 20, 1997 _________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents - democracy.net Cybercast draws Thousands to Interactive Hearing - Upcoming Events - Volunteering for democracy.net - About democracy.net ___________________________________________________________________________ DEMOCRACY.NET CYBERCAST DRAWS THOUSANDS TO INTERACTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HEARING democracy.net, a project designed to explore ways of enhancing citizens participation in the democratic process via the Internet, held its first live, interactive cybercast of a Congressional hearing on Wednesday March 19th, 1997. Thousands of Internet users joined this historic event by listening to a live audio feed from the hearing (cybercast over the Internet via RealAudio), submitting questions and testimony for the hearing record, reading information about the hearing, and joining a simultaneous online discussion forum to discuss the hearing with Congressional staff and policy experts. The hearing was held by the Senate Commerce Committe to consider S. 377, the Promotion of Commerce online in the Digital Era (Pro-CODE) Act and this issue of US encryption policy -- a critical issue to the Internet user community. Some statistics from the event. * 6,019 individual Internet users visited the democracy.net web site containing information about the Hearing, links to both sides of the issue, and other relevant information in the 24 hours preceding the event. * 703 individuals listened to the hearing live online via Real Audio throughout the 3 hour event. The actual Senate hearing room (Russell 253) where the event took place only holds less than one hundred people when filled to capacity (as it was for this hearing). * Throughout the event, between 20 - 50 people joined the simultaneous live chat discussion where Commerce Committee staff and encryption policy experts fielded questions and discussed the hearing. The audience included individual Internet users, reporters, advocacy groups, and Congressional staff. * Twenty-three Internet users submitted formal comments for the hearing record via the democracy.net web page, including IETF chair Fred Baker. The democracy.net cybercast was promoted on the front page of Netscape's World Wide Web site (one of the most popular destinations on the entire Web) on March 18 - 19. The site is also featured at Progressive Networks WebActive Site of the Week for the week of March 17-21. Despite some technical bugs early on (par for the course for a cutting-edge Internet event such as this), the cybercast went even better than we anticipated. We are grateful to Brett Scott, Mike Rawson, Matt Raymond, Mike Inners, and Pia Pialorsi of the Senate Commerce Committee staff for their help and support of this effort. Archives of the hearing are posted http://democracy.net/events/03191997/ democracy.net is a new project of the Center for Democracy and Technology and the Voters Telecommunications Watch designed to explore ways of enhancing citizen particpation in the democratic process via the Internet. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of Webactive Panix, Digex, and the Democracy Network. Visit http://democracy.net/about/ for more details. ______________________________________________________________________________ UPCOMING EVENTS * April 10, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Rick White (R-WA), Co-Founder of the Congressional Internet Caucus * April 16, 8:30PM EST - Online town hall meeting with Rep. Anna Eshoo (D-CA), Key Representative from California's Silicon Valley and leader on Internet Policy issues. * Additional events are in the works -- please visit http://www.democracy.net for more details, and sign up for our event announcement mailing list. democracy.net town hall meetings will be moderated by Todd Lappin (Cyber Rights Editor for Wired Magazine). The town hall meetings are designed to bring interested members of the Internet community and key members of congress together to discuss current Internet policy issues. ____________________________________________________________________________ VOLUNTEERING FOR DEMOCRACY.NET A volunteer is needed to help index the RealAudio transcript of the hearing. If you would like to help, please do the following and mail the results to webmaster(a)democracy.net. To index the RealAudio transcript, please listen to the transcript and watch the time counter at the bottom right of the page. Please note the following beginning and ending times: -whenever a new witness begins their prepared testimony and, -whenever a question and answer section begins. Mail them to us at webmaster(a)democracy.net with the start and stop times of each section. Thanks! ____________________________________________________________________________ ABOUT DEMOCRACY.NET The democracy.net is a joint project of the Center for Democracy and Technology (CDT) and the Voters Telecommunications Watch (VTW) to explore ways of enhancing citizen participation in the democratic process via the Internet. To this end, democracy.net will host live, interactive cybercasts of Congressional Hearings and online town hall meetings with key policy makers. democracy.net is made possible through the generous support of WebActive, PANIX Internet, the Democracy Network, and DIGEX Internet. More information about the project can be found at http://democracy.net/about/ To receive democracy.net announcements automatically, please visit http://democracy.net/ _____________________________________________________________________________ end Update No.2 03.20.97 =============================================================================

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Re: BXA on Crypto Plans
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Fri, 21 Mar 1997 08:42:22 -0500 > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > From: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Subject: BXA on Crypto Plans > Reply-to: John Young <jya(a)pipeline.com> > Excerpt of BXA head William Reinsch statement on Goodlatte's > SAFEncryption Bill HR 695 on March 20, 1997: > > [...] > To that end, > we will shortly submit legislation intended to do the following: > > Expressly confirm the freedom of domestic users to choose any > type or strength of encryption. > > Explicitly state that participation in the key management > infrastructure is voluntary. > I think we should ponder the validity of the underlying assumption here - that there will be *one* PKI system, and (speculating here) (i) the government sets what it's requirements are, and (ii) they will include compromising one's private keys. > > Offers, on a voluntary basis, firms that are in the business > of providing public cryptography keys the opportunity to > obtain government recognition, allowing them to market the > trustworthiness implied by government approval. ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ This is a joke, right? Peter Trei trei(a)process.com Disclaimer: I do not represent my employer.

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 24 Mar 97 6:48:58 PST remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- nym config(a)nym.alias.net --###*+***## 18:54 100.00% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net #####+***### 1:55 99.99% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com #########+# 3:23 99.94% shaman remailer(a)lycaeum.org *+*++*+++-++ 23:55 99.92% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com +*++++++++++ 35:54 99.91% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----_-.----- 5:07:09 99.89% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 2:47:00 99.89% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net + - +++*+*** 35:59 99.69% exon remailer(a)remailer.nl.com #* #+#*#*+## 16:00 99.61% dustbin dustman(a)athensnet.com ++.+ ++ +++ 44:28 99.26% replay remailer(a)replay.com +*_ -**-** 4:29:56 99.15% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ** **** * ** 21:53 99.05% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de ++++--+++-- 4:36:01 98.56% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net * - +-+ 44:40 97.15% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com _ _. +- 51:47:04 88.89% extropia remail(a)miron.vip.best.com -_..- . 21:51:10 65.36% middle middleman(a)jpunix.com ++-+*+++ 35:43 46.02% haystack haystack(a)holy.cow.net ++ 52:19 26.11% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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