- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto
by Bill Stewart 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Subject: Re: Newsflash: PGP approved for export of strong crypto To: ddt(a)pgp.com, cypherpunks(a)toad.com Hi, Dave! Thanks for forwarding the press release to various lists. (Could you also forward this along to Mike Nelson? The press release didn't include his email :-) I was interested in a couple of issues. 1) Cool - especially doing it without GAK! This kind of thing is a major wedge in the export control regime, even if it is mainly for the big players first. 2) Are there explicit terms a company has to agree to to be allowed to export PGP to its non-US subs/branches, or is it just negotiation with the State Department? Does it take excessive expensive legal paperwork, or is it something just about anybody could do? Could Bill Stewart Consulting (i.e. just me) meet the requirements? After a company is approved, are there special record-keeping requirements, or could I just email or registered-US-Snail or DHL-mail a copy to my branch in Japan or the UK? (One of the interesting cases for me is subsidiaries that are joint ventures with other companies such as non-government-owned foreign telcos.) 3) Your press release said: > In order to provide only the strongest encryption software, > Pretty Good Privacy publishes all of its encryption source code > and algorithms for extensive peer review and public scrutiny. Does this mean that the non-encryption parts of your code probably won't be reviewed, at least in public? -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 5.0 beta Charset: noconv iQBVAwUBM46IIfthU5e7emAFAQEi4wIAnnS3BM1lZuw179QNq7unrr9IIBAEUI7e ww46TBni27NUL9F5vN54L2HYTlg15Je3hfMTPKcSQn6abAvT12e+Vg== =huGZ -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- BTW, the 5.0 plug-in to Eudora is nice! I'm having a little trouble guessing when it's going to include my signature block and when it's not, but so far I like it, and the Win95 PGPtray widget was also convenient. # Thanks; Bill # Bill Stewart, +1-415-442-2215 stewarts(a)ix.netcom.com # You can get PGP outside the US at ftp.ox.ac.uk/pub/crypto/pgp # (If this is a mailing list or news, please Cc: me on replies. Thanks.)

1 0

Apology
by MoneyMan＠goplay.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a formal apology for the Chain letter I sent you. I was not aware at the time that things such as these were illegal. Please be reassured that you will no longer be recieving any mail from me. I am once again sorry if I have caused you any problems. Eric

1 0

There's something wrong...
by nobody＠huge.cajones.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friday, May 30, 1997 - 21:07:32 MET > A major nail in the coffin of Justice for any accused in the U.S. > > was when the justice system promoted the concept of guilt by virtue > > of "circumstantial" evidence to the point where people can now be > > convicted as a result of speculation rather than evidence. Prosecutors > > now seem to need only to convince the sheeple that it was "possible" > > for the defendant to have commited the crime and that circumstantial > > evidence points *only* to the accused. Actually we are well passed that point. Jim Bell's arrest and pending prosecution amounts to thought crime. Its not "possible they commited a crime" now its possible that they "may" commit a crime. At Waco, dozens of innocents were killed, burned alive on national television in their home and church from an unwarranted, excessive use of force in order to serve a search warrant on David Koresh for what they "may" have been doing. No one was under indictment, under arrest or accused of an actual crime, yet through media manipulation that branded koresh and his followers Kooks, the nation watched another act of Statist-TV-Terrorism. The message through the medium this time?, "We don't need no stinking charges." Mandatory sentencing (a legislative and executive end run that usurps judiaciary power by eliminating judicial discretion) Terroristic Speech (a euphemism for 'thought crime' in many cases) are two examples of end runs around citizens contitutionaly protected rights that are being used daily to commit violent attacks on individual citizens civil rights.

2 1

PGPlib-0.2 available
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text To: pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de Subject: PGPlib-0.2 available Date: Fri, 30 May 1997 15:06:42 +0200 From: Tage Stabell-Kulo <tage(a)acm.org> Reply-To: tage(a)acm.org Sender: pgplib-announce-owner(a)petium.rhein.de Precedence: list -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Announcing PGPlib-0.2 ===================== We are pleased to announce a new verison of PGPlib. You can obtain the newest version (that is 0.2 as of today) from ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz In short, you will find a library that enables your software to read and write "packages" which can be decrypted and/or verified by means of PGP. In other words, you can incorporate PGP compatibility in your software without having to run PGP. When you uncompress and un-tar the file, you will obtain four files in the CURRENT directory. These files are README Describing how to preceed PGPlib-0.2.tar The library, manual pages and so on PGPlib-0.2.tar.asc A detached signature for verification pubkey.asc My public key (again, for verification) It is described in README how to verify the release you have obtained, how to unpack, what you will actually get when you unpack, and so on. What is there for you ===================== PGPlib is a library that lets you generate (and manipulate) PGP packets without having to run PGP. In particular there is code to generate and understand the following types of PGP packets: - Literal with filename, mode, etc. You can create literate packages from files, or from buffers, and create files from literate packets; - Convential encrypted (IDEA with Zimmermann's context sensitive feedback). The library can both read (decrypt) and write (encrypt) convential packets (in PGP format); - Armor. You can (de)armor a buffer or a file into a buffer or a file; - UserID packets are read and written in a variety of formats; - Keys can be obtained from a database (which is provided) or by parsing keyrings. Keys can be kept in buffers or on files; - You can maintain a PGP public-key database (I use this library to maintain a database with ~40.000 keys). There is code to use DBM as supplied from Berkeley or, if you prefer, GDBM from GNU; - You can verify RSA signatures on public keys and on buffers (files); - You can encrypt data (file or buffer) with public keys. The DEK is naturally written as a separate packet; - With a secret key you can sign other keys and buffers. Keys can be read from databases or files; they are decrypted on the fly. We have made a small program that will (de)armor anything, a parser to parse PGP files (including decryption and so on), a shell to manipulate a keydatabase, a keyserver to run on top of such a database, a program to verify signatures on keys and/or files, a program to split keyrings in smaller parts and a program that will sign files for you. You will find all these (and more) in the applications/ directory. None of these uses PGP, the library provides all the functionality you need. What you need ============= - You must have the SSLeay library as I have not implemented any cryptographic functionality; I hope SSLeay is a good choice. I did not major in mathematics and can thus not judge the quality of their work, although it looks solid (to me). I link with their version 0.6.6. I rely on SSLeay for great many things, in particular their BIGNUMs, RSA encryption and IDEA. I use "fprintf(stderr" when problems occur, but integration into the SSLeay "error-system" might happen. You can obtain SSLeay from: * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSL/ - SSLeay source * ftp://ftp.psy.uq.oz.au/pub/Crypto/SSLapps/ - SSL applications * http://www.psy.uq.oz.au/~ftp/Crypto/ssl.html - SSLeay Programmer Reference SSLeay is quite large and I only use a fraction of it. On the other hand, SSLeay seems to be well maintained and their crypto-library might very well shrink or become more modular as time passes. Your Feedback ============= Your feedback is solicited. Peter Simons <Peter.Simons(a)gmd.de> has created a mailinglist for PGPlib. To subscribe, send an e-mail to the address pgplib-dev-request(a)petium.rhein.de and write the command SUBSCRIBE into the BODY. If you want to be subscribed under a different address than the one you're mailing from, you can also use SUBSCRIBE yourname(a)somewhere.else to do the trick. To post to the list, send an e-mail to pgplib-dev(a)petium.rhein.de as usual. There is also an pgplib-announce(a)petium.rhein.de. Subscribe by sending an e-mail to pgplib-announce-request(a)petium.rhein.de with SUBSCRIBE in the body. The latter list will be very low-volume. If you write a nice application based on this library (the ultimate feedback :-), please feel free to send it to me and I will include it in the next release; Where to get PGPlib =================== ftp://dslab1.cs.uit.no/pub/PGPlib.tar.gz COPYRIGHT (yum, yum) ========= The library and included applications are all available under "Berkely style" copyright terms. Basically, this means that it is FREE for commercial and non-comercial use, and that you can do almost anything with the code. The only thing you can not do is to say that you wrote it. See the file COPYING for details. Let's go to work ================ I hope you like it, that you find is useful, that you will find no bugs, and that you will provide valuable feedback by means of the mailing list. Tage Stabell-Kul¯ Castelmaggiore, Italy 30. May 1997 //// Tage Stabell-Kuloe | e-mail: tage(a)ACM.org //// /// Department of Computer Science/IMR | Phone : +47-776-44032 /// // 9037 University of Tromsoe, Norway | Fax : +47-776-44580 // / "'oe' is '\o' in TeX" | URL:http://www.cs.uit.no/~tage/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.3ia Charset: latin1 Comment: Processed by Mailcrypt 3.2, an Emacs/PGP interface iQCVAwUBM47QfAMzZ6tx+9RpAQFHJQQAmsrh3sqgeRdOFscXWAb7/bV5ivdgnB4+ IpgGpGPMhNYfAzDJvz2rdvt1Z38NhLjOHOTEl+RhKGUGmc7cDXiaAE38Vh3OJIPu FijHtMgr++GdxZS5/WvcUxlvvMQjyjDaX84eG0clG1djYizMzR+7HwsIaaJeLtOb wlBORx01NRo= =Q5Ed -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ PGP Library Announcements --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

1 0

The Bible Code
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Published today with great fanfare, "The Bible Code" describes the fruits of three Israeli mathematicians in decrypting hidden messages in the Bible by textual analysis algorithms. Blurbs claim that the work passed peer review for publication in a math journal a few years back, was confirmed by "a US Defense Department code-breaker" and predicted the assassinations of JFK, RFK, Sadat and Rabin. The NYT reported on the fanfare a few days ago and quoted some who claimed that the Israelis' claims were examined and faulted when first published, that the book's bunkum, and that if enough analysis is done on any text, any message can be found -- holy writs being perdurable candidates. Even so, are any here familiar with the Israelis' work? Better, is this book the first of many to come to celebrate the cook-ups of codes and cyphers and algorithmic chefs? Is a film in the works, or, best, a Seinfeld of 0s and 1s?

1 0

Re: relevance to Hayek research?
by Robert Hettinga 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Mon, 19 May 1997 11:21:28 -0400 To: Gregransom(a)aol.com From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> Subject: Re: relevance to Hayek research? Cc: austrianecon(a)agoric.com, VPostrel(a)aol.com Bcc: X-Attachments: Greg Ransom just set my subscription to Hayek-L to "review" because of the DCSB announcement I sent both there and to AustrianEcon. Since I figure that this posting probably won't see the light of day on Hayek-L, I'll just send it here to AustrianEcon instead. :-). Of course, I'm not complaining, really. Greg can do anything he wants with Hayek-L. I mean, he owns it; the internet being alloidial, and all. But, I thought I'd clear the air here a little bit about why I thought the June DCSB meeting would be useful to people both on AustrianEcon, and, even :-), Hayek-L. At 7:29 pm -0400 on 5/17/97, Gregransom(a)aol.com wrote: > Can you motivate this posting to the Hayek-L list for > me? Wow. I feel like a method actor or something. Say hello to Mr. Stanislawski for me, would you, Greg? > It is important that all posting to the > Hayek-L list be relevant to Hayek and his work, appropriate for the research > community, and not overly promotional or commercial in nature, nor in the > vein of advertising. Yeah. Anything that smacks the least bit of capitalism should be strictly avoided in such an academic setting. Hey, even *I* understand that one. ;-). If it's any consolation, DCSB really *is* just a bunch of people who get together to have lunch on first Tuesday of the month. It's not like I'm leveraging the old Harvard Club membership to create a massive personal fortune, or something. :-). I do confess that I sent the announcement to both place, and mostly on impulse, because I thought people in the Austrian economics trade would want to hear about a relatively unique economic phenomenon on the net, particularly as it reveals interesting things about how the net's decreasing the "latency" of money changes, or at least better defines, all kinds of transaction processes, and, maybe, the underlying economics of same. Not only do the type of instantaneous, continuous, digital cash-settled recursive auctions that Fred Hapgood is going to talk about at the June 3rd DCSB meeting have the potential to remove any need for copyright law on the internet, which I'll get to in a moment, but they're the tip of the iceberg for something waaay bigger. The technology behind the digital cash these recursive auctions will eventually use is all by itself a nation-state killer. In the long run, anyway. <and now, for a few blatantly commercial messages...> Since the strongest form of David Chaum's "ecash" <http://www.digicash.com/> digital bearer certificate transaction settlement protocol doesn't require book-entries, it doesn't require the force monopoly of a nation-state to backstop its transaction clearing process. There's a quote which might be useful here. It's from FC97, the first conference on Financial Cryptography, which we held in Anguilla this February and (plug, plug) a conference I had the good fortune think up ;-) <http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97>. Doug Barnes, a fellow cypherpunk and now the Marketing VP for C2Net, a pioneering financial cryptography company in Berkeley <http://www.c2.net/>, said, during the legal session, "It's a bad idea when your internet payment protocol, in one of its terminating steps, says, 'and then you go to jail'". See my web page, <http://www.shipwright.com/>, for more details about this kind of stuff if you're interested. Also, see the debate I had in March with someone from the American Banking Association about the subject of digital bearer certificate technology. It's on HotWired's Brain Tennis site, <http://www.braintennis.com/>. Remember that, due to to the structure of the debate, he got in the last word, though. :-). <we now return you to the heresy trial, currently in progress> Now you can see why the war cry for most of my cypherpunk crypto-anarchist financial cryptography developer friends is "write software, not laws." That sounds pretty Hayekian, I'd say. Last September I was on the law enforcement panel, of all things, at the Institute, nee Office (go, Newt!), of Technology Assessment's "Symposium on the Regulation of Digital Cash". This thing was held in a conference room deep in the bowels of the Capitol Building. Yech. Talk about the lion's den. Anyway, they had me speaking, dead last in the whole symposium, immediately after the Justice Department's brand-new, wet-behind-the-ears and freshly-lobbied-for-by-the-EFF Assistant Attorney General for "computer crime", whatever that is. And, before him, and more to the point for our discussion here, spoke the Assistant Director of FinCEN. FinCEN stands for the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, a truly amazing government agency which has the ability to tell anyone with a credit card or checking account not only what his current bank balance is, but, through perfectly legal "administrative requests" to his bank, what his, say, total clothing and grocery expenditures were last year, categorized by store. Couple that with those wonderfully subpoenable scanner cards at your supermarket, and I would say that Orwell almost has his revenge with us, eaten very cold indeed, for being so far behind schedule with '1984'. Anyway, there I was, at ground zero, in the very belly of the beast, and, if I do say so myself, I was a wonder to behold. I scared them so bad that the everyone's eyes actually bugged out. Their jaws really bounced on the floor a few times in true Tex Avery fashion. Proving, once again, that cartoon physics really is the only kind of science they allow inside the Washington Beltway. I told the assembled unholy host of legislative aides, beltway bandits, and various other corridor-crawling symbionts to Le Infame Moderne that David Chaum's blind signature patent created fully anonymous digital cash (issued by private free banks, mind you), something they vaguely knew already and were gathered there to try to stop. But, even more frightening to statists everywhere, it was quite a simple matter, really, to use the same cryptographic protocol to create anonymously held digital *bearer* forms of any negotiable instrument you could care to imagine: bonds, stocks, futures, or any derivative thereof. I told them Perry Metzger's joke about "Gold Denominated Burmese Opium Futures". That was good for a titter or two of nervous laughter... Remember, of course, that, and increasingly so, most assets are financial, and thus completely convertable to digital bearer form if the transaction protocol for them turns out to be significantly cheaper than the book-entry settlement methods of the status quo. After all, it wasn't too long ago in financial history that paper bearer certificates were the norm. There's a lot of cultural memory still there. The word "coupon" as a synonym for bond interest is a perfect case in point. Then came the real bombshell. The guy from FinCEN absolutely agreed that if the transaction costs of digital bearer certificates proved to be an order of magnitude (or, say, three) lower than book entries, which I claim they will be (without proof, of course, just yet ;-)), FinCEN would be pretty much out of business. The whole "crime" of money laundering would become the equivalent of a "legislated" value for Pi. An example which, I might add, proves Avery's Laws of Cartoon Physics, um, reigns, in legislative bodies the world over, and not just inside the Beltway. "Actually, it's worse than that, ladies and gentlemen," I said, quoting myself. "Virtually *all* of the current tax infrastructure is based upon book-entries and the necessity of audit trails to verify tax compliance: capital gains, income and sales taxes, even import duties. Those audit trails are there primarily to prevent non-repudiation in the execution of a transaction protocol, that is, all the double-entry bookeeping between the buyer and the seller and the financial intermediary(ies) underwriting the trade. Those audit trails are *not* there to enforce taxes, believe it or not." They didn't get the point, so I drove it home. I said, "Without the requirement to prevent non-repudiation (and, I ask you, when was the last time you had a cash transaction fail to clear?), the marginal cost of tax compliance will become unsustainable over time. Uncle, and his relations elsewhere, are all going to have to figure out something else to tax, in other words. Now, *what*, exactly, do you need all that money for?" I had all the right people standing up and yelling at me at question time, so I knew I was on to something. :-). So, somewhere, Greg, I think Dr. Hayek must be laughing out loud. That's why this kind of stuff might be important to your readership. Oh. Yeah. I forgot. The actual topic of this missive. What's a "recursive auction"? Jason Cronk, who subscribes to AustrianEcon, by the way, did a talk on them at the rump-session of, you guessed it, FC97 in Anguilla. Ian Grigg, a major free banking fan, and also a subscriber, presented an idea which is exactly the obverse(?) for *his* paper, which was accepted for the main conference session. Ian's paper dealt with a way to organize the "buy" side of the same process. Springer Verlag will be publishing the conference proceedings sometime this summer, and I'll announce that here, if there's interest. Anyway, a recursive auction market, for lack of a better analogy, is kind of like institutionalized software piracy. I create something new and digital. I go on the net, and I sell the first copy to the highest bidder. Then I sell the next copy to the next bid, which, of course, is probably lower than the first. I keep on doing this until people stop bidding. Of course, everyone who buys what I'm selling can turn right around and sell it to someone else in turn, probably at a lower price than they bought it from me. This is the only instance I can think of where buying high and selling low makes you money. ;-). Well, on an item-price basis, anyway. Obviously, the total return is higher on the sell side than the buy side, or nobody would be foolish enough to buy anything from you for resale. Just by forgetting the whole quasimystical issue of "rights" to electronic intellectual property (which, like the current "intellectual capital" craze, is, at best, a polite regulatory fiction), timeliness of content is rewarded, as is novelty, which keeps people who create new stuff right on cranking it out. A person who's invested in a big switch and bandwidth, or who has the most valuable use of any other kind, can afford to pay more for earlier, "fresher", copies of something than someone without the same net.resources. Because, for instance, in the case of the person with all the bandwidth, he can resell copies faster than anyone else. A person who doesn't need something badly can wait a while and pick it up at a lower price after the initial feeding frenzy's over. Finally, the person who continually invents something new gets paid as soon as something he makes becomes usable to anybody at all. The things which get sold can be anything from a jotted down brainstorm, to the first draft of a novel, to more perishible "content", like an hour of teleoperated surgery, say. So, for works of art, whatever that means, copyright law becomes superfluous. More to the point, given sufficient attention to such matters, *all* parties in recursive auction transactions can be completely anonymous, and everything still works. I mean, when was the last time you had to produce identification for a cash transaction? Okay, besides at the bank, and even then for deposits greater than $10k. That's the very exception which proves the rule, obviously. Cartoon physics comes to banking. Remember, again, book-entries cause book-entry taxation and regulations, not vice versa. Anyway, whether at the increasingly hysterical legislative cartoons, or because of the now sandy foundations of the nation state, again, Hayek, somewhere, *must* be laughing, Greg. Cheers, Bob Hettinga Moderator, The Digital Commerce Society of Boston (among other things...) --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Philodox e$, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire' The e$ Home Page: http://www.shipwright.com/

2 1

Government Conspiracy
by nobody＠hidden.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Timmy C. Mayflower sexually molests little children, farm animals, and inanimate objects. < > < > V )_.._( V Timmy C. Mayflower \\ <____> // ~ <______> ~ > /~\______/~\ // /~\_____/~\ /_\ /~\____/~\ /_\ /~\___/\~\ _/_\/ \___/\__/__\/ \___/__\/ There's something wrong when I'm a felon under an increasing number of laws. Only one response to the key grabbers is warranted: "Death to Tyrants!" ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^1398269 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

1 0

INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE; FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS Date: May 29, 1997 Expires July 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Encryption battle heats up in the House Experts assail government key recovery plans What YOU CAN DO NOW! Background What's at stake How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts _____________________________________________________________________________ ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security online. The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon. The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies. The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls. For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Pointers to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform U.S. encryption policy are attached below. Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign. Instructions are attached below. ________________________________________________________________________________ CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems. The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach. The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ ________________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. Adopt Your Legislator Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies a head of us in Congress. Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own legislator's telephone number and address. In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder the future of the Internet. Best of all, it's free. Do your part, Work the Network! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details. 2. Spread the Word! Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the importance of this issue. Please do not forward after July 1, 1997. _____________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND Complete background information, including: * A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users * Analysis and background on the issue * Text of the Administration draft legislation * Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy * Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings on encryption policy reform * And more! Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S AT STAKE Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. ______________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir(a)vtw.org will be ignored. _____________________________________________________________________________ PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org _____________________________________________________________________________ End crypto-news =============================================================================

1 0

Clinton on privacy and the Internet
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 29 May 1997 22:04:03 -0500 From: Andrew Shapiro <ashapiro(a)interport.net> To: telstar(a)wired.com, declan(a)well.com Subject: Clinton on privacy Todd and Declan: I assume you've both seen this quote about privacy (below) from Clinton's commencement speech last week. Declan, you might want to put up on the FC list -- if you haven't already. Cheers, Andrew *** From: http://www.epic.org/privacy/laws/clinton_speech_5_18_97.html#privacy Third, technology should not be used to break down the wall of privacy and autonomy free citizens are guaranteed in a free society. The right to privacy is one of our most cherished freedoms. As society has grown more complex and people have become more interconnected in every way, we have had to work even harder to respect the privacy, the dignity, the autonomy of each individual. Today, when marketers can follow every aspect of our lives, from the first phone call we make in the morning to the time our security system says we have left the house, to the video camera at the toll booth and the charge slip we have for lunch, we cannot afford to forget this most basic lesson. As the Internet reaches to touch every business and every household and we face the frightening prospect that private information -- even medical records -- could be made instantly available to the world, we must develop new protections for privacy in the face of new technological reality. (Applause.)

2 1

INFO: Encryption battle heats up in House; experts weigh in (5/30/97)
by Shabbir J. Safdar 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

============================================================================= ____ _ _ _ / ___|_ __ _ _ _ __ | |_ ___ | \ | | _____ _____ | | | '__| | | | '_ \| __/ _ \ _____| \| |/ _ \ \ /\ / / __| | |___| | | |_| | |_) | || (_) |_____| |\ | __/\ V V /\__ \ \____|_| \__, | .__/ \__\___/ |_| \_|\___| \_/\_/ |___/ |___/|_| PRO-ENCRYPTION BILL CLEARS SECOND CONGRESSIONAL HURDLE; FACES TOUGHER TEST IN COMING WEEKS. CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOVERNMENT KEY RECOVERY PLANS Date: May 29, 1997 Expires July 1, 1997 URL:http://www.crypto.com/ crypto-news(a)panix.com Redistribution of crypto-news is allowed in its entirety. _____________________________________________________________________________ Table of Contents Encryption battle heats up in the House Experts assail government key recovery plans What YOU CAN DO NOW! Background What's at stake How to start or stop receiving crypto-news Press contacts _____________________________________________________________________________ ENCRYPTION BATTLE HEATS UP IN THE HOUSE On May 14th, the House Judiciary Committee approved a bill designed to dramatically enhance the ability of Internet users to protect their privacy and security online. The bill now moves to the House International Relations Committee, where it is expected to face tougher opposition from the FBI, NSA, and the Clinton Administration. The International Relations Committee is expected to consider the bill soon. The Security and Freedom through Encryption Act (SAFE - HR 695) will prohibit the government from imposing mandatory law enforcement access to private online communications inside the US, affirm the right of American Citizens to use whatever from of encryption they choose, and relax current export restrictions which prevent the development of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies. The Clinton Administration, led by the FBI and the National Security agency, opposes SAFE and is pushing for a policy of domestic restrictions on the use of encryption, guaranteed law enforcement access to private communications via government designed "key-recovery" systems, and continued reliance on out-dated, cold-war era export controls. For the first time in history, Congress is close to passing real encryption policy reform legislation which will protect privacy, promote electronic commerce, and recognizes the realities of the global Internet. Pointers to additional information on the SAFE bill and other efforts to reform U.S. encryption policy are attached below. Congress needs to hear from you! If you value your privacy and care about the future of the Net, please take a few moments to join the Adopt Your Legislator campaign. Instructions are attached below. ________________________________________________________________________________ CRYPTOGRAPHERS AND COMPUTER SECURITY EXPERTS ASSAIL GOV'T. KEY RECOVERY PLANS On Wednesday May 21, a group of leading cryptographers and computer scientists released a report which for the first time examines the risks and implications of government-designed key-recovery systems. The report cautions that "The deployment of a general key-recovery-based encryption infrastructure to meet law enforcement's stated requirements will result in substantial sacrifices in security and cost to the end user. Building a secure infrastructure of the breathtaking scale and complexity demanded by these requirements is far beyond the experience and current competency of the field." The report substantially changes the terms of the ongoing debate over US encryption policy. For more than four years, the Clinton Administration has pushed for a policy of continued export restrictions on strong encryption, and the development of global key escrow and key recovery systems to address the concerns of law enforcement. The study, the first comprehensive analysis of the risks of key recovery and key escrow systems, calls into question the viability of the Administration's approach. The Report's authors, recognized leaders in the cryptography and computer science field, include Hal Abelson, Ross Anderson, Steven M. Bellovin, Josh Benaloh, Matt Blaze, Whitfield Diffie, John Gilmore, Peter G. Neumann, Ronald L. Rivest, Jeffery I. Schiller, and Bruce Schneier The report is be available online at http://www.crypto.com/key_study/ ________________________________________________________________________________ WHAT YOU CAN DO NOW 1. Adopt Your Legislator Now is the time to increase our ranks and prepare for the fight that lies a head of us in Congress. Please take a few minutes to learn more about this important issue, and join the Adopt Your Legislator Campaign at http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ This will produce a customized page, just for you with your own legislator's telephone number and address. In addition, you will receive the latest news and information on the issue, as well as targeted alerts informing you when your Representatives in Congress do something that could help or hinder the future of the Internet. Best of all, it's free. Do your part, Work the Network! Visit http://www.crypto.com/adopt/ for details. 2. Spread the Word! Forward this Alert to your friends. Help educate the public about the importance of this issue. Please do not forward after July 1, 1997. _____________________________________________________________________________ BACKGROUND Complete background information, including: * A down-to-earth explanation of why this debate is important to Internet users * Analysis and background on the issue * Text of the Administration draft legislation * Text of Congressional proposals to reform US encryption policy * Audio transcripts and written testimony from recent Congressional Hearings on encryption policy reform * And more! Are all available at http://www.crypto.com/ ________________________________________________________________________ WHAT'S AT STAKE Encryption technologies are the locks and keys of the Information age -- enabling individuals and businesses to protect sensitive information as it is transmitted over the Internet. As more and more individuals and businesses come online, the need for strong, reliable, easy-to-use encryption technologies has become a critical issue to the health and viability of the Net. Current US encryption policy, which limits the strength of encryption products US companies can sell abroad, also limits the availability of strong, easy-to-use encryption technologies in the United States. US hardware and software manufacturers who wish to sell their products on the global market must either conform to US encryption export limits or produce two separate versions of the same product, a costly and complicated alternative. The export controls, which the NSA and FBI argue help to keep strong encryption out of the hands of foreign adversaries, are having the opposite effect. Strong encryption is available abroad, but because of the export limits and the confusion created by nearly four years of debate over US encryption policy, strong, easy-to-use privacy and security technologies are not widely available off the shelf or "on the net" here in the US. A recently discovered flaw in the security of the new digital telephone network exposed the worst aspects of the Administration's encryption policy. Because the designers needed to be able to export their products, the system's security was "dumbed down". Researchers subsequently discovered that it is quite easy to break the security of the system and intrude on what should be private conversations. This incident underscores the larger policy problem: US companies are at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace when competing against companies that do not have such hindrances. And now, for the first time in history, the Clinton Administration has DOMESTIC RESTRICTIONS on the ability of Americans to protect their privacy and security online. All of us care about our national security, and no one wants to make it any easier for criminals and terrorists to commit criminal acts. But we must also recognize encryption technologies can aid law enforcement and protect national security by limiting the threat of industrial espionage and foreign spying, promote electronic commerce and protecting privacy. What's at stake in this debate is nothing less than the future of privacy and the fate of the Internet as a secure and trusted medium for commerce, education, and political discourse. ______________________________________________________________________________ HOW TO START OR STOP RECEIVING CRYPTO-NEWS To subscribe to crypto-news, sign up from our WWW page (http://www.crypto.com) or send mail to majordomo(a)panix.com with "subscribe crypto-news" in the body of the message. To unsubscribe, send a letter to majordomo(a)panix.com with "unsubscribe crypto-news" in the body. Requests to unsubscribe that are sent to shabbir(a)vtw.org will be ignored. _____________________________________________________________________________ PRESS CONTACT INFORMATION Press inquiries on Crypto-News should be directed to Shabbir J. Safdar (VTW) at +1.718.596.2851 or shabbir(a)vtw.org Jonah Seiger (CDT) at +1.202.637.9800 or jseiger(a)cdt.org _____________________________________________________________________________ End crypto-news =============================================================================

1 0