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17 Dec '03

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New CIA Rule on Information Access
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The CIA has published in the Federal Register today interim rules and soliciting comments prior to adoption of final rules to implement its obligations under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and Executive Order 12958 provisions relating to classification challenges by authorized holders, requests for mandatory declassification review, and access by historical researchers. http://jya.com/cia061697.txt (150K)

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"dustbin"} = "<dustman(a)athensnet.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek mix reord middle"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 16 Jun 97 6:49:32 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de +--+--+--+- 1:51:30 99.94% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de +-+++-+--+- 1:48:38 99.93% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net -###_____.+- 31:17:55 99.88% balls remailer(a)huge.cajones.com ####+# -+## 37:39 99.73% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com --.-.-...-. 10:15:59 99.71% replay remailer(a)replay.com ** * **-++* 7:46 99.62% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca ***** ++ ++* 12:39 99.58% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net ---+_---.--- 2:05:48 99.44% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ** * **+++** 21:08 98.20% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ---------- - 6:05:20 98.03% lucifer lucifer(a)dhp.com ++ ++++-+++ 42:58 97.94% nym config(a)nym.alias.net # 2:46 51.51% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Kerrey bill introduced in Senate (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 17 Jun 1997 19:09:09 -0400 > From: Robert Hettinga <rah(a)shipwright.com> > Subject: Kerrey bill introduced in Senate > Sen. Kerrey's evil "Secure Public Networks Act" was introduced in the > Senate today, cosponsored by Sen. McCain. > > The bill, if passed, would: > > Criminalize breaking another person's ciphertext for the purpose of > violating their privacy, security, or property rights; (goodbye, Netscape > bugs bounty and DES/RC4 cracks) (s. 105(3)) Actualy it would prevent me from cracking your ciphertext, it does not prevent me from trying to crack my own ciphertext. Since I am supplying the plaintext it is clear that I can continue to test Netscape or any other algorithm. It also implies, by specificaly mentioning privacy, that you can give me permission to attempt to crack your ciphertext. It, intentionaly or not, give you the individual the choice and not Uncle Sam. > Criminalize intercepting another's intellectual property for the purpose of > violating intellectual property rights (s. 105(4)) I have absolutely no problem with making it illegal for you to packet sniff my network when your specific goal is to take internal information against my will and use it against me. I think this is the kind of law that needs to be made. I would however suspect that existing law covers this quite thoroughly. > Require federal government purchasers of crypto equipment to buy GAK > crypto; (s. 202, 204) The federal government can require whatever the hell it wants of itself. I don't work for them anymore and would not consider it in the future. When they start telling me that I have to do something for their convenience, then and there I have a major bitch. > Require crypto products purchased with federal funds for use on a public > network to employ GAK crypto; (s. 203, 205) See above. > Legalize the export of 56-bit DES crypto; (s. 302) Ain't much, but it is a step in the right direction. I mean, 64-bit ain't that far from 56, and shoot if your gonna give me 64 how about 128 since it is ONLY twice as 'large'. > Criminalizes the issuance of signature certificates by registered CA's for > encryption keys if the user has not complied with GAK procedures; (s. > 407(a)(4)) When did they pass a law requiring registration of CA's in the first place? Or is this another law that only applies to voluntarily registered government CA's? And just exactly what is the ANSI/ISO standard of said registrant? RFC? > Criminalizes requesting a signature certificate for an encryption key from > a registered CA if the user has not complied with GAK procedures; (s. > 407(a)(5)) I don't understand this. Is the person asking committing the crime for asking for a signature certificate without complying with GAK processes? Or is the person refusing to register their key with a CA after the CA received a request from a third party? > Allows the Secretary of Commerce to "make investigations, obtain > information, take sworn testimony, and require reports or the keeping of > records by .. any person", to the extent necessary to enforce the Act; (s. > 701(a)) Are you saying they must require everyone in a particular business class to comply with their regulatory mechanations without exception OR that they will be able to force such regulatory excesses as they can squeeze out of an individual person/business? > Allows the Secretary of Commerce to subpoena witnesses and documents in any > State at any designated place; (s. 701(b)(3)(A)) Their enforcement agents already have this power since they are considered federal agents equivalent to DEA or FBI (Hint: NEVER argue with a guy wearing NOAA, NASA, USGS, DoA, etc. *AND* a badge). > Allows the Secretary of Commerce to impose civil/adminstrative penalties of > up to $100K for violations of the Act; (s. 702(1)) Without trial? ____________________________________________________________________ | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http:// www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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About Golf Balls
by ballman＠t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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About Golf Balls
by ballman＠t-1net.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=====> WE WANT YOU TO KNOW MORE ABOUT GOLF BALLS <======= Lets Take Air For Example.... All of us know how tough it is to hit a good shot in windy conditions. We assume therefore that air is just another natural element we must out wit in order to score well. In reality, AIR is what makes it possible for us the hit the ball as far as we do. The SPIN we impart on a ball actually gives the ball lift, much like the wing on an aircraft imparts lift. This lift makes it possible for the ball to stay airborne longer, enabling it to travel further. In a vacuum, the average 250 yard drive would only travel about 180 yards. A winged aircraft would not fly. Air is your Friend....::)) Now here's one for you......Does a ball fly farther on a hot dry day or cold wet day??....How about a hot humid day or a cold dry day ? Let me know what you think. Golfballs Unlimited USA reclaims balls from over 130 courses in 13 states. We stock over 50 varieties of balls. If you're an average player, by the time you have played 3 holes with a new ball, you are playing with a ball that's in much worse condition than our premium balls. We offer the highest possible quality recycled balls available...at direct pricing....HUGE SAVINGS over new balls. Yes we have BALATAS. Customer Satisfaction Is Absolutely Guaranteed. If you would like a free catalog, just send me an email. Click Here For Free Catalog Regards, Dana Jones The Ballman ps..I have worked carefully to see that this educational information goes only to those who may have an interest. If you do not, please send me back message with remove as the subject. I will not mail you again. Our Mission: To Be The Best (As Determined By Our Customers) Suppliers of Quality Recycled Golf Balls BUY SELL TRADE

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Anguilla surpasses US military in code breaking challenge.
by Vincent Cate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Press Release Anguilla, June 16, 1997 Anguilla surpasses US military in code breaking challenge. The Caribbean country of Anguilla has searched through more than 2,380,000,000,000 code keys as part of the Deschall effort to break a DES encrypted message. This is in response to a challenge by RSA Inc to show that DES 56 bit keys are not large enough given the rapid advances in computing technology. As of June 16th, the entire US military effort, represented by Internet machine names ending in ".mil" in the Deschall statistics pages, has searched fewer keys. Anguilla host names end in ".com.ai". Anguilla is a free and democratic country, that does not limit key lengths. Offshore Information Services organized the Anguilla effort. OIS also hosted a conference in Anguilla called "Financial Cryptography 97" in February of this year. Deschall: http://www.frii.com/~rcv/deschall.htm RSA: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/97challenge/ Offshore: http://www.offshore.com.ai/ Statistics: http://www.frii.com/~rcv/krstat/ FC97: http://www.offshore.com.ai/fc97/ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Vincent Cate Offshore Information Services Vince(a)Offshore.com.ai http://www.offshore.com.ai/ Anguilla, BWI http://www.offshore.com.ai/vince ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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Need Your Immediate Help To Stop Censorship by FCC's Reed Hundt
by constitution99＠hotmail.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

TO THE INTERNET COMMUNITY Need your help before June 19th Rogue FCC (AKA FEDERAL CENSORSHIP COMMISSION) -- Chairman Hundt has put his sights on the 1st Amendment. Seems free speech is inconvenient for him. Hundt trying to ban liquor, a legal product, advertising on TV.Makes no sense. Commissioners Quello and Chong telling Hundt to get lost. Give them your support. Need to hear from you by June 19th. Copy E-mails to the addresses listed below: rhundt(a)fcc.gov rchong(a)fcc.gov jquello(a)fcc.gov president(a)whitehouse.gov vice.president(a)whitehouse.gov stopcensorship(a)juno.com Censorship is alive-and-well in the good ol' U.S. of A. Reed Hundt, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission wants to make it the FEDERAL CENSORSHIP COMMISSION. Hundt wants to ban liquor, a legal product, advertising on TV. Only good Americans can reign in Hundt. Help us to stop censorship. Let the Hundt and other FCC Commissioners and the White House know your concerns. Copy E-mails to the addresses listed below: rhundt(a)fcc.gov rchong(a)fcc.gov jquello(a)fcc.gov president(a)whitehouse.gov vice.president(a)whitehouse.gov freespeech1(a)juno.com Renegade federal regulator - FCC's Reed Hundt - trying to ban liquor advertising on TV. What's the difference between beer, wine and liquor? None. Let Hundt and other FCC Commissioners and White House know what you think - copy e-mail to: rhundt(a)fcc.gov rchong(a)fcc.gov jquello(a)fcc.gov president(a)whitehouse.gov vice.president(a)whitehouse.gov stopcensorship(a)juno.com Right to free speech? Renegade federal regulator - FCC's Reed Hundt - says only beer and wine companies have right to advertise on TV. Hundt is trying to ban liquor advertising on TV. Protect free speech, let FCC and White House know what you think - copy e-mail to: rhundt(a)fcc.gov rchong(a)fcc.gov jquello(a)fcc.gov president(a)whitehouse.gov vice.president(a)whitehouse.gov freespeech1(a)juno.com ymr - massmail

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Re: [DES] Anguilla surpasses US military in code breaking challe
by Peter Trei 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: Vincent Cate <vince(a)offshore.com.ai> > To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Anguilla surpasses US military in code breaking challenge. Vince writes: > Press Release > Anguilla, June 16, 1997 > > Anguilla surpasses US military in code breaking challenge. > > The Caribbean country of Anguilla has searched through more than > 2,380,000,000,000 code keys as part of the Deschall effort to break a DES > encrypted message. This is in response to a challenge by RSA Inc to show > that DES 56 bit keys are not large enough given the rapid advances in > computing technology. As of June 16th, the entire US military effort, > represented by Internet machine names ending in ".mil" in the Deschall > statistics pages, has searched fewer keys. Anguilla host names end in > ".com.ai". Anguilla is a free and democratic country, that does not limit > key lengths. NOT a press release, but true. Framingham,MA , June 16, 1997 Process Software surpasses Anguilla in code breaking challenge. The small software firm of Process Software has searched through more than 25,600,000,000,000 code keys as part of an independent effort to break a DES encrypted message. This is in response to a challenge by RSA Inc to show that DES 56 bit keys are not large enough given the rapid advances in computing technology. As of June 16th, the entire US military effort, represented by Internet machine names ending in ".mil" in the Deschall statistics pages, has searched fewer keys. Anguilla host names end in ".com.ai". This represents 5965 2^32 key segments, or 0.035% of the total keyspace. We've got a long way to go. It's worth noting that the DESChall people claim to have now searched over 23% of the keyspace, and at the current rate will have searched the whole thing about 3 months from now. They have not released their source code for independent evaluation. I for one would feel a lot more comfortable with DESChall if there was at least some outside review, even if no general release is made. Peter Trei trei(a)process.com

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DREI 97: Cryptography and Network Security
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/drei/1997/schedule/DREI97_ad_Research.htm DIMACS Research & Education Institute DREI 97 Cryptography and Network Security July 28 - August 15, 1997 Rutgers University, NJ Speakers and papers (abstracts available at the site): Martin Abadi, Digital Systems Research Center, DEC "Strengthening Passwords" Ross Anderson, Cambridge University, "Medical Records Security" and "Steganography" Alex Biryukov, Technion "Cryptanalysis of the Portz Interconnection-Network Block-Cipher" and "Cryptanalysis of RC5" Daniel Bleichenbacher, Bell Labs "Comparing RSA and RSA-Type Cryptosystems Over Elliptic Curves" Gilles Brassard, University of Montreal "The Impact of Quantum Mechanics on Cryptology" Ran Canetti, IBM "Towards Realizing Random Oracles: Hash Functions That Hide All Partial Information" and "On the Adaptive Security of Multiparty Protocols" Benny Chor, Technion "Private Information Retrieval" Claude Crepeau, Universite de Montreal "Cryptographic Power of Noisy Channel" Cynthia Dwork, IBM "Positive Applications to Lattices of Cryptography" Carl Ellison, Cybercash, Working Cryptanalysis of the German Enigma" and Key Management in the Post-Identity Era" Yair Frankel, Sandia "New Techniques for Sharing Cryptographic Functions" Matthew Franklin, AT&T Labs - Research, "Ecash and the Power of Positive Paranoia" Rosario Gennaro, IBM "How to Sign Digital Streams" Stuart Haber, Surety Technologies, "Ensuring the Integrity of Records On Line: How to Time-Stamp a Digital Document" Jack Lacey, AT&T Labs - Research, "Music on the Internet and the Intellectual Property Protection Problem" Susan Landau, University of Massachusetts at Amherst "Cryptology, Technology and Policy" David P. Maher, AT&T Labs - Research "Security Models for Partially Accounted E-Cash Systems" Dalia Malkhi, AT&T Labs - Research "Auditable Metering with Lightweight Security" Moni Naor, The Weizmann Institute "A Formal Teatment of Remotely Keyed Encryption" Hilaire Orman, DARPA "The Imperfection of Secrecy in Real Network Protocols" Pino Persiano, University of Salerno "A Transparent Distributed Cryptographic Filesystem" and "Randomness-Efficient Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs" Marcus Ranum, Network Flight Recorder, Inc., "Hacking and Networked Terrorism" and "Problems with the Firewall Concept" Mike Reiter, AT&T Labs - Research "Toward Acceptable Metrics of Authentication" Fred Schneider, Cornell University "Mobile Code Security Issues" Rich Schroeppel, University of Arizona "Fast Arithmetic in GF[2^156]" Adi Shamir, The Weizmann Institute "A New Paradigm for Massively Parallel Random Search" and "Cryptanalytic Fault Attacks" Martin Strauss, AT&T Labs - Research "Proxy Cryptography" and "A Formal Teatment of Transactional Trust Management" Edlyn Teske, University of Manitoba "Space Efficient Group Structure Computation Using Pollard's $\rho$-Method"

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