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Keep Feds' nose out of the Net, by Sen. John Ashcroft
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sun, 13 Jul 1997 22:53:17 -0700 (PDT) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: Keep Feds' nose out of the Net, by Sen. John Ashcroft >Copyright (c) 1997 Investors Business Daily, All rights reserved. >Investor's Business Daily - Guest Editorial (07/11/97) >Encryption: Keep Feds' Nose Out Of The Net >By SEN. JOHN ASHCROFT > > J. Edgar Hoover would have loved this. The Clinton administration wants >government to be able to read international computer communications - >financial transactions, personal e-mail and proprietary information sent >abroad - all in the name of national security. > >In a proposal that raises obvious concerns about Americans' privacy, >President Clinton wants to give agencies the keys for decoding all exported >U.S. software and Internet communications. Such a policy also would tamper >with the competitive advantage that our U.S. software companies currently >enjoy in the field of encryption technology. > Not only would Big Brother be looming over the shoulders of >international cybersurfers, he also threatens to render our state-of-the-art >computer software engineers obsolete and unemployed. > Granted, the Internet could be used to commit crimes, and advanced >encryption could disguise such activity. However, we do not provide the >government with phone jacks outside our homes for unlimited wiretaps. Why, >then, should we grant government the Orwellian capability to listen at will >and in real time to our communications across the Web? > The protections of the Fourth Amendment are clear. The right to >protection from unlawful searches is an indivisible American value. > The president has proposed that American companies and computer users >supply the government with decryption keys to high-level encryption programs. >Yet European software producers are free to produce computer encryption codes >of all levels of security without providing keys to any government authority. > Buyers of encryption software value security above all else. They will >ultimately choose airtight encryption programs - not those for which the U.S. >government maintains keys. > In spite of this obvious fact, the president is trying to foist his >rigid policy on the exceptionally fluid and fast-paced computer industry. >Furthermore, recent developments in decryption technology cast doubt on the >wisdom of any government meddling in this industry. > Two weeks ago, the 56-bit algorithm government standard encryption code >that protects most U.S. electronic financial transactions, from ATM cards to >wire transfers, was broken by a low-powered 90-megahertz Pentium processor. > In 1977, when this code was first approved by the U.S. government as a >standard, it was deemed unbreakable. And for good reason - there are 72 >quadrillion different combinations in a 56-bit code. However, with today's >technology, these 72 quadrillion different combinations can each be tried >-it's only a matter of time and determination. > Two days after this encryption code was broken, however, the Senate >Commerce Committee voted, in accordance with administration policy, to force >American software companies to perpetuate this already compromised 56-bit >encryption system. > Meanwhile, 128- bit encryption software from European firms is available >to every Web user. Interestingly, European firms can import this supersecure >encryption technology (originally developed by Americans) to the U.S., but >U.S. companies are forbidden by law from exporting these same programs to >other countries. > So to move forward with the president's policy or the Commerce >Committee's bill would be an act of folly, creating a cadre of government >peeping Toms and causing severe damage to our vibrant software industries. >Government would be caught in a perpetual game of catch-up with whiz-kid >code-breakers and industry advances. > Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., has signaled his objection to both >proposals. He and I would like to work to bring to the floor a version of the >encryption legislation by Sen. Conrad Burns, R-Mont. Burns' bill closely >resembles the popular House encryption bill sponsored by Rep. Bob Goodlatte, >R- Va. Both measures would not require sharing of keys with the goverment. > In essence, these proposals would give U.S. encryption software >manufacturers the freedom to compete on equal footing in the worldwide >marketplace. They would set up a quasi-governmental board for the industry to >decide encryption bit strength based on the current level of international >technology. > U.S. companies are on the front line of online technologies - the value- >added industries of the future. > The best policy for encryption technology is one that can rapidly react >to breakthroughs in decoding capability and roll back encryption limits as >needed. The Burns and Goodlatte proposals would accomplish this. In contrast, >the Clinton administration's unnecessary and invasive interest in >international e-mail is a wholly unhealthy precedent, especially given this >administration's track record on FBI files and Internal Revenue Service >snooping. > Every medium by which people communicate can be exploited by those with >illegal or immoral intentions. Nevertheless, this is no reason to hand Big >Brother the keys to unlock our e-mail diaries, open our ATM records or >translate our international communications.## > > John Ashcroft is a Republican U.S. senator from Missouri and a member of >the Senate Commerce Committee.

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No Subject
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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17 Dec '03

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Spread Spectrum Update
by James M. Atkinson, Comm-Eng 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

=========================================== TSCM-L Technical Security Mailing List Monday, July 14 1997 Postings: TSCM-L(a)tscm.com Unsubscribe: unsubTSCM-L(a)tscm.com Subscribe: subTSCM-L(a)tscm.com Admin: jmatk(a)tscm.com =========================================== Several weeks ago I had a chance to examine a number of spread spectrum microwave bugging devices. Since that time I've conducted some analysis and gathered further intelligence on the circuit. Here are a few of my observations. ======= C O N F I D E N T I A L ======== 1) Most of the products use a high bandwidth QPSK/BPSK modulator, multi channel audio CODEC, and a RISC micro-controller chip (all components are either surface mounted ICs or multiple dice potted in epoxy). 2) RF Circuit seems to be a simple homodyne audio transmitter (6 Ghz Gilbert Cell Mixer) which is driven by a single CPU/microcontroller (with a clock speed of 180 Mhz). 3) Frequencies used for the ultra low power device are clean from 130 Mhz to 4 Ghz, circuit starts to fail above 5.5 Ghz (but is still operable to about 8 Ghz). 4) Emitter is driven directly from vector modulator chip, with no power amp circuits. PIN diode found on output appears to provide gain control or disconnect of circuit, but provides no amplification of signal. 5) Noise floor of circuit is -135 dBm (below 2 ghz), -142 dBm (2-4 ghz), and -150 dBm above 4 Ghz. 6) Signal has a variable bandwidth which varies between 350 Mhz and 900 Mhz. Appears to be designed for a 900 Mhz bandwidth signal. Device operates "deep" inside the noise floor. 7) Virtually impossible to detect at close range with a conventional RF spectrum analyzer (492/494/8566/etc). 8) Detectable with most wideband systems (with IF BW above 300 - 900 Mhz, 700 Mhz ideal). 8) VCC = +3.0 VDC, all circuits functional 2.3 to 6.8 VDC 9) Output applied to PIN diode ranges between -28 and -42 dBm (depending on frequency and span) 10) Device enters some type of sleep mode when power is present but audio level is low (seems to auto squelch). Total current draw when in sleep mode is 12 µA. Device does not emit RF energy when in sleep mode. ------------- 11) One of the devices has no type of connection for external power, but instead uses a uses a network of Schottky diodes and capacitors which constitute an effective RF to DC converter. 12) The RF to DC circuit requires an un-modulated 10-15 Ghz RF signal, and seems to respond well to X-Band microwave motion detectors used for many corporate alarm systems. 13) Device also has a small microphone built onto the circuit, microphone measures 4.5mm * 1.6mm * 4.1mm. 14) Entire device measured 3.2 cm * 5.2 cm and about 3 mm thick (or about the thickness of a standard business envelope). 15) Device contains some type of adhesive on both sides of a foil backing. Suspect it's applied as some type of "sticky label". Once the device is installed any attempt to remove results in its total destruction (unless you freeze it off). 16) The French government has been know to use a similar device in some of its "Diplomatic" activities. -jma ======================================================================== "For those who risk, life has a flavor the protected shall never enjoy." ======================================================================== James M. Atkinson Phone: (508) 546-3803 Granite Island Group - TSCM.COM 127 Eastern Avenue #291 http://www.tscm.com/ Gloucester, MA 01931-8008 jmatk(a)tscm.com ======================================================================== The First, The Largest, The Most Popular, and The Most Complete TSCM Counterintelligence Site on the Internet ========================================================================

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{"extropia"} = "<remail(a)miron.vip.best.com> cpunk pgp special"; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"exon"} = "<remailer(a)remailer.nl.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"haystack"} = "<haystack(a)holy.cow.net> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"lucifer"} = "<lucifer(a)dhp.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"balls"} = "<remailer(a)huge.cajones.com> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"middle"} = "<middleman(a)jpunix.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek reord"; $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"wazoo"} = "<remailer(a)wazoo.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"shaman"} = "<remailer(a)lycaeum.org> cpunk pgp hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"hidden"} = "<remailer(a)hidden.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix) (weasel squirrel) The alpha and nymrod nymservers are down due to abuse. However, you can use the nym or weasel (newnym style) nymservers. The cyber nymserver is quite reliable for outgoing mail (which is what's measured here), but is exhibiting serious reliability problems for incoming mail. The squirrel and winsock remailers accept PGP encrypted mail only. 403 Permission denied errors have been caused by a flaky disk on the Berkeley WWW server. This seems to be fixed now. The penet remailer is closed. Last update: Mon 14 Jul 97 6:47:04 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com ..-.--*.-*.+ 7:06:50 99.95% weasel config(a)weasel.owl.de -+++.++--++ 2:00:20 99.91% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -+++.++--+++ 2:00:46 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +#*###+*#*#+ 1:36 99.82% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net ----.------+ 5:42:48 99.78% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net ++***# ***** 8:13 99.71% replay remailer(a)replay.com *****+*** * 4:23 99.25% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca **++.*+ ** * 13:03 99.10% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net -***+ **+ - 1:02:17 98.68% hidden remailer(a)hidden.net 4:44:03 -14.70% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Re: Making Imaginary Sex Illegal
by Martin Janzen 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Alan Olsen writes: > http://www.wired.com/news/news/politics/story/5153.html > Making Imaginary Sex Illegal > by Ashley Craddock > 12:05pm 14.Jul.97.PDT Is there such a thing as child porn which doesn't > involve children? Logic would say no, but adherence to the rules of > reason has never been a hallmark of the United States Congress, > particularly when it comes to hot-button issues like child protection. > [...] It's even less of a hallmark of the Canadian government; we've had this sort of thing for a while. From the Electronic Frontier Canada archives: >1. R. v. Pecciarich (sentencing) [1995] O.J. No. 2238 > http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/court/R.v.Pecciarich-sentence.html > > This summarizes the penalty (2 years probation, with various conditions) > given to Canada's first person convicted of computerized kiddie porn. Apparently he was convicted on obscenity charges for scanning in and modifying pictures from department store catalogs. However, he was acquitted of distribution because it couldn't be proven that he did the actual uploading. (The lesson being, don't digitally sign all of your outgoing traffic automatically?) >2. Lawyer's Weekly - Pecciarich case > http://www.efc.ca/pages/media/lawyers-weekly.23jun95.html > > Here's what the lawyer's said amongst themselves about > the Pecciarich decision. tzeruch(a)ceddec.com, or maybe nobody(a)mars.ceddec.com, writes: >If "computer-simulated" images are legal, how can you tell that it is >computer simulated? Everyone will then claim to be a talented artist, or >use reverse aging algorithms on adult porn photos, or [...] That's a good point, and will almost certainly come up in someone's defence arguments sooner or later. The cypherpunkish answer, I believe, would be to say that images of any sort should not be illegal, but the means by which they were produced may be. In other words, do what you want on your computer, as long as you leave real kids alone. Of course, actual laws on the subject will bear no resemblance to the CPish solution... MJ

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17 Dec '03

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Jerry Springer Crypto Special
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sitting at home this morning I decided to turn the TV to the Jerry Springer show, assuming that, since his network was trying to promote him as a News person, his show would no doubt be dealing with a serious issue such as the future of the InterNet, encryption, censorship, etc. Instead, the show turned out to be titled, "I Cut Off My Manhood." It was a delightfully artful mosaic about a guy who cut off his penis with gardening shears, the queer stalker who had killed the penisless guy's cat by throwing a recliner across the room, the stalker's lesbian friend and two fairly average relatives of the self-mutilater who apparently were there to confirm for us that cutting off one's penis with a pair of gardening shears is a bit over the edge, to say the best. Although I was disappointed in that encryption issues were not being addressed on the show, I did get somewhat enlightened as to what we can do to help spread strong encryption. The Jerry Springer audience got to see pictures of the mutilated penis (I assume in close-up color glossies) while those of us at home had to be content to watch the audience members groan and try not to throw up. I immediately realized that if the show had been on WebTV and pictures of the mutilated penis were available to home viewers in encrypted form, that "Applied Cryptography" would soon be on the Best Seller lists around the nation. Thinking about crypto issues from the standpoint of female body parts, I realized that GAK and Key Recovery are likely to become a part of our everyday reality because Silicon Valley Crypto has the same allure as Silicon Breasts. We live in a bottle-fed society that has learned from infancy to accept substitutes for the real thing. From topless bars to the beach, we are willing to settle for the illusion that matches the advertised product our minds have been sold, rather than accept the forms that exist in reality and take the time and effort to find ones that truly suit our needs and desires. Is a society that eats food that sometimes has less nutritional value than the package it comes in, are the masses going to demand "the real thing" in a crypto product, or will they settle for a watered down product which "meets government standards" and comes in a pretty box? The masses don't have the time or expertise to test the nutritional value of their food or the security of their crypto. They depend on the government, corporations and the press to provide them with the products and information to make a rational choice as to what truly meets their needs. The government's main interest is power over the citizens; the corporation's main interest is profiting from the citizens; the press' main interest is pandering to government and corporations enough to be kept from getting cut "out of the loop" of money and power. The only hope the masses have of getting anything resembling a square deal in regard to the products and information they are fed is for there to be enough individuals within the government, corporations and the press who are willing to resist the mindless, self-perpetuating evolution of these non-human entities, and make an effort to provide products and information which have real value based on the goals which they are designed and advertised to meet. There was a discussion on the list as to whether the cypherpunks who have "gone corporate" are a blessing or a curse to the spread of strong crypto. I think that the answer lies in the individual and in the final product of their efforts. Perhaps crypto needs Colonel Tom Parker to promote it, with Barnum and Baily bringing the Silicon Rockettes to town to give away pictures of of a mutilated penis which can only be viewed using a strong crypto product. ("As seen on the Jerry Springer show!") The Dark Forces are making a concerted bid to set the direction and the tone of crypto debate and crypto development in a manner which will lead to the negation of the constitutional right to have our freedom and our privacy unfettered by government intrusion. It is not government, nor corporations, nor the press, who ultimately decide whether our freedom and privacy will be maintained or whether it will be compromised. It is the individuals who make a decision whether to go along with the abrogation of our rights in their own individual self-interest, or whether they will speak out and/or resist those who put the goals of organizations over the interests of the people. Our government and our society are being directed by manipulation of the same mob mentality that is in evidence on the morning talk shows. The voice of reason gets shouted down unless there are enough people who realize that the answer to noise is more noise. The greater the position and authority of an individual, the more noise they are able to make to counter the efforts of those who are attempting to work the mob into a frenzy for their own aims. Thus the greater is their responsibility to act in the long-term interest of freedom. At the same time, unless there are people of conscience at every level of government, corporation and society who are willing to take a personal stand, and to support those in higher positions who take a stand, then freedom is doomed. There is a Swiss bank security guard who discovered bank records about to be shredded which detailed the accounts of Jews who were victims of the Holocaust. He chose to resist "going along" with the government laws, corporate rules, and societal taboos against making a decision based on one's own conscience, and he "stole" the records in order to prevent them from being destroyed. He was threatened with death, prosecution, had to leave his home and country behind and faces an uncertain future. There is a cost to resisting the fascism of organizations and of society itself, and the less that resistance is spread among us, then the greater the cost that each of us has to bear. Resist. Make noise. The freedom you save could be your own. TruthMonger

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law as enemy: was Re: Jim Bell reference
by Antonomasia 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Paul, Ant> Makes me think the issue is the preservation of many Ant> thousands of _unathorised_ taps. What else could explain that viewpoint? PB> Don`t cloud the issue: The simple fact is strong encryption can and will PB> obstruct law enforcement agencies in their "fight" against terrorism, PB> child pornography, drugs etc... good. Strong widespread crypto will cut down on much crime in the form of electronic theft, blackmail etc. I expect some obstruction of law enforcement, but not enough to outweigh the benefits. Despite the occasionally glaring failures of a legal system it is still overall of use to the public. Ant> Incidentally, I'm against terrorism, child molestation etc etc. Ant> I'm confident most other cypherpunks are too, so no nonsense please Ant> about free crypto supporters being backers of [crime of the month]. PB> Once again, you fail to give adequate qualification to this statement, PB> what forms of terrorism are you against: one mans terrorist is another PB> mans freedom fighter. Were the French resistance during WWII terrorists? Not everything is relative. WW2 was a clearly recognised war, in which France had been invaded. PB> Would you then say their actions were wrong? As for child molestation, PB> this is a clear cut case, most libertarians follow the basic rule that a PB> crime has to be a direct act of agression, and infringe the rights of PB> another person, therefore child molestation clearly comes into this PB> category, distributing pictures of children being molested, raped, PB> buggered, tortured and killed is clearly not a crime. Please clarify your PB> position on this. Such photography would suggest at least cooperation with those you'd regard as criminals. My position is toward the Trei/Sameer end of the scale and away from the extreme anarchist views of you, TCM and Jim Bell. Not that you 3 are always wrong, but in the issue of 'law always enemy' I completely fail to see where you get your ideas. Sufficiently clarified ? PB> Above are two examples of why strong cryptography is a good thing, law PB> enforcement should be routinely obstructed as often as possible. Are you going to post your home address and holiday plans on the list so we give you the chance to gloat over failing law enforcement ? There's probably not much point in pursuing this discussion. -- ############################################################### # Antonomasia ant(a)notatla.demon.co.uk # # See http://www.notatla.demon.co.uk/ # ###############################################################

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