- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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Re: [cryptography] attacks against bitcoin
by Ian G 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/06/11 8:16 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > How safe is the bitcoin cryptosystem and the communication network > against targeted attacks? It depends on what the intention or objective of the attack is. And that depends on the threat actor. For example, a phishing threat actor would be looking to steal money. Whereas the state actor would be looking to figure out who is doing what, to attack out of band. A competitor would look to attack the reputation, by e.g., disruption to reliability or mud flinging. A retailer / consumer would look to dump liability. Insiders would look to extract rents. Each of these interests from diverse parties result in different attractivenesses to different threat scenarios, many of them uncorrelated. Some of the scenarios and assets can be protected ("mitigated") by tech/crypto, but typically most cannot, and require non-tech mitigations. To go any distance on this, you'd rapidly end up doing a major risk analysis, a lot of work. The alternative is to start from the classical CIA, etc. The problem with that is it that it is someone else's threat model, not yours. You really don't want to discover who that someone is after you've built your system, it'll so ruin your appetite. iang ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Secrecy News -- 06/20/12
by Steven Aftergood 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Format Note: If you cannot easily read the text below, or you prefer to receive Secrecy News in another format, please reply to this email to let us know. SECRECY NEWS from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy Volume 2012, Issue No. 60 June 20, 2012 Secrecy News Blog: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ ** DNI DIRECTIVE SEEKS TO TIGHTEN PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE ** HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, AND MORE FROM CRS DNI DIRECTIVE SEEKS TO TIGHTEN PROTECTION OF INTELLIGENCE Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper issued a directive earlier this month to improve the protection of intelligence information and to help prevent unauthorized disclosures. The newly revised Intelligence Community Directive 700 requires a new degree of collaboration between counterintelligence and security activities. While counterintelligence (CI) was scarcely mentioned in the previous version of the policy on protecting intelligence in 2007, it is now being elevated to a central role and integrated with security. http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-700.pdf "Together, CI and security provide greater protection for national intelligence than either function operating alone," the new directive states. In order to combat the insider threat of unauthorized disclosures, the directive prescribes that "all personnel with access to national intelligence... shall be continually evaluated and monitored...." But since there are more than a million government employees and contractors holding Top Secret clearances who are potentially eligible for access to intelligence information, it seems unlikely that any significant fraction of them can literally be "continually monitored." Still, that is now formally the objective. A copy of the June 7, 2012 directive on "Protection of National Intelligence" was released by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence under the Freedom of Information Act. The new directive has been under development for at least several months. It was not specifically devised as a response to the latest controversy over leaks of classified information. It serves as a reminder that the implementation of revised policies to address unauthorized disclosures of classified information (including congressional action just last year to establish an "insider threat detection program") is ongoing, possibly obviating the need for new legislation. HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, AND MORE FROM CRS A 2008 report by the Congressional Research Service discussed the history of claims of executive privilege, including various unresolved questions surrounding its use. The Obama Administration asserted executive privilege today in connection with records sought by a House Committee. See "Presidential Claims of Executive Privilege: History, Law, Practice and Recent Developments," updated August 21, 2008: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/RL30319.pdf Newly updated reports from the Congressional Research Service that Congress has not made publicly available include the following. U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, June 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32496.pdf Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, June 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf Madagascar's Political Crisis, June 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40448.pdf Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests, June 15, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33453.pdf U.S. Trade Deficit and the Impact of Changing Oil Prices, June 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22204.pdf Unauthorized Alien Students: Issues and "DREAM Act" Legislation, June 19, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33863.pdf Federal Taxation of Aliens Working in the United States, May 18, 2012: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21732.pdf _______________________________________________ Secrecy News is written by Steven Aftergood and published by the Federation of American Scientists. The Secrecy News Blog is at: http://www.fas.org/blog/secrecy/ To SUBSCRIBE to Secrecy News, go to: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/subscribe.html To UNSUBSCRIBE, go to http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/unsubscribe.html OR email your request to saftergood(a)fas.org Secrecy News is archived at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/secrecy/index.html Support the FAS Project on Government Secrecy with a donation: http://www.fas.org/member/donate_today.html _______________________ Steven Aftergood Project on Government Secrecy Federation of American Scientists web: www.fas.org/sgp/index.html email: saftergood(a)fas.org voice: (202) 454-4691 twitter: @saftergood ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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by Jim Choate 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> > Let's face it, shit like hotmail, AOL, MSN, and their cousins are really > > socialism in disguise. They allow the morons access to what they > > shouldn't have. > > Now THERE is socialism, deciding what others should have and want based > on your own personal convenience. Some people confuse "socialism" with anything that enables the "weak" to survive. They forget that if there's a profit in it, capitalists would do it. I agree with Jim once again; dang! [Fortunately, it didn't happen in a long time.] Mark

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Re: [cryptography] attacks against bitcoin
by Ian G 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 12/06/11 8:16 PM, Eugen Leitl wrote: > > How safe is the bitcoin cryptosystem and the communication network > against targeted attacks? It depends on what the intention or objective of the attack is. And that depends on the threat actor. For example, a phishing threat actor would be looking to steal money. Whereas the state actor would be looking to figure out who is doing what, to attack out of band. A competitor would look to attack the reputation, by e.g., disruption to reliability or mud flinging. A retailer / consumer would look to dump liability. Insiders would look to extract rents. Each of these interests from diverse parties result in different attractivenesses to different threat scenarios, many of them uncorrelated. Some of the scenarios and assets can be protected ("mitigated") by tech/crypto, but typically most cannot, and require non-tech mitigations. To go any distance on this, you'd rapidly end up doing a major risk analysis, a lot of work. The alternative is to start from the classical CIA, etc. The problem with that is it that it is someone else's threat model, not yours. You really don't want to discover who that someone is after you've built your system, it'll so ruin your appetite. iang ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Thesis: Improving Tor using a TCP-over-DTLS Tunnel
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi folks, Joel Reardon has finished his thesis at U Waterloo under the guidance of Ian Goldberg. He looked at switching Tor's transport from TCP to UDP. There are still many unsolved problems before we can do the switch, but the thesis walks through a lot of the issues as well as future work. It's definitely worth a look. http://uwspace.uwaterloo.ca/handle/10012/4011 --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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