- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

technical spam prevention
by Vladimir Z. Nuri 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

the problem of spam prevention has concerned me for a long time. the Internet was designed to withstand a nuclear attack-- yet it is incredibly vulnerable to spam. the initial assumption was that all nodes on the network are friend, not foe, i.e. trusted. this concept is breaking down as the net scales massively. some people warned long ago that spam would become an increasing problem on the net as it scaled, and that the technical visionaries would wise to try to cooperate and come up with approaches. such a point of view is not popular on this list, which is not really big on collaboration (despite that some of the greatest successes and fame have come from it, such as via the code cracking ring). but increasingly events are forcing people to come together to come up with solutions. there are many promising approaches to spam prevention. the one I like is a system whereby the receiver can specify how much money it costs to receive an email from anyone. the mail is rejected if it doesn't contain this fee. different people can configure their incoming mail different. Gates may charge, say, $1000. joe schmoe would charge, say, $1. an interesting part of this model is that if someone you like sends you mail, including the fee, there is nothing to prevent you from reimbursing them in a return message (or paying their own fee with the money they supply). such a system would be a very powerful spam prevention system. (due credit goes to TCM for being one of the first for advocating this.) however, I would like to suggest that spam prevention is a great test for a *reputation*system*, something we have talked about a long time here but found it very difficult to implement. the reputation system would rate people based on their lack of email complaints, and allow queries that could screen email based on poor ratings. such a system would not immediately block spam, but it could be implemented in a way such that spam becomes far less powerful. there are two problems with spam that any designer has to confront. there are some internet providers who do not want their users to spam. if they inserted a few header into the outgoing mail such as the following, it would allow excellent screening heuristics: 1. total bytes sent through this email address. 2. total age of this account in days. the sender is free to calculate the ratio if it prefers, or use various heuristics on the straight values themselves. now, I consider this pretty easy. the more difficult problem is that there are some IPs that do not wish to ban spammers-- they may be making a business out of it. a reputation system that weeds out these sites may be buildable-- but it's the most difficult problem. I think a lot of fame and glory will go to someone who invents effective spam prevention mechanisms-- increasingly I think the future of cyberspace depends on solving this very difficult and seemingly intractable problem. (if anyone can point me to a mailing list that focuses on technical spam prevention, I'd appreciate it.)

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Not quite as much Blood in the Streets (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > From: frissell(a)panix.com > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 09:32:46 -0500 > Subject: Not quite as much Blood in the Streets > The Net teaches even old dogs new tricks. From the Laissez Faire Books > catalog: > > http://www.lfb.org/investment.html#iv7644 > > ***************** > > James Davidson and William Ress-Mogg > > THE SOVEREIGN INDIVIDUAL > How to Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare State > by James Dale Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg > > In their newest work, the authors of Blood in the Streets and The Great > Reckoning predict increased autonomy for the individual as information > technologies advance and old institutions crumbleincluding the welfare state > itself. Along with an array of provocative predictions (government will > declare war on groups that try to circumvent income tax through cyberspace; > central banks will lose control over the money supply as cybercash supplants > paper money; the U.S. government will shrink) Rees-Mogg and Davidson offer > investment advice and strategies for coping. Check the archives, I've made several posts about this book. It *SUCKS*, the authors can't make up their minds, use poor logic, use examples which if researched even a little become clearly incompatible with their thesis, etc. Spend your money elsewhere. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Gilmore to speak on encryption policy at UMBC (Tues, Dec 16)
by Dr. Alan Sherman 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The UMBC Security Technology Research Group presents Two Divergent Views on Encryption Policy: I. Wisdom and Constitutionality in U.S. Cryptography Policy John Gilmore, Co-Founder, Electronic Frontier Foundation II. A Government Perspective on Encryption Policy [Will anyone from the U.S. Government agree to speak??*] Two divergent views on the topic of encryption policy by freedom activist John Gilmore and by a government official, if one agrees to speak. Journalist Peter Wayner will moderate the event, which is free and open to the public. Note: If no one from the U.S. Government is willing to explain and discuss Government encryption policy, then the event will proceed with John Gilmore alone. 8-10:30 pm Tuesday, December 16, 1997 Lecture Hall III (in Administration Building) University of Maryland Baltimore County http://www.cs.umbc.edu/events/fall97/crypto.shtml The fifth employee of Sun Microsystems and a strong believer in the U.S. Constitution, John Gilmore is currently involved in litigation against several government agencies over matters of freedom of information, freedom of expression, and encryption policies. He will discuss the constitutionality of controlling encryption. Directions: Take Exit #47B off interstate I-95 and follow signs to UMBC. LH III is on the ground floor of the (tall) administration building, adjacent the visitor's parking lot, near the I-95 entrance to UMBC. Host: Dr. Alan T. Sherman Associate Professor, Computer Science sherman(a)cs.umbc.edu http://www.umbc.edu (410) 455-2666 This event is held in cooperation with the UMBC Intellectual Sports Council Honors College Phi Beta Kappa honors society CMSC Council of Majors IFSM Council of Majors * The following U.S. Government officials declined to speak on December 16: Barry Smith (Supervisory Special Agent, FBI) [Mr. Smith has agreed in principle to speak at UMBC in the spring on a law enforcement view of encryption policy; the evening of Dec 16 turned out to be a bad time for him.] William Reinsch (Undersecretary for Export Administration, BXA) Bob Litt (Attorney General's Office, DoJ) Scott Charney (Computer Crimes, DoJ) Bruce McConnell (Information Policy, OMB) Ron Lee (General Counsel, NSA) Dr. Clint Brooks (Director, Cryptographic Policy, NSA) Charlotte Knepper (Co-Chair, Inter-Agency Working Group on Encryption Policy) Chris McLean (Staffer for Senator Bob Kerry; helped draft legislation on encryption policy) I am still hopeful to find a second speaker by Tuesday evening.

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Q
by Yuri Freneites 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

some body out there can tell me how can i get in boy boy web page without password thank...

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Re: Kong Re: Please Beta test my communications cryptography product.
by jamesd＠echeque.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- 177 At 5:00 PM -0800 12/4/97, James A. Donald wrote: > > > I have produced a program that, like PGP, provides digital > > > signatures and communications encryption. > > > http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/Kong.htm > > >This is the first beta. Please beta test this product. At 07:06 PM 12/12/97 -0800, Bill Stewart wrote: > The web page says that the first beta had some problems, Beta 2 is now out. Please uninstall your old copy, using "Add/Remove programs" in the control panel, before installing the new copy, as overinstall does not work. (If you forgetfully overinstall, a warning comes up, but most people cheerfully disregard the warning) >- Signed Message: Delimiter, Message Body, ECC Public Key, ECC Sig. > I didn't notice what hash was used for the signatures -- SHA? > SHA: I failed to document that, will add it to the documentation. >- Encrypted Message: ECC(SessionKey), RC4(Message Body, SessionKey). > > I'm not sure if there are headers that include the recipient's key, > or if there's any special form for an encrypted-and-signed > message. I assume there's no multiple-recipient form? Multiple recipient form works, but the user interface to use it does not yet exist which makes it kind of useless. Coming soon. >1) Are the Signer's Name and the ECC key included in the > material that's hashed for signature? Doing that is > valuable, but depending on it makes it more difficult if > people change addresses. Yes: However the name is only hashed in a cryptographically weak manner, so a third party could change the name in a cleartext message. However if the message is cleartext there is nothing to stop him from copying the body and giving it any signature he pleases, so this does not actually gain the attacker anything. After all, that is what cleartext is. If he changes the name it looks to the user and Kong like a new and different signature. >2) It would be nice if the starting and ending delimiters were >different. > This would let you nest messages without needing >s. Can Kong > tell a nested opening -- from a closing --digsig ? Are --s > escaped, or at least <NL>--digsig? -- Yes: For example this message contains a nested message. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG J14rDU1EjUofOmSoHg1Ye0GF6/+6wdvxmCwMryE4 1jNcIP5kRfVPada+5w8zfIGEodi2Mrz80ZbvXsK1 >3) How are newlines and whitespace in the message body handled for >signatures? > Canonicalized? Ignored? Not worried about? Not worried about, which is probably a seriously bad idea. Will fix in a later release. In a later release I will canonicalise carriage returns to Microsoft conventions, but not whitespace. As this is alas, a Borg only product, and will remain so for some time, such canonicalisation will not break existing signed documents. > This affects not only reliability of signatures after > emailing, but also affects signing binary files. Signing binary files is not yet supported, and will not be for some time. >4) I'd guess, since you're using 240-bit ECC and base-64 encoding, > that the first 40 characters of garble in the signature are > the key, and the remaining 80 characters are the signature > itself? Yes > If so, is there some easy way to use the 40-char string, e.g. > type in a copy from the bottom of a business card? Yes If Kong says a signature is good, and the public key agrees with a business card then the guy who wrote the business card is claiming to be the author of the message. Actually you do not have to check all 43 characters. It is sufficient to check the first ten characters, or any ten characters. > Some of the documentation says something about the key being > derived from your passphrase and a randomness file hashed > together. How does this affect multiple keys generated by the > same user? I assume it means you can't share passphrases > between keys. If two keys have the same passphrase, but a different secret file, then they will be two completely different keys. However, the same passphrase, and the same file, means the same key. The secret file is merely concatenated with the secret file >5) Is the format of the signature freeform, or do the newlines and > whitespace have to be in their official locations? Minor flexibility. You can add or remove leading blanks, and use either lf or cr or both. It is not totally rigid, but it is pretty rigid. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG Uy36NbrQf/3FKV77cTtzFrHxsy0dcx9l6Svy/Fl5 xP+I6vLpjTgacrHEqXoD3gv+HF9Tx4Zl+0yDGhQF

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Re: Columbian squib on Bell sentencing
by Brian B. Riley 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On 12/13/97 9:38 AM, frissell(a)panix.com (frissell(a)panix.com) passed this wisdom: >>>From The Columbian's web site at >><http://www.columbian.com/newsroom/topstories.html>: >> >> 'Assassination Politics' >> author gets 11 months >> >> TACOMA, Wash. - James Dalton Bell, the Vancouver man who >> wrote an Internet essay entitled "Assassination Politics," was >>sentenced this morning to 11 months in prison and two to three years >>of tightly supervised probation. > >Eleven *whole* months (8 months served already). They've got to be >kidding. > >This is misdemeanor territory. I know he was chicken enough to plead >but Milken pleaded and got 10 years! We're quaking in our boots out >here. ... hmmmm ... any hint of resrictions? i.e like not being able to use a computer or be on the Internet??? Considering how much they harped about the A.P. scheme I would have thought that would have been a centerpiece of any punishment they meted out to Jim. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGP for Personal Privacy 5.0 Charset: noconv iQEVAwUBNJL02j7r4fUXwraZAQG1Ogf/W/3Sq5L+KNmWQuNryYqXSlykB0zELONA bsdlh7X6OslhB0vcfDzTlScfHTAV0dSI3PjHRvVIxAa8/ofQqNsD3zBxT8yoeJ79 ++KkprNFbDBleOR5OQk2R4dh8NkxeSe/j64snL8ra4duipjWfizqaM/5He2+dYgy SdI6IVzQUFPbXUQEk5AFb0r9s0E5/3YFPK7dp6KpXilIbFWPweTzsZKn5UamsdBR m0rmWu+uH+5xL0+xbE5P0zGOEJtXzdaovQS8RSfKfOd3Fdnh75NFewPufM1aNDKd yfvmRHZLt3zwn9bNqd0tavSPo2hO66pQsIIM3sP4S0hF7Xp0PLTV3A== =y+eC -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Brian B. Riley --> http://members.macconnect.com/~brianbr For PGP Keys <mailto:brianbr@together.net?subject=Get%20PGP%20Key> "One of the deep mysteries to me is our logo, the symbol of lust and knowledge, bitten into, all crossed with in the colors of the rainbow in the wrong order. You couldn't dream of a more appropriate logo: lust, knowledge, hope, and anarchy." -- Gassee - Apple Logo

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Jim Bell Revisited
by Human Gus-Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Gag Broiled wrote: >>Phillip M. Hallam-Baker <hallam(a)ai.mit.edu> wrote: >>>FC folk may find this interesting. What Jim Bell was charged >>>with and admitted was planning and executing attacks on the >>>IRS. >> >>No, that's not correct. Half-Baked knows that, but with his bowling-mentality, he thinks he has a better chance of throwing a strike if he puts a little spin on his balls, while twisting Jim's. >>He was charged with (and plead guilty to) >>obstructing an IRS agent (26 USC 7212(a)) and misuse of a Social Security >>number (42 USC 408). The "attack" he admitted to executing consisted of >>applying a stinky chemical to the doormat of an IRS office. (see >><http://jya.com/jimbell-dock4.htm> for more.) Was that FELONY 'Making a bad smell'? I farted in an IRS office once (on purpose). Am I a Jim Bell co-conspirator? Are my armpits considered a felony or a misdemeanor? The government misuses my Social Security Number to steal my money. Where do I press charges? Can I place airline employees under citizen's arrest when they demand it? >>It's >>interesting to note that the prosecutor and the defense concurred in >>recommending to the judge that Jim receive a sentence at the low end of the >>permissible range, while the probation department (which acts as an >>"attitude police") urged a sentence of 27 months, at or near the upper end >>of the applicable guidelines. >> >>Jim's analysis of AP and its relationship to our legal/political/social >>structure was poor, and his behavior juvenile and indefensible. He did not, >>however, present a credible threat to the IRS, nor should he be punished >>more harshly because of his political views/ideas. Winter winds blow both ways. >>We should not let distaste/disgust for Jim's ideas and tactics blind us to >>the important legal and constitutional questions lurking beneath the >>surface of this investigation and prosecution - there's some possibility >>that the IRS used its investigation of Jim as a threat to other prolific >>authors on the Internet. The government's armed assault on Ma and Pa Bell's residence took place within hours of an email being sent to him containing a rough draft of a chapter of an InterNet published manuscript describing and lauding Bell's AP system. >>For example, copies of the press release announcing the raid on Jim's home >>were mailed, apparently from computer systems inside the IRS, to >>individuals active on the Cypherpunks list. The IRS has never before (or >>since) bothered to notify those individuals about criminal investigations >>which might otherwise be of interest. It is interesting to note that the emails from treasury.gov constituted the same type of 'threat' that Bell was roundly accused of by government officials and the press. >>One easy conclusion to reach is that >>the raid was intended to chill those individuals' expressive activity on >>the Net with respect to Jim and his ideas and the interplay between >>taxation and anonymity and cryptography. The winter wind blows both ways. It is also easy to reach the conclusion that the AP-BOT results sent to the Oregonian and to the officials involved (via their internal email systems) played a hand in the judges 'vacation' before Bell's delayed sentencing. (Or that petty government officials involved in Bell's case were not impressed with the fact that they were becoming the source of valuable digital prizes in the AP-BOT community, without receiving the same protection as those who were behind the criminal malefeasance directed at Bell.) >>Further, it's worth considering carefully the relationship between Jim's >>legitimate and constitutionally protected political speech and the criminal >>trial process. To what extent did Jim's outspokenness about the IRS >>influence its interest in investigating and prosecuting him? To what extent >>was his protected speech used to argue that he was ineligible for release >>on bail pretrial? To what extent did his extended pretrial incarceration >>pressure him to plead guilty? Bell's persecution was straight out of the spook's political torture- indoctrination handbook. The only difference is that many aspects of the turning of Bell's thumbscrews were made public (just before tax-time, surprise, surprise). >>To what extent >>will his protected speech be used to measure his compliance with the terms >>of his supervised release? That was half of the purpose of his persecution. "We the people" were the other half of the sacrificial lamb targeted for cold-storage. >>But cases like Jim's demonstrate that there's a considerable >>gulf between the high-school-civics-class idea that we are all equal before >>the law and the practical world of the criminal trial system. Jim was >>treated specially at every stage of this process because of what he's >>written, and that should make every person who values free political >>expression uncomfortable. Jim's case demonstrates that we're moving closer >>to a country where one can be prosecuted for thoughtcrime. The corollary to this is that we are moving closer to a country where we will need to take up arms in both meatspace and cyberspace if we wish to defend our basic human rights. (Former NRA members are unlikely to take any more consolation from the government's expressed desire to only want to ban 'strong' crypto, than they were from the government's incremental announcements that they only want to ban criminal/assault/dangerous-looking/kind-of-scary/citizen's guns.) Rage Against The Machine Lock And Load Lock And Loll Human Gus-Peter-San <gold(a)toad.com>

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Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > X-No-Archive: yes > :> That must mean that I'm harassing you as well, right? > : > :That is exactly my objection to the tactics of Gary Burnore and the DataBasix > :gang. > > You've posted no evidence tactics were EVER used. Naturally, you expect > everyone to believe you and naturally, a few like sam will. I don't expect anybody to "believe me". That's why I have posted a URL to a post by Jeff Burchell in which he outlines your tactics, such as your demand that he turn over his logs to you, which would have had the effect of compromising the remailer's security and eroding confidence in it. Is that really what you wanted? For remailer users to distrust the remailer net and stop using it? You have still not explained why you wanted the remailer logs and what you intended to do with the names and addresses contained therein. > : He calls > :the kind of discussion that the three of us are engaging in "harassment", and > :has even, upon occasion, accused posts critical of him of constituting > :"libel". > > You have from time to time constituted libel. Would you care to prove that? Saying something that Gary Burnore or Belinda Bryan don't like is not "libel". To be "libel" a statement must be both DEFAMATORY as well as FALSE. While being reminded of your own actions several months ago might prove to be embarassing, it's not libel. What was really laughable was when your fellow DataBasix staff member Billy McClatchie accused another anonymous usenet poster of "slander"! He must have gone to the same law school as Belinda. <g> > That's not abuse. Your > harassment is only that, harassment. The ABUSE is UCE-Baiting. The fact that > some remailer operators are now taking measures to prevent UCE-Baiting is > evidence not only that the problem existed, but that something COULD be done > about it. That's not what Jeff's post said. It said that your pretext for demanding his user logs was an "unflattering post", not all this nonsense about "spam baiting" that you invented later. My "harassment"? You keep whining about my so-called "harassment", but you have yet to prove ANY of it. > :Actually, Gary may unwittingly prove to be a "friend" of remailers, yet. > > > Unwittingly? I was never NOT a friend of remailers. YOU on the otherhand may > simply be unwittingly trying to shut them down. I happen to believe you're > doing it on purpose, but maybe, just maybe, you have no clue what you're > doing. What would people have to be smoking (and inhaling) to believe that nonsense? Anyone who demands that a remailer operator violate the privacy of all of his users to placate one chronic whiner is no "friend" to remailers. Such "friends" they can do without. What do you think it would have done for the reputation of remailer security if Jeff had actually kept logs and had turned them over to individuals such as you and Belinda? Do you really think it would be more "pro remailer" to just pretend that your attempt to attempt to obtain sendmail logs from the Huge Cajones Remailer didn't occur? Of the two of us, I'm the one that admits to actually USING remailers. For me to try to shut them down would make no sense. > If you don't like being called the anon asshole, stop being an asshole. If you don't like being called anti-privacy, stop being anti-privacy.

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Ok children...
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Hi, Would you gentlemen be so kind as to take your personal and apparently petty squabble elsewhere? Thanks for your prompt help with this matter. ____________________________________________________________________ | | | | | We built your fort. We will not have it used against us. | | | | John Wayne - Allegheny Uprising | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________| Forwarded message: > From owner-cypherpunks(a)ssz.com Sat Dec 13 16:27:26 1997 > Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 23:04:07 +0100 (MET) > Message-Id: <199712132204.XAA04453(a)basement.replay.com> > To: mail2news(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu, cypherpunks(a)toad.com, > mail2news(a)basement.replay.com, m2n(a)alpha.jpunix.com > From: nobody(a)REPLAY.COM (Anonymous) > Organization: Replay and Company UnLimited > > X-001: Replay may or may not approve of the content of this posting > X-002: Report misuse of this automated service to <abuse(a)replay.com> > X-URL: http://www.replay.com/remailer/ > Newsgroups: alt.privacy.anon-server,alt.cypherpunks,news.admin.net-abuse.email,alt.privacy,alt.censorship,comp.org.eff.talk > Subject: Re: Another of Gary Burnore's Lies Exposed > References: <66ssjm$bei(a)examiner.concentric.net> <199712131402.PAA10108(a)basement.replay.com> <3494afd2.148597235(a)nntp.best.ix.netcom.com> > Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)ssz.com > Precedence: bulk > X-Mailing-List: cypherpunks(a)ssz.com > X-List-Admin: list(a)ssz.com > X-Loop: ssz.com > X-Language: English, Russian, German > > gburnore(a)netcom.com (Gary L. Burnore) wrote: > > > X-No-Archive: yes > > > :> That must mean that I'm harassing you as well, right? > > : > > :That is exactly my objection to the tactics of Gary Burnore and the DataBasix > > :gang. > > > > You've posted no evidence tactics were EVER used. Naturally, you expect > > everyone to believe you and naturally, a few like sam will. > > I don't expect anybody to "believe me". That's why I have posted a URL to a > post by Jeff Burchell in which he outlines your tactics, such as your demand > that he turn over his logs to you, which would have had the effect of > compromising the remailer's security and eroding confidence in it. Is that > really what you wanted? For remailer users to distrust the remailer net and > stop using it? You have still not explained why you wanted the remailer logs > and what you intended to do with the names and addresses contained therein. > > > : He calls > > :the kind of discussion that the three of us are engaging in "harassment", and > > :has even, upon occasion, accused posts critical of him of constituting > > :"libel". > > > > You have from time to time constituted libel. > > Would you care to prove that? Saying something that Gary Burnore or Belinda > Bryan don't like is not "libel". To be "libel" a statement must be both > DEFAMATORY as well as FALSE. While being reminded of your own actions > several months ago might prove to be embarassing, it's not libel. > > What was really laughable was when your fellow DataBasix staff member Billy > McClatchie accused another anonymous usenet poster of "slander"! He must have > gone to the same law school as Belinda. <g> > > > That's not abuse. Your > > harassment is only that, harassment. The ABUSE is UCE-Baiting. The fact that > > some remailer operators are now taking measures to prevent UCE-Baiting is > > evidence not only that the problem existed, but that something COULD be done > > about it. > > That's not what Jeff's post said. It said that your pretext for demanding his > user logs was an "unflattering post", not all this nonsense about "spam baiting" > that you invented later. > > My "harassment"? You keep whining about my so-called "harassment", but you > have yet to prove ANY of it. > > > :Actually, Gary may unwittingly prove to be a "friend" of remailers, yet. > > > > > > Unwittingly? I was never NOT a friend of remailers. YOU on the otherhand may > > simply be unwittingly trying to shut them down. I happen to believe you're > > doing it on purpose, but maybe, just maybe, you have no clue what you're > > doing. > > What would people have to be smoking (and inhaling) to believe that nonsense? > Anyone who demands that a remailer operator violate the privacy of all of his > users to placate one chronic whiner is no "friend" to remailers. Such > "friends" they can do without. What do you think it would have done for the > reputation of remailer security if Jeff had actually kept logs and had turned > them over to individuals such as you and Belinda? > > Do you really think it would be more "pro remailer" to just pretend that your > attempt to attempt to obtain sendmail logs from the Huge Cajones Remailer > didn't occur? > > Of the two of us, I'm the one that admits to actually USING remailers. For me > to try to shut them down would make no sense. > > > If you don't like being called the anon asshole, stop being an asshole. > > If you don't like being called anti-privacy, stop being anti-privacy. >

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Ad Gaolas Deliberandas
by Toto 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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