- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

ECCp-79 challenge cracked
by Trei, Peter 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm enclosing two messages from sci.crypt: Peter Trei ------------------------------------------------------------------------ First message On sci.crypt Volker Mueller <vmueller(a)cdc.informatik.tu-darmstadt.de> wrote: >[...] Maybe the problem is not so easy. The biggest DL computation for an >elliptic curve was a 19 digit prime order computation (up to my >knowledge). The first Certicom "exercise" has 79 bits or 24 decimal >digits. > >Cheers, Volker You're right, the so-called "exercise" was not so easy! However a few Alphas and some optimised code got through it eventually. I just posted the following to Certicom... -- Rob. PS: Any volunteers willing to dedicate Alpha CPU time for cracking the next challenge? With a bunch of machines it would be a piece of cake! ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------ This message is copyright Robert J. Harley, 1997. If you wish to quote more than one sentence, please quote the whole thing. To: certicom-ecc-challenge(a)certicom.com Robert J. Harley, Se`vres, France, 6th of December, 1997. Dear Anonymous, Certicom's professed aim in setting its ECC challenge is to encourage research into secure cryptosystems based on elliptic curve discrete logarithms. Yet Certicom is a member of the Key Recovery Alliance, a lobby group whose purpose is to promote the use of back-doors allowing supposedly secure communications to be intercepted. How are these contradictory positions reconciled? The solution to your ECCp-79 problem is the residue class of 92221507219705345685350 modulo 466597814831947642887217. It was found by Wayne Baisley and myself using several Digital Alpha workstations running Linux and Digital Unix at the Institut National de Recherche en Informatique et Automatique (INRIA), at Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory and at the California Institute of Technology C.S. Department. The method used was a "birthday paradox" algorithm iterating from a random initial point (one per machine) with a random function (the same on all machines) until a collision was detected at 17:58 today at INRIA, Rocquencourt, France by a 500MHz Linux machine. This machine did 25 billion elliptic curve operations per day. The peak rate of all machines was approximately 6 six times as much. A total of about 1400 billion iterations were performed. If this is the first correct submission, please send the prize (a copy of "Handbook of Applied Cryptography" and Maple software) to the following address: Robert Harley, c/o Sylvie Loubressac, Projet CRISTAL, INRIA, Domaine de Voluceau - Rocquencourt, 78153 Le Chesnay, France. Thank you, Rob. .-. Robert.Harley(a)inria.fr .-. / \ .-. .-. / \ / \ / \ .-. _ .-. / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / \ / `-' `-' \ / \ / \ \ / `-' `-' \ / `-' Linux + 500MHz Alpha + 256MB SDRAM = heaven `-' ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ------ ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---------------------------------------------- Second message: From: Dimitris Tsapakidis <dimitris(a)alien.bt.co.uk> Date: 1997/12/08 Message-ID: <348BDD10.B5B2E641(a)alien.bt.co.uk> Newsgroups: sci.crypt [More Headers] Hello Robert, Congratulations on your effort. We would like to post some information on our attempt at BT Labs. We found the private key after you at 19:58 GMT on Sunday the 7th. We only completed 481 billion ECC operations at a peak rate of 84 billion per day using 170 to 210 machines. A couple of months ago we contributed 180-250 machines to the distributed.net/Bovine group attack on RC5-56, peaking at 60 million keys/sec. Dimitris

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List of reliable remailers
by Raph Levien 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I operate a remailer pinging service which collects detailed information about remailer features and reliability. To use it, just finger remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu There is also a Web version of the same information, plus lots of interesting links to remailer-related resources, at: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~raph/remailer-list.html This information is used by premail, a remailer chaining and PGP encrypting client for outgoing mail. For more information, see: http://www.c2.org/~raph/premail.html For the PGP public keys of the remailers, finger pgpkeys(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu This is the current info: REMAILER LIST This is an automatically generated listing of remailers. The first part of the listing shows the remailers along with configuration options and special features for each of the remailers. The second part shows the 12-day history, and average latency and uptime for each remailer. You can also get this list by fingering remailer-list(a)kiwi.cs.berkeley.edu. $remailer{'cyber'} = '<alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net> alpha pgp'; $remailer{"mix"} = "<mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut ek ksub reord ?"; $remailer{"replay"} = "<remailer(a)replay.com> cpunk mix pgp hash latent cut post ek"; $remailer{"jam"} = "<remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek"; $remailer{"winsock"} = "<winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub reord ?"; $remailer{'nym'} = '<config(a)nym.alias.net> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"squirrel"} = "<mix(a)squirrel.owl.de> cpunk mix pgp pgponly hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{'weasel'} = '<config(a)weasel.owl.de> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"reno"} = "<middleman(a)cyberpass.net> cpunk mix pgp hash middle latent cut ek reord ?"; $remailer{"cracker"} = "<remailer(a)anon.efga.org> cpunk mix remix pgp hash ksub esub latent cut ek reord post"; $remailer{'redneck'} = '<config(a)anon.efga.org> newnym pgp'; $remailer{"bureau42"} = "<remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org> cpunk mix pgp ksub hash latent cut ek"; $remailer{"neva"} = "<remailer(a)neva.org> cpunk pgp pgponly hash cut ksub ?"; $remailer{"lcs"} = "<mix(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu> mix"; $remailer{"medusa"} = "<medusa(a)weasel.owl.de> mix middle" $remailer{"McCain"} = "<mccain(a)notatla.demon.co.uk> mix middle"; $remailer{"valdeez"} = "<valdeez(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"arrid"} = "<arrid(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"hera"} = "<goddesshera(a)juno.com> cpunk pgp pgponly hash ek"; $remailer{"htuttle"} = "<h_tuttle(a)rigel.cyberpass.net> cpunk pgp hash latent cut post ek"; catalyst(a)netcom.com is _not_ a remailer. lmccarth(a)ducie.cs.umass.edu is _not_ a remailer. usura(a)replay.com is _not_ a remailer. remailer(a)crynwr.com is _not_ a remailer. There is no remailer at relay.com. Groups of remailers sharing a machine or operator: (cyber mix reno winsock) (weasel squirrel medusa) (cracker redneck) (nym lcs) (valdeez arrid hera) This remailer list is somewhat phooey. Go check out http://www.publius.net/rlist.html for a good one. Last update: Thu 23 Oct 97 15:48:06 PDT remailer email address history latency uptime ----------------------------------------------------------------------- hera goddesshera(a)juno.com ------------ 5:03:45 99.86% nym config(a)nym.alias.net +*#**#**### :34 95.82% redneck config(a)anon.efga.org #*##*+#**** 2:00 95.44% mix mixmaster(a)remail.obscura.com +++ ++++++* 19:18 95.27% squirrel mix(a)squirrel.owl.de -- ---+--- 2:34:19 95.16% cyber alias(a)alias.cyberpass.net *++***+ ++ 11:26 95.11% replay remailer(a)replay.com **** *** 10:06 94.93% arrid arrid(a)juno.com ----.------ 8:50:34 94.41% bureau42 remailer(a)bureau42.ml.org --------- 3:38:29 93.53% cracker remailer(a)anon.efga.org + +*+*+*+ 16:32 92.80% jam remailer(a)cypherpunks.ca + +*-++++ 24:14 92.79% winsock winsock(a)rigel.cyberpass.net -..-..---- 9:59:18 92.22% neva remailer(a)neva.org ------****+ 1:03:02 90.39% valdeez valdeez(a)juno.com 4:58:22 -36.97% reno middleman(a)cyberpass.net 1:01:28 -2.65% History key * # response in less than 5 minutes. * * response in less than 1 hour. * + response in less than 4 hours. * - response in less than 24 hours. * . response in more than 1 day. * _ response came back too late (more than 2 days). cpunk A major class of remailers. Supports Request-Remailing-To: field. eric A variant of the cpunk style. Uses Anon-Send-To: instead. penet The third class of remailers (at least for right now). Uses X-Anon-To: in the header. pgp Remailer supports encryption with PGP. A period after the keyword means that the short name, rather than the full email address, should be used as the encryption key ID. hash Supports ## pasting, so anything can be put into the headers of outgoing messages. ksub Remailer always kills subject header, even in non-pgp mode. nsub Remailer always preserves subject header, even in pgp mode. latent Supports Matt Ghio's Latent-Time: option. cut Supports Matt Ghio's Cutmarks: option. post Post to Usenet using Post-To: or Anon-Post-To: header. ek Encrypt responses in reply blocks using Encrypt-Key: header. special Accepts only pgp encrypted messages. mix Can accept messages in Mixmaster format. reord Attempts to foil traffic analysis by reordering messages. Note: I'm relying on the word of the remailer operator here, and haven't verified the reord info myself. mon Remailer has been known to monitor contents of private email. filter Remailer has been known to filter messages based on content. If not listed in conjunction with mon, then only messages destined for public forums are subject to filtering. Raph Levien

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Why NOT have an Offshore Trust ??
by bways＠earth.spearhead.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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Crypto Law Survey updated
by Bert-Jaap Koops 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have just updated my survey of existing and envisaged cryptography laws and regulations. See the Crypto Law Survey at http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/lawsurvy.htm This update includes: -new entries on Estonia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Romania, Turkey (import/export) and on Argentina, Malaysia, South Korea (domestic) -update on European Union (Commission Communication: advises export adaptation, wary of key recovery, EU will use encryption itself), Belgium (govt proposal), Brazil (import/ use controls possible in 1998), France (expected decrees delayed by NL), Germany (Kanther chip; no regulation intention), Sweden (Cabinet Office report), Turkey (perhaps domestic controls), US (BXA seeks comments; Bernstein hearing scheduled; SAFE Act amended/ uncertain future; KMI FIPS meetings; AES candidate call) -clarification on Poland (import), Singapore, South Africa, UK (export) -URLs added to EU (KRISIS), France (critique), UK (list of responses), US (KMI FIPS, amendment S909) Kind regards, Bert-Jaap --------------------------------------------------------------------- Bert-Jaap Koops tel +31 13 466 8101 Center for Law, Administration and facs +31 13 466 8149 Informatization, Tilburg University e-mail E.J.Koops(a)kub.nl -------------------------------------------------- Postbus 90153 | This world's just mad enough to have been made | 5000 LE Tilburg | by the Being his beings into being prayed. | The Netherlands | (Howard Nemerov) | --------------------------------------------------------------------- http://cwis.kub.nl/~frw/people/koops/bertjaap.htm ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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[Fwd: (Fwd) GILC on racism, Asian events, copyright, etc. (472 l (fwd)]
by TruthMonger 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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A Pretty Good Story, from The Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1617,00.html The Netly News Network (http://netlynews.com/) December 8, 1997 A Pretty Good Story by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) Phil Zimmermann had it easy fighting the U.S. government: At least everyone else was on his side. Today the legendary cryptographer and founder of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is finding that his latest adversaries are just as determined but much more diverse. Earlier this fall PGP drew fire for releasing PGP 5.5 with a so-called "message recovery" feature that a corporation could require users to turn on to let the boss read their e-mail. Then, when McAfee Associates announced last week it would buy PGP, formerly supportive privacy advocates screamed that the company's new owners were part of the "Key Recovery Alliance," a group of firms devoted to producing data-scrambling software easily snoopable by the government. Now the complaining may stop, at least for a while. The McAfee-PGP combo, called Network Associates, has dropped out of the alliance. "I never would have allowed my own company to join the Key Recovery Alliance," Zimmermann told me yesterday. "As soon as I found out about McAfee being a member, I tried to do something about it." [...]

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"Kids Safe" calls for mandatory blocking sw; op-ed on summit
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

[What was that the IFEA folks were saying last week? Oh, yes, I remember: by building systems like PICS you also create an irresistable temptation for Congress to make them mandatory. --Declan] Business Wire December 5, 1997, Friday DISTRIBUTION: Business/News Editors & High-Tech Writers LENGTH: 486 words HEADLINE: Child-Safety Advocate Calls on Congress to Mandate Parental Software on All Computers Sold in U.S. DATELINE: LOS ANGELES BODY: Dec. 5, 1997--Saying that we must protect children from the dangers of sexually explicit material on the Internet, a leading child-safety advocate Friday called on Congress to enact legislation to mandate that every computer sold in the United States by 1999 be outfitted with parental software that can block out sexually explicit or adult Web sites. Jayne Murphy Shapiro, founder and president of KIDS SAFE, an organization dedicated to protecting children against sexual molestation, is writing all members of Congress to express her concerns about the dangers of the Internet and her goal to make the Internet online experience safe, educational and entertaining for chldren. Shapiro, who attended the Internet Online Summit in Washington this week and met with government officials and community activists from across the country, said, "Mandating that computer makers install screening software will give parents new power to control what material young children are exposed to. "Our proposal would require manufacturers to install computer software in new computers to allow parents to block Internet sites considered too violent or obscene for their children. The easy-to-use filtering software would allow parents, educators and employers to screen the Internet, providing an alternative to government censorship." Shapiro pointed out that KIDS SAFE does not believe in censorship of the Internet, but rather in the common goal of protecting the First Amendment and the Internet so it can be used for free expression, education and commerce. Current software on the market allows for an Internet site to be blocked if it meets the following guidelines: 1) a disclaimer indicating restricted access; and 2) a screen or warning that identifies the site as adult-oriented or containing information unsuitable for those underage or the publisher has requested that his/her site be blocked. "Screening software, coupled with parental responsibility, enables parents to make informed decisions about what Internet sites their children can enter," said Shapiro. "Parental responsibility, with the help of the screening software, can be a major step in curtailing the needless exposure to inappropriate Web sites that plague the Internet." -0- NOTE: Jayne Murphy Shapiro, president of KIDS SAFE, is available for comments on this or any other child-safety issues. ------ The Record (Bergen County, NJ) December 4, 1997; THURSDAY; ALL EDITIONS SECTION: OPINION; Pg. L10 LENGTH: 618 words HEADLINE: PEDOPHILES IN CYBERSPACE ; WE MUST STOP CHILD PORNOGRAPHY ON THE INTERNET BYLINE: The Record BODY: THE increasing presence of child pornography on the Internet is a national problem that must be dealt with aggressively and quickly. This is not a free-speech or First Amendment issue. Child pornography is a crime. We do not tolerate it in our communities, and we should not tolerate it in cyberspace. Unfortunately, as a Page One article in The Record pointed out yesterday, cyberspace is tailor-made for the dissemination of child pornography. It allows pedophiles instant access to explicit photos in the privacy of their own homes, and it gives distributors and collectors enough anonymity to avoid getting caught and being prosecuted. In fact, the anonymity and the ease of finding sexually explicit material involving children on the Internet may have actually broadened the audience for child pornography. And law enforcement officials worry that this could in turn lead to increased child sexual abuse. Vice President Al Gore has been leading a campaign to make the Internet safe for children. This week, he announced a new partnership between Internet service providers and the Justice Department in an effort to crack down on child pornography, and a toll-free hot line to report any suspected incidents of child sexual exploitation. America Online also announced its cooperation."When child pornography is appropriately brought to our attention and we have control over it, we will remove it,"AOL Chairman Steve Case said. But law enforcement officials, computer experts, and child advocates say it's not that easy, by any means. Even if AOL cooperates, a great deal of child pornography is found on chat rooms hosted by hundreds of much smaller providers, who are loathe to police themselves because of liability or censorship concerns, or because they don't have the staff to do so. The Record's article also pointed out that most law enforcement officials are not knowledgeable enough to track down child pornography distributors, who are experts at disguising themselves on the Internet and finding new ways to fool monitors. Law enforcement officials may also lack the manpower needed to track down pedophiles."If we go on line undercover for one night,"one investigator said,"we're busy for two weeks, getting warrants and records." Many more"cybercops"are needed at the federal, state, and local levels who have the expertise to keep one step ahead of child pornographers, and much more manpower and training is needed. In New Jersey, state Sen. Andrew Ciesla, R-Brick, has introduced a bill that would create a high-tech crimes and investigation support unit for the state police. The measure, which should be approved, would set aside $ 400,000 for the unit to investigate computer crimes, including child pornography on the Internet, and create a 24-hour toll-free state hot line for reporting anything suspicious. Alerting the authorities is a key component of this crackdown, and Mr. Gore also announced a national"Cybertip"hot line to report suspicious on-line activity related to child pornography. The number is (800) 843-5678. The vice president is to be commended for seeking ways to stop these ugly predators. But this effort must be more than just lip service. It will take time to find the most effective ways to crack down on child pornography on the Internet, but the quest should take on increasing urgency, given all the evidence that the problem is growing. In the meantime, intense pressure should be brought to bear on the Internet industry, which can make a huge dent in this particularly vile cybercrime by aggressively policing itself. ----

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RightsMarket Demo
by Stacey Feltham 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thank you for your interest in our product. In an effort to authenticate each user, we would ask that you please provide us with a more comprehensive profile, such as your full name, company name, and complete address and telephone information. Once this information has been forwarded to us (you can simply forward this information to this email address), we would be happy to provide you with a Username and Password for the RightsMarket Demo. Thank you again for your interest in our product and we look forward to receiving this information.

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Re: Cato forum tomorrow: should money laundering be a crime?
by Steve Schear 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>(Why is this discussion limited to just the four of us? Surely Declan and >his Cato buddies are worthy to hear our arguments? I dislike the "taking >things private" mindset, when the lists are already so cluttered with Toto >rants and other consumers of vast amounts of bandwidth.) If my header lines implied this, it was inadvertent. I agree more 'relevent' content on CP is desireable. >I haven't quite said that all forms of communication/spending money will be >speech and therefore protected. (Besides, we all know of many forms of >speech that are unprotected.) > >What I (and Michael Froomkin, in his own CFP talk) have argued is that >digital money will be _undetectable_ in many cases unless government >demands that the contents of a private communication be revealed. A kind of >prior restraint on speech. > [snip] >If the government determines, somehow, that Alice was >involved in an illegal transaction, tax evasion, money laundering, etc., >they can try to get her on that. But they can't insist that words be >submitted to a government agent for approval." Isn't uttering a check protected speech? What about if a check is stego-coded in some political rant? Can the Feds insist I not utter that speech? --Steve PGP mail preferred, see http://www.pgp.com and http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html RSA fingerprint: FE90 1A95 9DEA 8D61 812E CCA9 A44A FBA9 RSA key: http://keys.pgp.com:11371/pks/lookup?op=index&search=0x55C78B0D --------------------------------------------------------------------- Steve Schear | tel: (702) 658-2654 CEO | fax: (702) 658-2673 First ECache Corporation | 7075 West Gowan Road | Suite 2148 | Las Vegas, NV 89129 | Internet: schear(a)lvdi.net --------------------------------------------------------------------- I know not what course others may take; but as for me, give me ECache or give me debt! "It's your Cache"

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17 Dec '03

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