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fwd: The Swedes discover Lotus Notes has key escrow! (Win Treese)
by Ray Arachelian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

(From the SpyKing Security Mailing list) 2)From: Mike G <mgevaert(a)bfree.on.ca> Subject: Lotus Privacy Problems This was taken from the Computer Privacy Digest 1/4/98 V12#00 Very interesting. The Swedes discover Lotus Notes has key escrow! (Win Treese) The article describes the reaction when various people in the Swedish government learned that the Lotus Notes system they were using includes key escrow. They were apparently unaware of this until Notes was in use by thousands of people in government and industry. Besides being an interesting reaction to key escrow systems, this incident reminds us that one should understand the real security of a system.... Secret Swedish E-Mail Can Be Read by the U.S.A. Fredrik Laurin, Calle Froste, *Svenska Dagbladet*, 18 Nov 1997 One of the world's most widely used e-mail programs, the American Lotus Notes, is not so secure as most of its 400,000 to 500,000 Swedish users believe. To be sure, it includes advanced cryptography in its e-mail function, but the codes that protect the encryption have been surrendered to American authorities. With them, the U.S. government can decode encrypted information. Among Swedish users are 349 parliament members, 15,000 tax agency employees, as well as employees in large businesses and the defense department. ``I didn't know that our Notes keys were deposited (with the U.S.). It was interesting to learn this,'' says Data Security Chief Jan Karlsson at the [Swedish] our Notes keys were deposited (with the U.S.). It was interesting to learn this,'' says Data Security Chief Jan Karlsson at the [Swedish] defense department. Gunnar Grenfors, Parliament director and daily e-mail user, says, ``I didn't know about this--here we handle sensitive information concerning Sweden's interests, and we should not leave the keys to this information to the U.S. government or anyone else. This must be a basic requirement.'' Sending information over the Internet is like sending a postcard--it's that simple to read these communications. When e-mail is encrypted, it becomes unintelligible for anyone who captures it during transport. Only those who have the right codes or raw computer power to break the encryption can read it. For crime prevention and national security reasons, the United States has tough regulations concerning the level of crytography that may be exported. Both large companies and intelligence agencies can already--in a fractions of a second--break the simpler cryptographic protections. For the world-leading American computer industry, cryptographic export controls are therefore an ever greater obstacle. This slows down utilization of the Internet by businesses because companies outside the U.S.A. do not dare to send important information over the Internet. On the other hand, the encryption that may be used freely within the U.S.A. is substantially more secure. Lotus, a subsidiary of the American computer giant IBM, has negotiated a special solution to the problem. Lotus gets to export strong cryptography with the requirement that vital parts of the secret keys are deposited with the U.S. government. ``The difference between the American Notes version and the export version lies in degrees of encryption. We deliver 64 bit keys to all customers, but 24 bits of those in the version that we deliver outside of the United States are deposited with the American government. That's how it works today,'' says Eileen Rudden, vice president at Lotus. Those 24 bits are critical for security in the system. 40-bit encryption is broken by a fast computer in several seconds, while 64 bits is much more time-consuming to break if one does not have the 24 bits [table omitted]. Lotus cannot answer as to which authorities have received the keys and what rules apply for giving them out. The company has confidence that the American authorities responsible for this have full control over the keys and can ensure that they will not be misused. On the other hand, this (assurance) does not matter to Swedish companies. On the contrary, there is a growing understanding that it would be an unacceptable security risk to place the corporation's own ``master key'' in the hands of foreign authorities. Secret information can leak or be spread through, for example, court decisions in other countries. These concerns are demonstrated clearly in a survey by the SAF Trade and Industry security delegation. Some 60 companies answered the survey. They absolutely do not want keys deposited in the U.S.A. It is business secrets they are protecting. These corporations fear that anyone can get a hold of this information, states Claes Blomqvist at SAF. Swedish businesses are also afraid of leaks within the American authorities. The security chief at SKF, Lars Lungren, states: ``If one has a lawful purpose for having control over encryption, it isn't a problem. But the precept is flawed: They ought to monitor (internally), but the Americans now act as if there are no crooks working within their authorities.'' In some countries, intelligence agencies clearly have taken a position on their country's trade and industry. Such is the case in France. One example, which French authorities chose to publicize, was in 1995 when five CIA agents were deported after having spied on a French telecommunications company. Win Treese <treese(a)openmarket.com> [The Lotus Notes crypto scheme is one that I have familiarly been calling ``64 40 or fight!'' (in a reference to a slogan for an early U.S. election campaign border-dispute issue many years ago. PGN]

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Gadget Warfare, from the Netly News
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********* http://cgi.pathfinder.com/netly/opinion/0,1042,1669,00.html The Netly News (http://netlynews.com/) January 6, 1998 Gadget Warfare by Declan McCullagh (declan(a)well.com) For a country with no real military rivals, the U.S. still manages to find an amazing number of enemies. Terrorists top the list of anti-American villains, according to a Pentagon report released last month. The 100-page document, called "Responses to Transnational Threats," describes how the military should respond to the threat of saboteurs and bombers aiming for violence, not victory. The solution, according to the Pentagon, is to develop a set of gadgets that would make even James Bond jealous: * STICKY ELECTRONICS Think SpiderMan's spidertracers, only smaller. "Sticky electronics" adhere to a suspected terrorist's clothing, hair, luggage or vehicle and report his location. These almost microscopic gizmos tune in to satellite signals and transmit their exact latitude and longitude. "To conserve battery (and mission life) they would respond only when" activated by a radio signal, the Pentagon says. And if you're the suspicious type, sprinkle some in your spouse's underwear. * DATA MINING If you worried about the FBI's jones for access to your data, wait 'til you find out what the military hopes to do. The Pentagon wants authority to sift through private-sector databases in hopes of tracking down, say, the World Trade Center bombers before they strike. The plan is to incorporate "real-time data on international border crossings, real-time cargo manifests, global financial transactions and the global network carrying international airline ticket manifests." As new private-sector databases are developed, "the baseline system would be augmented so that the correlation and fusion process becomes more automated." But the benefits of invading everyone's privacy are dubious: It's hard to imagine the alleged Unabomber, for instance, showing up in computer files. [...]

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Re: cypherpunks and guns
by David Honig 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 05:28 AM 1/6/98 -0500, Ryan Lackey wrote: > >I am fairly certain that as an irregular army soldier I could inflict >a substantial amount of damage upon an occupying military. With maybe >$20k in equipment and several hundred hours of training, you could make >life very difficult for any luckless squad that happens your way. Multiply >that by 100 million armed citizens and you see that armed civilian >resistance *can* defeat an occupying army. A distributed decentralized terrorist group can trash almost any country's infrastructure as well. The gov't knows this, but if it were to start happening (or their intelligence indicated it might) guards would be sent to the power stations, transformers, water works, radio relays, NAPs, refineries, etc. These guards would be physical, guarding physical resources against physical threats. They would be able to resist smaller threats. As you say, if outnumbered, they're eventually hosed. The recent gov't interest in 'cyber' threats against infrastructure reflects the fact that the government doesn't dominate the digital domain, and can't protect it with troops, and needs it to run civilization and its armies. ------------------------------------------------------------ David Honig Orbit Technology honig(a)otc.net Intaanetto Jigyoubu "How do you know you are not being deceived?" ---A Compendium of Analytic TradeCraft Notes, Directorate of Intelligence, CIA

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Jim Bell article excerpt (Was: Letter on Jim Bell)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I wrote this last summer: [...] Then Assassination Politics sent the IRS into a tizzy. Jeffrey Gordon, an inspector in the IRS' Internal Security Division, widened the investigation immediately. He detailed in an 10-page affidavit how he traced Bell's use of allegedly fraudulent Social Security Numbers, how he learned that Bell had been arrested in 1989 for "manufacturing a controlled substance," how he found out that Bell possessed the home addresses of a handful of IRS agents. Gordon's conclusion? Bell planned "to overthrow the government." The IRS investigator said in his affidavit that Bell's "essay details an illegal scheme by Bell which involves plans to assassinate IRS and other government officials... I believe that Bell has begun taking steps to carry out his Assassination Politics plan." But for all Gordon's bluster in court documents, he had no proof that Bell broke the law. He didn't even have enough evidence to arrest the prolific essayist -- at least not yet. After the April 1 raid, Gordon and a team of IRS agents worked to assemble a case against Bell. They pored through the hard drives of the three computers they seized. They scrutinized documents from Bell's house. They interrogated his friends. They listened to tape recordings of the "Multnomah County Common Law Court." They scoured the Net for mentions of Assassination Politics. Six weeks later they felt their case was complete. --- IRS agents arrested Bell on May 16 and charged him with obstructing government employees and using false Social Security numbers. Now, this is hardly attempting "to overthrow the government." But government agents insist Bell is far more dangerous than the charges suggest. (The judge seemed to agree: at the time of this writing, Bell is being held without bail.) The latest IRS documents filed with the court label Bell a terrorist. They claim he talked about sabotaging the computers in Portland, Oregon's 911 center, contaminating a local water supply with a botulism toxin, extracting a poison called Ricin from castor beans, and manufacturing Sarin nerve gas. He allegedly bought and tested some of the chemicals. "Bell has taken overt steps to implement his overall plan by devising, obtaining, and testing the materials needed to carry out attacks against the United States, including chemicals, nerve agents, destructive carbon fibers, firearms, and explosives," the complaint says. But what really got the IRS in a stink was what happened a month after they seized Bell's car. The complaint says: "On March 16, 1997, a Sunday, an IRS employee noted a strong odor in the Federal building. On March 17, 1997, several IRS employees had to be placed on leave due to the odor, and another employee reported other ill effects. The odor was traced to a mat and carpeting... just outside the IRS office entrance." The chemical proved to be "mercaptan," with which Bell's friends say he doused an adversary's law office in the early 1980s. Yet if Bell was a crypto-terrorist, he was a singularly idle one. This is a problem with the IRS' accusations: if true, they prove too much. If Bell was bent on toppling the government, and his exploits date back from the early 1980s, why are they such laughably juvenile and ineffectual ones? Stink-bombing offices isn't a Federal felony, nor should it be. "I would've thought this would be 'malicious mischief,' at most," Tim May, one of the founders of the cypherpunks, writes. "People who've done far, far, far worse are left unprosecuted in every major jurisdiction in this country. The meat thrown to the media -- the usual AP stuff, mixed in with 'radical libertarian' descriptions -- is just to make the case more media-interesting... It sure looks like they're trying to throw a bunch of charges against the wall and hope that some of them stick -- or scare Bell into pleading to a lesser charge." Since his arrest, the denizens of the cypherpunks list, where Bell introduced and refined his ideas, have become generally sympathetic. Gone is the snarling derision, the attacks on his ideas as too extreme. Now a sense of solidarity has emerged. One 'punk wrote: "I have decided that I cannot in good conscience allow Jim Bell's persecution for exercising his basic human right to free speech to pass by without taking personal action to support him." --- When I talked to Bell a few days before his arrest, he spoke calmly and with little rancor about the pending investigation. I couldn't tell how he felt after being raided and interrogated by his arch-enemy, the IRS. But imagine continuously railing on the Net against jackbooted thugs, then having real ones bash down your front door. Bell was most interested in talking up Assassination Politics and predicting how it would eventually blossom. He had just published an op-ed in a local newspaper saying "the whole corrupt system" could be stopped. "Whatever my idea is, it's not silly. There are a lot of adjectives you can use, but not silly," he told me. "I feel that the mere fact of having such a debate will cause people to realize that they no longer have to tolerate the governments they previously had to tolerate. At that point I think politicians will slink away like they did in eastern Europe in 1989. They'll have lost the war." He told me why he became convinced that the government needed to be lopped off at the knees. Bell's epiphany came after he ordered a chemical from a supply firm and was arrested when he failed to follow EPA regulations. "That radicalized me," he said. "That pissed me off. I figured I'd get back at them by taking down their entire system. That's how I'd do it."' Moral issues aside, one of the problems plaguing Bell's scheme is that it's not limited to eliminating "government thugs who violate your rights," as he likes to describe it. If it existed, anyone with some spare change could wipe out a nosy neighbor or even an irritating grocery store clerk. After I pointed this out to Bell on the phone, he fired email back a few days later saying, "Assuming a functioning Assassination Politics system, nothing stops you from contributing to my death." He suggested that maybe assassins would develop scruples: "You'd be able to purchase deaths of unworthy people, but it might be only at a dramatically higher price. Doable but not particularly economical." [...] -Declan

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ACM conference on computer-related policy (DC, 5/98)
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 6 Jan 1998 11:10:49 -0800 (PST) From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> To: fight-censorship-announce(a)vorlon.mit.edu Subject: ACM conference on computer-related policy (DC, 5/98) [The best policy for the Net is probably no policy, or at most a hands-off one. We don't have national "policies" for how we should regulate, for example, newspapers or bookstores, and we don't need such policies for the Net. On universal service, we already have Internet connections that are cheaper than cable TV; on copyright, the safest course is to let federal courts decide; on crypto, most agree that the current "policy" is misguided at best. --Declan] *************** ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTING (ACM) ANNUAL CONFERENCE * * * POLICY98 * * * "Shaping Policy in the Information Age" Washington, DC, Renaissance Hotel May 10-12, 1998 Preliminary Notice For Conference and Registration information see: http://www.acm.org/usacm/events/policy98/ The ACM Annual Conference will focus on public policy issues affecting future applications of computing. Our goal is to forge stronger links between computing professionals and policy makers. Attendees will interact with prominent leaders from academia, industry, Congress, and Executive agencies, and participate in debates on policy issues including Universal Access, Electronic Commerce, Intellectual Property, and Education Online. The conference will promote more regular engagement of computing professionals in democratic processes related to productive use of computing and information processing innovations. A blend of technical skills and policy insights are essential to cope with the inherent opportunities and dangers of any transformational technology. Continuing collaborations between computing professionals and policy makers will benefit citizens, consumers, entrepreneurs, researchers, and students. You can make a difference! May 10: Ethical and social impacts papers and panels May 11-12: Public policy panels and featured speakers All Policy98 attendees are invited to the Annual ACM Awards Banquet on Sunday evening May 10th, and a conference reception on Monday evening May 11th. +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ PANEL TOPICS AND COORDINATORS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Universal Service: Ollie Smoot What can be done to promote widespread access to the benefits of the Internet? What is the role of government and the role of the private sector in wiring schools, libraries, and medical facilities? Electronic Commerce: Jim Horning How much public policy does EComm need? What problems would inadequate, excessive, or misguided policies cause? Can compromises in areas like fair trade practices, fraud prevention, security, privacy, law enforcement, and taxation advance the interests of all stakeholders? Intellectual Property in Cyberspace: Pam Samuelson What will be the impact of the WIPO agreements on copyright in cyberspace? How should intellectual property be protected and what safeguards are necessary to protect libraries and academic institutions? Education Online: Charles N. Brownstein The Internet offers unparalleled opportunities for learning and teaching. What public policy and technical challenges must be met to realize these prospects? +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ CONFERENCE CO-CHAIRS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Ben Shneiderman, USACM (U.S. Public Policy Committee) C. Dianne Martin, SIGCAS (ACM Special Interest Group on Computers & Society) +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ PROGRAM COMMITTEE CHAIRS =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ Marc Rotenberg, Public Policy Keith Miller, Ethics and Social Impacts +=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ REGISTRATION INFORMATION =+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+=+ For more information, contact: policy98(a)acm.org or to register electronically, see: http://www.acm.org/usacm/events/policy98/reginfo.html Early registrants and ACM members receive discounts.

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Re: cypherpunks and guns
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Ryan Lackey <rdl(a)mit.edu> # AOLserver (a nice web server formerly from GNN/navisoft) punted their # 128bit SSL module distribution *EVEN TO US CITIZENS* due to commerce # department fuckedness. Anyone know where I could get a copy? It would # really suck to have to patch the 40bit one into a 128bit version, since # they do not distribute source. I don't know if this is the "module" form of the answer you want: http://www.replay.com/ Download Netscape Communicator 4.04 with 128 bits SSL today on: ftp.replay.com Replay Associates distributes this software so you can safely conduct your E-commerce ---- Tim May wrote: > Final comment: If I find the motivation, I may finish an essay I've been > working on about how we, the Cypherpunks and the World, are *retrogressing* > in crypto areas. Most of the exotic applications are no longer being > discussed, and various mundane commercial products are the main focus. > Yawn. How about moving this list to encrypt its transmissions in the recipient's public keys, just to begin encrypting Net traffic? Obviously not to hide what is being said, but simply to start moving communications into the encrypted realm. That way, we'll build up the software tools for handling this, and try to get other lists to do the same. Maybe encourage all pro-crypto people to use it for all email to as many other people they talk with as possible. (Adopt two others...) Heh: a white-list to allow only encrypted messages through. Encourage Senators to set up public keys. In general, try to get the general flow of traffic encrypted, even if PGP is "mundane" these days. Solving the human factors problem of getting its use wide-spread is _not_ a mundane problem. Encryption ain't gonna be that useful if only a few in-the-know use it. ---guy

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Silly Shrinkwrapped Encryption
by Eric Cordian 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Could someone poke through Lotus Notes with a debugger and see exactly how this "giving 24 bits to the government" is implemented? Most commercial software simply introduces redundancy in order to limit the keyspace to 40 bits, regardless of the advertised length of the key. This claim that they deliver 64 bits of key to the customer seems a bit bogus. Of course, they could have done something clever, like generating a completely random 64 bit key, and then encrypting 24 bits of it with a giant government-owned RSA public key, and including this additional information with each message. However, it seems unlikely that they would employ such strong encryption for message recovery, while offering only 64 bits for message encryption. Is Lotus Notes encryption documented anywhere? Are the differences between the export and domestic versions disclosed to overseas customers? -- Eric Michael Cordian 0+ O:.T:.O:. Mathematical Munitions Division "Do What Thou Wilt Shall Be The Whole Of The Law"

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Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily
by Declan McCullagh 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>Date: Wed, 7 Jan 1998 07:44:57 -0800 (PST) >From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> >To: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Subject: FC: Governments want to change Net architecture, from Comm Daily >MIME-Version: 1.0 >Sender: owner-politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >Reply-To: declan(a)well.com >X-Loop: politech(a)vorlon.mit.edu >X-URL: Politech is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ > >[Apologies to Art for not forwarding this earlier. --Declan] > >---------- Forwarded message ---------- >Date: Thu, 18 Dec 1997 10:28:49 -0500 >From: Art Brodsky <arb(a)well.com> >To: declan(a)smtp.well.com >Subject: comm daily story > >Declan, > Here's the story from Comm Daily, Dec. 17 > >'Optimistic and Damned Silly' > > INTERNET CHANGE FOCUS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT > > Law enforcement officials of U.S. and 7 other industrialized >countries want to make fundamental changes in Internet technology >in order to aid in their ability to track and catch criminals, >Justice Dept. sources said. > > Program to consider changes in Internet architectures comes as >part of agreement announced last week by Attorney Gen. Janet Reno >and Justice ministers from around world after meeting in Washington >(CD Dec 11 p10). However, one leading Internet authority, MCI >Senior Vp Vinton Cerf, said international group's plan wouldn't >work. > > Justice ministers are considering approach similar to that of >Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) program in >U.S., which would make traffic from advanced telecom networks more >accessible to law enforcement entities. Representatives of Canada, >France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and U.K., as well as U.S., >agreed as part of "statement of principles" issued in communique >following 2-day session that: "To the extent practicable, >information and telecommunications systems should be designed to >help prevent and detect network abuse, and should also facilitate >the tracing of criminals and the collection of evidence." Several >items on "action plan" issued in support of those principles refer >to working with new technologies to collect critical evidence, >developing standards for authenticating electronic data for use in >investigations and encouraging standards-making bodies to provide >public and private sectors "with standards for reliable and secure >telecommunications and data processing technologies." > > DoJ officials said Dept. may want to talk later with telephone >industry on trap and trace issues, but it's premature to involve >them now in follow-up to international summit. Instead, they said, >they are looking at broader picture of telecom networks that >haven't worked as closely with law enforcement as they could, and >have begun thinking about Internet protocols. Internet operates >globally with common protocols, currently Internet Protocol version >4. Internet engineers are working on next iteration, version IPv6 >(Internet Protocol version 6 -- 5 was experimental attempt that was >dropped). Justice official said that one problem now is that it's >easy to send and receive e-mail with false address, called >"spoofing." > > It would be helpful to law enforcement if information sent >over Internet were tagged, and packets would transmit information >reliably as to where they came from, including user and service >provider, officials said. Loose analogy would be to compare e-mail >messages to tagging of explosives, so law enforcement can track >explosive material to its source. DoJ said new protocols could be >designed to make it easier to authenticate messages and to make >system more reliable. Law enforcement wants to work with industry >to accomplish goal, saying it would help "keep people who are >abusing information technologies from continuing to do it." > > There will be substantial obstacles to law enforcement >concept, however. Not least of them is that IPv6 will include >sophisticated encryption capabilities as part of protocols. Such >security isn't built in to Internet now, one of reasons why >electronic commerce has yet to take off, said Mark McFadden, >communications dir. for Commercial Internet eXchange Assn. (CIX). >That feature will make it harder for law enforcement to gain access >to information, he said. > > Cerf, co-inventor of Internet protocols, said in interview >that law enforcement's concept of tagging e-mail messages wouldn't >work: "To imagine that we would instantly create the >infrastructure for that throughout the entire Internet strikes me >as optimistic and damned silly, at least in the short term. Anyone >who anticipates using tools to guarantee that everything will be >traceable is not going to have a successful outcome." Technically, >such project could be accomplished, Cerf said, but having >administrative infrastructure to administer it is quite different >issue. > > It's possible to have digital signature for every packet of >data, but it would take "an enormous amount of processing, and it's >not clear we have any network computers and routers that could do >that and maintain the traffic flow that's required," Cerf said. It >also would require that each sender affix digital signature to each >piece of mail, idea that Cerf said couldn't be enforced: "Frankly, >the idea of trying to guarantee traceability of that kind is far >from implementable." He said he didn't want to be misunderstood >that his objections were "an argument in favor of criminality." >But Cerf said he worries that "someone relies on what they think is >a technical solution without recognizing all of the administrative >mechanics that need to be put in place." > > Law enforcement has some time to work with Internet community. >McFadden said IPv6 isn't scheduled to be implemented at consumer >level for at least 5 years, possibly as much as 10. There was some >urgency when it appeared that reservoir of Internet addresses would >dry up, but with progress being made to protect addresses as scarce >resource there's less pressure for new set of protocols, he said. > > >posted with permission Warren Publishing > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >POLITECH -- the moderated mailing list of politics and technology >To subscribe: send a message to majordomo(a)vorlon.mit.edu with this text: >subscribe politech >More information is at http://www.well.com/~declan/politech/ >-------------------------------------------------------------------------- >

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Re: Silly Shrinkwrapped Encryption
by jim＠mentat.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eric Cordian says: > Could someone poke through Lotus Notes with a debugger and see exactly how > this "giving 24 bits to the government" is implemented? Lotus produced a "backgrounder" called "Differential Workfactor Cryptography" when they first promulgated the 64/40 stuff. It says (in part): We do that by encrypting 24 of the 64 bits under a public RSA key provided by the U.S. government and binding the encrypted partial key to the encrypted data. I haven't seen the USG RSA key -- if it's 512 bits, that would be a humorous next factoring target. Jim Gillogly 15 Afteryule S.R. 1998, 20:02 12.19.4.14.15, 12 Men 13 Kankin, Seventh Lord of Night

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17 Dec '03

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