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Re: FCPUNX:comp.html (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Forwarded message: > Date: Tue, 10 Feb 1998 15:10:08 -0800 (PST) > From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd(a)echeque.com> > Subject: Re: FCPUNX:comp.html > However quantum computers so far envisaged (but not yet > built) can only do a few steps before they lose quantum > coherence. > > So far factoring a four bit number is well beyond the state > of the art in quantum computation. I only have two things to say to this: - This year. - Quantum Coupled Architectures ____________________________________________________________________ | | | The obvious is sometimes false; | | The unexpected sometimes true. | | | | Anonymous | | | | | | _____ The Armadillo Group | | ,::////;::-. Austin, Tx. USA | | /:'///// ``::>/|/ http://www.ssz.com/ | | .', |||| `/( e\ | | -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- Jim Choate | | ravage(a)ssz.com | | 512-451-7087 | |____________________________________________________________________|

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Re: FCPUNX:comp.html
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- At 03:14 PM 1/28/98 -0600, Jim Choate wrote: > Recently, an algorithm was developed for factoring > numbers on a quantum computer which runs in steps where > is small [1]. This is roughly quadratic in the input > size, so factoring a 1000 digit number with such an > algorithm would require only a few million steps. The > implication is that public key cryptosystems based on > factoring may be breakable. However quantum computers so far envisaged (but not yet built) can only do a few steps before they lose quantum coherence. So far factoring a four bit number is well beyond the state of the art in quantum computation. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG W7fOL2Uec3TpIWpLT+xcgrKGVfoQL3gmNdcADrkN 41SXVwnn/Gy+C42ptPxygaLgt1miSt2a1T/6/b9p8 --------------------------------------------------------------------- We have the right to defend ourselves and our property, because of the kind of animals that we are. True law derives from this right, not from the arbitrary power of the state. http://www.jim.com/jamesd/

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Re: "Corporations selling your ass down the road for a dollar"
by Jim Ray 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- At 02:28 PM 2/10/98 -0500, Declan McCullagh wrote: ... >I'm sure Michael was upset and not typing clearly. He knows as well as >anyone that libertarians are not pro-business; they're pro-individual >rights. Libertarians spend quite a bit of time complaining about the >Republican habit of funding corporate subsidies. ... In view of his constant spewing of lies to the contrary, I'm beginning to doubt that (and it isn't just the Republicans voting for corporate welfare socialism, Democrats do it too). JMR -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 Comment: Freedom isn't Freeh. iQEPAwUBNODjfjUhsGSn1j2pAQFziQfQ4ZrEuBdROssccGRGZHvhLUsCBhlz3j/1 PD0bcZXD8xvHiprG8jsCQV1nduKE3FNA8odhtbRUwtYF5dUxS5aSscnb/wuQXcda FaSs6UhRmnwwech38zh7fK0qeC56rstpDdAKy5aoBso4lSLGOu/vyCEhU78zw/NW 2hxm5w9wHapJ4LyU7NwpGrCZWpKHREJKoPnme77roU+AiAVmM44TnZmVNRjbb0lL +rEwXeSckj+d8qF+qdv/l0WUhg3jBMRXBwlBYOejEjNpwLkeGlWo70zLsSq/ihPc 9c9qbb/q2582mwmnl7rI/jo4q4RbVhsQdRCZ8UVdBACghg== =EyXh -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Who are the "digerati"?
by Ross Wright 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

http://www.edge.org/digerati/index.html Have you guys seen this? Any comments? I thought it was pretty interesting. Ross =-=-=-=-=-=- Ross Wright King Media: Bulk Sales of Software Media and Duplication Services http://ross.adnetsol.com Voice: (408) 259-2795

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FC'98 Palm Pilot Resources
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I have produced some FC'98 files in suitable formats for the Palm Pilot. I will be adding more as the date approaches. http://www.frissell.com/AXA/axa.html So far we have: A map of Anguilla (looks great in Image). A map of Monserrat with eclipse lines. and in DOC format: The Wired article on FC'97. The Forbes cover story on FC'97. and finally: For purposes of amusement only, a Jfile databse of the first 4 quarterly reports of the (1786) names of Taxpatriates (those with too much money who renounce their US citizenship) as reported to the Secretary of the Treasury last year by the State Department. More to come including a schedule in .dba format as soon as The Powers That Be settle on one. DCF

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No Subject
by nelsonde＠umich.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I'm Snyder, the karmic metacrawler. The word: cryptanalytic and Alta Vista's Scooter lead me to you. Know that in the frigid wastes of the WWW my PERL-scripted heart beats for you. To: cypherpunks\(a)toad.com

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PRESS RELEASE: VENTURE CAPITAL CD
by spencer＠datamerge.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

_______________________________________________________________ HIGH TECH FINANCING FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE: DATAMERGE ANNOUNCES VENTURETRACK 2000 CD-ROM INFOBASE VENTURE CAPITAL INSIDERS "TELL ALL" DATABASE Press Contact: Peter Masi (303) 399-6031 MasiPR(a)aol.com http://www.datamerge.com/venturetrack.html DENVER -- DataMerge, Inc., a Denver-based developer of software and information for companies seeking financing, today announced the release of VentureTrack 2000, a software package containing extensive profiles and proprietary "insider" information on hundreds of venture capital firms throughout North America. The VentureTrack 2000 CD-ROM Infobase gives entrepreneurs and small business owners "insider" information, education and advice critical to establishing business relationships with specific venture capitalists and securing financing from them. The software lets users find the firms that optimally fit their needs by identifying links between their company and the interests of the venture capitalists. VentureTrack 2000's "Inside Track" section then instructs users on custom tailoring their business plan and presentation to each venture capital firm. Specific questions, concerns and objections that a given firm will likely raise and good responses for each are also provided to VentureTrack 2000 users. Information contained in the profiles was gathered by finance savvy investigative reporters who used techniques adapted from the intelligence community. The information is exclusive to VentureTrack 2000 and is not available in competing products. It includes: *Insight into the firm's most likely areas of interest; *Personal/individual preferences of principals; *Best methods of approach and specific things to say or not say to a particular individual; *Investment philosophies and strategies based on past experiences; *Firm background, working atmosphere and relationships; *Case studies of investments that best represent their investment philosophy; *Inside advice/scoop from companies each VC firm has previously financed; *Information from DataMerge's customer "grapevine"; *Key contacts by project type and procedure for internal review; *Portfolio investment overview. In addition to the eight- to 12-page profiles of each venture capital firm, VentureTrack 2000 includes an on-line tutor and venture industry knowledgebase called VentureAdvisor, which was developed with extensive input from venture capital principals. The total package is designed to give users proprietary "insider" information and insight into the venture capital industry, which historically were closely guarded secrets of a few well-placed individuals. In addition to small business people, DataMerge CEO Spencer Kluesner says venture capital firms themselves have shown strong interest in VentureTrack 2000 because they want to gather competitive intelligence on their rivals. VentureTrack 2000 supports Windows 95 and Windows NT. The time-limited introductory price is $495. VentureTrack 2000 can be ordered by calling (800) 580-1188. Privately-held DataMerge was founded in 1989 by Spencer Kluesner, a former securities advisor who today serves as chief executive officer of the 26-person company. DataMerge's products are sold directly to customers in the North America, Western Europe and Asia. Additional information can be obtained at DataMerge's website: http://www.datamerge.com/venturetrack.html Additional Information: VentureTrack 2000 White Paper - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/capital/whitepaper.html Sample VentureTrack Profile - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/page5.html VentureTrack Brochure - http://www.datamerge.com/venture/page2.html --30--

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TEMPEST open-source definition version 0.1alpha
by Ryan Lackey 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- So, if we're going to try to protect computers from TEMPEST threats, and we don't have access to the multiple government classified standards, we should come up with the Cypherpunks TEMPEST standard. A theoretical definition of what we want to do (strong) is that we should be able to put the equipment in a virtual box, have an empty virtual box, and then nothing anything which is not in the TCB can do can distinguish one box from the other. Perhaps the "empty" box should also contain simulators for the ethernet, visible light output, and straight power draw (harmonics are still to be avoided), or in some other definitional way they should be accounted for. This prevents non-TCB programs from utilizing the EM spectrum as a covert channel. Additionally, we need to protect the user from divulging state information about his TCB. I guess this condition can best be met by simply saying "take the target system and clone its state perfectly. Separate the two systems. Allow the user to modify the state of the target system while you retain the clone -- you do not have a non-negiligible improvement in matching future state using the EM emissions of the first system over not using the EM emissions." I think there is a better way of stating this, though. So, given a workable theoretical definition which defines perfection, it's time to reverse engineer the practical TEMPEST systems (and in so doing perhaps the classified TEMPEST spec) out there. Next time I find a TEMPEST case at swapfest, or at a con, I'll pick it up (if someone wants to ship me one, so much the better). You *can* buy them from some vendors, although they often refuse to sell them to non-government affiliated entities). MIT's quasi-affiliated Draper Labs has proper TEMPEST verification equipment, and I think some places on MIT's campus have some general purpose equipment which can be used for such purposes. If not, I have a copy of NI LabView and some DAQ hardware which, coupled with some antenna frobbery, can be used to do a quick spectrum analyzer, and there's the capacity to do some serious analysis once the data are on the computer. It would be nice to know how good government TEMPEST systems really are. In practice, matching them would probably be enough. The above theoretical definition doesn't really help that much -- in practice, there's going to be some information coming out, and just because you can't figure out how to use it, doesn't mean no one can. I think preventing the covert channel attack might actually go beyond the government's TEMPEST spec -- certainly if a non-TCB program can cause a system reboot, or power up a peripheral, you can detect the change in power draw, unless the system naturally throws away the difference between its max power consumption and its present power consumption all the time. Being able to telegraph even 1 bit of information might be enough, and if you've got an arbitrary precision clock, you could use this method to send an arbitrary codeword from an arbitrary-length codebook given an arbitrary time interval. The rainbow books talked about covert channel elimination being a really hard problem. Now I see even more why they were right. IIRC, it's only at the not-really-commercially-available levels (A1) that covert channels are utterly eliminated; usually they are comfortable just documenting them. Of course, it would probably make a lot of sense to do TEMPEST reverse engineering in a country that has neither an OSA nor the ability to randomly classify research. Yet another project for cypherpunks.to, Lucky? A practical way of approaching theoretical TEMPEST-perfection is just a decent faraday cage with a lead-glass monitor cover, shielded or eliminated cables, and a serious double-conversion UPS. From the government TEMPEST products I've seen, that's all they are (or they use mesh). I've mainly seen thinks like the SafeKeyper, not general purpose computers, though. I don't think Jim was that far off the mark in thinking class B machines are a worthwhile starting point, but it doesn't go anywhere near far enough. ObCrypto: I've been looking at implementing a cipher in a reconfigurable processor. I might even customize one. Yay. ObGuns: I got to use a .22cal nail gun. It was fun. ObPersonalAttacks: There are a lot of people who are not Real US Citizens on this list. Beware the evil multinationalist conspiacy in our midst, good followers of Bill Clinton! ObQuestion: Can the US government deny a passport for no reason to a random US citizen who is not a felon? - -- Ryan Lackey rdl(a)mit.edu http://mit.edu/rdl/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQEVAwUBNOD8sawefxtEUY69AQG3NQf9GWJjz3pwORa4y5V1YQA/BBAebDJNlnhd gauYxwALwsEIID20Da3x7f/ZZ/ipVH1fhk9SJYGgPK+mtc7HMpPA7WhEfR1awuyE FaP6VrJ18vKy6Cf+JlUbag2w5luQfSlo4o1jK0v6Os3D+PpuDyRN3GUI05dTxKyC +VfS8oiw+SaM455l1knHGnegLZzivCKGS/xXDFD71dl5QCRQsAMBaGrjg0pej8gJ ByiO4X7ae8OdlUytdQpfaNOtJTdSQJ7C3FLjczp9dQKvb7msfQUWzAWG9L8XneUP b6xRF5Ra1JaixfFEJisnP+CfZbtJknvNlffUh+//b17ql8Jz5WsFJg== =IRsn -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Godwin, et al, a pity, this
by nobody＠REPLAY.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Who are the "digerati" and why are they "the cyber elite"? They are the doers, thinkers, and writers who have tremendous influence on the emerging communication revolution. They are not on the frontier, they are the frontier. The digerati evangelize, connect people, adapt quickly. They like to talk with their peers because it forces them to go to the top of their form and explain their most interesting new ideas. They give each other permission to be great. That's who they want to talk to about the things they are excited about because they want to see if it plays. They ask each other the questions they are asking themselves, and that's part of what makes this cyber elite work. The Connector < John Brockman> The Pragmatist < Stewart Alsop > The Coyote < John Perry Barlow > The Scout < Stewart Brand > The Seer < David Bunnell > The Thinker < Doug Carlston > The Idealist < Denise Caruso > The Statesman < Steve Case > The Physicist < Greg Clark > The Matchmaker < John Doerr > The Gadfly < John C. Dvorak > The Pattern-Recognizer < Esther Dyson > The Software Developer < Bill Gates > The Conservative < David Gelernter > The Defender < Mike Godwin > The Genius < W. Daniel Hillis > The Judge < David R. Johnson > The Searcher < Brewster Kahle > The Saint < Kevin Kelly > The Prodigy < Jaron Lanier > The Marketer < Ted Leonsis > The Scribe < John Markoff > The Maestro < Stewart McBride> The Force < John McCrea > The Competitor < Scott McNealy > The Publisher < Jane Metcalfe > The Pilgrim < Jerry Michalski > The Chef < Nathan Myhrvold> The Webmaster < Kip Parent > The Citizen < Howard Rheingold > The Buccaneer < Louis Rossetto > The Curator < Doug Rowan > The Oracle < Paul Saffo > The Radical < Bob Stein > The Skeptic < Cliff Stoll > The Catalyst < Linda Stone > The Evangelist < Lew Tucker > The Cyberanalyst < Sherry Turkle > The Lover < Dave Winer > The Impresario < Richard Saul Wurman > http://www.edge.org/digerati/index.html

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Re: Cyber 'Nannys"
by Information Security 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> To: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > Subject: Re: Cyber 'Nannys" > From: dlv(a)bwalk.dm.com (Dr.Dimitri Vulis KOTM) > Message-Id: <qsoPke10w165w(a)bwalk.dm.com> > > The mentally retarded pedophile Guy Polis tried to mailbomb me from his ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^ > former eviljay(a)bway.net account, and bway.net pulled his plug in minute. Fire One. ---guy

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