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17 Dec '03

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Re: Encryption export controls are a rationalization of a "cheat"
by 'die＠die.com' 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Sun, Mar 08, 1998 at 01:59:53PM -0800, Ernest Hua wrote: > today. I am not aware of what cellular spectrum chip sets are available > via Wyle or some other distributor, but I wouldn't be surprised if the > cost of a digital intercept equivalent gear would be much more than $300 > in parts plus a 300MHz PC (to decode the intercepted stream). I don't think I'll bother the list with this, but a big problem with cellphones is that people have cellphones. And cellphones are generally not designed to be tamperproof (in many cases little or no effort in this cost competitive market has gone into this) so making a real cellphone serve as the front end to a snooping system has and will be done and in fact be the easiest hack engineering solution. > > The question is, what is worth the potential interceptor's time and > money to do this? It's obvious that politics is enough for the Florida > couple (in the Gingrich case). For a college-age hacker, "because I can > do it" plus "I work in a well-stocked University lab" is probably enough > reason. I won't venture to guess what is worth a criminal's time and > money, but surely existing models for analog piracy behavior is enough > to characterize the trade-offs. There are lots and lots of people who like to be spectators and are keenly interested in other people's affairs. All of us are to some degree - witness the feeding frenzy over the Monica affair - and some guestimates have estimated that perhaps as much as 40% of analog cell calls near large cities are being eavesdropped on by at least one other person. > > In short, we violently agree on the technical plus behavioral front. > But we are preaching to the choir. The real audience for a > easy-to-understand summary is Congress. They need to understand that > the assumptions 30 years ago do not apply today. And that market demand > for more and more technically-literate engineering professionals along > with the phenomenal downward price spiral in PC's and consumer > electronics gear will simply make those assumptions even less applicable > in the future. That problem is getting worse rather than better. The media depiction of the mysterious "hacker" long haired mad kid intent on evil invasion of the worlds computers is helping create the illusion that there is a separate techno criminal class. But the reality is that more and more people are crossing the barriers that the older lawyers in congress never tried to cross and learning something about technology and software. And these people are the guy next door with the cute kids, not fringe crazies. And the evil net allows information to become available much more widely than before. > > Regarding my moral or ethical argument, I am using the fuzzy standard > set by what society will accept or not accept. From my perspective, there are deep divisions and ambivalences in what the US people will tolerate. They hate the idea of being spied open but buy nanny cams and gobble up spy novels and TV shows. They purchase millions of police scanners and react in horror when Linda Tripp tapes a conversation to protect her ass. And they expect the US government to be on top of events around the world and have inside knowlage of other governments and react in horror when their spies are unmasked within our walls, and their eavesdropping gets shown on the nightly news. And cities install more and more cameras and bosses read more email and listen to more calls on business phones every year. > I don't think I need to > argue that most American citizens will be really really pissed if they > found out that the NSA is spying here via their British counterparts, or > that the FBI has conducted far more intercepts than they officially > report. Yes, its definately sausage but it tastes good... > I am definitely not arguing that the FBI or the NSA has any > obligation to inform the public of what weaknesses they use to gain an > intercept advantage. What concerns most people is that they see > (correctly) that the NSA's advantage was not based on technical > superiority, but on the ignorance of everyone else. That is true, and it is also sadly true that a lot of their effort has gone into frank deception, and active determined efforts to block those of us who have been fighting for incorperating at least minimal crypto communications security into the infrastructure. The Internet is ending this era, however, because it is no longer possible to control the flow of information and news about communications security and crypto, and slowly the holes will get plugged. People do get more > intelligent over time, and the rapid public gain in the cryptography > area has pretty much wiped out the gains the NSA has depended on over > the last 50 years. If the average person understands that what the FBI > and the NSA REALLY want is for you to be stupid (at least in the area of > communications security), then there would be an uproar. > This is happening, and that is why Louie is grabbing desperately for the last chance... and why congress is busily passing anti scanner bills to solve the cellphone privacy problem that don't mention a thing about cryptography. Their desparate hope is if they say it solomnly enough and with enough ceremony the public will see the emporer's clothes -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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Wrong Address???
by Roger H Tancrell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

To Cypherpunks: In the last couple days, I have received many, many e-mail messages. How did I get your your group list??? Perhaps, you have the wrong "Roger". Please remove my name. Thanks. Roger Tancrell

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Matt Blaze KE Patent
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

9 March 1998, MicroPatent: Escrow key management system for accessing encrypted data with portable cryptographic modules (Assignee -- Lucent Technologies Inc.) Abstract: A cryptographic module, such as a smartcard, is designed to a) store decrypting software programs, and information indicative of predetermined conditions under which an escrow agent is enabled to use the software programs stored on the module to decrypt encrypted data files, and b) records for audit purposes, information indicating every time the software programs are used for decryption. Ex Claim Text: A system for managing access to one or more encrypted data files stored in a computer system, said system comprising: a file of the computer system which associates a cryptographic key with a cryptographic module that is subsequently assigned to a selected user; a memory of the cryptographic module which stores a) access information allowing use of the cryptographic module by the selected user under specific conditions, said access information including the cryptographic key, a corresponding cryptographic passphrase and a software program to decrypt the one or more encrypted data files; means responsive to receiving at said cryptographic module said corresponding cryptographic passphrase from said selected user, for a) permitting decryption of said one or more data flies when the specific conditions are met, and b) recording in said memory transactional information associated with said decryption, and b) uses said cryptographic module for the purpose of decrypting one or more of said data files; and means for querying at a later time said cryptographic module to retrieve said transactional information recorded on said memory. Assignee: Lucent Technologies Inc. Patent Number: 5721777 Issue Date: 1998 02 24 Inventor(s): Blaze, Matthew A. If you would like to purchase a copy of this patent, please call MicroPatent at 800-648-6787.

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Re: [LEGAL] Crypto as Contraband?
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- At 06:20 PM 3/6/98 -0800, Tim May wrote: > How could any "outlawing of unescrowed crypto" conceivably > deal with this vast amount of distributed software? Will a > user of RSA's MailSafe program face jail time for using a > program he legally bought in 1991 (as I did)? > > More questions than answers. Can anybody help me to > understand the legal issues? You are getting out of date. As the rule of law dissolves, legal issues become insignificant, and will in due course vanish altogether. For example nobody knows what are the "legal issues" with putting strong crypto on a web site, as I have done. According to what the legislation says, what I have done is completely in accord with legislation. Indeed, it is completely in accord with US legislation simply to post the stuff. on any server inside the US, the foreigner doing the download is violating the legislation, not the person who put it up. I have gone considerably further than is required by legislation, though not nearly as far as some others have gone. But mere legislation counts for less and less these days. If you read the business press, you will frequently read them complain of cases where the distinctions between executive, legal, and judicial powers are effectively dissolved, and penalties are in effect adminstratively applied for undefined offences, or retrospectively and administratively defined offences, often in ways that appear to personally enrich those administering these quasi judicial powers. Generally this sort of thing is only applied to people who are unpleasant and unpopular. Tobacco companies, junk bond merchants whose businesses have been more profitable for themselves than for many of their investors, and the like. Of course this creates a large vested interest in demonizing more and more people, so that more and more people can be dealt with in this fashion. Similar measures are applied not only to alleged recreational drug distributors, but to lawyers who defend alleged recreational drug distributors, but the business press tends to report such cases less. Meanwhile formerly totalitarian countries, such as China and Cuba, where there used to be no such things as laws, merely some people having the power to harm other people, power exercised in accordance with rules that those subject to this power were forbidden to know, are moving towards the rule of law. It used to be that if someone imprisoned in Cuba were to discover the actual reason for his imprisonment, he might possibly suffer some draconian additional punishment for improper possession of state secrets. In a fully totalitarian state, the regime does not have rules for most people, merely goals and desires. If some desire is not fulfilled, the masters will go around killing people more or less at random until somebody fulfills that desire, or until they have killed so many people that they suspect that what they desire is not readily achievable, or sometimes until they simply run out of people who might be able to assist in fulfilling that desire. For example all people possessing certain skills and experience were wiped out by Stalin, and in Cambodia everyone connected to the jute industry in any way. Such rules as exist only apply to the privileged, to those administering the terror, not to those terrorized. Crypto legislation is likely to resemble the announcement of a desire, rather than the announcement of rules and restrictions likely to fulfill that desire. Indeed, the proposals we have so far seen are desires, not rules. As you point out, that desire cannot be fulfilled, except by means that further radically undermine the rule of law. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG KheXnmd1kekBNA4gB1wyUeQgjPT7Y26FWeajCBIR 43jg9sJBVPllkPf+Yt2ByoAf/sIdt9xbXwh/wMV+Z

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Final CFP: 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
by Gene Tsudik 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Final Call for Papers Fifth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security San Francisco, California November 3-5, 1998 Sponsored by ACM SIGSAC Papers offering novel research contributions in any aspect of computer security are solicited for submission to the Fifth ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security. Papers may present theory, technique, applications, or practical experience on topics including but not limited to access control authentication accounting and audit mobile code security applied cryptography data/system integrity cryptographic electronic commerce intrusion detection protocols key management privacy and anonymity intellectual property protection information warfare secure networking secure operating systems viruses and worms security management distributed systems security database security smart-cards and secure security verification PDAs Accepted papers will be presented at the conference and published by the ACM in a conference proceedings. Outstanding papers will be invited for possible publication in ACM Transactions on Information and System Security. Instructions for paper submissions: Submitted papers must not substantially overlap papers that have been published or that are simultaneously submitted to a journal or a conference with a proceedings. Papers should be at most 15 pages excluding the bibliography and well-marked appendices (using 11-point font and reasonable margins on 8.5'x11' paper), and at most 20 pages total. Committee members are not required to read the appendices, and so the paper should be intelligible without them. Papers should be submitted in a form suitable for anonymous review (no author names or affiliations). * Send via email to reiter(a)research.att.com a plain ASCII text message containing the title and abstract of your paper, the authors' names, email and postal addresses, phone and fax numbers, and identification of the contact author. * In addition, submit your paper using ONE of the following two methods. o Electronic submission (preferred): Instructions for submitting your Postscript paper by e-mail can be obtained from http://www.research.att.com/~reiter/ccs5/esub.html or by sending email to ccs98(a)research.att.com with the Subject line containing "HELP". It is strongly recommended that you electronically submit your paper at least five days in advance of the submission deadline, to allow us adequate time to verify that we can print your paper (and if not, to allow you to submit your paper in hardcopy to be received by the submission deadline). We cannot be held responsible for papers that we cannot print. OR o Hardcopy submission: Send eighteen (18) copies of your paper to the program chair at the address below with a cover letter indicating that your paper is a submission for the 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, and listing the authors' names, email and postal addresses, phone and fax numbers, and identifying the contact author. Submissions received after the submission deadline will be rejected without review. Where possible all further communications to authors will be via email. Paper submissions due: April 3, 1998 Acceptance notification: June 5, 1998 Final papers due: July 16, 1998 Instructions for panel proposals The conference may include panel sessions addressing topics of interest to the computer security community. Proposals for panels should be no longer than five (5) pages in length and should include possible panelists and an indication of which of those panelists have confirmed participation. Send two (2) hardcopies of your proposal to the program chair at the address below with a cover letter indicating that your proposal is for the 5th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, and listing the proposers' names, email and postal addresses, and phone and fax numbers. Panel proposals due: May 1, 1998 Acceptance notification: June 5, 1998 Steering committee chair: Ravi Sandhu, George Mason University General chair: Li Gong, JavaSoft Program chair: Mike Reiter AT&T Labs, Room A269, 180 Park Avenue Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971 USA phone: +973-360-8349 Awards chair: Jacques Stern, ENS/DMI Publication chair: Stuart Stubblebine, AT&T Labs Publicity chair: Gene Tsudik, USC ISI Program committee: Martin Abadi, DEC SRC David Naccache, Gemplus Bill Cheswick, Lucent/Bell Labs Hilarie Orman, DARPA/ITO Carl Ellison, Cybercash Avi Rubin, AT&T Labs--Research Ed Felten, Princeton University Pierangela Samarati, Universita di Milano Paul Karger, IBM T.J. Watson Gene Tsudik, USC ISI Steve Kent, BBN Corporation Paul Van Oorschot, Entrust Technologies Ueli Maurer, ETH Zurich Bennet Yee, UCSD Cathy Meadows, Naval Res. Lab Moti Yung, CertCo For more information, visit http://www.research.att.com/~reiter/ccs5 or http://www.isi.edu/~gts/cfp.html

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17 Dec '03

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by sara＠iddqd.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

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RE: Crypto as contraband
by jtatz＠chemistry.ohio-state.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> The morons in congress responded to intercepts of cellphones. Because > Newt was scanned. Response: outlaw *cellphones*... which are > themselves typically programmable as scanners of cell freqs. > And scanners > and programmable RF receivers. The ECPA (Electronic Communications Privacy Act) banned cell phone scanning, as of 1994 I believe. When Newt was monitored, that was nothing really new. Ch 83, (890-986?) is cell, however Federal law (Title 18, Chapter 119) makes cell monitoring illegal only if it INTENTIONAL. And owning and buying cell-phone capable devices is LEGAL. The only catch is who is selling it, it is my understanding you can sell a cell scanner used without a prob. I currently own a cell-capable scanner. ~Jim ------------------------------------------ A great man named Ben Tersian once said "Avoid the cliche 'Information must be free'" "Find it learn it embrace it and set it free."

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Updated list of crypto and security courses
by Avi Rubin 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Thanks to everyone for your great suggestions/additions/deletions. I added, changed or deleted over 25 courses this time around. Now back to my regularly scheduled life. The updated course list can be found at: http://www.cs.nyu.edu/~rubin/courses.html Avi ********************************************************************* Aviel D. Rubin rubin(a)research.att.com Secure Systems Research Dept. Adjunct Professor at NYU AT&T Labs - Research 180 Park Avenue http://www.research.att.com/~rubin/ Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971 Voice: +1 973 360-8356 USA FAX: +1 973 360-8809 --> Check out http://www.clark.net/pub/mjr/websec/ for a new book on web security (The Web Security Sourcebook). *********************************************************************

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