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How to Spot a Government Infiltrator
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

How to Spot a Government Infiltrator by Mike Johnson Those who have been studying the stories released to the media these days about the arrests of various different people within the militia movement will doubtlessly have noted that government infiltrators are usually involved. This should make people nervous. And rightly so. Our normal view of government is that the only people who should have to worry about what the government is up to are people who are breaking the law. As the vast majority of constitutional militia units are composed of people who are of good character and don't go around breaking the law to begin with, they might feel that they should have little to worry about from the government. Unfortunately that does not seem to be the case. The government appears to be going all out to discredit the constitutional militia movement in this country. This effort on the part of the government does include the use of government agents to infiltrate militia units and cause as many problems, hate and discontent as they possibly can. In many instances, these government agents may not be readily apparent as to who and what they are. Some of these people may have had extensive experience in working undercover operations and may not make some of the more stupid mistakes. There are a variety of different roles that such government operatives may play. The first is that they may simply act as a mole. They will do everything anybody else in the unit does, and do nothing at all to call undue attention to themselves. However, they will relay everything that goes on within the unit to their handlers. About the only indication a unit may have that they have been infiltrated by a mole may be that they can't seem to be able to keep anything a secret. This type of role is the most difficult for a unit to detect and deal with. Which is also possibly why most of the spy novels that get written deal with various different ways to smoke out moles. While I wouldn't suggest that anybody try a technique for which the only source of documentation is a work of fiction, it is an indication of just how obnoxious this type of agent could be to deal with. Another role that a government agent might play may be that of a dissipator. A dissipator is one who tries to redirect the course and energy of a unit in ways which will cause it to accomplish nothing of any importance. They may also act so as to break a unit up by emphasizing differences, disagreements and personality clashes between unit members. Given that the people who are attracted to the constitutionalist militia movement usually tend to be strong willed and opinionated people to begin with, such an agent may find that his task is somewhat easier than it might be if he were working with other groups. Unit members should simply be encouraged not to take things personally, be aware that there will be honest differences of opinion between the members of the unit, and to be wary of somebody who does try to take everything personally, or set up cliques within the unit. The final role which will be discussed is that of the agent provocateur. Such an agent infiltrates a unit and tries to get the members of the unit to actually commit crimes, or make it look like they are actually planning to commit crimes. One should also bear in mind that a government agent is not going to be confined to operating within any one of the roles that have been discussed, and may likely mix and match as they feel best. However, the role that has received the highest profile in government operations these days is that of the agent provocateur. That is largely because the results of an operation conducted by an agent provocateur or two make for good propaganda when the media gets hold of it. The resultant publicity given to the arrests and the charges gets used to brand everybody in the entire movement as a criminal. The fact that the entire thing was set up by someone in the employ of the government isn't going to be mentioned at all by the mainstream media. For those who haven't caught on by now, your antenna should start to quiver in the presence of any one, or especially a combination of the following behaviors/patterns demonstrated by a unit member: (1) Wants to make bombs. (2) Wants to get everybody else to make bombs. (3) Wants people to buy/store large quantities of substances which could be used for explosives manufacture. (4) Fanatic about obtaining fully automatic weapons, without benefit of Class III license. (5) No obvious means of support, especially if they have lots of money to throw around. (6) Auto license tag changed on an irregular basis. (7) Encourages people to plan/do stupid things (raid armories, blow up office buildings, etc.) (8) Some groups can get auto tags run. They should be especially suspicious of anybody whose auto tag turns up a complete blank when run. (9) In our case, the guy was absolutely paranoid about his car being out of either his sight or his "wife's" sight for even a trivial amount of time. (10) Person claims to have a military background that they do not have. One individual claimed to be former Special Forces, but was found to be ignorant of some of the things that he should have known when quizzed by people who were former Special Forces. Depending on the level of trust that the members of your group have with each other, it might be a good idea to request to see the DD-214s of anybody claiming to have a military background. (11) One of your members has taken effective action to expose or block activities of the police or government preventing the expansion of or preservation of government power to control people and/or invade the privacy of the people. (12) One of your members (a) has an FFL; or (b) is involved in selling at gun shows; or (c) Is involved in promoting gun shows. Arguably the best way to deal with people who meet criteria 1-10 is simply to invite them to leave the unit. As Starr and McCranie found out, trying to turn them in will do no good at all, so the next best bet is to try to get them to leave. Failing that, disband unit, start again from scratch with people you can trust after sufficient elapsed time. Given the way things are going right now, those who have not joined up with public units may want to consider forming small closed units with just a small group of people that they have known for a long time and that they trust. For persons in 11, and 12: Do your best to be sure the goons cannot find a pretext as that is what they often work from. (*) Bill Albert of the Michigan Militia contributed to the list of items to look for and the discussion which follows it.

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No Subject
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<http://www2.clinet.fi/~msihvo/files/crossbows.html> "If you don't learn how to beat your plowshares into swords before they outlaw swords, then you sure as HELL ought to learn before they outlaw plowshares too. " --Chuck Hammill #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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Posse Comitatus
by lcs Mixmaster Remailer 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

<http://www.oz.net/~veils/veilsv2n1/politics.html> The Military's Growing Involvement In Domestic Law Enforcement For more than a century the U.S. military has been banned from involvement in routine domestic law enforcement. This tradition of separating the role of national defense from domestic law enforcement has it's origins in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. This law prohibits the army from being involved in domestic arrests, or in searches and seizures. This ban was later extended to the other services. It was passed in response to abuses committed by occupation troops in the South after the Civil War. This long tradition, which has helped to insure liberty and democracy for Americans, was quietly abandoned in 1989 when Congress and the Bush administration ordered the military into the "war on drugs". Since then the Pentagon has spent more than $7 billion on counter-drug activities, using tens of thousands of active duty and reserve personnel. Active duty units are primarily used to monitor and patrol for drug smuggling activity using sophisticated surveillance and communication systems. These units are assisted by thousands of National Guard troops whose activities are not normally restrained by the Posse Comitatus legislation. This allows them to perform routine police activities such as inspecting cargo, analyzing intelligence, and translating wiretapped conversations. The military's involvement in domestic policing activities has now been institutionalized and is being coordinated in the Defense Department by the Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6). Supporter of using the military in drug enforcement activities argue that drug use threatens the country economically and socially. Some military commanders see counter-drug operations as providing troops with useful training. While law enforcement officials see it as an opportunity to benefit from sophisticated surveillance and communication systems that they wouldn't normally have access to. Opponents of giving the military domestic law enforcement responsibilities and powers remind supporter of the abuses by troops that originally lead to passage of the Posse Comitatus legislation. They also point out that the military's involvement in drug enforcement efforts haven't had any discernible impact on the availability of drugs in the United States; so why take the risk of losing our liberties when we gain nothing in return. People need to ask themselves where the movement to involve the military in domestic policing activities is going to stop. Are Somalia, Hati, and Bosnia simply peacekeeping activities, or are they being used to train U.S. troops for the near future when they will be patrolling the streets of the United States as they now patrol Bosnia. #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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No Subject
by DOOM Anonymous Untraceable User 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Internet is slowing China's efforts to maintain control To eliminate political opposition by the China Democratic Party, Chinese authorities are putting prominent dissidents on trial for "inciting the overthrow of state power," but the Internet is making it difficult for them to accomplish their goal. The Washington, D.C.-based electronic magazine VIP Reference is a widely-used news source and network for dissident activities. Boston University professor Merle Goldman says, "It was relatively easy for the authorities to get rid of Democracy Walls in Beijing and in other cities in 1979, but it is virtually impossible to close down the use of the Internet as a means of political communication." (Washington Post 18 Dec 98) <http://www.ifcss.org/ftp-pub/org/dck/> #!/usr/local/bin/perl -0777-- -export-a-crypto-system-sig -RC4-3-lines-PERL @k=unpack('C*',pack('H*',shift));for(@t=@s=0..255){$y=($k[$_%@k]+$s[$x=$_ ]+$y)%256;&S}$x=$y=0;for(unpack('C*',<>)){$x++;$y=($s[$x%=256]+$y)%256; &S;print pack(C,$_^=$s[($s[$x]+$s[$y])%256])}sub S{@s[$x,$y]=@s[$y,$x]}

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[g8hxe@zetnet.co.uk: [WUN] MAR: MILLENIUM BUG]
by Dave Emery 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

----- Forwarded message from Keith Haywood <g8hxe(a)zetnet.co.uk> ----- Date: Sat, 26 Dec 1998 12:19:37 GMT Cc: keith.haywood(a)icl.com Hi all, I caught the following NAVTEX intercepts last night and thought they may be of interest to others, all were received on 518KHz. They are being repeated frequently be all the U/K stations and the Netherlands Coastguard, and similar messages are being broadcast by some of the Scandinavian stations. --- log opened Fri Dec 25 1998 00:00:20 UTC --- 05:31:06 UTC ZCZC OB07 05:33:09 UTC PORTPATRICKRADIO 05:33:43 UTC ZCZC OA40 05:33:46 UTC NAVAREA ONE 533 05:33:48 UTC YEAR 2000 AND MILLENIUM BUG. 05:33:54 UTC 1ST JAN 1999 IS THE FIRST OF SEVERAL CRITICAL DATES THROUGH 05:34:05 UTC 1999 AND 2000 WHEN SOME ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS MAY FAIL DUE TO 05:34:16 UTC THEIR INABILITY TO PROCESS THE DATE. SUCH SYSTEMS INCLUDE 05:34:27 UTC AUTOMATION AND SAFETY SYSTEMS WHOSE FAILURE MAY RESULT IN 05:34:38 UTC LOSS OF POWER, STEERING OR MALFUNCTIONING OF NAVIGATIONAL 05:34:45 UTC OR COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT. 05:34:50 UTC MASTERS ARE ADVISED TO CONSIDER CONTINGENCY PLANS IN 05:34:56 UTC PREPARATION FOR POSSIBLE FAILURE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT OF THE 05:35:07 UTC OPERATIONAL PROGRAMME OF THE SHIP. 05:35:09 UTC GUIDANCE ON THE RISKS AND PRECAUTIONARY ACTION, HAS BEEN 05:35:20 UTC PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANISATION AS 05:35:31 UTC MSC/CIRC.868, 'ADDRESSING THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM', AND AS AS A 05:35:42 UTC CORRECTION TO ALL VOLUMES OF THE UKHO ADMIRALTY LIST OF RADIO SIGNALS. 05:35:49 UTC CANCEL THIS MESSAGE 012359Z JAN 99. 05:35:54 UTC NNNN 07:52:24 UTC ZCZC PA47 07:52:36 UTC NETHERLANDS COASTGUARD 07:52:40 UTC NAVIGATIONALWARNING NR 47 250730UTC DEC 07:52:46 UTC EQUIPMENT FAILURE ONBOARD AND ASHORE 07:52:51 UTC DUE TO THE YEAR 2000 PROBLEM: 07:52:56 UTC SHIPPING SHOUZD BEWARE THAT ON THE 07:53:01 UTC FOLLOWING DATES PROBLEMS MAY OCCUR 07:53:06 UTC ONBOARD IN ENGINES, MACHINERY, CONTROL 07:53:12 UTC AND MONITORING, COMPUTER, NAVIGATION 07:53:18 UTC AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT, 07:53:22 UTC DETECTION, ALARM AND OTHER SYSTEMS. 07:53:28 UTC SIMILAR PROBLEMS MAY OCCUR ASHORE 07:53:33 UTC AND MIGHT HAMPER NAVIGATION AND 07:53:38 UTC COMMUNICATION POSSIBILITIES 07:53:42 UTC FOR SHIPPING. DATES: 07:53:45 UTC 01-01-1999 , 09-09-1999 07:53:49 UTC 01-01-2000 , 29-02-2000, 01-03-2000 07:53:54 UTC 31-12-2000 , 01-01-2001, 01-03-2001 07:53:59 UTC SHIPPING IS URGENTLY ADVISED TO 07:54:04 UTC NAVIGATE WITH EXTREME CAUTION ON 07:54:09 UTC THE AFOREMENTIONED DATES AND TO 07:54:13 UTC TAKE NECESSARY PRECAUTIONS WHERR 07:54:18 UTC POSSIBLE. 07:54:20 UTC CANCEL THIS MESSAGE 012359UTC JAN 99 07:54:25 UTC NNNN Keith Haywood G8HXE Manchester U/K. --- The Worldwide UTE News (WUN) mailing list. WUN is a non-profit, dues-free club established in 1995 to share information on shortwave utilities. For more information: http://www.gem.net/~berri/wun/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Dave Emery N1PRE, die(a)die.com DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18

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Zero-Knowledge Freedom AnonymousIP Whitepaper
by Austin Hill 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Zero-Knowledge has put up a draft of a whitepaper explaining the technical details of it's coming Freedom Internet Privacy system. The paper discusses the technical details of our AnonymousIP protocol and our Pseudonymous E-mail System. This is an early draft and comments/questions are appreciated. People familiar with Mixmaster, PipeNet, Cypherpunk Remailers and Onion Routing will find this whitepaper to address many of the same problems with regards to Internet Anonymity & Privacy. The paper is available at http://www.zks.net/products/whitepapers.asp Thanks, Austin _________________________________________________________________________ Austin Hill Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc. President Montreal, Quebec Phone: 514.286.2636 Ext. 226 Fax: 514.286.2755 E-mail: austin(a)zks.net http://www.zks.net Zero Knowledge Systems Inc. - Nothing Personal PGP Fingerprints 2.6.3i = 3F 42 A2 0D AF 78 20 ED A2 BB AD BE 8B 40 5E 64 5.5.3i = 77 1E 62 21 B3 F0 EB C0 AA 6C 65 30 56 CA BA C4 94 26 EC 00 keys available at http://www.nai.com/products/security/public_keys/pub_key_default.asp _________________________________________________________________________

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Car computer navigator forgets to mention ferry (fwd)
by Max Inux 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-- Max Inux <maxinux(a)openpgp.net> Hey Christy!!! KeyID 0x8907E9E5 Kinky Sex makes the world go round O R Strong crypto makes the world safe If crypto is outlawed only outlaws will have crypto Fingerprint(Photo Also): 259D 59F7 D98C CD73 1ACD 54Ea 6C43 4877 8907 E9E5 ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Sat, 26 Dec 1998 12:35:20 -0800 (PST) X-Loop: openpgp.net From: William Knowles <erehwon(a)kizmiaz.dis.org> To: DC-Stuff <dc-stuff(a)dis.org>, aaa-list(a)lists.netlink.co.uk Subject: Car computer navigator forgets to mention ferry POTSDAM, Germany (AP) [12.26.98] - A German couple out for a Christmas drive near Berlin ended up in a river - apparently because their luxury car's computer forgot to mention they had to wait for a ferry. The 57-year-old driver and his passenger were not injured in the accident, police said Saturday. Several companies sell computer navigators, some of which are attached to dashboards and serve as electronic road maps. Some offer traffic updates and Internet connections. The German couple was out driving Friday night when they came to a ferry crossing at the Havel River in Caputh, six miles from Berlin. That information, however, was never stored in the satellite steered navigation system they were using, police said. The driver kept going straight in the dark, expecting a bridge, and ended up in the water. River traffic was stopped for two hours while the car was fished out about 13 feet from the river bank. ``You can't always blindly rely on technology,'' a coast guard police officer said. == Some day, on the corporate balance sheet, there will be an entry which reads, "Information"; for in most cases the information is more valuable than the hardware which processes it. -- Grace Murray Hopper == http://www.dis.org/erehwon/

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Re: Zero-Knowledge Freedom AnonymousIP Whitepaper
by Anonymous 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Zero-Knowledge has put up a draft of a whitepaper explaining the technical > details of it's coming Freedom Internet Privacy system. > > The paper discusses the technical details of our AnonymousIP protocol and > our Pseudonymous E-mail System. > > This is an early draft and comments/questions are appreciated. Have algorithms been chosen? If I understand right, letting different users use different algos would make some users' messages look different from others while bouncing around in the network. I don't think anyone even suspects 3DES and a KEA cognate would fail. The "topologically close" tradeoff (i.e, a gain in performance for an unmeasured loss in security) seems to be more exploit-bait than optimization; it might be wiser not to enable this part of automatic route selection by default unless/until its effects on security are investigated more thoroughly. At least give me a while to make an attack on it. :) > > People familiar with Mixmaster, PipeNet, Cypherpunk Remailers and Onion > Routing will find this whitepaper to address many of the same problems with > regards to Internet Anonymity & Privacy. > > The paper is available at http://www.zks.net/products/whitepapers.asp > > Thanks, > > Austin > > _________________________________________________________________________ > Austin Hill Zero-Knowledge Systems Inc. > President Montreal, Quebec > Phone: 514.286.2636 Ext. 226 Fax: 514.286.2755 > E-mail: austin(a)zks.net http://www.zks.net > > Zero Knowledge Systems Inc. - Nothing Personal > > PGP Fingerprints > 2.6.3i = 3F 42 A2 0D AF 78 20 ED A2 BB AD BE 8B 40 5E 64 > 5.5.3i = 77 1E 62 21 B3 F0 EB C0 AA 6C 65 30 56 CA BA C4 94 26 EC 00 > keys available at > http://www.nai.com/products/security/public_keys/pub_key_default.asp > _________________________________________________________________________

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ABCReport:1st Aphrodisiac Drug Appr
by clinical27a＠usm.edu 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

The announcement of this scientific breakthrough, has set off a media fire-storm. In the last few days, the remarkable qualities of Androstenone Pheromones have been featured in every major publication, newspaper, national magazine, and television magazine. >From 20/20, Hard Copy, and Dateline NBC, to the N.Y. Times, and the American Journal of Modern Medicine. Several independent research institutes have concluded studies on the benefits of Androstenone (You may have heard about the most recent study on CNN.) TO READ MORE ABOUT THIS REVOLUTIONARY MEDICAL DISCOVERY and the CNN REPORT go to our new sites at : http://www.angelfire.com/on/aphrod7501/ **** OR **** http://www.nettaxi.com/citizens/aphrod7501

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David Angell and html
by bill payne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sunday 12/27/98 4:13 PM John Young I went to http://www.page1book.com this morning looking for books on HLML. I asked the clerk what was a good book on html. The clerk pointed me to HTML 4 Unleashed, second edition, by Rick Darnell, et al. A guy standing next to me volunteered that he wrote books on computing. He advised getting a reference book, looking at examples on Internet, RESEARCH the code, then modify the RESEARCHED the code. He introduced himself. David Angell. ISDN for Dummies (--For Dummies) ~ Usually ships in 2-3 days David Angell / Paperback / Published 1996 Our Price: $19.99 ~ You Save: $5.00 (20%) http://www.amazon.com He was visiting his mother who lives in abq. Angell now lives in Austin TOO. I am on the net to download THE [your?] code at http://jya.com/crypto.htm. To RESEARCH it, of course. I am experimenting with <BODY BACKGROUND="devil2.jpg"> for background for Pro Se Litigation with the US Federal Government. http://www.jya.com/nsasuit.txt Keep a good sense of humor. And up-wind too, of course. http://www.zolatimes.com/v2.29/bw1.html I CONTINUE to recall Bob Sernas joke. Q What is the difference between a terrorist and a woman with pms? A You can negotiate with a terrorist. We got to get this UNFORTUNATE MATTER settled BEFORE IT GETS WORSE! Later bill Thursday 12/10/98 5:08 PM J Kevin O'Brien, Chief Freedom of Information-Privacy Act Section Office of Public Affairs U.S. Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington D. C. 20535 O'Brien I received your form letter dated DEC 02 1998. YES, I want the information! I return your completed form. Sandia assigned me to break electronic locks for the FBI/ERF. SSA Mike Uttaro was my direct contact. His boss was SSA Mike McDevitt. The FBI is breaking the law under the veil of classification abuse. I may write another article --- False Security William H. Payne Abstract Wiegand wire plastic credit card-sized entry access credentials are the easiest to counterfeit. Yet Access Control & SECURITY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, September 1998 , www.prox.com http/www.securitysolutions.com ran a full page ad. "Why 130 million Wiegand cards are in use throughout the world . The most secure of all access card technologies. HID Wiegand cards are virtually impossible to counterfeit... any attempt to alter them destroys them! ... Since no direct contact with the card is required, they are totally enclosed, making them absolutely immune to the elements and a frustration of vandals. ... The secrets to the security of an HID Wiegand card are those little enclosed wire strips. Once corrupted, they won't work." Purpose of this article is to tell you how to counterfeit Wiegand http://www.securitysolutions.com/ and give you insight into Real Security. Fumble, Bumble and Inept Funds Electronic Lock Breaking at Sandia National Laboratories. http://www.jya.com/fbi-en7898.htm False Security William H. Payne Abstract Wiegand wire plastic credit card-sized entry access credentials are the easiest to counterfeit. Yet Access Control & SECURITY SYSTEMS INTEGRATION, September 1998 , www.prox.com http/www.securitysolutions.com ran a full page ad. "Why 130 million Wiegand cards are in use throughout the world . The most secure of all access card technologies. HID Wiegand cards are virtually impossible to counterfeit... any attempt to alter them destroys them! ... Since no direct contact with the card is required, they are totally enclosed, making them absolutely immune to the elements and a frustration of vandals. ... The secrets to the security of an HID Wiegand card are those little enclosed wire strips. Once corrupted, they won't work." Purpose of this article is to tell you how to counterfeit Wiegand http://www.securitysolutions.com/ and give you insight into Real Security. Fumble, Bumble and Inept Funds Electronic Lock Breaking at Sandia National Laboratories. http://www.jya.com/fbi-en7898.htm --- Counterfeiting Wiegand Wire Access Credentials Bill Payne October 16,1996 Abstract Wiegand wire access credentials are easy and inexpensive to counterfeit. Access Control & Security Systems Integration magazine, October 1996 [http://www/securitysolutions.com] published the article, Wiegand technology stands the test of time by PAUL J. BODELL, page 12 Many card and reader manufacturers offer Wiegand (pronounced wee-gand) output. However, only three companies in the world make Wiegand readers. Sensor Engineering of Hamden Conn., holds the patent for Wiegand, and Sensor has licensed Cardkey of Simi Valley, Calif., and Doduco of Pforzheim, Germany, to manufacture Wiegand cards and readers. ... A Wiegand output reader is not the same thing as a Wiegand reader, and it is important to understand the differences. In brief, Wiegand reader use the Wiegand effect to translate card information around the patented Wiegand effect in which a segment of a specially treated wire generates an electronic pulse when subjected to a specific magnetic field. If the pulse is generated when the wire is near a pick-up coil, the pulse can be detected by a circuit. Lining up several rows of wires and passing them by a cold would generate a series of pulses. Lining up two rows of wires - calling on row "zero bits" and the other "one bits" - and passing them by two different coils would generate two series of pulses, or data bits. These data bits can then be interpreted as binary data and used to control other devices. If you seal the coils in a rugged housing with properly placed magnets, and LED and some simple circuitry, you have a Wiegand reader. Carefully laminate the special wires in vinyl, and artwork, and hot-stamp a number on the vinyl, and you have a Wiegand card. IN THE BEGINNING Wiegand was first to introduce to the access control market in the late 1970s. It was immediately successful because it filled the need for durable, secure card and reader technology. Embedded in the cards, Wiegand wires cannot be altered or duplicated. ... Bodell's Last statement is incorrect. Tasks for EASILY counterfeiting Wiegand wire cards are 1 Locate the wires inside the card to read the 0s and 1s. 2 Build an ACCEPTABLE copy of the card. Bodell's clear explanation of the working of a Wiegand card can be visualized zero row | | | one row | | binary 0 1 0 0 1 representation Solutions to Task 1 A X-ray the card B MAGNI VIEW FILM, Mylar film reads magnetic fields ... Edmunds Scientific Company, catalog 16N1, page 205, C33,447 $11.75 is placed over the top of the Wiegand card. COW MAGNET, Cow magnetics allow farmers to trap metal in the stomachs of their cows. Edmunds, page 204, C31,101 $10.75 is placed under the card. Location of the wires is easily seen on the green film. Mark the position of the wires with a pen. Next chop the card vertically using a shear into about 80/1000s paper-match-sized strips. Don't worry about cutting a wire or two. Note that a 0 has the pen mark to the top. A 1 has the pen mark at the bottom. Take a business card and layout the "paper match"-like strips to counterfeit the card number desired. Don't worry about spacing. Wiegand output is self-clocking! Tape the "paper-match - like" strips to the business card. Only the FUNCTION of the card needs to be reproduced! History Breaking electronic locks was done as "work for others" at Sandia National Laboratories beginning in 1992 funded by the Federal Bureau of Investigation/Engineering Research Facility, Quantico, VA. The FBI opined that this work was SECRET/NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION. Details of the consequences of this work are covered in Fired Worker File Lawsuit Against Sandia Specialist Says He Balked When Lab Sought Electronic Picklock Software, Albuquer Journal, Sunday April 25, 1993 State-sanctioned paranoia, EE Times, January 22, 1996 One man's battle, EE Times, March 22, 1994 Damn the torpedoes, EE Times, June 6, 1994 Protecting properly classified info, EE Times, April 11, 1994 DOE to scrutinize fairness in old whistle-blower cases, Albuquerque Tribune, Nov 7 1995 DOE boss accelerates whistle-blower protection, Albuquerque Tribune, March 27, 1996 DOE doesn't plan to compensate 'old' whistle-blowers with money, Albuquerque Tribune September 27, 199 --- Here is one of my previous articles. http://www.zolatimes.com/v2.29/bw1.html http://www.aci.net/kalliste/bw1 We should get this settled before IT GETS WORSE. Black and white is an example of WORSE. bill payne

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