- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Duress, Watermarking, a simple design
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

Specificiation For A Duress File System. Disguised as a Watermark Annotation Management System Maj. Variola (ret), the OsamaSoft Corporation --------------------------------------------------- Background: To deter torture, physically *destroy* your data. If you can't destroy it, you need a *duress* system. It will at least buy some time. Specs for a duress system: Adversary can't know if there's more data You can reveal multiple passphrases to satisfy the Adversary (incl. false data) The former requires stego, otherwise the Adversary could tell that there's more data. The latter requires that your stego'd info doesn't interfere with other stego'd data. Simple Multiple-Use Implementation: Treat the cover media as a block-sized filesystem. The user must specify (and keep track of) the index of the block to embed the payload. To extract data, only a passphrase (not index) is needed if a checksum accompanies data in each occupied block. Multiple blocks can be embedded using the same passphrase, they are all decoded when that passphrase is supplied. (I don't think its possible to store allocation info *in* the file without giving away the presence of more occupied blocks!) Usage: As a watermarking system, anyone can embed any type of watermark in a "block" so long as block occupations are tracked globally. eBay could stego-watermark images in the upper left quadrant, individuals get to use the upper right. Each could use their own watermarking tools. As a collaborative tool, if the annotations are all plaintext this could be like writing comments on the back of a JPG. With the convenience of keeping them with the image. As a duress file system, the watermarks are secret data. They are compressed, encrypted, then embedded in the given block of the cover media. It would be smart to use boring annotations in some blocks so that its not unusual to use the tool with the cover media. (One should also use layers of increasingly sensitive info to give up gradually, as well as plausible fakes.)

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Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

At 09:23 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: >Innocents could be a good "cannon fodder" that can bring a lot of >backslash and alienation aganst the goons, stripping them from public >support. Yes, this has been discussed before, in addition to using it retributionally --finger some deserving civil servant's offspring. But eventually they'll come back to you wanting names that turn out to be legit, and reveal yet more names. Which is not to say that such countermeasures aren't valuable for the *warning time* your colleages get as a result. >> filesystems (etc) with layers of deniable stego. >Are there any decent implementations for Linux/BSD/NT? I haven't looked recently. One property that such a FS or app should have is that it is useful for something *else* besides stego & duress layers. Maybe a watermark :-) management tool that can embed multiple watermarks that don't interfere. Hmm... a meaty problem... tasty, with heavy theory sauce.. >> I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field >> with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't >> help. > >There are magnesium rods on the camping market, sold as firestarters for >very bad weather. One can also buy mag ribbon which is more convenient than the mini-ingots you are referring to. I know that pyrotechs coat Mg curls and the like with blackpowder paste (apply wet then dry). A coil of coated ribbon and a rocket-igniter would make a neat little daughterboard :-) Just don't take it on an airplane. There are patents on similar, of course. Testing might get expensive unless you can get destructive-test dongles cheaply, and how much effort do you expend trying to read the data?

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Smartcard patents
by Steve Schear 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

http://www.financialcryptography.com/mt/archives/000121.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Cryptography Research, the California company that announced the discovery of differential power analysis around late 1997, have picked up a swag of patents covering defences against DPA. One can't read too much into the event itself, as presumably they filed all these a long time ago, way back when, and once filed you just have to stay the distance. It's what companies do, over that side, and if you didn't predict it, you were naive (I didn't, and I was). What is more significant is the changed market place for smart cards. The Europeans dominated this field due to their institutional structure. Big contracts from large telcos and banks lead to lots of support, all things that were lacking in the fragmented market in the US. Yet the Europeans kept their secrets too close to the chest, and now they are paying for the vulnerability. CR managed to discover and publish a lot of the stuff that the Europeans thought they had secretly to themselves. Now CR has patented it. What a spectacular transfer of rights - even if the European labs can prove they invented it first (I've seen some confidential stuff on this from my smart card days) because they kept it secret, they lose it. Secrets don't enjoy any special protection. Security by obscurity loses in more ways than one. What's more, royalties and damages may be due, just like in the Polaroid film case. When both sides had the secret, it didn't matter who invented it, it was who patented it first that won. We will probably see the switch of a lot more smart card work across to CR's labs, and a commensurate rush by the European labs to patent everything they have left. Just a speculative guess, mind. With those patents in hand, CR's future looks bright, although whether this will prove to be drain or a boon to the smart card world remains to be seen.

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Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

t 10:09 AM 4/23/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >"I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field >with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't >help." > >Well, what if there were 3 passwords: > >1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be >smart enough to look beyond this...that's why they have guns) >2)One for real data...this is what you're hiding >3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys >the real data as it opens the plausible real data. The first thing cops do is make backups of the harddrives. So you can't destroy the "real data". You would need a tamper-"proof" card (ie trusted security region) to implement this. None of the commercial memory gizmos, from USB dongles to stamp-sized memory cards, do this. None of the smart cards are user programmable and none include secure wipe, AFAIK. Do PDA apps? How do they store data between battery changes? Is it enough to hold a tiny memory card for a minute over a lighter? Merely snapping the card into pieces? Does one need to make a scene with fireworks? (I'm remembering that spammer who tried to eat a small memory card.)

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Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by Major Variola (ret) 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

At 11:33 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > This will produce a loud bang, obviously. > >Thermite is a good choice to turn your fileserver into lava, but that thing >better be outside, or mounted in chamotte- or asbestos-lined metal closet. >Will produce smoke, and take some time, too. Thanks, I hadn't thought about the sensory impact of various methods. Varying amounts of bang vs. heat vs smoke vs lava. Obviously they affect usage environment. >If your keyring's been securely wiped, rubberhosing the passphrase out of you >to unlock it will give the attacker very little. Assuming the device is >powered on, and easily triggerable, that would be quickest. Yes, particularly if USB flash memory has no persistance. But there is no "clear" button on a USB dongle. "Secure clear" would require a small amount of logic. >Assuming the knuckle-draggers will know a CFS from a corrupted FS or a dead >drive, that is. You know the rules of the game, you have to assume that.

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Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by John Kelsey 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

>From: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com> >Sent: Apr 23, 2004 10:09 AM >To: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push ... >Well, what if there were 3 passwords: >1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually >be smart enough to look beyond this...that's why they have guns) >2)One for real data...this is what you're hiding >3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also >destroys the real data as it opens the plausible real data. The obvious problem with multiple levels of passwords and data is: When does the guy with the rubber hose stop beating passwords out of you? After he gets one? Yeah, that's plausible, if he's convinced there's only one. But once he's seen a second hidden level, why will he ever believe there's not a third, fourth, etc.? The same calculation applies to a judge or district attorney. He *knows* (even if he's wrong) that there's evidence of kiddie-porn, drug dealing, etc., in there somewhere. He knows you've given up two passwords. Why is he ever going to let you out of jail, or ever going to reduce the charges down to something a normal human might live long enough to serve out the time for? >-TD --John

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Entangled photons secure money transfer
by R. A. Hettinga 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

Further entanglement of the hype-meter with its peg... Cheers, RAH ------- <http://www.newscientist.com/news/print.jsp?id=ns99994914> New Scientist Entangled photons secure money transfer 17:10 22 April 04 NewScientist.com news service An electronic money transaction has been carried out in at a bank in Austria using entangled photons to create an unbreakable communications code. Although commercial quantum cryptography products already exist, none of these use entangled photons to guarantee secure communications. The link was used to transfer money between Vienna City Hall and Bank Austria Creditanstalt on Wednesday. The cryptographic system was developed by Anton Zeilinger and colleagues from the University of Vienna and the Austrian company ARC Seibersdorf Research. Entangled photons obey the strange principles of quantum physics, whereby disturbing the state of one will instantly disturb the other, no matter how much distance there is in between them. The pairs of entangled photons used were generated by firing a laser through a crystal to effectively split single photons into two. One photon from each entangled pair was then sent from the bank to the city hall via optic fibre. Key creation When these photons arrived at their destination, their state of polarisation was observed. This provided both ends of the link with the same data, either a one or a zero. In this way, it is possible to build a cryptographic key with which to secure the full financial transaction. Quantum entanglement ensures the security of communications because any attempt to intercept the photons in transit to determine the key would be immediately obvious to those monitoring the state of the other photons in each pair. And because the resulting key is random it can be used to provide completely secure link even over an unprotected communications channel, provided a new key is used each time. This system can be guaranteed secure. By contrast, most existing non-quantum cryptographic systems rely on extremely time-consuming mathematical problems to create a code that are impractical - but not impossible - to break. "If you are talking about large sums of money, people are interested," Zeilinger told New Scientist. He adds that the system should not be much more expensive to implement than current technology. Sewer link The photon-encrypted money transfer saw the Mayor of Vienna transfer a 3000-Euro donation into an account belonging to the University of Vienna team. The two buildings are just 500 metres away from one another, but fibre optics had to be fed through 1.5 kilometres of sewage system to make the link. Zeilinger says in principle it should be possible to extend this link to 20 kilometres. Beyond this distance it becomes difficult to transmit single photons reliably. In June 2003 the same team at the University of Vienna transmitted entangled photons through free space across the river Danube. The commercial quantum cryptographic devices that exist already, made by companies like ID Quantique and MagiQ, use different principles to create a secure key. They also use weak light pulses instead of individual photons. Because these pulses must be sufficiently weak to guarantee security, more sensitive detectors are required, says Tim Spiller, a quantum communications researcher at Hewlett-Packard's research laboratory in Bristol, UK. He notes that using pairs of entangled photons would make it easier to guarantee absolute secrecy. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Postfix 2.1 Released (fwd from brian-slashdotnews@hyperreal.org)
by Eugen Leitl 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

<mumble>TLS</mumble> ----- Forwarded message from brian-slashdotnews(a)hyperreal.org -----

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Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap push
by Tyler Durden 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

"I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't help." Well, what if there were 3 passwords: 1) One for Fake data, for amatuers (very few of the MwG will actually be smart enough to look beyond this...that's why they have guns) 2)One for real data...this is what you're hiding 3) One for plausible real data, BUT when this one's used, it also destroys the real data as it opens the plausible real data. Of course, some really really smart MwG (or the cool suits standing behind them) will be able to detect that data is being destroyed, but statistically speaking that will be much rarer. -TD >From: "Major Variola (ret)" <mv(a)cdc.gov> >To: "cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net" <cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net> >Subject: Re: [IP] One Internet provider's view of FBI's CALEA wiretap >push >Date: Thu, 22 Apr 2004 11:53:07 -0700 > >At 05:56 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > >On Thu, 22 Apr 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote: > > > >> At 12:09 PM 4/22/04 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: > >> > > >> >Are you truly expecting a worldwide ban on encryption? How do you >prove > >> >somebody is using encryption on a steganographic channel? > >> > >> Torture, of the sender, receiver, or their families, has worked >pretty > >> well. > >> If you're good you don't even leave marks. > > > >However, it's not entirely reliable. At some point, the suspect tells >you > >what you want to hear, whether or not it is the truth, just so you >leave > >him alone. It can even happen that the suspect convinces himself that >what > >he really did what he was supposed to do. > >Interrogators check out each confession. First ones won't work, bogus >keys. Just noise. Second confession reveals pork recipes hidden in >landscape >pictures. Beneath that layer of filesystem is stego'd some >porn. Beneath that, homosexual porn. But your interrogators >want the address book stego'd beneath that. They know that these >are stego distraction levels, uninteresting to them. You'll give it to >them eventually. If you give them a believable but fake one, >it will damage innocents or true members of your association. > > >This brings another ofren underestimated problem into the area of > >cryptosystem design, the "rubberhose resistance". > >My comments were written with that in mind. I'm familiar with >filesystems >(etc) with layers of deniable stego. > >I wonder how quickly one could incinerate a memory card in the field >with high success rate? Destroy the data and the passphrases don't >help. > > > _________________________________________________________________ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

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Blood Money
by R. A. Hettinga 23 Apr '04

23 Apr '04

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB108267600610591398,00.html> The Wall Street Journal April 23, 2004 COMMENTARY Blood Money By JOHN W. SNOW April 23, 2004; Page A14 One of the most critical things the 9/11 Commission hearings have brought to light is the important role the Patriot Act plays in helping to win the war on terror. We have heard a lot about "the wall" -- a conceptual barrier that prohibited agencies such as the FBI and CIA from communicating freely with each other. That wall was knocked down when President Bush signed the Patriot Act in October 2001. Sept. 11 compelled our nation to identify the areas we needed to bolster in order to secure our homeland. We have learned a number of very important lessons about the vulnerabilities in our financial system. First, that our ability to combat terrorist financing is linked with our ability to combat money laundering. Second, that we must remain vigilant in our continuing efforts to identify new ways in which terrorists and criminals will attempt to use our own financial system to fuel their agendas. And third, that our ability to obtain and share financial information is critical to our success in identifying and bringing down terrorist networks. Money is the lifeblood of terrorists because, like any businesspeople, they cannot sustain operations without it. A lack of finances can hinder or thwart short-term goals, and dismantle long-term agendas. Without funds, terrorist groups suffer disarray, defection and, ultimately, demise. The Patriot Act aids the ability of the government, along with our partners in the financial sector, to identify dollars flowing through our financial system in support of nefarious acts, and to prevent new dollars from entering the system. Notably, the act has helped the U.S. and our international partners designate 361 individuals and organizations as terrorists and terrorist supporters -- and to freeze and seize approximately $200 million in terrorist-related assets. Under the Patriot Act, banks and other financial institutions are directed to bolster defenses in potentially vulnerable areas. As we strengthen our defenses against financial crimes in traditional financial institutions, such as banks, criminals and terrorists will look to other types of financial institutions or methods through which to move or launder their money. With that in mind, we continue to bring additional types of businesses under the umbrella of anti-money-laundering and anti-terrorist-financing regulation, thereby raising awareness of the issues and equipping these businesses with the tools to protect themselves. We are committed to balancing the weight imposed by these regulations with our mission of ensuring that we are taking all appropriate steps to keep our citizens safe. We believe that financial institutions should have the flexibility to design programs custom-tailored to address their business, the products they offer and their customer base. This reflects the Treasury Department's judgment that those dealing directly with the public are in the best position to make such decisions, and that this flexibility ultimately enhances the effectiveness of the regulation. Additionally, the Patriot Act authorizes the sharing of critical information about suspected terrorist or money-laundering activity -- not only between the government and financial institutions, but also among financial institutions themselves -- by allowing them to register with the Treasury Department. As a first step to expand its information-sharing capabilities, Treasury has asked law enforcement authorities to provide the names of suspected terrorists and money launderers. We then review the names and, if appropriate, send them on to financial institutions to search their account and transaction records for potential matches. Matches are forwarded to law enforcement authorities through Treasury. At that point authorities must follow the appropriate legal process to take further steps. This process has been incredibly helpful to law-enforcement officials' efforts by saving them critical time and resources. In addition, the financial community has done an exemplary job; institutions large and small have committed themselves to the task, provided valuable leads for law enforcement, and our country is safer because of it. Since September 11, there has been a tremendous resolve in the financial community to deny terrorists access to the financial system. However, the Patriot Act was essential to first put in place the procedures needed to follow through on that resolve by providing innovative and essential tools to eliminate known risks to our financial system, as well as to identify and halt new risks that develop. As I mentioned before, the Patriot Act also lowered a wall that prevented the intelligence community from supporting our administrative authority. For example, when the Treasury Department had information indicating that two U.S.-based charities -- the Benevolence International Foundation and the Global Relief Foundation -- might be supporting al Qaeda, the Patriot Act gave Treasury clear authority to block the assets of these organizations while they were under investigation. This action prevented those assets from being dissipated or diverted to support terrorists. The U.N. ultimately joined the U.S. in designating these entities as supporters of Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda. Cutting off terrorists from the financial system is fundamental to disrupting their activities. Through our efforts, we continue to make it more difficult for terrorists to move money through formal financial systems, thus exposing them to greater risk of detection. The results are crippling to the networks that want to do us harm. Perhaps the most important result of the Patriot Act has been the strengthened partnership among the financial community, the government's financial agencies, and law enforcement, much to the detriment of terrorists. This partnership is the key to our success in choking off the blood money used by terrorists to fuel their agendas of hatred. Mr. Snow is secretary of the Treasury. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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