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[IP] microsoft offers "whitelist"
by Dave Farber 05 May '04

05 May '04

Microsoft offers anti-spam bypass Hotmail, MSN operator adopts program that will allow marketers to bypass filters by paying a bond. May 5, 2004: 6:28 AM EDT WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Microsoft Corp. said Wednesday it has adopted an e-mail "whitelist" program by IronPort Systems Inc. that will allow legitimate marketers to thread the gauntlet of spam filters protecting its in-boxes. Microsoft's Hotmail and MSN e-mail services, which together claim 170 million regular users, will require marketers to put money up front if they wish to ensure their messages aren't mistaken for unwanted spam. IronPort's "Bonded Sender" service guarantees that legitimate marketers who post a cash bond and adhere to a set of guidelines will get their messages delivered. "It's the exact opposite of blocking. It says, 'Hey you're a good guy, I'm not going to run you through the metal detectors," said Tom Gillis, IronPort's vice president for marketing. Such a "whitelist" approach requires the active cooperation of marketers -- a much more likely prospect now that Microsoft has signed up, Gillis said. Unsolicited bulk messages now account for roughly two-thirds of all e-mail, according to several estimates. Internet providers use filters to examine incoming messages and consult "blacklists" to block traffic from computers known to send out spam. IronPort's approach rewards e-mail senders who agree to be held accountable for their messages. Participating marketers must demonstrate a history of responsible e-mailing and must provide an easy way for consumers to opt out of future mailings, among other things. Those found to be engaging in abusive behavior forfeit a cash bond of up to $20,000, Gillis said. Internet providers are considering other ways to make e-mail more reliable. Both Microsoft and Yahoo Inc. (YHOO: Research, Estimates) are developing authentication systems that could make it harder for spammers to appropriate others' e-mail addresses. Other methods would make spamming less profitable by sucking up computing power or requiring human input every time a message is sent. "When you add these up over time, it will be uneconomical to send out spam," said Microsoft spam specialist George Webb. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as rah(a)shipwright.com To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[IP] microsoft offers "whitelist"
by Dave Farber 05 May '04

05 May '04

Microsoft offers anti-spam bypass Hotmail, MSN operator adopts program that will allow marketers to bypass filters by paying a bond. May 5, 2004: 6:28 AM EDT WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Microsoft Corp. said Wednesday it has adopted an e-mail "whitelist" program by IronPort Systems Inc. that will allow legitimate marketers to thread the gauntlet of spam filters protecting its in-boxes. Microsoft's Hotmail and MSN e-mail services, which together claim 170 million regular users, will require marketers to put money up front if they wish to ensure their messages aren't mistaken for unwanted spam. IronPort's "Bonded Sender" service guarantees that legitimate marketers who post a cash bond and adhere to a set of guidelines will get their messages delivered. "It's the exact opposite of blocking. It says, 'Hey you're a good guy, I'm not going to run you through the metal detectors," said Tom Gillis, IronPort's vice president for marketing. Such a "whitelist" approach requires the active cooperation of marketers -- a much more likely prospect now that Microsoft has signed up, Gillis said. Unsolicited bulk messages now account for roughly two-thirds of all e-mail, according to several estimates. Internet providers use filters to examine incoming messages and consult "blacklists" to block traffic from computers known to send out spam. IronPort's approach rewards e-mail senders who agree to be held accountable for their messages. Participating marketers must demonstrate a history of responsible e-mailing and must provide an easy way for consumers to opt out of future mailings, among other things. Those found to be engaging in abusive behavior forfeit a cash bond of up to $20,000, Gillis said. Internet providers are considering other ways to make e-mail more reliable. Both Microsoft and Yahoo Inc. (YHOO: Research, Estimates) are developing authentication systems that could make it harder for spammers to appropriate others' e-mail addresses. Other methods would make spamming less profitable by sucking up computing power or requiring human input every time a message is sent. "When you add these up over time, it will be uneconomical to send out spam," said Microsoft spam specialist George Webb. ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as rah(a)shipwright.com To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism
by Major Variola (ret) 04 May '04

04 May '04

>"The volume of data they collect has reached the point where good >analysis is no longer tractable in a theoretical algorithmic sense with >the best tools they currently have at their disposal, particularly when >you have a data space as broad and diffuse as "terrorism" to sift. " This is a sham. Their traffic analysis tools are very competent. And pervasive. They are perhaps jockeying for money for translators, since that may be the limiting resources. That may be what keeps the signal to noise down so that further resources can be applied. Tracking and correlating are not the bottlenecks.

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TSA to Test New Rail Security Technology
by R. A. Hettinga 04 May '04

04 May '04

<http://www.newsday.com/news/politics/wire/sns-ap-rail-security,0,7608472,pr…> Newsday.com TSA to Test New Rail Security Technology By LESLIE MILLER Associated Press Writer May 4, 2004, 9:36 AM EDT WASHINGTON -- Amtrak and commuter rail passengers at one suburban station will have to walk through an explosives detection machine and have their bags screened in a new security experiment designed to frustrate terrorists. The Transportation Security Administration was beginning a pilot project Tuesday at a rail stop in a Maryland suburb of Washington. Passengers were to walk through a "puffer" machine, which sucks in the air around them and within seconds determines whether they've been in contact with explosives. Jack Riley, director of the public safety research program for Rand Corp., a think tank, said harried commuters probably won't like being screened. "Anything that lengthens their rail experience is just going to meet with resistance," he said. TSA spokeswoman Yolanda Clark said the agency hopes passengers will see it "as another ring of security in another mode of transportation." The 30-day pilot program also includes a baggage screening machine used in overseas airports. The TSA wants to see how well the machines work in a passenger rail and commuter environment. Amtrak and a commuter railroad service use the station in New Carrollton, Md., about 9 miles northeast of Washington. The TSA announced the project in March, soon after terrorist bombings on trains in Madrid killed 191 people and injured more than 2,000. The FBI and the Homeland Security Department have warned that terrorists might strike trains and buses in major U.S. cities using bombs concealed in bags or luggage. Since more than half of Amtrak's 500 stations are unstaffed, screening all passengers is nearly impossible. TSA spokesman Mark Hatfield said of the experiment, "We're looking to get a lot of data that's going to help us look at ways it can be deployed and eliminate ways that it won't be practical." A key problem in screening railway passengers is doing it quickly enough that trains still run on time. That is not supposed to be a problem with the puffer machine, made by General Electric. The machine -- formally called EntryScan -- already is used in power plants and military installations in the United States and Europe. GE spokesman James Bergen said every person constantly radiates as much heat as a 100-watt light bulb in a "human convection plume." The puffer machine has a hood that catches the optimal amount of plume, he said. If someone has a bomb or has been in contact with one, the plume will carry traces of explosives into a detector that measures the wavelength of the energy coming off the particles. Some passengers also will be asked to put their bags through a machine that uses X-ray technology to determine what's in them. The machine, made by L-3 Communications of New York City, is used in overseas airports, as well as at the Statue of Liberty and in government buildings on Capitol Hill. The Rand Corp.'s Riley said he doubts the equipment will be practical on a day-to-day basis. Screening rail passengers might make sense for certain events, he said, such as the upcoming political conventions. Only passengers on Amtrak and the Maryland Transit Administration's MARC commuter rail system will be affected. A Washington Metro train also stops at the New Carrollton station, but those passengers won't be part of the study. * __ On the Net: Transportation Security Administration: http://www.tsa.gov Transportation Department: http://www.dot.gov -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism (fwd from andrew@ceruleansystems.com)
by Tyler Durden 04 May '04

04 May '04

"The volume of data they collect has reached the point where good analysis is no longer tractable in a theoretical algorithmic sense with the best tools they currently have at their disposal, particularly when you have a data space as broad and diffuse as "terrorism" to sift. " This is also going to get increasingly difficult in the US, as the entire world begins to view us as a rogue nation. In other words, within a few years a search of potential terrorists is likely to spit out 95% of the world's population! (Unless, of course, we can convince everyone that torture is a necessary tool for freedom.) -TD >From: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> >To: transhumantech(a)yahoogroups.com, cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism (fwd from >andrew(a)ceruleansystems.com) >Date: Tue, 4 May 2004 10:56:42 +0200 > >----- Forwarded message from "J. Andrew Rogers" ><andrew(a)ceruleansystems.com> ----- > >From: J.Andrew Rogers <andrew(a)ceruleansystems.com> >Date: Mon, 3 May 2004 22:08:30 -0700 >To: fork(a)xent.com >Subject: Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism >X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.613) > > >On May 3, 2004, at 9:14 AM, Contempt for Meatheads forwarded: > >We desperately need adult supervision and high quality minds in the > >intelligence business! I am growing more convince that the security > >clearance process, the government hiring/promotion process, and > >information silos are overwhelming our ability to get even a > >marginally adequate level of intelligence needed to fight terrorism. > >Wow, this is depressing. > > > >My confident belief (100%): we will continue to lose the war on > >terrorism until we fix our intelligence system. > > >I think this analysis is correct, but also a bit too shallow to be >really insightful. While there are some significant institutional >problems and byzantine self-defeating regulations, these things are >masking a much bigger technical problem that desperately needs to be >tackled from their perspective. > >The volume of data they collect has reached the point where good >analysis is no longer tractable in a theoretical algorithmic sense with >the best tools they currently have at their disposal, particularly when >you have a data space as broad and diffuse as "terrorism" to sift. >Institutional procedures and problems aggravate this, but the >underlying issues are deeper. > >One of the ways I keep track of what the US DoD is up to is by analysis >of the open research programs, contracts, and grants that they publish. > By threading the many, many programs together over time, you can see >how fast different technologies are progressing and you can chain >inferences to make an intelligent estimate as to when specific >capabilities (which may require the intersection of multiple research >tracks) could theoretically be available to the DoD. Furthermore, the >program managers have a habit of mildly editorializing their program >descriptions in response to some of the proposals they have received >and the success of the proposals they have actually funded, which also >gives some added insight. > >One thing that I have noticed for several years is that the advanced >data mining and automated intelligence analysis research programs have >been essentially stalled for many years now despite aggressive >marketing and a large number of agencies willing to liberally fund >proposals. And the editorializing of the program managers on this >research track makes it clear that they are quite frustrated both with >the lack of progress in this area and with the fact that research >proposals keep trying to beat the same dead horse over and over. >Furthermore, while most programs have a shelf-life after which they are >either closed (both on good progress or no progress), these particular >programs keep getting extended and re-funded over and over, sometimes >under a different name but always with roughly the same parameters. > >As long as this program track is stuck in neutral, the intelligence >agencies will have serious problems that will be all but >insurmountable. The US intelligence service is a victim of its own >ability to acquire data. This isn't a problem that they can simply >throw money at in the sense that it requires pretty substantial >algorithm breakthroughs to even be tractable for high-quality analysis. > To date, private research organizations have clearly been unable to >solve this problem in any meaningful way, and there is substantial >evidence of this fact. In the mean time, they are left using narrow >brittle algorithms to sift and analyze the data, with holes you could >drive a truck (bomb) through. > >Someone who fully understood the theoretical limitations and likely >implementation parameters of the current state-of-the-art could likely >defeat the automated analysis. Fortunately for the intelligence >agencies, few people have those skills and they get by on a pretty >broken system hampered further by institutional problems. > >j. andrew rogers > >_______________________________________________ >FoRK mailing list >http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork > >----- End forwarded message ----- >-- >Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> >______________________________________________________________ >ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE >http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net ><< attach3 >> _________________________________________________________________ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

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Getting Carded
by R. A. Hettinga 04 May '04

04 May '04

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB108362504078100827,00.html> The Wall Street Journal May 4, 2004 REVIEW & OUTLOOK Getting Carded May 4, 2004 The Scottish historian and philosopher David Hume once wrote that "it is seldom that any liberty is lost all at once." British Home Secretary David Blunkett seems to have taken Hume's lesson to heart with his slow-motion effort to introduce mandatory identity cards in the U.K. Last week, the U.K. began issuing national ID cards with biometric information. The pilot program will issue 10,000 ID cards. But this plan is scheduled to expand. By 2007 cards will be distributed "voluntarily" when renewing a passport; those not interested in a biometric card will be free to surrender their passports. Before the Parliament votes in 2012 or 2013 on whether to give everyone over 16 years of age a card and require people to carry them at all times, 80% of the population will have been issued a card. That's why now is the time for a serious debate over the merits of national ID cards that will include a retinal scan, fingerprints or measurements of the exact dimensions of the face in addition to the usual name, address, and passport number. The cards might make life harder on illegal immigrants, but it's hard to see how they would protect British subjects or anyone else from terrorists. Mr. Blunkett has managed to muddy the water by introducing the cards incrementally and by fueling a stir over whether royals would carry them. He is quoted in the media describing the level of fine for failing to update an address, (#1,000), or failing to carry a card when (and if) the program becomes mandatory (#2,500). A Home Office that argues that such a program would protect against identity theft, benefits fraud and illegal immigration has sought to capitalize on fears and anxieties prompted by terrorist attacks to build support for the program. But all this distracts from the basic debate of whether the net benefit of universal biometric ID cards is worth the cost in terms of civil liberties, privacy and freedom. That debate has nothing to do with recent Home Office hype. It's important to acknowledge what a national ID program would and would not do. Such a program undoubtedly would make life more difficult for economic refugees and other immigrants. That is not to say that immigrants would cease to flee unlivable economic and political situations because of an added layer of regulation, but such persons would be driven into an underground economy to an even greater extent than currently. If Mr. Blunkett wants to debate immigration policy, he should do so. Hiding xenophobic policies behind the terror threat, from which many look to the government for protection, is disingenuous. ID cards might also reduce some social security fraud. But British taxpayers shouldn't see the cards as saving money. ID cards could prevent an estimated 5% of the #2 billion of social-security fraud each year. But once you've paid for the cards themselves (just over #3 billion according to Mr. Blunkett's estimate) and bought 4,500 card readers, it's hard to see a huge net gain. There are better, cheaper and less invasive methods of curbing fraud. Most importantly, ID cards would not protect against terrorists. To argue that a small plastic card would present an obstacle to a suicidal fundamentalist terrorist is preposterous. Mr. Blunkett has danced just shy of this argument, saying, of course it wouldn't prevent terror, and in the same breath arguing that it would help terror enforcement. In the introduction to the bill, he's written "the threat of global terrorism . . . make[s] secure identification more vital than ever." But better protection against false identities wouldn't have prevented the 9/11 attacks, where individuals -- most with clean records and bona fide papers -- entered the U.S., in some cases years before the attacks. Unlike economic migrants, terrorists have the wherewithal to get their papers in order. Al Qaeda terrorists are far too sophisticated to get tripped up by a regulation requiring IDs. The attempt to harness the anxiety from the Madrid bombings and channel it to provide momentum for his bill is intellectually dishonest. Mr. Blunkett at least owes an undisguised debate about ID cards. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [FoRK] Why We Are Losing The War on Terrorism (fwd from andrew@ceruleansystems.com)
by Eugen Leitl 04 May '04

04 May '04

----- Forwarded message from "J. Andrew Rogers" <andrew(a)ceruleansystems.com> -----

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PGP
by R. A. Hettinga 03 May '04

03 May '04

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pearl_of_Great_Price> Main Page | Recent changes | Edit this page | Page history Printable version | Disclaimers Not logged in Log in | Help Pearl of Great Price >From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Pearl of Great Price (PGP) is a collection of scriptures of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. The PGP includes: the Book of Abraham, a book dealing with Abraham's journeys in Egypt, containing many distinctive Mormon doctrines such as eternal progression; the Book of Moses, which comes from the Joseph Smith Translation of the Bible; the Joseph Smith-History, a history of the early Mormon church by Joseph Smith; Joseph Smith-Matthew, a translation of a portion of the Gospel of Matthew by Joseph Smith; and the Articles of Faith, a brief summary of the major doctrines of the Mormon faith written by Joseph Smith for a newspaper. Considerable controversy surrounds the Book of Abraham, and the Papyri that some claim it was translated from. Others dispute that such papyri have been found, or dispute that Smith used direct revelation from God, rather than any other source write it. External link To read the text, go to http://scriptures.lds.org/pgp/contents. The Pearl of Great Price also refers to a parable told by Jesus Christ, recounted at Matthew 13:45-46 in explaining the Kingdom of Heaven. A man discovered that a certain field had an extremely valuable pearl in it. He then sold all that he had to raise money to purchase the field, so that he could obtain the pearl, with the final result that he was wealthier than before. The Pearl, a 14th century Middle English alliterative poem written by the Pearl Poet, makes allusion to the parable in describing the narrator's dead daughter, Pearl. It begins: Perle, pleasaunte to prynces paye To clanly clos in golde so clere, Oute of oryent, I hardyly saye, Ne proued I neuer her precios pere. Edit this page | Discuss this page | Page history | What links here | Related changes Main Page | About Wikipedia | Recent changes | This page was last modified 16:57, 23 Apr 2004. All text is available under the terms of the GNU Free Documentation License (see Copyrights for details). Disclaimers. Wikipedia is powered by MediaWiki, an open source wiki engine. Main Page Recent changes Random page Current events Community Portal Edit this page Discuss this page Page history What links here Related changes Special pages Contact us Donations -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: message, but also test
by Ryan Lackey 02 May '04

02 May '04

I've always used a special vmware instance whenever I wanted to do something anonymously, as I assumed my OS choices and customizations might give me away to the other end as well, especially for anything I don't notice (a good attack would be trying a well-known 0-day OS vulnerability on an interactive counterparty, seeing if his machine drops off the net -- you could do this several times and figure out which OS is running). Running a pretty much standard win2k/xp virtual machine with whatever anonymity functionality running on the windows side OR the unix side seems to deal with that, as well as making it easier to sniff all output from the machine in realtime to make sure nothing else is going through. And it would then be very obvious which nym you're using. I don't think gmail would work well with a 500MB archive -- I've used it, and their UI seems inefficient past a certain point. General web indexing of html archives works pretty well -- ("from, "to" searching would be equivalent to author searches, and keyword + or - terms can be done through a web ui as easily) I think I'd also prefer being able to do LOCAL searches on most of the topics on cypherpunks, vs. web searches on someone else's machine, so I'll just let people download raw archives when reconstructed, with a 5Mbps cap or something. I am not sure how safely spam can be filtered from the list -- each person would have his own view of what is spam. I think ideally there would be all messages in the spool, broken up by month or quarter or year, and then a way to run various filters on it, like kill certain senders, kill keywords, "traditional" spamassassin/bayesian type systems, etc. Then the ability to search over any subset. Google doesn't support enough negative keywords to do this, and it would be computationally expensive to do the filtering and reindexing in realtime for each user. If you had all the spools yourself locally, you could run whatever spam elimination you considered proper once, and then search index, with negative keywords for specific senders (or just excise certain senders permanently as spam) Quoting An Metet <anmetet(a)freedom.gmsociety.org>: > Ryan Lackey writes: > > > I have two questions: > > > > 1) Does anyone have actual performance measurements of ZKS from when > > it was operational/at peak, in terms of bandwidth, MTU, latency, and > > jitter? Is there a good way to quantify just how far from > > "acceptable" it was? > > I don't have any actual measurements, but as far as I can remember it > worked pretty well, i.e., slower than usual but still pages would load > within a few seconds. > > Recently I've experimented with the onion routing system at > www.freehaven.net/tor, and the main problem there is slow startup times > setting up the first path. Seems to take a couple of minutes sometimes > for the first web page to download. I think it's struggling to find a > working path, or something. But then after that the performance seems > comparable to Freedom. > > I'm a big user of anonymity systems, and the worst problem I've had with > proxies is remembering who I am supposed to be at the time. Several times > with Freedom and more recently with other proxies, I have done stuff > using my real name when I was in the mode where my nym was being used, > and vice versa. Oops. That's a pretty big mistake to make and can > totally destroy your pseudonymity, both at the time and throughout the > past lifetime of the nym. > > What I'd like would be some kind of big, glaring indication that I am > in "anonymous" mode, like overlaying some kind of color display on the > screen, or maybe a crawling animation around the edges, or something. > I realize that this is out of scope for most efforts of this type, but > from my experience it's a big problem. > > > (I also subscribed the al-qaeda node, and will probably finish setting > > up the spamfiltered version of the list, as well as passing the back > > archives through the same archiving software as current archives, and > > search-indexing them, next time I get bored) > > Making your deep archive available in search-indexed form would be a > great service, as would spam-cleaning your current one. May you grow > bored soon. > > BTW, how big is the entire CP archive when compressed? Would it fit into > a gmail account that someone could set up and share the passphrase to? > I'd pay quite a few bucks to have a copy of that on my disk. > > _______________________________________________ > cypherpunks mailing list > cypherpunks(a)cypherpunks.metacolo.com > http://cypherpunks.metacolo.com/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks -- Ryan Lackey [RL960-RIPE AS24812] ryan(a)venona.com +1 202 258 9251 OpenPGP DH 4096: B8B8 3D95 F940 9760 C64B DE90 07AD BE07 D2E0 301F _______________________________________________ cypherpunks mailing list cypherpunks(a)cypherpunks.metacolo.com http://cypherpunks.metacolo.com/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks

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Re: message, but also test
by An Metet 02 May '04

02 May '04

Ryan Lackey writes: > I have two questions: > > 1) Does anyone have actual performance measurements of ZKS from when > it was operational/at peak, in terms of bandwidth, MTU, latency, and > jitter? Is there a good way to quantify just how far from > "acceptable" it was? I don't have any actual measurements, but as far as I can remember it worked pretty well, i.e., slower than usual but still pages would load within a few seconds. Recently I've experimented with the onion routing system at www.freehaven.net/tor, and the main problem there is slow startup times setting up the first path. Seems to take a couple of minutes sometimes for the first web page to download. I think it's struggling to find a working path, or something. But then after that the performance seems comparable to Freedom. I'm a big user of anonymity systems, and the worst problem I've had with proxies is remembering who I am supposed to be at the time. Several times with Freedom and more recently with other proxies, I have done stuff using my real name when I was in the mode where my nym was being used, and vice versa. Oops. That's a pretty big mistake to make and can totally destroy your pseudonymity, both at the time and throughout the past lifetime of the nym. What I'd like would be some kind of big, glaring indication that I am in "anonymous" mode, like overlaying some kind of color display on the screen, or maybe a crawling animation around the edges, or something. I realize that this is out of scope for most efforts of this type, but from my experience it's a big problem. > (I also subscribed the al-qaeda node, and will probably finish setting > up the spamfiltered version of the list, as well as passing the back > archives through the same archiving software as current archives, and > search-indexing them, next time I get bored) Making your deep archive available in search-indexed form would be a great service, as would spam-cleaning your current one. May you grow bored soon. BTW, how big is the entire CP archive when compressed? Would it fit into a gmail account that someone could set up and share the passphrase to? I'd pay quite a few bucks to have a copy of that on my disk. _______________________________________________ cypherpunks mailing list cypherpunks(a)cypherpunks.metacolo.com http://cypherpunks.metacolo.com/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks

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