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whatever is necessary
by Major Variola (ret) 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

At 08:57 AM 9/3/04 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >Well, W did say he'd do "whatever is necessary". I caught the last bit of Bush's rant. The scary part was him talking about the "resurrection" of NYC. Given how his little bubble-brain is addicted to xianity, and his coterie has geo-political messianic delusions, this is not good. Just heard Clinton's going in the hospital to get a heart. Maybe W can get a brain? And Rummy some courage? Maybe Frances is Nature reminding FLA to shape up this time..

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Re: Anonymizer outsourcing customer data?
by Anonymous via the Cypherpunks Tonga Remailer 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

On Tue, 17 Aug 2004, Nomen Nescio wrote: > > They claim they have over 1 million users. Is a class action suit in > > order? Their privacy policy clearly states > > > > "We consider your email address to be confidential information. We will > > never rent, sell, or otherwise reveal it to any other party without prior > > consent, except under the conditions set forth in the User Agreement for > > spamming and related abuses of netiquette, or unless we are compelled to > > do so by court order." > > > > As if that's not bad enough, I emailed their (useless) support about > this and some retarded drone emailed back claiming that the email came > from Anonymizer not lyris.net (even though I pointed out the IP address > in the email belonged to lyris.net) > > *sigh* > Such incompetance :( Oh, look! Anonymizer has fixed the problem in their latest HTML-laden email! Return-Path: <bounce-XXXX-XXXX(a)wecare.anonymizer.com> See, they >>care<<! Oops: Name: anonymizer.lyris.net Address: 64.62.197.139 Aliases: wecare.anonymizer.com Methinks they are mocking us. What happened to them? They were a fine company once. Did Cottrell sell the brand? What other parts of the privacy policy are they willfully violating?

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PGP Identity Management: Secure Authentication and Authorization over the Internet
by R. A. Hettinga 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

<http://www.pgp.com/resources/ctocorner/identitymgmt.html> Click for illustrations, etc... Cheers, RAH -------- PGP Corporation - Resources - CTO Corner United States | International? Resources > CTO Corner > Guest Contributors > PGP Identity Management Welcome CTO Corner Data Sheets Flash Government Regulations Webcasts White Papers PGP Identity Management: Secure Authentication and Authorization over the Internet By Vinnie Moscaritolo, PGP Cryptographic Engineer 3 September 2004 Abstract Access to computer services has conventionally been managed by means of secret passwords and centralized authentication databases. This method dates back to early timeshare systems. Now that applications have shifted to the Internet, it has become clear that the use of passwords is not scalable or secure enough for this medium. As an alternative, this paper discusses ways to implement federated identity management using strong cryptography and the same PGP key infrastructure that is widely deployed on the Internet today. Beyond Passwords The inherent security weakness and management complexities of password-based authentication and centralized authorization databases make such systems inadequate for the real-world requirements of today's public networks. However, by applying the same proven cryptographic technology used today for securing email, we can construct a robust authentication system with the following goals in mind: * Provide a single sign-on experience in which users only need to remember one password, yet make it less vulnerable to "cracking" (hacking) attempts. * Employ strong user authentication, extendable to multi-factor methods such as tokens or smart cards. The only copy of the authenticating (secret) material is in the possession of the user. * Design such a system so it does not depend on any trusted servers and so that the compromise of any server does not affect the security of other servers or users. * Build on existing and well-accepted infrastructures that scale to fit a very large base of users and servers. * Enable users to sign on to the networks of more than one enterprise securely to conduct transactions. Authentication with Cryptographic Signatures Email communications via the Internet face a security challenge similar to network user authentication. Messages traveling through public networks can be eavesdropped or counterfeited without much effort. Yet we have been able to successfully mitigate these risks by using public key cryptography to digitally sign and authenticate email messages. With public key cryptography, each user generates a pair of mathematically related cryptographic keys. These keys are created in such a way that it is computationally infeasible to derive one key from the other. One of the keys is made publicly available to anyone who wishes to communicate with that user. The other key is kept private and never revealed to anyone else. This private key can be further secured by either placing it in a hardware token, encrypting it to a passphrase, or sometimes both. The holder uses the private key to digitally sign data. This digital signature can later be checked with the matching public key to ensure the data has not been tampered with and that it originated from the holder of the private key. Because the holder of the private key is the only entity that can create a digital signature that verifies with the corresponding public key, there is a strong association between a user's identity and the ability to sign with that private key. Thus, a digital signature is strong testimony to the authenticity of the sender. Cryptographic Challenge-Response Because the public key functions as a user's identity in cyberspace, we can apply digital signatures to strongly authenticate users of network services. One way to do this is to challenge the user to sign a randomly generated message from the server. The server then verifies the identity of the user with the public key. This process is illustrated below. 1. The user initiates network service access. 2. The server looks up the user's public key in its authentication database. The server then generates a random challenge string and sends the challenge to the client. 3. The client digitally signs the challenge string and returns the cryptographic signature to the server. The client also sends a counter-challenge string, which is used to verify the server's authenticity. 4. The server then checks the client's signature, and if successful, grants access. It also signs and returns the client's counter-challenge. The use of such cryptographic user authentication offers a number of advantages over password-based systems. For example, if we employ the same key used to sign email, user authentication becomes as strong as the applied cryptographic digital signature algorithm. This approach reduces the need for users to periodically change the password, yet means they only need to remember one passphrase for all servers using this system. In addition, because the user maintains the only secret material in the system, compromising a server's user database results in only limited damage. All this can be accomplished without the risks associated with passphrase caches or key chains. PGPuam - Proof of Concept A public key login system was originally prototyped by the author as PGPuam and later distributed as sample code by Apple Computer in 1998 [PGPUAM]. Consisting of an AppleShare-IP client and server plugin, the system enabled a user to perform two-way strongly authenticated logins to an AppleShare-IP server from a Mac OS client. The cryptographic routines were provided by the PGP Software Development Kit (SDK) shipped with PGP 6.0. The user interface was an extension of the existing AppleShare login and is illustrated below. Although entirely functional, the PGPuam sample was never intended to be a shipping product. Rather, it was meant to be a practical demonstration of why public key cryptography should be treated as a core operating system component. Unfortunately in the late 1990s, cryptography was mired in both commercial and political constraints and widespread public key infrastructure (PKI) was slow to solidify. Nevertheless, PGPuam was successful in demonstrating that cryptography could be used for more than encrypting email. (Note that AppleShare-IP was just a convenient test platform. This concept is portable to file servers that support plugin authentication modules such as Apache modules or Windows GINA Authentication DLL.) Authentication vs. Authorization Although the PGPuam authentication effectively addresses most password management and single sign-on issues, it does nothing for user authorization. File servers still have to maintain some form of user-file access control database. Managing and maintaining these user authorization databases securely quickly become cumbersome for server administrators when more than a handful of servers are involved. Consider, for example, what happens when a new user wishes to gain access to a server. The system administrator must create an account and add the user's name and access information to the appropriate server database. If the user wishes to access a number of servers, this process must be duplicated and kept synchronized on each server. This process is further exacerbated when the servers are owned by different organizations. Conversely, when a user departs from an organization, each of the servers must then be updated to reflect this change. Often, removed users are overlooked and left active on servers managed by different departments, thus creating a security risk. Although have been a number of attempts to create automated systems to replicate or centralize the authorization databases, such as Kerberos, they all seem to share the following drawbacks: * The authorization server itself must be physically secure and is a critical link in the security chain. * Each server must be in communication with the authorization server to verify user identity and authorizations. This could be an unreasonable requirement for remote sites or devices such as a door badge reader, for example. * The authorization server is an ideal target for denial-of-service attacks because they affect all the servers managed by it. PGPticket - Secure Federated User Authorization A number of papers have described ingenious alternatives for distributing network service authorization [BFL] [SPKI]. In particular, the Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) model introduces a change in how authorization is performed for network services. Instead of maintaining a per-server database of users' names, passwords, and their corresponding access rights, we can apply digital-signature technology to create an authorization certificate. Think of this certificate as a digital "permission slip," valid only for a specific user's key over a certain period of time. The authorization certificate is signed by the organization or a proxy that owns the server and presented by the user upon accessing a restricted service. One way to encapsulate these certificates is in the form of an OpenPGP standalone signature packet [OPENPGP]. These packets, known as PGPtickets , form the basis of a lightweight but very secure federated authorization protocol [PGPTICKET]. Each PGPticket contains the following fields: * The ISSUER who generates and signs the certificate, represented by a PGP Key-ID. * The SUBJECT, the principal or set of principals to which the certificate grants its authorization. A combination of KeyID, algorithm ID and key fingerprint is used to represent the subject. * VALIDITY is some combination of dates or online tests specifying the validity period/conditions of the certificate-typically, a creation and expiration date. This field might be useful for a school that wants to allow access to facilities for a limited period such as a term. * AUTHORIZATION is a structured field expressing the authorization this certificate grants to the subject. This data could be represented as SAML or some form of XML. * DELEGATION is a flag that indicates if the subject is allowed to delegate the specified authorization further. PGPtickets can be issued in or out of band and are uniquely identified by the hash of the ticket packet, known as its Ticket-ID. The issuer verifies the subject's key information through standard practice, such as key fingerprint. Unless there is a specific requirement to encrypt the signed tickets, they can be returned via cleartext email or even placed on a public website and accessed by the Ticket-ID. The subject can even store the ticket in a database, smart card, or token. The following illustrates the process of accessing a service with a PGPticket: 1. The user requests server access from the system admin. The user provides either a copy of his/her public key or makes the key available on a keyserver. The issuer verifies the validity of this key. 2. The administrator generates the PGPticket with appropriate authorizations and validity information, signing the ticket with the server admin key. The ticket is either posted in a public place or sent by email to the user. 3. The user retrieves the PGPticket and stores it in a local ticket database. 4. When the user attempts to access a network service, the client searches its ticket database for the appropriate ticket and sends a copy of it along with the access request. 5. The server checks the validity of the ticket by verifying the admin signature and expiration date of the ticket. The server then generates a random challenge string and sends the challenge to the client, requesting that the key specified in the ticket sign it. 6. The client signs and returns the challenge, which is checked by the server and, if successful, access is granted with the authorizations specified in the ticket. The server only requires a copy of the root issuer's public key. It does not need to store copies of the subject's public keys because the key fingerprint is signed into the ticket body. The subject public key can be provided by request from the client and cached for later use. The same is true for delegated tickets. There is no specific requirement for a certifying authority, although its use is certainly not precluded and would make PGPtickets usable for small sites as well as enterprises. One of the more interesting features of this design is that it enables the servers to function without access to a keyserver, independent of outside influences and resilient to denial-of-service attacks. This approach allows the use of PGPtickets for standalone devices where no network connection is practical, which opens a number of possibilities. PGPtickets can be transported in a token or Bluetooth device, and not only used for such things as Web Service or VPN access but also for restricted door access. In essence, PGPtickets could extend the usefulness of the PGP PKI to the physical world. PGPcoupon - Building on XML Web Services Other interesting possibilities occur when you consider that PGPticket piggybacks on the flexibility of the PGP key infrastructure. Consider a system that produced tickets automatically through some pay-per-use service and combine that with anonymous keys. Or what about using the key-splitting features to create a ticket that needs a certain amount of shares for service access? Another possibility is to mix the technologies of PGPticket and XML object Web Services. A client could post a Web request for a proposal whereby vendors could reply with a PGP-signed coupon that would be honored by various distributors for a given period. For example, imagine a school wants to purchase a number of books; various vendors compete for the order and send replies. In the replies is a 20% off PGPcoupon that Amazon or BN.com would honor. The client could then present this coupon upon purchase and have the transaction processed automatically. Conclusion I have outlined a number of alternate uses for PGP technology that go far past email encryption. Most of these designs have been around for a number of years, but were untapped because of political or commercial restraints and, at times, lack of vision. Fortunately, the environment has changed and cryptographic technology can be used to solve a number of real-world identity management problems today. References [OPENPGP] Callas, J., Donnerhacke, L., Finney, H., Thayer, R. "OpenPGP Message Format." RFC 2440, November 1998 [SPKI] Ellison, C. "SPKI Requirements." RFC 2692, September 1999 Ellison, C., Frantz, B., Lampson, B., Rivest, R. "SPKI Certificate Theory." RFC 2693, September 1999 [BFL] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., and Lacy, J. "Decentralized Trust Management." Proceedings 1996 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. [PGPTICKET] Moscaritolo, V. "PGPticket - A Secure Authorization Protocol." Mac-Crypto Workshop, October 1998 Moscaritolo, V., Mione, A. draft-ietf-pgpticket-moscaritolo-mione-02.txt [PGPUAM] Moscaritolo, V. "PGPuam - Public Key Authentication for AppleShare-IP." Mac-Crypto Workshop, October 1998 "Now that applications have shifted to the Internet, the use of secret passwords is not scalable or secure enough. Instead, there are ways to implement federated identity management using strong cryptography and same PGP key infrastructure that is widely deployed on the Internet today." - Vinnie Moscaritolo, PGP Cryptographic Engineer Related Links * Expert advice from Jon Callas: "Encryption 101 - Triple DES Explained" * Video: HNS interview with Jon Callas * Summary: HNS interview with Jon Callas Company | Privacy Statement | Legal Notices | Site Map )2002-2004 PGP Corporation. All Rights Reserved. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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gmail as a gigabyte of an external filesystem
by Thomas Shaddack 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

Cuuuute! :) Could be even more interesting if combined with a suitable kind of encryption; I don't know how much I should trust Google, they are way too big to not be more than attractive "focus point" for "carpet-watching" people. The author is aware of this issue. Question for the crowd: How difficult it would be to write a suitable crypto engine as a plug-in module for FUSE itself? Then we could have support for encrypted files on any filesystem accessible through FUSE. ----------- http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/29/turn_gmail_storage_i.html What to do with all that extra, network-based storage that comes with your Gmail account? If you're using Linux, you can turn it into a mountable filesystem with GmailFS. GmailFS provides a mountable Linux filesystem which uses your Gmail account as its storage medium. GmailFS is a Python application and uses the FUSE userland filesystem infrastructure to help provide the filesystem, and libgmail to communicate with Gmail. GmailFS supports most file operations such as read, write, open, close, stat, symlink, link, unlink, truncate and rename. This means that you can use all your favourite unix command line tools to operate on files stored on Gmail (e.g. cp, ls, mv, rm, ln, grep etc. etc.). Link (via Waxy) <http://richard.jones.name/google-hacks/gmail-filesystem/gmail-filesystem.ht…> posted by Cory Doctorow at 08:21:29 AM

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RE: [FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... (fwd from beberg@mithral.com)
by Tyler Durden 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

Well, W did say he'd do "whatever is necessary". -TD >From: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> >To: cypherpunks(a)al-qaeda.net >Subject: [FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... (fwd from beberg(a)mithral.com) >Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2004 11:10:24 +0200 > >----- Forwarded message from Adam L Beberg <beberg(a)mithral.com> ----- > >From: Adam L Beberg <beberg(a)mithral.com> >Date: Thu, 02 Sep 2004 22:39:09 -0500 >To: FoRK <fork(a)xent.com> >Subject: [FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... >User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.7.3 (Windows/20040803) > >http://www.sianews.com/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=1062 > >There over 800 prison camps in the United States, all fully operational >and ready to receive prisoners. They are all staffed and even surrounded >by full-time guards, but they are all empty. These camps are to be >operated by FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) should Martial >Law need to be implemented in the United States and all it would take is >a presidential signature on a proclamation and the attorney general's >signature on a warrant to which a list of names is attached. Ask >yourself if you really want to be on Ashcroft's list. > >... > >-- >Adam L. Beberg - beberg(a)mithral.com >http://www.mithral.com/~beberg/ >_______________________________________________ >FoRK mailing list >http://xent.com/mailman/listinfo/fork > >----- End forwarded message ----- >-- >Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> >______________________________________________________________ >ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE >http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net > >[demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature] _________________________________________________________________ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/

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Big Brother in perfidous Albion
by Eugen Leitl 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/08/31/constantsurveillance.ap/index.html Big Brother watches Britain Will the technology find acceptance in U.S.? Tuesday, August 31, 2004 Posted: 10:55 AM EDT (1455 GMT) LONDON, England (AP) -- The teenagers who stabbed wealthy Joao Da Costa Mitendele to death before burgling his home were careful to conceal the crime. They used a pretty girl to gain access to his apartment, where they wore rubber gloves while committing their crimes. What they hadn't counted on was the phalanx of video cameras that silently watched and recorded them leaving the local subway station, buying those gloves and approaching 45-year-old Mitendele's apartment in suburban north London. The same cameras caught their hasty return journey to the station half an hour later. The tapes sealed the fate of the so-called "Honey Trap" gang when played in court earlier this year. Seven of the group were convicted of offenses ranging from manslaughter to conspiracy to rob and sent to jail for a minimum of seven years each. Big Brother is always watching in Britain. An estimated 4.2 million closed-circuit TV cameras observe people going about their everyday business, from getting on a bus to lining up at the bank to driving around London. It's widely estimated that the average Briton is scrutinized by 300 cameras a day. The phenomenon is enabled by the arrival of digital video, cheap memory and sophisticated software. And Britain is acknowledged as the world leader of Orwellian surveillance -- perhaps because it has the experience of Irish terrorism, and is on guard for even worse today. Authorities maintain the cameras deter crime, and despite some claims to contrary and the outrage of civil libertarians, the public seems willing to accept the constant monitoring for the greater good. In the past two months, British police used or publicized CCTV imagery during investigations into a 12-year-old robbing a store at gunpoint, the disappearance of a doctor, attacks by a serial rapist, a father and son hit by a train, laptops stolen from a school and a soccer riot. Cameras loom over city centers, shopping malls, train stations, university grounds, public parks, beaches, airports, offices and schools. "Britain, almost without anyone noticing, has become the surveillance capital possibly of the world, certainly of Europe," said Barry Hugill, a spokesman for the civil rights group Liberty. The cameras are concentrated mostly in the main cities. In London alone, the train stations contain 1,800 cameras. And there are more than 6,000 cameras in the London Underground -- including at Edgware Station in north London where Mitendele's killers were caught on tape -- and 260 around Parliament. "The uses are absolutely phenomenal. In some places, there are cameras in schools in the classroom so parents can be shown the footage if a child misbehaves," said Peter Fry, spokesman for the CCTV Users Group. The ability to store images digitally has played a key role in fostering the industry's growth. Gas stations around the country are testing automatic number plate recognition to catch people who fill up but don't pay. The technology is also being used to enforce London's $9 charge for vehicles entering the city center. A police database scans license plate numbers for everything from suspected terrorists to traffic offenders. Other video-cam networks use software that instructs the cameras to pick up unusual activity. "They can identify something, like a bag in an airport, that shouldn't be part of the scene," said Fry. In London's busy Soho district, officials are using wireless CCTV cameras that can be moved in less than an hour, allowing police to quickly target crime hotspots. The portable cameras are also cheaper to install than fixed cameras. Some critics say the scheme will simply push crime further out but Simon Norbury, head of IT at Westminster City Council, said the cameras' mobility would keep criminals on their toes. "As the problem moves, we move with it and can blitz it," said Norbury. In the next phase of the Soho trial, the cameras will be viewed and controlled by a mobile response unit, allowing quick deployment of officers in the event of an incident. The abduction was recorded by this parking lot surveillance camera in the U.S. The abduction was recorded by this parking lot surveillance camera in the U.S. Soho resident Brooke Hartney, 24, a cafe manager, said she felt comforted by the cameras, including a fixed one right outside her apartment bedroom window. "I do feel safer knowing that Big Brother is watching. I'd walk around here at 5 a.m. but I wouldn't out in the suburbs," Hartney said. "I guess I just take the cameras for granted and hope that they are going to help me one way or another if I need it." An earlier form of CCTV -- back in the day of videotapes monitored, changed and rewound by workers -- was embraced in Britain after two deadly IRA bombings in London in 1992 and 1993. CCTV also caught the 1993 abduction of toddler James Bulger by two 10-year-old boys who were later convicted of his murder. Some British communities have even asked for cameras to be installed on their streets, seeking to scare off prostitutes and drug dealers. In his new book, "The Naked Lunch, Reclaiming Security and Freedom in an Anxious Age," American author Jeffrey Rosen expressed amazement at the easy acceptance. "Instead of being perceived as an Orwellian intrusion, the cameras in Britain ... were hailed as the people's technology, a friendly eye in the sky, not Big Brother but a kindly and watchful uncle or aunt," he wrote. Now Britain is beginning to export its expertise. Fry's industry group has just incorporated in the United States, and reports particular interest from universities and schools. Britain contributed to the network of more than 1,000 cameras that watched over the Olympics in Athens. The London-based Autonomy Corp., whose clients include the U.S. National Security Agency, provided technology that examines words and phrases collected by surveillance cameras and in communications traffic. In much of the rest of the world, the technology is viewed with more suspicion. The use of cameras to film people in the street is banned in Germany -- although it uses cameras to catch speeders _ Canada, Denmark and several other countries. In the United States, CCTV is use primarily at airports, casinos and in city centers -- Manhattan has almost 2,400 cameras patrolling its streets. However, not everyone in Britain is happy with the seemingly relentless march of CCTV across the country. Last year, a 47-year-old man won $14,400 in damages following public airing of CCTV footage of police preventing his suicide attempt. There have also been incidents of nightclubs selling footage of couples having sex to TV stations. The Trades Union Council has warned of a rise in the illegal use of cameras to monitor employee behavior. Will Kittow, 38, a van driver enjoying a coffee break in Soho, said he was concerned about how many times he is captured on film driving around London and just who else has access to the information recorded by CCTV that is enough to send him a parking ticket. "All this information is going somewhere. It doesn't take a genius to work out that it is going to be misused, even if it is only petty larceny," said Kittow. Ian Brown, a researcher at the Foundation for Information Policy Research, said that CCTV has been shown to work only in detecting car theft and shoplifting. It doesn't prevent rape or assault, he said. A study by crime reduction charity NACRO found the technology reduced crime by only 3 percent to 4 percent while better street lighting led to a 20 percent reduction. The Home Office is conducting its own evaluation. "Much of it is deeply intrusive," said Brown. "There's an illusion that it makes people safe when it does no such thing." Copyright 2004 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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[FoRK] Veeery Intewesting... (fwd from beberg@mithral.com)
by Eugen Leitl 03 Sep '04

03 Sep '04

----- Forwarded message from Adam L Beberg <beberg(a)mithral.com> -----

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Re: The cages on the Hudson, AKA Little Guantanamo (fwd)
by Major Variola (ret) 02 Sep '04

02 Sep '04

At 10:55 PM 9/1/04 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote: >Puerto Ricans in the ethnic neighborhoods along the shore >might get uppity and take over the naval base, which everybody knew >had Nuke-u-lur Weapons even though they'd never admit it, >and the naval base might not be able to defend itself against a mob, >so he convinced the town council that they needed to buy a tank. Its quite clear (from the Empire Wars in the middle east) that the 2nd amendment requires citizens to bear RPGs to defeat tyranny. Alas, even neutered rifles are illegal in many places; thus among the first order of business will be to raid the Armories for the right tools. ---- And I'm tired of all these soldiers here And everything's broken, And no one speaks english.. -Tom Waits

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Re: The cages on the Hudson, AKA Little Guantanamo (fwd)
by Tyler Durden 02 Sep '04

02 Sep '04

>a. there is no "we", except individuals with the freedom to chose their >own actions. Bullshit. Live in New York for a while and you'll see there's a "we". >b. cops have guns. So do we, and guns they're not allowed to have. (Well, we're not allowed to have 'em either...) >Yeah, "Not totally." Just like Red China isn't a total totalitarian state, >and it allowed the students at Tienamen Sq to demonstrate. We're not too >far away from that, except these cops don't (yet?) have tanks and as far >as has been reported in the media, haven't murdered anyone in the >protests, and that the arrested have been let out a few days later rather >than tortured. This ain't Red China. We're armed and not peaceful. We're not cream of the crop, true-believer Beijing DaXue types like the Chinese kids in TianAnMen Fang. If we grew up here we know how to fight back, and we will after a certain point. >It's certainly inching towards totalitarianism and away from "the right of >the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a >redress" (not, there's nothing in that text about protest pens, open your >bag searches, show me your ID, or protest permits.) Well, I didn't say it was going to be a downhill ride. But you're clearly "not from around here, are you boy"? Try growing up in Washington Heights and Brooklyn, and you'll understand why the cops were nervous enough to even try this kind of shit. This ain't the nice little suburb you do your contract programming in...this is New York City. We only obey the law because we know there's a thin line between order and chaos in this town. -TD > > >----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--------------------------- > + ^ + :"Our enemies are innovative and resourceful, and so are we. /|\ > \|/ :They never stop thinking about new ways to harm our country /\|/\ ><--*-->:and our people, and neither do we." -G. W. Bush, 2004.08.05 \/|\/ > /|\ : \|/ > + v + : War is Peace, freedom is slavery, Bush is President. >------------------------------------------------------------------------- > >On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, Tyler Durden wrote: > > > Not totally. That cop on a scooter rightfully got the crap kicked out of >him > > for mowing down demonstrators. > > > > They can gain local, temporary control but if we take to the streets en > > masse then there's not much they can do, and they know it. _________________________________________________________________ FREE pop-up blocking with the new MSN Toolbar get it now! http://toolbar.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200415ave/direct/01/

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Re: The cages on the Hudson, AKA Little Guantanamo (fwd)
by Tyler Durden 02 Sep '04

02 Sep '04

>Wheee! NYC==Police State for the last week for those of you living under >rocks... Not totally. That cop on a scooter rightfully got the crap kicked out of him for mowing down demonstrators. They can gain local, temporary control but if we take to the streets en masse then there's not much they can do, and they know it. -TD _________________________________________________________________ Check out Election 2004 for up-to-date election news, plus voter tools and more! http://special.msn.com/msn/election2004.armx

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