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Cell phones for eavesdropping - finally some public "chatter"
by Gadi Evron 27 Dec '04

27 Dec '04

/Pun intended on the subject line!/ Okay, so, we have all known cell phones are "dangerous". Stepping out of the cellular protocols security and vendor-side systems, and forgetting for a second about interception of transmissions through the air, Trojan horses/worms that may install themselves on the cell phone and even bluetooth risks, there is the long talked of risk of "operating" a regular un-tampered cell phone from a far and the risk of modified devices. Sorry for stating the obvious, but cell phones are transmitters. For years now paranoid people and organizations claim that eavesdropping through a cell phone is a very valid risk. Much like somebody pressing "send" by mistake during a sensitive meeting is a very valid yet different risk. Some of the stricter organizations ask you to do anything from (top to bottom) storing the cell phone in a safe, through shutting it off or removing the battery, and all the way to *only* "don't have that around here while we are in a meeting". Then again.. *most* haven't even heard of this risk. Forgetting even this risk, many of us even ignore the obvious. I usually ask people who talk to me while I'm on the phone "even if the NSA (for example) is not interested in what I have to say or not capable of intercepting it and even that I don't care if they heard my conversations... Should the person I talk to hear our conversation?" Lately there seems to be some more awareness about the "dangers" of cell phones. Knowing which risk is more of a threat than the other is another issue. It seems to me that other than in the protocols, where there has been a serious learning curve (and GPRS seems very promising), cellular companies keep doing the same mistakes, and we can see the security problems of the PC world reappearing in cell phones, much like those of the main frames re-appeared in PC's (to a level). History repeated. Heck, I can't even disable Java or the web browser in most cellular computers (we really should refer to them as computers now). Here are some URL's on the subject: Here is one about modified cell phones, which also mentions the risk of eavesdropping through a cell phone as mentioned above: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/200206/msg0003 1.html Here is a product for sale, a cellular phone BUILT for eavesdropping: http://wirelessimports.com/ProductDetail.asp?ProductID=347 Also, check out the IEEE Pervasive article that mentions this problem area, although discusses more the issue of malware: http://csdl.computer.org/comp/mags/pc/2004/04/b4011abs.htm Or Google for "symbian +virus", for example. Thanks go to David Dagon for the links. ------ End of Forwarded Message ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Stolen passports missed at U.S. borders
by R.A. Hettinga 24 Dec '04

24 Dec '04

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20041223-113834-…> The Washington Times www.washingtontimes.com Stolen passports missed at U.S. borders By Jerry Seper THE WASHINGTON TIMES Published December 24, 2004 Foreign nationals applying for admission to the United States using stolen passports have "little reason to fear being caught" and usually are admitted, even when their fraudulent documents have been posted on the government's computerized "lookout" lists, a report said. The Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General said in a 40-page report that of the 176 foreign nationals who its investigators identified as having used a stolen passport in an attempt to enter the United States from 1998 to 2003, 136 were admitted. "While most persons using stolen passports to enter illegally into the United States may be simply violating immigration laws, some could have more sinister intentions," said the department's acting inspector general, Richard L. Skinner. The report, completed in November but made public this week, also said when U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers received new reports of stolen passports, they did not routinely review existing admission records to determine whether any already had been used. Even if there was such a procedure, the report said, CBP had no way to give the information on the stolen passports to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Homeland Security's investigative arm. "While the 136 successful entries using stolen passports is a relatively small number, it is significant for several reasons," Mr. Skinner said. "First, the passports were obtained by criminal acts. Second, though small, the number could and should be zero, at least for those admissions that occurred after lookouts were posted. Third, there was no law-enforcement pursuit once it was recognized an illegal entry had occurred." Mr. Skinner said actionable information was reported and logged in the lookout system, yet entry was accomplished, "defeating a costly apparatus established precisely to prevent such an occurrence." The inspector general's probe targeted travelers from the 27 foreign countries for whom a visa is not required, including France, Germany and Britain. Although those travelers were told in October to present either a machine-readable passport or a U.S. visa, CBP has given officials at ports of entry the discretionary authority to grant one-time exemptions in an effort to facilitate travel. President Bush also has signed legislation delaying until October 2005 the requirement for visa-waiver countries to include biometrics in their passports. Mr. Skinner said the "vast numbers of stolen passports available" presented a significant challenge for U.S. immigration authorities, noting that Interpol estimated last year that more than 10 million lost and stolen passports are in circulation. CBP records show that during 2003, more than 12.7 million travelers to the United States from visa-waiver countries were inspected at ports of entry -- nearly 35,000 a day -- and that 4,368 fraudulent passports were intercepted. The United States had 40.4 million international visitors last year. According to the inspector general's report, of the 98 foreign nationals who did not have lookouts posted for their stolen passports before their attempted U.S. entry, 79 were admitted -- a rate of 81 percent. Of those 78 aliens who had posted lookouts on their passports, 57 gained entry -- a rate of 73 percent. Of those 57 who gained entry despite "lookouts" on their passports, 33 did so after the September 11 attacks. The report also said that 18 aliens whose passports had posted lookouts were referred by immigration officers to secondary inspections for more intensive interviews, but got in anyway. "We could not determine from the secondary inspections records, the inspectors' rationale for admitting the aliens with lookouts for the stolen passports," Mr. Skinner said, describing the records as nonexistent or "so sketchy that they were not useful." Mr. Skinner's report made several recommendations: *Primary inspectors should refer foreign nationals to secondary inspections when their passports are the subject of a lookout. *The inspectors should record in detail the results of the secondary inspections and justifications for any subsequent admission. *There should be a supervisory review and approval of a decision to admit an alien who was the subject of a lookout. *Inspectors should enter new names into the lookout database on a timely basis. *CBP should initiate routine reviews of admission records to identify prior uses of stolen passports. *Information on the successful use of stolen passports should be reported to ICE for investigation. Homeland Security Undersecretary Asa Hutchinson, who oversees CBP and ICE, said the inspector general's report had reached "overly broad and generalized conclusions" based on a limited study. But he said CBP agreed with the recommendations and had taken "prudent steps" to address them. Mr. Skinner also recommended that ICE develop procedures to investigate, locate and remove from the United States foreign nationals who have used stolen passports to gain entry to the country and to report the outcomes of its investigations to CBP. For those aliens who used stolen passports that have terrorist links, he said, ICE should investigate their activities while in the United States and determine their whereabouts. Mr. Hutchinson said efforts were under way to ensure that ICE investigated all questionable cases. CBP inspects the millions of foreign nationals arriving at the nation's land, sea and air ports of entry to determine their eligibility for admission. Secondary inspections are sought when more detailed information is required. ICE is responsible for enforcing immigration law in the nation's interior. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network
by R.A. Hettinga 24 Dec '04

24 Dec '04

<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/23/technology/circuits/23pain.html?pagewante…> The New York Times December 23, 2004 A Force Field in Flat Gray to Protect a Wireless Network Adam Baer s wireless networks have proliferated, computer security companies have come up with increasingly complex defenses against hackers: password protection, encryption, biometrics. Insulating the interior of a house, apartment or office from radio-wave interference is a simpler concept that has yet to become a popular consumer strategy, but a new product called DefendAir from Force Field Wireless could change that. Available online at forcefieldwireless.com, the product is a latex house paint that has been laced with copper and aluminum fibers that form an electromagnetic shield, blocking most radio waves and protecting wireless networks. Priced at $69 a gallon and available only in flat gray (it can be used as a primer), one coat shields Wi-Fi, WiMax and Bluetooth networks operating at frequencies from 100 megahertz to 2.4 gigahertz. Two or three coats will achieve the paint's maximum level of protection, good for networks operating at up to five gigahertz. Force Field Wireless also sells a paint additive ($34 for a 32-ounce container, enough to treat a gallon of paint) and $39 window-shield films. Harold Wray, a Force Field Wireless spokesman, said the paint must be carefully applied. "Radio waves find leaks," he said. It should be applied selectively, he said, because it might hinder the performance of radios, televisions and cellphones. "Our main goal is to shield your wireless radio waves from hackers and outside interference," he said. "Plus, today, many people watch cable television." Adam Baer Copyrigh -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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U.S. passport privacy: Over and out?
by R.A. Hettinga 24 Dec '04

24 Dec '04

<http://www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2004/12/22/news/passpo…> U.S. passport privacy: Over and out? By Hiawatha Bray The Boston Globe Thursday, December 23, 2004 It's December 2005 and you're all set for Christmas in Vienna. You have your most fashionable cold-weather gear, right down to Canada's national red maple leaf embroidered on your jacket and backpack, to conceal your American citizenship from hostile denizens of Europe. But your secret isn't really safe. As you stroll through the terminal, you pass a nondescript man with a briefcase. The briefcase contains a powerful radio scanner, and simply by walking past, you've identified yourself as an American. Without laying a finger on you, the man has electronically "skimmed" the data in your passport. Science fiction? The American Civil Liberties Union doesn't think so. Neither does Bruce Schneier, software engineer and author of multiple books on computer security, nor Katherine Albrecht, a privacy activist in Cambridge, Massachusetts. They are all worried about a State Department plan to put radio identification tags in all future U.S. passports, beginning next year. That way, American passport data can be read merely by waving it past a radio detector. But whose radio detector? That's what worries many people. "Somebody can identify you as an American citizen from across the street because of the passport in your back pocket," said Albrecht, founder of a Web site concerned with the matter, spychips.com. "You're a walking target." Nonsense, replies a State Department spokeswoman, Kelly Shannon. "We're going to prevent the unauthorized skimming of the data," Shannon said. The U.S. government thinks the new passports will be harder to forge and easier to verify than the current model, without causing undue risk of identity theft. It is all part of the continuing debate over radio frequency identification systems, also known as RFID. Tags that let people zoom through a highway toll booth contain an RFID chip. Many American pets have them embedded under their skin and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration has approved doing the same for people, to provide reliable medical information to emergency room doctors. But privacy advocates like Albrecht contend that government agencies and big corporations want to embed RFID chips into virtually every product, giving them the ability to track almost every move that people make. The RFID chips contain a tiny bit of information that is transmitted via radio when the chip comes within range of a reading device. The chip could broadcast a simple code number, or it could contain a lot more information, like a traveler's name, nationality and digital photograph. This is what the chips planned for future U.S. passports will do, part of a plan to make the passport system more secure. But according to government documents released by the civil liberties union, early versions of the system allowed detection of personal data by a snoop 30 feet, or 9 meters, away. Shannon, of the State Department, dismissed this research, saying the equipment needed to capture the data was too complex and heavy to be used undercover. That is not much comfort to Schneier, the computer security expert. "Technology only gets better," he said. "It never gets worse." Schneier figures that would-be spies and snoops will find ways to pick up signals from the passport chips. The chips might be made more secure by encrypting the data they contain. That way, it would be useless even if intercepted. But the State Department opposes that idea, because immigration officials in many poor countries cannot afford the necessary decryption gear. "Encryption limits the global interoperability of the passport," said Shannon. Why use a radio-based identity system at all? Smart chips, like those found in some credit cards, are plentiful and cheap, and they don't broadcast. You slide them through a chip reader that instantly scoops up the data. But the International Civil Aviation Organization, which sets global standards for passports, has decided on the use of a "noncontact" technology - another way of saying radio-based identification. So will Americans be stuck with high-tech passports that beam their personal data to all comers? Not necessarily. Turns out there's a simple fix: a passport cover made of aluminum foil. It would form what engineers call a Faraday cage, after Michael Faraday, the 19th-century British physicist who discovered the characteristics of electromagnetic waves. Wrap an RFID chip inside a Faraday cage, and the electromagnetic waves from the chip reader can't get in and activate the chip. The State Department says it may use the principle to give travelers an added sense of security. No, there won't be rolls of aluminum foil included with every passport. Instead, the passport cover may include a network of wires woven into the fabric. Fold the passport shut, and there's your Faraday cage. Even Schneier agrees that a properly shielded passport cover should solve the problem. He wonders why this wasn't included in the original plans for the new passports. "It took a bunch of criticism before they even mentioned it," Schneier said. And he hopes the anti-snooping technology is thoroughly tested before the new passports are introduced next spring. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Finally, the Killer PKI Application
by R.A. Hettinga 24 Dec '04

24 Dec '04

<http://sys-con.com/story/print.cfm?storyid=47592> (SYS-CON)(Printview) Finally, the Killer PKI Application Web Services as an application - and a challenge December 22, 2004 Summary Enterprise PKI has a bad name. Complex, costly, difficult to deploy and maintain - all these criticisms have dogged this technology since it first appeared. To the dismay of so many CIOs, few applications have stepped up to make effective use of PKI. But this may soon change: Web services promotes a security model that demands the flexibility that an enterprise PKI deployment can offer. By Scott Morrison Enterprise PKI has a bad name. Complex, costly, difficult to deploy and maintain - all these criticisms have dogged this technology since it first appeared. To the dismay of so many CIOs, few applications have stepped up to make effective use of PKI. But this may soon change: Web services promotes a security model that demands the flexibility that an enterprise PKI deployment can offer. The Trend Away from Channel-Level Security If you lumped all the existing, production-level Web services applications together, and categorized their security models, you would probably discover some interesting trends. First, an awful lot of these don't address security at all, which probably owes more to the relative immaturity of Web services technology than to a conscious choice on the part of developers. The bulk of the remainder will simply delegate security entirely to SSL - or in some cases, a VPN connection. SSL isn't a bad choice. It provides confidentiality and integrity. Automatic sequence numbering stands guard against replay attacks. Servers are always authenticated using a certificate that binds the server's DNS name to the Subject, a strategy to defeat man-in-the-middle and impersonation attacks. This does rely heavily on the integrity of the DNS system, but by and large it is viewed as an acceptable risk. SSL even offers optional client-side certificate authentication, which is powerful, though in practice rarely implemented. Probably the most unheralded quality of SSL is channel continuity. Once a session is set up - and once the client and server mutually authenticate (with the client using a certificate under SSL, through HTTP authentication, or an application-level means such as forms) - a level of trust is established on the open socket so that it is available for multiple transactions without repeating this lengthy process each time. There is great value in a transparently maintained security context, and it is easy to take for granted. Of course, one of the reasons behind SSL's success on the Web was that, although it utilizes public key cryptography, it doesn't need full-blown PKI. Most SSL-enabled Web servers use certs issued by the "browser cartel," those CAs fortunate enough to have their root certificates automatically installed within the trust store of the most popular browsers. And with the exception of a few early consumer banking products - which have largely been abandoned - almost nobody steps up to the baroque logistics of client-side certificates on the Web. The ability to delegate PKI to a third party greatly simplified security on the Web; this was one of the reasons SSL became good enough for most online transactions, even when challenged in the early days by technically elegant, though complex, solutions like SET (Secure Electronic Transaction). But SSL's greatest weakness is that it is oriented toward synchronous transactions, requiring a direct connection between participants. It's like an encrypted telephone conversation, which is probably something alien to you and me, but I suppose that James Bond uses it regularly. Both parties need to be available, multiple passes are necessary to set up a secure context, and all of the information - the critical points alongside the mundane ("how's the weather in London?") - is encrypted wholesale, which can be a costly processor burden. This is why SSL is an insufficient security model for Web services. Despite the name - an unfortunate one that is probably one of the great misnomers in the history of technology - Web services isn't really about the Web. In one realization, it does use existing Web infrastructure, including HTTP transport, Web application servers, etc. However, Web services is fundamentally a one-way messaging paradigm for computer communications, composed around a simple XML message structure with an extensible header model. Web service messages may not piggyback on HTTP at all. They might flow across a message-oriented middleware (MOM) such as IBM's MQSeries, or be carried asynchronously by that other ubiquitous infrastructure, SMTP. SOAP messages are designed to flow through a network of intermediates, not unlike IP packets being passed between routers. Intermediates may be required to view header information to make processing decisions based on application-level protocol. A channel-based security model, one that encrypts everything and requires synchronous responses from a receiver, simply isn't appropriate in such a Web services architecture. Security in the Message The solution to this problem, as put forth in standards by OASIS and the W3C, is to absorb security into the message itself. That is, provide a means of authentication, integrity, and confidentiality that is integral to the message, and completely decoupled from transport channels. Thus, the message security remains consistent and trustworthy whether it flows over regular HTTP across a P2P network using proprietary protocols, is persisted to a file, or even printed onto a piece of paper. Ironically, it's closer to the time-honored cryptographic tradition of writing encrypted information into a message and sending it via a messenger than it is to Mr. Bond's fancy, synchronous encrypting telephone. This may strike you as lower tech, but a security model that supports asynchronous messaging has great architectural advantages. In the Oasis Web Services Security (WSS) standard, each SOAP message stands alone, and can have security applied uniquely. It includes mechanisms for encrypting any content in the message at a very finely grained level. For example, rather than applying a cipher to the entire message, only those parts that are deemed necessary to cryptographically secure need be encrypted, such as a credit card number. This means that public parts of a message, such as header fields that might be relevant to an intermediate making a routing decision, can be left in the clear. Of course, any part of a SOAP message is subject to modification by an attacker as it traverses potentially hostile networks. To address this, WSS provides a mechanism to sign message content, with a granularity identical to encryption. Thus, not only can a message author encrypt the credit card element, they can sign it to ensure that no substitution in transit goes undetected. The same protection can be extended to unencrypted, public elements, such as timestamps inserted into the header. A Role for PKI WSS goes to great lengths to remain flexible and not to specify a particular encryption/signing technology. It's certainly possible to build a WSS-compliant system based on shared secrets that are exchanged out-of-band of the WSS specification (though this disqualifies a transaction from any claims to nonrepudiation, as well as subjecting it to a toxic list of potential security flaws). Nevertheless, you would be hard-pressed to find a vendor's WSS implementation that isn't based on public key infrastructure. Furthermore, everyone is building systems predicated to have key pairs on both sides of a transaction: at the message producer (client), and the message consumer (server). So PKI is back. This is good news if you spent a lot of money a few years back on a large, enterprise-wide PKI rollout. It was painful, and probably unrecognized, but now the investment may finally be realized. If you avoided PKI until now, Web services may be the application that forces your organization to swallow this often bitter pill. The Typical Pattern To understand why PKI is so essential to the typical WSS implementation, it helps to examine a common interaction model (see Figure 1). A single message is secured for transmission between two parties. This is a sessionless scenario, meaning that there is no prenegotiated, temporary security token shared between parties. In other words, there is no shared secret between the producer and the consumer, such as a key used for symmetric encryption and HMAC signing. Emerging standards, such as WS-Secure Conversation and WS-Trust, provide for negotiated security tokens and define well-known key derivation mechanisms similar to SSL's session key scheme. In this instance, we are illustrating how a message can be secured directly using only the key pair and certificate held by the producer, and the certificate for the consumer. Figure 2 shows a map of the message exchanged between the producer and the consumer. In this simplified message, the body has been encrypted using a two-step process described in WSS. First the producer generates a random symmetric key to encrypt the body content, using a symmetric algorithm like triple-DES or AES. A specialized security header describes the exact algorithm and key length. Note the contrast here to SSL, which supports negotiation of cipher suites and key lengths. This is largely to accommodate a diversity of clients, any of whom may be subject to cryptography export restrictions. Here we assume a prior, out-of-band agreement on cipher capabilities. So how does this shared secret become, well, shared? It's pretty simple. The producer encrypts this symmetric key with the consumer's public key, ensuring that only that party can decrypt the message. This encrypted key is then embedded in the security header, with a reference to the key pair needed to unlock it (often, this is implemented using the subject key identifier field from the receiver's certificate). In the security header, anyone can read the encrypted key, but only the designated receiver can decrypt it, and use it to further decipher the message content. Thus, no complex, multipass protocol is required to negotiate a security session key. Each message stands alone. Encryption, however, is only one component of the security story, albeit an important one. As it stands, the encrypted message body is subject to substitution by a malicious party, as are critical header fields such as the timestamp, which is necessary for servers to uniquely identify messages and apply an effective replay defense. Furthermore, the consumer has no means to authenticate the message producer: encryption for a particular receiver does not identify the author - the message could have come from anyone. To address this shortcoming, our message producer calculates digests of the encrypted message body and critical header fields, and places these into yet another block in the security header. It signs this block, aggregating the digested components into a single, simultaneous integrity/origin authentication statement. The producer includes its certificate (or a reference to it) in the security header so that the receiver can validate the signature and follow any certificate chain in the certificate to a trust anchor. Now the consumer can have confidence that a specific producer authored the message, it was not altered in transit, and most importantly, that it was designated specifically for this consumer. What is important to recognize here is that all parties in this transaction have key pairs and certificates. Without PKI, the model doesn't work. Conclusion Clearly, Web services is a great opportunity for PKI, but it's also a great challenge. Most vendors' toolkits have a deliberately vague coupling to commercial PKI systems. As always, it's what the standards loosely describe that becomes the source of problems. Interfacing to a particular key store type or location, coercing servers to check CRLs or use OCSP can be troublesome. It's best to start proactively, rolling out your PKI system before its services are demanded by a Web services application. And the demand will come. SSL is sufficient for Web-like, client/server application, but large enterprise computing is built on asynchronous messaging; this is where Web services will shine, and where PKI will become essential. About the author Scott Morrison is director of Architecture at Layer 7 Technologies. Layer 7 provides technology for managing and coordinating Web services security and transaction policy across loosely coupled systems (more) -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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DOJ: IRS Summons are unenforceable. (fwd)
by J.A. Terranson 24 Dec '04

24 Dec '04

This just gets weirder and weirder! In their attempt to prevent the Petition, DOJ is asserting that the IRS is essentially a non-entity. Except when they take you to prison. Or something like that... -------------------------------------------------------------------- http://www.givemeliberty.org/RTPLawsuit/update04-Dec-22.htm In Defense of the Petition Clause: Battles Now Underway on Three Fronts 2nd Circuit Directs DOJ to Explain Lack of IRS Summons Enforcement Authority As is now widely known, since July of 1999 the We The People organization has led a nationwide legal and educational attack on the federal government, utilizing the force of .popular constitutionalism.. This assault has come in the form of an intelligent and rational exercise of the First Amendment Right to Petition for Redress of Grievances, relating to the government.s imposition of an unconstitutional, direct, un-apportioned tax on labor. What is also known is that in November of 2002, three additional Petitions for Redress were added to the People.s overall Petition process. These Petitions are related to the Constitution.s war powers clauses versus the Iraq Resolution, the privacy and due process clauses versus the USA Patriot Act, and the money and debt limiting clauses versus the Federal Reserve System. It is also widely known that the People.s Petitions for Redress have been legally served on the highest ranking officials of the Executive and Legislative branches of the federal government, including the President and leadership of the Congress and every member of Congress, the Attorney General, Treasury Secretary, and Commissioner of the IRS. Undoubtedly, these officials know about the We The People Foundation and the Petitions for Redress of Grievances. What.s more, with dismay, the People watched their servant government.s reaction: they have seen the government trespass on the People.s First Amendment Right to Petition by striking out against the Petitioners -- infringing on that unalienable Right, rather than respond by answering their questions. The People decided to fight back . to defend against this invasion of their Right to Petition. Nearly two thousand joined the fight this year by becoming named plaintiffs in the lawsuit aimed at getting the federal courts to declare the meaning of the Right to Petition, including the Right of the People to retain their money until their grievances are redressed if the government decides not to properly and honestly respond as the Constitution commands. What has not been widely known is that parallel battles in defense against the government.s invasion of the People.s Right to Petition are now being fought on a total of three judicial fronts by the We The People organization. What follows is an update of the primary lawsuit and breaking news regarding significant developments in a related case that has reached the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals. This second case was brought by Chairman Bob Schulz, as the sole plaintiff, against the IRS. We will discuss the third case in a future article. Ed. Note: Many of the following linked .PDF documents are large. It is suggested that you RIGHT-CLICK to Save (i.e., download) the files to your computer before attempting to open them using the (free) Adobe Reader software. Update -- The Primary Battle: We The People v. The United States On July 19, 2004, this case was initiated in the U.S. District Court in the District of Columbia. An Amended Complaint was filed in early September. On September 30, 2004, as we had previously reported, the government filed a Motion to Dismiss our complaint. On November 12, 2004, Mark Lane and Bob Schulz filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the government.s motion to dismiss. We asked constitutional scholar and attorney John Wolfgram to review and comment on our Opposition memorandum. Wolfgram called the Memorandum .Splendid.Brilliant.. Click here for Wolfgram.s comments. Wofgram is the author of the article, .How the Judiciary Stole the Right To Petition,. which was published in 31 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. (Summer 2000). Wolfgram has a B.A. Degree (University of Wisconsin) and a J.D. Degree (Southwestern University 1977). Wolfgram founded the Constitutional Defender Association in 1989 to advance Petition Clause Principles. Its name derives from the observation that the practical value of a Constitution depends on the effective enforcement of constitutional rights and limits against government, by the people. Wolfgram argues that the Petition Clause is the People's Right to redress government violations of the Constitution - the Constitution's Defense system against government usurpation and oppression. According to the rules of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the government had until November 17, 2004 to reply to our Memorandum in Opposition to the government.s Motion to Dismiss. However, DOJ filed a Motion for more time, due in part, to .the gravity of the relief sought.. We thought this to be an odd reason because the only relief we are seeking is a declaration of our Rights under the Petition Clause of the First Amendment, and an end to unconstitutional retaliation against those who Petition for Redress. However, the court granted the request. DOJ's reply is due today, December 22, 2004. After reading the government.s motion to dismiss our complaint, our Memorandum in Opposition (dated 11/12/04), and the government.s reply (due 12/22/04), the court will decide to deny or grant the government.s motion to dismiss. If the court denies the government.s motion to dismiss, the government may appeal that decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals. If the government does not appeal the court.s denial of its motion to dismiss, the case will move to the discovery phase, in advance of trial. On the other hand, if the court grants the government.s motion to dismiss, we will appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals. On November 12, 2004, Mark Lane and Bob Schulz filed a Motion to Amend our complaint, in order to add hundreds of named plaintiffs, to narrow the issues and to cure a minor issue in our complaint. The government has opposed our Motion to Amend the complaint and we have replied to the government.s opposition. We are also awaiting the court.s decision on our Motion to Amend. Right-Click to download the Second Amended Complaint. A Second Front: Schulz v. IRS A second front has been established in the People.s defense against the government.s invasion of our First Amendment Right to Petition. Bob Schulz has sued the IRS for interfering with his Right to Petition for Redress. The government decided to retaliate against the leaders of the Petition process, including Bob Schulz in his personal capacity and as Chairman of the WTP organization. The government served Schulz with a Summons, demanding that Schulz turn over certain personal records to the IRS. Schulz immediately sued the IRS in the US District court. In his complaint, Schulz asked the Court to quash the IRS Summons on the grounds that the IRS did not have a legitimate purpose, that the IRS was infringing on his First Amendment Right to Petition and his Right to associate with others of like mind, and that the Summons was nothing more than harassment and impermissible retaliation. Right-click here for the Memorandum of Law. The IRS, as defendant, did not respond to the lawsuit. They never made an appearance in District Court! Eventually, Schulz motioned the District Court for a default judgment. The District Court issued its decision, holding that the court was prevented by law from quashing an IRS Summons. Schulz immediately appealed to the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (see Schulz.s Appellant Brief). The IRS, through its attorney, the U.S. Department of Justice, decided to make an appearance in the court of Appeals. DOJ, through its Senior Counsel, Robert Storch, filed a Respondent.s Brief. Schulz filed his Reply Brief. Oral argument was held last week on December 13, 2004. At oral argument, DOJ argued that the District Court lacked jurisdiction and could not quash the Summons served on Schulz because the Summons legally meant nothing. Ironically, in order to scuttle Schulz.s case by asserting lack of jurisdiction, and to avoid a judicial skirmish directly debating the Summons authority of the IRS, DOJ argued before the three appellate justices that the IRS Summons was legally .unenforceable,. therefore Schulz was under no legal obligation to respond to it, denying the court subject matter jurisdiction. Schulz disagreed. He argued that Reisman was dispositive, that in Reisman, the US Supreme Court recognized the jurisdiction of the federal courts in such matters, by declaring the right of a person served with an IRS Summons to respond to the Summons by taking the IRS to a US District Court. Schulz also argued that under Powell, the IRS was required to appear in court to prove its purpose in issuing the Summons was a legitimate purpose. Finally, Schulz argued that the court had jurisdiction on the ground that the Summons was, in fact, an IRS .enforcement action. with significant adverse, statutorily prescribed consequences (including arrest for contempt), if he either ignored the Summons or failed to give the IRS what it was demanding of Schulz. See IRC Sections 7604 & 7210. During argument, one of the justices inquired of Storch, .If there is no legal obligation to respond to IRS Summons, then why didn't the IRS simply print a disclaimer on the Summons itself informing people that they did not have to respond to the Summons?. Storch could not answer the question. In a highly unusual move, the appellate court ordered DOJ to submit a memorandum to the Court by December 23, 2004, further explaining to the court why DOJ believes people do not have to respond to IRS Summons, why people will suffer no consequences if they ignore such Summons, and why the court is without power to grant Schulz.s request to quash the Summons. In response, Storch, the Senior Counsel in the office of the US Attorney, repeatedly asserted he did not understand this area of the law and would have to engage IRS officials to draft the Memorandum requested by the Court. RIGHT-Click here to save (download) a copy of the audio file containing the oral arguments made by Schulz and the DOJ before the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals on December 13, 2004 to your computer. The Third Front A third battle in defense against the government.s attempt to seize power from the People by acting without authority, and in defense of the People.s Right to Petition is now being waged. This battle also involves the practical application and legal enforcement of the Right to Petition by withholding taxes. Specifically, the case involves property taxes and the commitment of seven families who have "bet the farm" in defense of their constitutionally protected Rights. We will provide details in a future article. Just The Beginning Although we have made considerable progress since our primary judicial work commenced just months ago, and it appears the government is having measured difficulty with our efforts thus far, we want to remind everyone that our battle to secure the Right to Petition -- and restore Constitutional Order -- will likely be long, and without doubt, very costly. Although many are fighting hard and sacrifices have been made, there remains much to be done -- including moving the District Court for Injunctive protections for all the lawsuit Plaintiffs, generating a critical mass of public awareness, and defending our Rights through trial Court, the Courts of Appeal, and through to the Supreme Court. We ask each of you to help us remain focused on our common objectives and strategies and share, as you are able, in the substantial burdens of this landmark, righteous, and necessary cause. Please consider a year-end, tax-deductible donation so that you and your family may soon enjoy Freedom as our Founders and our Creator intended. PLEASE REMEMBER DICK SIMKANIN After four requests for more time, Simkanin's attorney is apparently about ready to file his Brief on Behalf of Appellant Simkanin. One would argue that it is better to take the time to prepare a persuasive and winning argument than to rush the appeal brief and fall short. Although it shocks the senses to consider what Dick Simkanin and his wife Carol have endured in defense of Liberty, Dick's sprit remains very strong and positive. He has asked us to remind people not to forget him and that he always looks forward to "mail call". Please consider dropping Dick a note. Dick's address is: Richard Michael Simkanin 30383-177 Unit F FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION P.O. BOX 7000 TEXARKANA, TX 75505-7000 Join the RTP lawsuit as a Plaintiff and learn about the long-forgotten Right to Petition. in the Lawsuit Information Center. Remember, there is NO cost to become a Plaintiff.

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Camera Phone Criminals Targeting Holiday Shoppers
by R.A. Hettinga 23 Dec '04

23 Dec '04

<http://www.local6.com/print/4019956/detail.html> local6.com Camera Phone Criminals Targeting Holiday Shoppers Identity Theft Is Fastest Growing Crime In Florida POSTED: 6:36 am EST December 23, 2004 UPDATED: 6:54 am EST December 23, 2004 ORLANDO, Fla. -- Thieves armed with camera cell phones are using the devices to steal credit card numbers, bank account numbers and even ATM numbers from holiday shoppers, according to a Local 6 News report. Police said that criminals who are able to get close enough to a person's personal information can snap a photo of the card or bank account number, and steal the number. Orange County sheriff's deputies said they are aware of the latest identity theft -- the fastest growing crime in Florida. "It's real easy to capture someone's information by standing behind somebody, pointing to where they can get personal information," Orange County sheriff's spokesman Carlos Torres said. "As the technology gets more advanced, criminals get more advanced with it." Police said whatever information a shopper pulls out in public is subject to being photographed and used to a criminal's advantage, Local 6 News reported. Central Florida resident Robert Devers said his aunt was likely the victim of a camera phone criminal. "My aunt's ATM account was wiped out, because someone was able to get a hold of her PIN number," Devers said. There have been no arrests in connection with Devers case. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] Robbers' quandary: Getting rid of the cash
by InfoSec News 23 Dec '04

23 Dec '04

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4117961.stm By Gavin Stamp BBC News business reporter 22 December, 2004 Pulling off one of the largest and most daring cash robberies of all time is one thing. Disposing successfully of the loot and enjoying the benefits is another matter. For the criminals who have made off with more than #20m from the headquarters of Northern Bank in Belfast, the problems may only just be beginning. Firstly, they will have to contend with the huge worldwide publicity that their heist has generated. 'Massive headache' Police in the United Kingdom and across Europe will be hot on their trail while shopkeepers from Ballymena to Brighton will be alert to any large or unusual purchases for the next few weeks. Secondly, the sheer size of the robbers' hoard could turn out to be a millstone around their necks. Getting rid of #20m without causing huge suspicion is likely to tax even the most resourceful and determined of criminal minds. Not only do the stolen notes each have their own serial number, making them easy to identify but the majority are denominated in Northern Ireland currency. Although this is accepted throughout the United Kingdom, far fewer notes of this type tend to be in circulation outside Northern Ireland, making any effort to disperse them in England more risky. "They have a massive headache," says John Horan, a money laundering expert with accountants Harbinson Mulholland. "To some extent, they have been the victims of their own success." Furthermore, the laws governing reporting of suspicious money flows have been tightened up over the past two years, making it far harder for the criminals to discreetly invest their loot in a piece of real estate or an Old Master. Suspicious minds While banks have always had a legal responsibility to report suspicions of potential money laundering, the Proceeds of Crime Act passed in 2003 has extended this obligation to a whole raft of businesses and professionals. "If they're thinking of buying property, that's a bad idea because property developers, estate agents and conveyancing lawyers are regulated and all have an obligation to report their suspicions," says Mr Horan. "Thinking of buying a Matisse or a nice Rembrandt? That's a bad idea too because high value dealers such as auction houses are also regulated." The robbers still have a number of options, money laundering experts agree, although they are limited. If they plan to keep the money within the United Kingdom without resorting to burying it, setting up a front company is the most likely option. "They can set up a fake company which can be used to nominally provide services and invoices for those services," says Trevor Mascarenhas, a partner at Phillipsohn Crawfords Berwald, a law firm specialising in fraud and money laundering. "They can then take the cash and put it through the system, paying tax on what they purport to provide and try to legitimise the money." Overseas options To do this successfully, says Mr Horan, they would need the assistance of an expert money launderer who would expect to take a major cut of the proceeds. More likely, however, is that the robbers will attempt to smuggle the money out of United Kingdom in multiple consignments so as not to jeopardise the entire haul. Drug laundering organisations in South America and Russian criminal gangs operating across Europe may provide a ready conduit for the money, channelling it through banks willing not to ask too many questions. According to Ian Hopkins, a senior consultant with corporate investigators Carratu International, Colombia is one destination the robbers may consider. "There are places like that which are not too concerned where the money comes from. There are banks which will take their 2% to 3% and deal with the rest of the money." The money could even ultimately find its way back into the British economy through offshore businesses and accounts. Whatever the fate of the money, most experts believe the robbers may have taken on more than they can chew. "I would be very surprised if they expected to steal #20m," says Mr Hopkins. "It is like the Great Train Robbery. They are likely to be surprised and not a little panicked about how much they have got." _________________________________________ Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable - http://www.osvdb.org/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] Robbers' quandary: Getting rid of the cash
by InfoSec News 23 Dec '04

23 Dec '04

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4117961.stm By Gavin Stamp BBC News business reporter 22 December, 2004 Pulling off one of the largest and most daring cash robberies of all time is one thing. Disposing successfully of the loot and enjoying the benefits is another matter. For the criminals who have made off with more than #20m from the headquarters of Northern Bank in Belfast, the problems may only just be beginning. Firstly, they will have to contend with the huge worldwide publicity that their heist has generated. 'Massive headache' Police in the United Kingdom and across Europe will be hot on their trail while shopkeepers from Ballymena to Brighton will be alert to any large or unusual purchases for the next few weeks. Secondly, the sheer size of the robbers' hoard could turn out to be a millstone around their necks. Getting rid of #20m without causing huge suspicion is likely to tax even the most resourceful and determined of criminal minds. Not only do the stolen notes each have their own serial number, making them easy to identify but the majority are denominated in Northern Ireland currency. Although this is accepted throughout the United Kingdom, far fewer notes of this type tend to be in circulation outside Northern Ireland, making any effort to disperse them in England more risky. "They have a massive headache," says John Horan, a money laundering expert with accountants Harbinson Mulholland. "To some extent, they have been the victims of their own success." Furthermore, the laws governing reporting of suspicious money flows have been tightened up over the past two years, making it far harder for the criminals to discreetly invest their loot in a piece of real estate or an Old Master. Suspicious minds While banks have always had a legal responsibility to report suspicions of potential money laundering, the Proceeds of Crime Act passed in 2003 has extended this obligation to a whole raft of businesses and professionals. "If they're thinking of buying property, that's a bad idea because property developers, estate agents and conveyancing lawyers are regulated and all have an obligation to report their suspicions," says Mr Horan. "Thinking of buying a Matisse or a nice Rembrandt? That's a bad idea too because high value dealers such as auction houses are also regulated." The robbers still have a number of options, money laundering experts agree, although they are limited. If they plan to keep the money within the United Kingdom without resorting to burying it, setting up a front company is the most likely option. "They can set up a fake company which can be used to nominally provide services and invoices for those services," says Trevor Mascarenhas, a partner at Phillipsohn Crawfords Berwald, a law firm specialising in fraud and money laundering. "They can then take the cash and put it through the system, paying tax on what they purport to provide and try to legitimise the money." Overseas options To do this successfully, says Mr Horan, they would need the assistance of an expert money launderer who would expect to take a major cut of the proceeds. More likely, however, is that the robbers will attempt to smuggle the money out of United Kingdom in multiple consignments so as not to jeopardise the entire haul. Drug laundering organisations in South America and Russian criminal gangs operating across Europe may provide a ready conduit for the money, channelling it through banks willing not to ask too many questions. According to Ian Hopkins, a senior consultant with corporate investigators Carratu International, Colombia is one destination the robbers may consider. "There are places like that which are not too concerned where the money comes from. There are banks which will take their 2% to 3% and deal with the rest of the money." The money could even ultimately find its way back into the British economy through offshore businesses and accounts. Whatever the fate of the money, most experts believe the robbers may have taken on more than they can chew. "I would be very surprised if they expected to steal #20m," says Mr Hopkins. "It is like the Great Train Robbery. They are likely to be surprised and not a little panicked about how much they have got." _________________________________________ Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable - http://www.osvdb.org/ --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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An interesting thread...Hacking Bluetooth
by Tyler Durden 23 Dec '04

23 Dec '04

There's some guy ("German Guy") spouting some coherent-sounding conspiracy theories over here: http://www.godlikeproductions.com/bbs/message.php?page=23&topic=10&message=… I wouldn't normally post something like this, but the guy's done a little bit of homework on a huge variety of topics, so it's really an excellent hoax, seen from a distance. Here's on thing giving me some doubts, though (but of course if this is true he may have just pulled it from Google somewhere): "Here4s another myth: you cannot hack bluetooth from a distance of more than 40 metres. Not true. My technical partner Felix can crack it at over half a kilometre. Which is why he enjoys driving around so much in areas where we know British, American, Israeli or Russian ops are living or working. The great thing about many German cities is that most affordable residences are within metres of the street anyway." Any comments? -TD

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