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FSTC Announces Availability of FSTC Counter-Phishing Project Whitepaper and Supporting Documents
by Zachary Tumin 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

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FSTC Announces Availability of FSTC Counter-Phishing Project Whitepaper and Supporting Documents
by R.A. Hettinga 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

--- begin forwarded text

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Le no-no
by R.A. Hettinga 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

<http://www.redherring.com/PrintArticle.aspx?a=11201&sector=Industries> RED HERRING | The Business of Technology Le no-no The U.S. trips up a simple plan between IBM and Lenovo. January 28, 2005 Homeland security is a cornerstone of the Bush Administration. But does halting the IBM-Lenovo deal make the United States any safer? The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has decided to investigate the threat presented by the sale of IBM's personal computer business to China's Lenovo Group. Industry observers want to know what it is about this deal that irks the feds. "I don't know," says Jeff Moss, CEO of Black Hat, a computer security consulting firm. "It could be the loss of any manufacturing technology, any kind of proprietary technology that IBM had; but the Chinese could take a laptop apart themselves, too." Besides, most personal computers are already made in China-PC production is extremely commoditized, perhaps as much as transistors. "It is quite a stretch [to say] that the sale of the PC business to Lenovo would threaten American security," says Baizu Chen, a professor at the University of Southern California's Gordon S. Marshall School of Business. "Some senators want to make a noise. Eventually, this will pass. It's just transfer of ownership." One concern may have to do more with location than technology. The Washington Post quoted a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission-a Congressional panel created to watch commercial relations between the U.S. and China-as saying that Chinese computer experts could use an IBM facility in North Carolina as a base for industrial espionage. While the U.S. Treasury Department wouldn't confirm or deny the launch of the 45-day probe, IBM, which will still hold an 18.9 percent stake in the business, says it has filed the required notice with the committee and is cooperating fully. The company is confident in the process and outcome. One would hope so, given that the deal is worth $1.75 billion in cash, equity, and assumed debt. Where are the red flags? The U.S. government must demand action if a deal impacts domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, or the capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense requirements, or the control of domestic industries by foreign citizens. The sale of IBM's money-losing PC unit doesn't quite cut it. It could be an issue of pride, say some-or perhaps cryptographic chips, say others. "Some of the IBM laptops have built-in cryptographic chips," says Pete Lindstrom, research director for Spire Securities. Mr. Lindstrom points out that if the intellectual property associated with cryptography is sold to a foreign country, one could potentially transfer a strong cryptographic capability to another country. But IBM is a multinational company, with employees across the globe. Would it really be so hard for someone to access such information? In the end, it all comes down to whom you trust. Legend Holdings owns the majority stake in Lenovo, and the Chinese government controls a large chunk of Legend. A few years ago, Global Crossing wanted to sell its telecommunications network to Hong Kong-based Hutchison Whampoa. It almost did-until the CFIUS stepped in. But that's a story IBM executives would rather not think about. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Mudge Returns to BBN
by R.A. Hettinga 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

<http://home.businesswire.com/portal/site/google/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_vi…> Business Wire February 01, 2005 10:03 AM US Eastern Timezone Peiter ''Mudge'' Zatko, Information Security Expert -- Who Warned that Hackers ''Could Take Down the Internet in 30 Minutes'' -- Returns to BBN Technologies CAMBRIDGE, Mass.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Feb. 1, 2005--BBN Technologies, an advanced technology and research and development firm, announced today that Peiter Zatko has re-joined the company as a division scientist. Mr. Zatko joins a group of over 75 scientists and engineers at BBN who perform leading edge research and development to protect Department of Defense data and systems and are also well known for their IP security expertise. At a time when cyber threats are occurring at an unprecedented rate, Mr. Zatko is focused on anticipating and protecting against the next generation of information and network security threats to government and commercial networks. Known to the security community as "Mudge," Mr. Zatko has a long track record of success in the security industry, most recently as founding scientist of Intrusic, Inc., the first security software company to target the 'Insider Threat.' He is renowned for running L0pht Heavy Industries (and later founding @stake, Inc.), a hacker research collaborative and consultancy that released security tools such as L0phtCrack, now the industry standard Microsoft password-auditing tool. "It's exciting to be back at BBN, working alongside the very people who helped invent the Internet and defending against some of the toughest information warfare threats," said Mr. Zatko. "I've often said that my personal mission is to 'make a dent in the universe' and what better place to do that than at BBN, where the focus is on protecting vital networks from the most critical and challenging attacks." Mr. Zatko testified before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs in 1998 and warned that, if they were so inclined, any member of L0pht could bring down the Internet in 30 minutes and keep it down for several days. He has also been a witness for the House and Senate Joint Judiciary Oversight committee, and, in 2000, was invited to participate in a security summit with former U.S. President Bill Clinton and ex-Attorney General Janet Reno. "BBN is currently tackling some of the toughest security problems for our government and high-profile corporations," said Tad Elmer, president, BBN Technologies. "This challenging environment is what people like Mudge find most rewarding." Mr. Zatko is the developer of L0phtCrack (now LC5), the de-facto Microsoft password auditing tool; AntiSniff, the world's first remote promiscuous system detector that was used across primary Department of Defense entities; Tempwatch, now a distributed component of Linux and BSD distributions; and SLINT, a pioneering tool in automating source code analysis to discover security coding problems. He originally joined BBN Technologies in 1994, before founding @Stake and Intrusic and consulting for the White House, the Pentagon, the FBI, and Fortune 500 companies. About BBN BBN Technologies, an advanced technology and research and development firm, is focused on solving some of the world's most pressing problems. >From national security, information security, speech recognition and language translation, to integrating disparate systems and networks, BBN has been at the forefront of technological change for over 50 years. Known for pioneering the development of the ARPANET, the forerunner of the Internet, BBN continues to create advances in Internet and networking technologies through its work on ad hoc networking, the semantic web, quantum communications, and advanced protocols. Building on its substantial list of firsts, BBN operates the first metro quantum cryptography network, the first real-time foreign broadcast monitoring system, and has developed the world's first stereoscopic digital mammography system. For more information, visit BBN.com Contacts BBN Technologies Contact: Joyce Kuzmin, 617-873-8193 jkuzmin(a)bbn.com or Agency Contact: Mullen Christine Milligan, 978-468-8951 christine.milligan(a)mullen.com -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] Call for Papers - PHRACK #63
by R.A. Hettinga 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

--- begin forwarded text

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[ISN] REVIEW: "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice", Wenbo Mao
by R.A. Hettinga 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

--- begin forwarded text

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[ISN] REVIEW: "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice", Wenbo Mao
by InfoSec News 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

Forwarded from: "Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah" <rslade(a)sprint.ca> BKMDNCRP.RVW 20041207 "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice", Wenbo Mao, 2004, 0-13-066943-1, U$54.99/C$82.99 %A Wenbo Mao %C One Lake St., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458 %D 2004 %G 0-13-066943-1 %I Prentice Hall %O U$54.99/C$82.99 +1-201-236-7139 fax: +1-201-236-7131 %O http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinterne http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinte-21 %O http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesin03-20 %O tl s rl 1 tc 3 ta 3 tv 0 wq 1 %P 707 p. %T "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice" A "Short Description of the Book" states that it is intended to address the issue of whether various crypto algorithms are "practical," as opposed to just theoretically strong. This seems odd, since no algorithm is ready for implementation as such: it must be made part of a full system, and most problems with cryptography come in the implementation. The preface doesn't make things much clearer: it reiterates a "fit-for-application" mantra, but doesn't say clearly, at any point, why existing algorithms are not appropriate for use. The preface also suggests that this book is for advanced study in cryptography, although it states that security engineers and administrators, with special responsibility for developing or implementing cryptography, are also in the target audience. Part one is an introduction, consisting of two chapters. Chapter one outlines the idea of the first "protocol" of the book: a "fair coin toss" over the telephone, grounding the book firmly in the camp of cryptography for the purpose of secure communications. The remainder of the chapter points out all the requirements to make such an unbiased selector work, acting as a kind of sales pitch or "come on" to make you want to read the rest of the book. The promotion is slightly flawed by the fact that there is very little practical detail in the material (it takes a lot of work on the part of the reader to figure out that, yes, this system might work), excessive verbiage, and poor explanations. The stated "objectives" of the chapter, given at the end, say that you should have a "fundamental understanding of cryptography": this is true only in the most limited sense. Chapter two slowly builds a kind of pseudo-Kerberos system. Part two covers mathematical foundations. Chapter three deals with probability and information theory, four with Turing Machines and the notion of computational complexity, five with the algebraic foundations behind the use of prime numbers and elliptic curves for cryptography, and various number theory topics are touched on in chapter six. Part three addresses basic cryptographic techniques. Chapter seven deals with basic symmetric encryption techniques, touching on substitution and transposition, as well as reviewing the operations of DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The insistence on converting all operations, and giving all explanations, in symbolic logic does not seem to have any utility, does not provide any clarity, and makes the material much more difficult than it could be. Asymmetric techniques, and attacks against them, are outlined in chapter eight. Finding individual bits of the message, a process examined in chapter nine, can, over time, result in an attack on the message or key as a whole. Chapter ten looks at data integrity, hashes, and digital signatures. Part four deals with authentication. Chapter eleven reviews various conceptual protocols, pointing out (for example) that there is a serious problem of key storage for challenge/response systems. A variety of real applications are considered in chapter twelve, and warnings issued about each. Issues of authentication specific to asymmetric systems are covered in chapter thirteen. Part five looks at formal approaches to the establishment of security. There is more asymmetric cryptographic theory in chapter fourteen. Chapter fifteen examines a number of provably secure asymmetric cryptosystems, while sixteen does the same for digital signatures. Formal methods of authentication protocol analysis are given in chapter seventeen. Part six discusses abstract cryptographic protocols. Chapter eighteen reviews a number of zero knowledge protocols, which provide the basis for authentication where the principals are not previously known to each other. The coin flipping protocol, initiated in chapter one, is revisited in chapter nineteen. Chapter twenty wraps up with a summary of the author's intentions for the book. The book is certainly for advanced study, but it is hardly suitable for security administrators, professionals, or even engineers. The mathematical material is quite demanding, and is seldom explained (as opposed to the clear explanations of the implications of the math that is given in, for example, "Applied Cryptography" [cf. BKAPCRYP.RVW], or even the equally advanced but much more comprehensible "Algebraic Aspects of Cryptography" [cf. BKALASCR.RVW]). However, there are points in the material that could be useful for practical cryptographic systems, provided one is dealing primarily with authentication of communications, and the possibility of physical access is ignored. The text would have been much more useful if the author could have been induced to provide some of the basic explanations in English, rather than leaving the reader to work out the math. copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004 BKMDNCRP.RVW 20041207 ====================== (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer) rslade(a)vcn.bc.ca slade(a)victoria.tc.ca rslade(a)sun.soci.niu.edu As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy. - Christopher Dawson, The Judgment of Nations http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade _________________________________________ Bellua Cyber Security Asia 2005 - http://www.bellua.com/bcs2005 --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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[ISN] REVIEW: "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice", Wenbo Mao
by InfoSec News 01 Feb '05

01 Feb '05

Forwarded from: "Rob, grandpa of Ryan, Trevor, Devon & Hannah" <rslade(a)sprint.ca> BKMDNCRP.RVW 20041207 "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice", Wenbo Mao, 2004, 0-13-066943-1, U$54.99/C$82.99 %A Wenbo Mao %C One Lake St., Upper Saddle River, NJ 07458 %D 2004 %G 0-13-066943-1 %I Prentice Hall %O U$54.99/C$82.99 +1-201-236-7139 fax: +1-201-236-7131 %O http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinterne http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesinte-21 %O http://www.amazon.ca/exec/obidos/ASIN/0130669431/robsladesin03-20 %O tl s rl 1 tc 3 ta 3 tv 0 wq 1 %P 707 p. %T "Modern Cryptography: Theory and Practice" A "Short Description of the Book" states that it is intended to address the issue of whether various crypto algorithms are "practical," as opposed to just theoretically strong. This seems odd, since no algorithm is ready for implementation as such: it must be made part of a full system, and most problems with cryptography come in the implementation. The preface doesn't make things much clearer: it reiterates a "fit-for-application" mantra, but doesn't say clearly, at any point, why existing algorithms are not appropriate for use. The preface also suggests that this book is for advanced study in cryptography, although it states that security engineers and administrators, with special responsibility for developing or implementing cryptography, are also in the target audience. Part one is an introduction, consisting of two chapters. Chapter one outlines the idea of the first "protocol" of the book: a "fair coin toss" over the telephone, grounding the book firmly in the camp of cryptography for the purpose of secure communications. The remainder of the chapter points out all the requirements to make such an unbiased selector work, acting as a kind of sales pitch or "come on" to make you want to read the rest of the book. The promotion is slightly flawed by the fact that there is very little practical detail in the material (it takes a lot of work on the part of the reader to figure out that, yes, this system might work), excessive verbiage, and poor explanations. The stated "objectives" of the chapter, given at the end, say that you should have a "fundamental understanding of cryptography": this is true only in the most limited sense. Chapter two slowly builds a kind of pseudo-Kerberos system. Part two covers mathematical foundations. Chapter three deals with probability and information theory, four with Turing Machines and the notion of computational complexity, five with the algebraic foundations behind the use of prime numbers and elliptic curves for cryptography, and various number theory topics are touched on in chapter six. Part three addresses basic cryptographic techniques. Chapter seven deals with basic symmetric encryption techniques, touching on substitution and transposition, as well as reviewing the operations of DES (Data Encryption Standard) and AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The insistence on converting all operations, and giving all explanations, in symbolic logic does not seem to have any utility, does not provide any clarity, and makes the material much more difficult than it could be. Asymmetric techniques, and attacks against them, are outlined in chapter eight. Finding individual bits of the message, a process examined in chapter nine, can, over time, result in an attack on the message or key as a whole. Chapter ten looks at data integrity, hashes, and digital signatures. Part four deals with authentication. Chapter eleven reviews various conceptual protocols, pointing out (for example) that there is a serious problem of key storage for challenge/response systems. A variety of real applications are considered in chapter twelve, and warnings issued about each. Issues of authentication specific to asymmetric systems are covered in chapter thirteen. Part five looks at formal approaches to the establishment of security. There is more asymmetric cryptographic theory in chapter fourteen. Chapter fifteen examines a number of provably secure asymmetric cryptosystems, while sixteen does the same for digital signatures. Formal methods of authentication protocol analysis are given in chapter seventeen. Part six discusses abstract cryptographic protocols. Chapter eighteen reviews a number of zero knowledge protocols, which provide the basis for authentication where the principals are not previously known to each other. The coin flipping protocol, initiated in chapter one, is revisited in chapter nineteen. Chapter twenty wraps up with a summary of the author's intentions for the book. The book is certainly for advanced study, but it is hardly suitable for security administrators, professionals, or even engineers. The mathematical material is quite demanding, and is seldom explained (as opposed to the clear explanations of the implications of the math that is given in, for example, "Applied Cryptography" [cf. BKAPCRYP.RVW], or even the equally advanced but much more comprehensible "Algebraic Aspects of Cryptography" [cf. BKALASCR.RVW]). However, there are points in the material that could be useful for practical cryptographic systems, provided one is dealing primarily with authentication of communications, and the possibility of physical access is ignored. The text would have been much more useful if the author could have been induced to provide some of the basic explanations in English, rather than leaving the reader to work out the math. copyright Robert M. Slade, 2004 BKMDNCRP.RVW 20041207 ====================== (quote inserted randomly by Pegasus Mailer) rslade(a)vcn.bc.ca slade(a)victoria.tc.ca rslade(a)sun.soci.niu.edu As soon as men decide that all means are permitted to fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy. - Christopher Dawson, The Judgment of Nations http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev or http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade _________________________________________ Bellua Cyber Security Asia 2005 - http://www.bellua.com/bcs2005 --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Effort to Speed Airport Security Is Going Private
by R.A. Hettinga 31 Jan '05

31 Jan '05

<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB110549106703823542,00.html> The Wall Street Journal January 12, 2005 Effort to Speed Airport Security Is Going Private Move Aims to Expand Program That Preregisters People Who Travel Frequently By AMY SCHATZ Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL January 12, 2005; Page D1 The Homeland Security Department, under pressure to jump-start a program allowing select preregistered travelers to speed through airport security, is turning to the private sector for help. The Registered Traveler program gives frequent air passengers access to special security lines, provided they first voluntarily undergo criminal and terrorist background checks. In exchange, they get a biometric identification card -- containing a fingerprint and other personal data -- and access to the shorter lines. The program has generally received favorable reviews from volunteers and the three-month trial has been extended indefinitely. There is just one problem: The pilot program, currently administered by the department's Transportation Security Administration, is offered at only five airports for just 10,000 volunteers. This means that Registered Travelers can use their cards only at their home airports and nowhere else. TSA's pace at expanding the test into a national program has, so far, been the biggest complaint. The slow introduction has prompted interest from some businesses, who believe that travelers would be willing to pay to participate in the program. Interested entrepreneurs include Steven Brill, who started American Lawyer magazine and Court TV and, after writing a book on Sept. 11, decided to get into the homeland-security business. In a plan set to be unveiled in coming weeks, TSA officials will lay out some details of a privately operated Registered Traveler pilot program at Orlando International Airport. The success of the pilot, expected to begin by the end of March, could determine the future of the Registered Traveler program and be a model for expanding it nationally. Mr. Brill and others have been pushing for TSA to privatize the program, saying that businesses are better equipped than the government to market and expand it, especially because some travelers have indicated that they would pay annual fees -- as much as $100 -- for faster screening. TSA officials agree, believing that passengers, not taxpayers, should fund Registered Traveler, because it is likely to be used by business people rather than leisure travelers. Homeland Security officials are eager to see it move forward. TSA has had some false starts in other initiatives, and it has taken knocks for long lines and intrusive pat-down searches. But privacy advocates, who have already voiced concern about the government-run pilot programs, are even more worried now that TSA is turning to the private sector. EXPRESS LINE How expedited security works in five pilot programs: Who's eligible: 10,000 frequent- flier club members; enrollment closed What they provide: Fingerprint, iris scan, personal data What they get: Biometric ID card What they have to do at airport: Open laptop, remove keys, coins. What they don't have to do: Join leisure travelers for random screening. They complain that Homeland Security officials routinely publish privacy guidelines too vague to give the public a real understanding of how personal data are handled. A privatized system could exacerbate the problem, says Marcia Hoffman, staff counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a Washington nonprofit organization. TSA sees private-sector involvement as a route to faster growth. "We're trying to encourage as much private sector participation as possible," says Justin Oberman, a TSA official in charge of both Registered Traveler and its more controversial sister-project, Secure Flight, a computerized prescreening system that will replace a system currently run by the airlines. Plans to run the privatized pilot in Orlando were publicly disclosed in October, when AirTran Airways, a unit of Orlando-based AirTran Holdings Inc., said it would participate in the program. But efforts between TSA and the airport to reach terms on the pilot have dragged on. One reason: TSA officials haven't decided whether to compile a master list of Registered Travelers, which could be used to check passengers at all participating airports, or allow private companies to maintain passenger data in a universal format easily accessed by competitors. The Orlando airport hasn't yet chosen a vendor to run its test, although airport officials say they are in talks with Mr. Brill's New York-based company, Verified Identity Pass Inc. Verified Identity would essentially assume marketing responsibilities while its partners -- possibly including Lockheed Martin Corp. -- would install scanners, process applications and manufacture ID cards. TSA screeners, who are government employees, would continue to staff the security lines. Orlando officials say their program will be open to all passengers, although they will likely first market it through airline frequent-flier programs. But unlike the current test, which is free to volunteers recruited through frequent-flier programs, the Orlando program will eventually charge a fee. Some estimates put the cost to passengers at $50 to $100 annually. "This is something people will voluntarily pay for at the right price," says Mr. Brill, who estimates the startup cost at between $500,000 and $1 million per airport. Initially, one Registered Traveler lane would be installed at the airport's east terminal, which serves Delta Air Lines Inc. and AirTran. Airport officials would later add a lane in Orlando's other terminal and likely open it to travelers on any airline. Registered travelers are required to undergo the same security screening as other passengers, but usually in separate lines. They have to do the same basic things, such as empty their pockets of keys and other metal items or take a laptop out of its case. But they aren't randomly chosen for extra screening and must undergo secondary screening only if they set off a metal detector. At Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport, where 2,500 frequent Northwest Airlines fliers are enrolled, from 130 to 180 registered travelers use the special security lane daily, says Tim Anderson, deputy executive director for airport operations. They can move through security in as little as a few minutes. There are other concerns about private sector involvement. Passengers could grow so tired of being harassed at airport security checkpoints that they will feel compelled to join the program, says Ms. Hoffman, of the Electronic Privacy Information Center. "You worry that we'll get to a point where Registered Traveler isn't so much voluntarily as necessary to get through security with a minimum of hassle," she says. On the privacy issue, TSA officials argue that they have written stringent protections for private data and that the program is voluntary. "We'd have less information about you than American Express or the airlines," Mr. Brill says. As long as the program is voluntary, and offers separate lines and shorter wait times, many will be willing to sacrifice on personal privacy, predicts Bill Connors, executive director of the National Business Travel Association and a registered traveler participant. "There are a lot of people who'd be up for it," he says. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype
by R.A. Hettinga 31 Jan '05

31 Jan '05

Wherein Dieblod remembers, hey, presto, they're a cash-register company after all... Cheers, RAH ------- <http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/evoting/2005-01-28-diebold-pri…> USA Today Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype NORTH CANTON, Ohio (AP) - Diebold said Thursday it has completed a prototype printer designed for use with touch-screen electronic voting machines, allowing voters to print, review and verify ballot selections. "Voter verified paper receipts are something new," said David Bear, a spokesman for subsidiary Diebold Election Systems in McKinney, Texas. "No other type of voting provides a receipt for voters. But some states are asking for it, so we needed to develop a product that meets standards for functionality," he said. Voters can view their selections, but will not be able to remove the printout. The voter's printed selections would be placed into a secure enclosure, stored and numbered with a security tag. The printer weighs less than three pounds. The printer will be submitted to independent testing authorities to ensure that it meets federal standards as a prerequisite to certification in states, Bear said. The printer would be an optional component to any new or existing Diebold AccuVote TSx touch-screen voting machine. Bear said a per-unit cost and a time frame for possible sale are not yet determined. -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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