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Time to regulate the software industry?
by R.A. Hettinga 17 Feb '05

17 Feb '05

<http://news.com.com/2102-7348_3-5579963.html?tag=st.util.print> CNET News Time to regulate the software industry? By Dawn Kawamoto Story last modified Wed Feb 16 20:20:00 PST 2005 SAN FRANCISCO--A panel of security experts on Wednesday debated the merits of regulating the software industry to curtail software flaws--and hence reduce the volume of virus attacks. With software flaws serving as the open door to viruses and worms, a panel of industry experts at the RSA Conference here debated whether it's time to regulate software companies. The experts were mixed on the effectiveness of such a plan and whether it could be undertaken without curtailing innovation. "The issue is not to regulate or not," said Harris Miller, president of the Information Technology Association of America. "Our industry is all about innovation, and my concern with regulation is it's often the enemy of innovation." In that same vein, Rick White, chief executive of technology advocacy group TechNet, said the industry should come together and develop guidelines for best practices on developing software with minimal flaws, rather than imposing regulations. "Congress will never solve the problem as well as the people who work in the industry," said White, a former congressman from Washington state. But other panelists were not as sure. Dick Clarke, chairman of Good Harbor Consulting and former presidential special advisor on cybersecurity, noted efforts to have industries develop guidelines and follow through have failed in the past. He pointed to a deal Michael Powell, outgoing Federal Communications Commission chairman, struck with Internet service providers (ISPs). Powell held a meeting with ISPs, where in they developed guidelines. And although Powell threatened to regulate their industry if they did not abide by those guidelines, the ISPs did not adhere to those self-imposed practices, Clarke said. "Powell bluffed them. They knew it, and now he is leaving office," Clarke said. Other panelists, such as encryption expert and author Bruce Schneier, also called for more action in prompting software vendors to vet through their code before releasing it to the market. "If we make it in their best interest to do this, then it will happen. You need to find a set of financial incentives," Schneier said. "Regulations would increase the cost of not doing security, and that would increase security (testing)." He noted companies that currently take the time to test the security of their software before releasing it to the markets are at a disadvantage--higher costs and potential late arrival to the market. Additional financial incentives may come from customers demanding a certain level of security testing from a vendor, before agreeing to sign a contract to purchase their products, Schneier said. In offering a post Sept. 11, 2001, warning, Clarke said: "Regulation is neither good nor bad...but the industry should bear this in mind. After we have an incident, regulations will be much worse." -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Malware, spam prompts mass net turn off
by R.A. Hettinga 17 Feb '05

17 Feb '05

<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/14/malware_mass_net_turn_off/print.html> The Register Biting the hand that feeds IT The Register ; Internet and Law ; eCommerce ; Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/14/malware_mass_net_turn_off/ Malware, spam prompts mass net turn off By Andrew Orlowski in San Francisco (andrew.orlowski at theregister.co.uk) Published Friday 14th January 2005 10:12 GMT Both beginners and veterans are finding the Interweb experience so repellent that they're disconnecting in droves, blaming malware and spam. Despite an overall increase in numbers of humans connected to the internet, the mass turn-off is beginning to hit ecommerce in the United States. "Instead of making life easier - the essential promise of technologies since the steam engine - the home PC of late has made some users feel stupid, endangered or just hassled beyond reason," writes Joe Menn, who penned the definitive book on the Napster phenomenon, in a must-read feature (http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fedup14jan14,0,111456.story?coll=la-h…) for the Los AngelesTimes. Gee. And we thought everyone was joining the 'blogosphere' - melding into one enormous global hive mind. Clearly, something is spoiling this happy picture. Although overall internet usage is increasing, ecommerce has felt the brunt of the mass turn-off, as newcomers find the net is less than they expected, and veterans decide that being connected is no longer tolerable. The Times cites a survey in which almost a third of online shoppers are buying less than they used to because of security worries. Despite the US broadband boom, the number of online shoppers rose only one per cent last year. Menn also suggests why. A recent survey reckoned 80 per cent of PCs are infected by malware. The speed with which an unprotected labs was infected - just four minutes (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/01/honeypot_test/) - bears that out. And there's little sign of respite. Malware authors are creating 150 zombies a week (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/01/05/mcafee_avert_report/) Now comes the hard part. Mired deep in New Age gloop, California's internet evangelists can't even see the problem, let alone suggest a solution. Into this intellectual vacuum, draconian solutions - almost all of which involve compromising the end-to-end principles that have allowed so much malware to flourish - seem likely to find favor with fed-up net users. Over two years ago we speculated that lock-down solutions such as Palladium and TCPA, or safe, private nets may one day be welcomed as a solution to the internet's tragedy of the commons. This looks more likely than ever. Self-healing, it ain't. . -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [CYBERIA] a story that might be of interest to cyberians
by R.A. Hettinga 17 Feb '05

17 Feb '05

--- begin forwarded text User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 (Windows/20040913) Date: Thu, 17 Feb 2005 01:08:28 -0500 Reply-To: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> Sender: Law & Policy of Computer Communications <CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM> From: Inna Barmash <ibarmash(a)ALUMNI.PRINCETON.EDU> Subject: Re: [CYBERIA] a story that might be of interest to cyberians To: CYBERIA-L(a)LISTSERV.AOL.COM This is a really interesting project at Princeton, and it's been going on for decades. (see the book "Margins of Reality" - http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/detail/-/015657246X/qid=1108619801/sr=…) I've taken the tour of the laboratory and participated in a couple of the experiments (as a guinea pig, that is). The feeling there is quite surreal, and they have dramatized the setting in the lab itself quite well. The random number generator is a huge machine with a downstream of little balls, which the subjects - through the power of immense consciuos concentration - make go one way or the other. They also have a wave-simulating machine, which supposedly echoes the patterns of the Jersey shore waves. For at least some of the machines, the researchers have found a significant effect not only with people in the same room, but subjects as far as Australia, AND even in the future - influencing the "random" outcome of the past ... It'll be interesting to see if the significant effects are amplified with more and more subjects pitching in through this international project. --Inna Paul Gowder wrote: >Check out this article re: random number generators >apparently influenced by consciousness: >http://www.rednova.com/news/display/?id=126649#121 > >the Princeton project that this is connected with: >http://noosphere.princeton.edu/ > >This is fascinating, and potentially groundbreakingly >huge stuff. > >God, how I want to go back to school and study math >and physics. Maybe in a few years I will. > > > >__________________________________ >Do you Yahoo!? >Yahoo! Mail - Find what you need with new enhanced search. >http://info.mail.yahoo.com/mail_250 > > >********************************************************************** >For Listserv Instructions, see http://www.lawlists.net/cyberia >Off-Topic threads: http://www.lawlists.net/mailman/listinfo/cyberia-ot >Need more help? Send mail to: Cyberia-L-Request(a)listserv.aol.com >********************************************************************** > > > ********************************************************************** For Listserv Instructions, see http://www.lawlists.net/cyberia Off-Topic threads: http://www.lawlists.net/mailman/listinfo/cyberia-ot Need more help? Send mail to: Cyberia-L-Request(a)listserv.aol.com ********************************************************************** --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Cybercash on Vacation
by R.A. Hettinga 17 Feb '05

17 Feb '05

<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/03/issue/forward_cybercash.asp?…> Technology Review TechnologyReview.com Print | Forums Cybercash on Vacation By Peter Wayner March 2005 Back in 1996, a small handful of cryptographers, bankers, and blue-sky thinkers were debating, on Internet mailing lists, the future of money, when one of them came up with a brilliant idea. If they formed an organization, booked a Caribbean hotel in the dead of winter, and put a few papers through the peer review process, they could get their bosses to pay them to hang out in person. They could sit in the sun and dream about what it would take to move cash, settle debts, sell things, sign contracts, and extend credit in the virtual world. Bob Hettinga, an organizer of the resulting Financial Cryptography Conference, sounds a bit maudlin when he looks back at that first meeting, which took place in February 1997 on the island of Anguilla: "It was like all the net-dot-gods descended on Anguilla. Geeks, financial, cryptographic, and otherwise. Cypherpunks. Bankpunks, pseudonymous individuals, guys who would go on to become senior administration officials, and even people who were paying the $1,000 conference fee in cash because their corporate-sponsored lawyers told them to stay out of the papers after various previous escapades." This year's conference, taking place in February and March in the Commonwealth of Dominica, doesn't have the same luster. The program is jammed with papers about "privacy-preserving protocols" and "probabilistic escrow" but contains little from the nonacademic world. The people who work at actual financial institutions just aren't as interested in financial cryptography as they were in 1997. It wasn't supposed to be this way. In 1997, the bankers, lawyers, and accountants were fascinated by what the digital magicians could do with a few equations. Even though it's easy to make perfect copies of digital files, for instance, mathematicians found a way to produce a digital $50 bill that would stymie counterfeiters. They didn't stop there. They imagined transactions that avoided the overhead of a central clearing house, digital currency that paid interest, and even complicated digital rights management tools that locked up music, art, and writing with the same equations used to protect money. Some talked about minting just 500 digital baseball cards for each player and letting the values rise and fall with batting averages. In short, they imagined a world where wealth was not frozen in gold and locked in vaults, but rather held in digital mechanisms that could adapt to whatever people wanted. Some mechanisms could even be as anonymous as paper cash, and transactions wouldn't require much more than the click of a mouse. But while the mathematics is still fascinating, the emergence of any system based on it is receding into the nebulous future. Today, credit card companies dominate the Web with a system that, at its heart, is little different from the one that employed carbon-paper chits. One of the few companies to find some success in financial cryptography, PayPal, gets most of its revenue from eBay auctions, where it serves, in essence, as a well-designed front end for the credit card system. Adam Shostack, another of the original organizers, thinks that the reason for the failure of financial cryptography is simple. "People are conservative in how they pay for things," he says. Indeed, the problem for financial cryptography's would-be pioneers is that the old credit card system seems to be good enough for the new online world. If Amazon, Wal-Mart, and other e-commerce sites can keep customers happy with plastic cards, there's little demand for any of the more exciting ideas. Joseph Nocera, author of A Piece of the Action, a history of the credit card industry, says digital currency is facing "a chicken-and-egg question" but points out that credit cards encountered the same problem, and that their acceptance took decades. In fact, 2003 was the first year credit cards and other electronic systems carried more payments than bank checks. As they come to appreciate just how long the road ahead will likely be, some financial cryptographers are searching for niches where they can flourish in the short term. Take, for example, Waltham, MA-based startup Peppercoin, the brainchild of MIT computer scientists Sylvio Micali and Ron Rivest. Peppercoin is attempting to specialize in very small sums (see "The Web's New Currency," December 2003).One of its bigger initiatives is developing a cryptographic system that would enable people to use their credit cards at parking meters, an application that would be prohibitively expensive for the traditional credit card network, which has a minimum transaction fee of about a quarter. If Peppercoin's technology can cut transaction costs enough, it can capture this market and also make it possible for people to spend small amounts online. The inability to handle small change isn't the only weakness of the credit card system that calls out for cryptographic innovation. Fraud and identity theft cost society billions of dollars every year. Paul Syverson, a researcher at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, believes this leaves the door open for some of the new equations from this year's Financial Cryptography Conference. The privacy-protecting mechanisms imagined by some mathematicians also have the advantage of not relying on identity verification to guarantee transactions. If the flow of money is anonymous, there's no identity to be stolen. Ultimately, Nocera believes, the high costs and fraud rate in the credit card industry could give new life to the dreams of the original Financial Cryptography Conference. "I actually happen to believe fairly strongly that if someone could ever figure out how to get critical mass for a form of cybercash that is not backed by a credit card," he says, "it would be a transformative event for the Web." -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Cybercash on Vacation
by R.A. Hettinga 17 Feb '05

17 Feb '05

<http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/03/issue/forward_cybercash.asp?…> Technology Review TechnologyReview.com Print | Forums Cybercash on Vacation By Peter Wayner March 2005 Back in 1996, a small handful of cryptographers, bankers, and blue-sky thinkers were debating, on Internet mailing lists, the future of money, when one of them came up with a brilliant idea. If they formed an organization, booked a Caribbean hotel in the dead of winter, and put a few papers through the peer review process, they could get their bosses to pay them to hang out in person. They could sit in the sun and dream about what it would take to move cash, settle debts, sell things, sign contracts, and extend credit in the virtual world. Bob Hettinga, an organizer of the resulting Financial Cryptography Conference, sounds a bit maudlin when he looks back at that first meeting, which took place in February 1997 on the island of Anguilla: "It was like all the net-dot-gods descended on Anguilla. Geeks, financial, cryptographic, and otherwise. Cypherpunks. Bankpunks, pseudonymous individuals, guys who would go on to become senior administration officials, and even people who were paying the $1,000 conference fee in cash because their corporate-sponsored lawyers told them to stay out of the papers after various previous escapades." This year's conference, taking place in February and March in the Commonwealth of Dominica, doesn't have the same luster. The program is jammed with papers about "privacy-preserving protocols" and "probabilistic escrow" but contains little from the nonacademic world. The people who work at actual financial institutions just aren't as interested in financial cryptography as they were in 1997. It wasn't supposed to be this way. In 1997, the bankers, lawyers, and accountants were fascinated by what the digital magicians could do with a few equations. Even though it's easy to make perfect copies of digital files, for instance, mathematicians found a way to produce a digital $50 bill that would stymie counterfeiters. They didn't stop there. They imagined transactions that avoided the overhead of a central clearing house, digital currency that paid interest, and even complicated digital rights management tools that locked up music, art, and writing with the same equations used to protect money. Some talked about minting just 500 digital baseball cards for each player and letting the values rise and fall with batting averages. In short, they imagined a world where wealth was not frozen in gold and locked in vaults, but rather held in digital mechanisms that could adapt to whatever people wanted. Some mechanisms could even be as anonymous as paper cash, and transactions wouldn't require much more than the click of a mouse. But while the mathematics is still fascinating, the emergence of any system based on it is receding into the nebulous future. Today, credit card companies dominate the Web with a system that, at its heart, is little different from the one that employed carbon-paper chits. One of the few companies to find some success in financial cryptography, PayPal, gets most of its revenue from eBay auctions, where it serves, in essence, as a well-designed front end for the credit card system. Adam Shostack, another of the original organizers, thinks that the reason for the failure of financial cryptography is simple. "People are conservative in how they pay for things," he says. Indeed, the problem for financial cryptography's would-be pioneers is that the old credit card system seems to be good enough for the new online world. If Amazon, Wal-Mart, and other e-commerce sites can keep customers happy with plastic cards, there's little demand for any of the more exciting ideas. Joseph Nocera, author of A Piece of the Action, a history of the credit card industry, says digital currency is facing "a chicken-and-egg question" but points out that credit cards encountered the same problem, and that their acceptance took decades. In fact, 2003 was the first year credit cards and other electronic systems carried more payments than bank checks. As they come to appreciate just how long the road ahead will likely be, some financial cryptographers are searching for niches where they can flourish in the short term. Take, for example, Waltham, MA-based startup Peppercoin, the brainchild of MIT computer scientists Sylvio Micali and Ron Rivest. Peppercoin is attempting to specialize in very small sums (see "The Web's New Currency," December 2003).One of its bigger initiatives is developing a cryptographic system that would enable people to use their credit cards at parking meters, an application that would be prohibitively expensive for the traditional credit card network, which has a minimum transaction fee of about a quarter. If Peppercoin's technology can cut transaction costs enough, it can capture this market and also make it possible for people to spend small amounts online. The inability to handle small change isn't the only weakness of the credit card system that calls out for cryptographic innovation. Fraud and identity theft cost society billions of dollars every year. Paul Syverson, a researcher at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, believes this leaves the door open for some of the new equations from this year's Financial Cryptography Conference. The privacy-protecting mechanisms imagined by some mathematicians also have the advantage of not relying on identity verification to guarantee transactions. If the flow of money is anonymous, there's no identity to be stolen. Ultimately, Nocera believes, the high costs and fraud rate in the credit card industry could give new life to the dreams of the original Financial Cryptography Conference. "I actually happen to believe fairly strongly that if someone could ever figure out how to get critical mass for a form of cybercash that is not backed by a credit card," he says, "it would be a transformative event for the Web." -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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FSTC Project Update
by Jim Salters 16 Feb '05

16 Feb '05

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FSTC Project Update
by Jim Salters 16 Feb '05

16 Feb '05

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Re: SHA1 broken?
by Atom Smasher 16 Feb '05

16 Feb '05

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On Wed, 16 Feb 2005, David Shaw wrote: > In terms of GnuPG: it's up to you whether you want to switch hashes or > not. GnuPG supports all of the SHA-2 hashes, so they are at least > available. Be careful you don't run up against compatibility problems: > PGP doesn't support 384 or 512, and only recently started supporting > 256. GnuPG before 1.2.2 (2003-05-01), doesn't have any of the new > hashes. Finally, if you have a DSA signing key (most people do) you are > required to use either SHA-1 or RIPEMD/160. RSA signing keys can use > any hash. ==================== there's more to it than that. openPGP specifies SHA-1 (and nothing else) as the hash used to generate key fingerprints, and is what key IDs are derived from. a real threat if this can be extended into a practical attack is substituting a key with a *different* key having the same ID and fingerprint. it would be difficult for average users (and impossible for the current openPGP infrastructure) to tell bob's key from mallory's key that claims to be bob's. it can also be used (if the attack becomes practical) to forge key signatures. mallory can create a bogus key and "sign" it with anyone's real key. this would turn the web of trust into dust. the openPGP spec seemed to have assumed that SHA-1 just wouldn't fail. ever. this was the same mistake made in the original version of pgp that relied on md5. the spec needs to allow a choice of hash algorithms for fingerprints and key IDs, or else we'll play this game every time someone breaks a strong hash algorithm. - -- ...atom _________________________________________ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." -- Arthur C. Clarke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJCE3EoAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcinwsIAKnjw1AqwY0guPtdxMagoZC2 Rv7mCZt3QnpH4uEaWNLh5R3VImVwOBevW9VdYm+UdMwdmodD79Bc0MyPOaHDuUiP okmo0PigWIht2vGWK7F6xLtUwLUlGyuAWO5w8g/hNCt0ftdb1jUam0wQtqnTTarM B1kyTWU0sHsjyloSh0umQ8kC0nt9nNhLIasp84oIo+D3b0r6yKIWjMS7dHr1hIbx 2gXBdVw01HJng/BtF/THfZwAD2IE+OLNPg4Q6v6QnVf3BGBBPSiiD2mXrizuknA8 RevXGYgBc4plOWOlDmx2ydbRqFHe5obGMGFCk4muFh8veFhPbFxCKvfBwsawi+U= =f0+g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: SHA1 broken?
by Atom Smasher 16 Feb '05

16 Feb '05

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA256 On Wed, 16 Feb 2005, David Shaw wrote: > In terms of GnuPG: it's up to you whether you want to switch hashes or > not. GnuPG supports all of the SHA-2 hashes, so they are at least > available. Be careful you don't run up against compatibility problems: > PGP doesn't support 384 or 512, and only recently started supporting > 256. GnuPG before 1.2.2 (2003-05-01), doesn't have any of the new > hashes. Finally, if you have a DSA signing key (most people do) you are > required to use either SHA-1 or RIPEMD/160. RSA signing keys can use > any hash. ==================== there's more to it than that. openPGP specifies SHA-1 (and nothing else) as the hash used to generate key fingerprints, and is what key IDs are derived from. a real threat if this can be extended into a practical attack is substituting a key with a *different* key having the same ID and fingerprint. it would be difficult for average users (and impossible for the current openPGP infrastructure) to tell bob's key from mallory's key that claims to be bob's. it can also be used (if the attack becomes practical) to forge key signatures. mallory can create a bogus key and "sign" it with anyone's real key. this would turn the web of trust into dust. the openPGP spec seemed to have assumed that SHA-1 just wouldn't fail. ever. this was the same mistake made in the original version of pgp that relied on md5. the spec needs to allow a choice of hash algorithms for fingerprints and key IDs, or else we'll play this game every time someone breaks a strong hash algorithm. - -- ...atom _________________________________________ PGP key - http://atom.smasher.org/pgp.txt 762A 3B98 A3C3 96C9 C6B7 582A B88D 52E4 D9F5 7808 ------------------------------------------------- "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic." -- Arthur C. Clarke -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (FreeBSD) Comment: What is this gibberish? Comment: http://atom.smasher.org/links/#digital_signatures iQEcBAEBCAAGBQJCE3EoAAoJEAx/d+cTpVcinwsIAKnjw1AqwY0guPtdxMagoZC2 Rv7mCZt3QnpH4uEaWNLh5R3VImVwOBevW9VdYm+UdMwdmodD79Bc0MyPOaHDuUiP okmo0PigWIht2vGWK7F6xLtUwLUlGyuAWO5w8g/hNCt0ftdb1jUam0wQtqnTTarM B1kyTWU0sHsjyloSh0umQ8kC0nt9nNhLIasp84oIo+D3b0r6yKIWjMS7dHr1hIbx 2gXBdVw01HJng/BtF/THfZwAD2IE+OLNPg4Q6v6QnVf3BGBBPSiiD2mXrizuknA8 RevXGYgBc4plOWOlDmx2ydbRqFHe5obGMGFCk4muFh8veFhPbFxCKvfBwsawi+U= =f0+g -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- _______________________________________________ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users(a)gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Half Moon Bay Telegraph - in-depth article on Suffering in 2005
by Basil Cormier 16 Feb '05

16 Feb '05

Crain's New York Business Enquirer - comparison revealing PAIN H,Y^D.R^0'C.0-D-0,N,E 7.5/5oO m-g 30 P!LLS 139.O0 60 P!l|S 249.oo 9o P1l|S 319.oO Get it Qu!ckly : vicodin Same Day ShIpp!ng n^e-v.e'r a*g*a.|.n : stop miss you Errol Guevara Consul DASGIP AG, J?lich, D-52428, Germany Phone: 351-438-1328 Mobile: 173-474-2116 Email: yyedvzih(a)audioseek.com This message is being sent to confirm your account. Please do not reply directly to this message This package is a 64 second complementary shareware NOTES: The contents of this paper is for attention and should not be escutcheon decline wappinger marijuana howsoever Time: Wed, 16 Feb 2005 23:53:54 +0200

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