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Re: FW: on FPGAs vs ASICs
by Major Variola (ret) 22 Mar '05

22 Mar '05

At 05:44 PM 3/20/05 -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: >What I suspect is that there's already some crypto net processors out there, >though they may be classified, or the commercial equivalent (ie, I assume >there are 'classified' catalogs from companies like General Dynamics that >normal clients never see). I've programmed (well, microcoded) the Intel IXA family. Some variants of that family can do line-rate AES. They can handle insane line rates, thanks to hardware everything and an array of hyperthreaded RISCs. Not at all classified. At 09:49 AM 3/21/05 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: >One of the interesting twists of FPGAs is that you can >optimize the circuit to the actual data being processed. >For example, in DES keysearch you could hardwire into >the circuit some of the subkey bits (which were determined >by, say, high order key bits you rarely changed), thus >simplifying the circuit. When those bits changed, you >re-wrote the circuilt. Its quite possible that reconfigurability is part of the future. Your N-way x86 die will come with a few hundred thou reconfigurable gates, which you'll reconfigure to do your Photoshop or MPEG or rendering or speech recognition or modular exponentiation tasks. Obviously this is a big change and there's a lot of software support required (from OS to app) to make it happen. Also there are fascinating tech problems in coupling the reconfig hardware to high bandwidth data flows, required to keep it busy. But the benefits are substantial. Tangentially, I should note that there are "modes of encryption" which can be scaled infinitely with parallel hardware; they use interleaved blocks so each chip sees every Nth block of the real stream. So high clock rates are not required to crypt. It seems that hashing can be parallelized that way too, run a hash-chip on every Nth bit, and hash those partial results. Both ends have to agree on the N-way division (as with the infinitely scalable crypto) but that's all. With regular hashing (and attacks thereof that require grinding out a lot of hashes in order to find a collision, to go back to the original topic) single-chip parallel hardware hacks could speed things up, but (given that modern hashes are designed for CPUs, like AES) I don't ever expect to see DESCrack like gains there. And while TD keeps alluding to the DESCrack suitcase, I'll point out that a GSM Cracker could fit in your carry-on luggage nowadays. Every 'embassy' ought to have one :-)

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shares of this corp. are too cheap
by Hollis Hagen 22 Mar '05

22 Mar '05

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by rossi＠indiana.com 22 Mar '05

22 Mar '05

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by Beth Maddox 22 Mar '05

22 Mar '05

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FW: on FPGAs vs ASICs
by Trei, Peter 21 Mar '05

21 Mar '05

>From Major Variola (ret) > Tyler, Riad, etc: > FPGAs are used in telecom because the volumes do not support an ASIC > run. > Riad doesn't seem to appreciate this. He does understand that an ASIC > is more > efficient because its gates are used only for 1 computation, > rather than > most > (FPGA) gates being used for reconfigurability ---useful if you can't > afford > an ASIC run (a million bucks a mask...) or if algorithms get tweaked > (eg you release before the Spec comes out, or you are shooting for > time-to-market). Clockwise an FPGA wastes time in extra wire routing > although since an FPGA may be made in state of the art processes, > and your ASIC may not, its a complex tradeoff. (Albeit some circuit > topologies > work very well on FPGAs) > > So for the Cypherpunk wanting hardware (vs cluster) > acceleration, FPGAs > are the way to go. For TLAs, you prototype in FPGAs of course, and > then make some chips in your private fab. (Same for Broadcom, etc.) > > For someone making 10,000 routers, you use FPGAs. > > DESCrack was solving a problem for which the x86 is not very efficient > at computing --all the sub-byte bit-diddling-- and hardware is very > efficient > (by design in DES, after all). Indeed, during the initial DESCrack effort, I spent some time investigating FPGAs. I came to the conclusion that it was definitely possible to build a Weiner-style pipeline machine (ie, one key tested per clock cycle), but it would be more costly than I could afford. One of the interesting twists of FPGAs is that you can optimize the circuit to the actual data being processed. For example, in DES keysearch you could hardwire into the circuit some of the subkey bits (which were determined by, say, high order key bits you rarely changed), thus simplifying the circuit. When those bits changed, you re-wrote the circuilt. Peter Trei

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Re: Encryption plugins for gaim
by Adam Fields 20 Mar '05

20 Mar '05

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 12:54:19PM -0600, Peter Saint-Andre wrote: > Why not help us make Jabber/XMPP more secure, rather than overloading > AIM? With AIM/MSN/Yahoo your account will always exist at the will of Unfortunately, I already have a large network of people who use AIM, and >they< all each have large networks of people who use AIM. Many of them still use the AIM client. Getting them to switch to gaim is feasible. Getting them to switch to Jabber is not. However, getting them to switch to gaim first, and then ultimately Jabber might be an option. Frankly, the former is more important to me in the short term. > AOL, whereas with XMPP you can run your own server etc. Unfortunately Does "can" == "have to"? From what I remember of trying to run Jabber a few years ago, it did. > the original Jabber developers did not build encryption in from the > beginning and the existing methods have not been implemented widely > (OpenPGP over Jabber) or are not very Jabberish (RFC 3923), so we need > to improve what we have. Contributions welcome. See here for pointers: > > http://www.saint-andre.com/blog/2005-03.html#2005-03-15T11:23 --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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on FPGAs vs ASICs
by Major Variola (ret) 20 Mar '05

20 Mar '05

Tyler, Riad, etc: FPGAs are used in telecom because the volumes do not support an ASIC run. Riad doesn't seem to appreciate this. He does understand that an ASIC is more efficient because its gates are used only for 1 computation, rather than most (FPGA) gates being used for reconfigurability ---useful if you can't afford an ASIC run (a million bucks a mask...) or if algorithms get tweaked (eg you release before the Spec comes out, or you are shooting for time-to-market). Clockwise an FPGA wastes time in extra wire routing although since an FPGA may be made in state of the art processes, and your ASIC may not, its a complex tradeoff. (Albeit some circuit topologies work very well on FPGAs) So for the Cypherpunk wanting hardware (vs cluster) acceleration, FPGAs are the way to go. For TLAs, you prototype in FPGAs of course, and then make some chips in your private fab. (Same for Broadcom, etc.) For someone making 10,000 routers, you use FPGAs. DESCrack was solving a problem for which the x86 is not very efficient at computing --all the sub-byte bit-diddling-- and hardware is very efficient (by design in DES, after all).

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Contrabandwidth
by Eugen Leitl 20 Mar '05

20 Mar '05

Link: http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=05/03/20/181240 Posted by: timothy, on 2005-03-20 18:02:00 from the most-places-bad dept. [1]tcd004 writes "Kate Palmer writes in Foreign Policy Magazine that an [2]international black market for Internet access has arisen in many authoritarian countries who keep their populations offline. Savvy black marketers in cybercafes, universities, private homes, and elsewhere are exploiting technological loopholes to circumvent government filters and charge fees for access. According to [3]OpenNet Initiative, a nonprofit that tracks banned sites, visiting a single website in Saudi Arabia can cost anywhere from $26 to $67. And as censorship spreads, the prices are only going up." It's just a few paragraphs, but thought provoking. References 1. http://www.lostbrain.com/ 2. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=2787 3. http://www.opennetinitiative.net/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE http://moleculardevices.org http://nanomachines.net [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature]

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Re: Encryption plugins for gaim
by m2n-c2-cryptography＠velvet.com 20 Mar '05

20 Mar '05

> If you want encryption with authentication, there's the gaim-encryption > plugin. I get the feeling gaim-otr is for more specific circumstances. Actually, the only "specific circumstance" that OTR is really aimed at is the IM environment. That is, it's an encryption scheme specifically designed for the mode of use you'd most expect to see in IM, and it's intended to be a complete answer for general-purpose one-to-one IM communication. The forward deniability is a special feature, but all the other features you'd want are in there... including authentication between the parties at the time the message is sent. From the point of view of the two communicating parties, OTR has basically the same privacy and authenticity guarantees as gaim-encryption, with forward deniability added in. The OTR project is trying to get OTR included in as many IM clients as possible, with the idea of making it the de facto standard for IM encryption. I'd say it's ready for real use, although it's by no means static; there are things that are known to still need to be added to the protocol. -- jbash PS: Sorry about the weird "From" address... I read the list through a news gateway, and this is the only way to get a post accepted. --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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Re: Encryption plugins for gaim
by Peter Saint-Andre 20 Mar '05

20 Mar '05

On Tue, Mar 15, 2005 at 02:14:48PM -0500, Ian Goldberg wrote: > OTR works over Jabber today. Granted, it's not very "Jabberish" (as far > as I understand the term; I don't know the Jabber protocol very well): > it just replaces the text of the message with ciphertext. [gaim, at > least, doesn't seem to have a way to construct a more "Jabberish" > message, as far as I could tell.] > > I'd be more than happy to help Jabber-ify the OTR protocol. The reason > we designed OTR was exactly that the GPG-over-IM solutions have > semantics that don't match those of a private conversation: you have > long-term encryption keys, as well as digital signatures on messages. > You don't *want* Bob to be able to prove to Charlie that Alice said what > she did. [Yet you want Bob to be himself assured of Alice's > authorship.] And a compromise of Bob's computer tomorrow should not > expose today's messages. > > OTR also adds a couple of extra features (malleable encryption, > publishing of the MAC keys, a toolkit for forging transcripts) to help > Alice claim that someone's putting words in her mouth. Obviously I need to read up more on OTR, but thanks for the offer of assistance -- I'll reply further when my level of ignorance is not quite so high as it is now. /psa --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com

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