- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: A Few Random Thoughts...
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 08:16:00AM -0400, Michael wrote: > What I *am* doing is deploying a couple of heavy iron closed relays > on OC3 or better bandwidth. The first is now deployed after a lot of up > and down testing, and I'll get to the second in due time. Sounds great. Let us know if you have any questions or run into any problems. Depending on how you're installing, you might like the development version (currently 0.2.1.16-rc). The 0.2.1.x series is going to become the new "stable" soon (it's already probably more stable in practice than 0.2.0.35), and it's way better in a number of other ways. But either 0.2.0.x or 0.2.1.x is fine, really. > On the "Who uses Tor?" section of the website, I see no mention of > IT people. I've used the Tor network for many practical uses as an IT > Director. That's a really good point. Especially since a lot of the people who really hate/fear Tor are IT folks who don't understand it. > Quite frankly Tor is an undervalued IT tool and it's capabilities > should be trumpeted loudly on the web page. You might also find IT guys > like me throwing up some relays in exchange. After all- who has the > bandwidth anyway? Yep. The next step is to come up with some really good clean simple example sentences for our new category. Those examples will dictate the title we give it -- "Security experts use Tor", "Sysadmins use Tor", "Computer experts use Tor", or something else. > So > if Tor as an organization had a partnership with a few server rental > whores (in multiple countries), it would simplify getting more exits. If anybody knows good places, please let us know. :) There's a small list being built here: https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs Another concern is that if we centralize all the exit relays in a few places, we reduce the anonymity that the Tor network can provide. But I don't think we're anywhere near doing that yet, so it's just something to keep in the back of our minds. > I read back about 6 months in the or-talk list and there were a > couple of suggestions inferring that *everyone* should be forced to be > an exit node. I think this is a very bad idea, Me too. Don't worry, we won't do it. But see also https://blog.torproject.org/blog/two-incentive-designs-tor --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: A Few Random Thoughts...
by Roger Dingledine 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On Fri, Jun 26, 2009 at 08:16:00AM -0400, Michael wrote: > What I *am* doing is deploying a couple of heavy iron closed relays > on OC3 or better bandwidth. The first is now deployed after a lot of up > and down testing, and I'll get to the second in due time. Sounds great. Let us know if you have any questions or run into any problems. Depending on how you're installing, you might like the development version (currently 0.2.1.16-rc). The 0.2.1.x series is going to become the new "stable" soon (it's already probably more stable in practice than 0.2.0.35), and it's way better in a number of other ways. But either 0.2.0.x or 0.2.1.x is fine, really. > On the "Who uses Tor?" section of the website, I see no mention of > IT people. I've used the Tor network for many practical uses as an IT > Director. That's a really good point. Especially since a lot of the people who really hate/fear Tor are IT folks who don't understand it. > Quite frankly Tor is an undervalued IT tool and it's capabilities > should be trumpeted loudly on the web page. You might also find IT guys > like me throwing up some relays in exchange. After all- who has the > bandwidth anyway? Yep. The next step is to come up with some really good clean simple example sentences for our new category. Those examples will dictate the title we give it -- "Security experts use Tor", "Sysadmins use Tor", "Computer experts use Tor", or something else. > So > if Tor as an organization had a partnership with a few server rental > whores (in multiple countries), it would simplify getting more exits. If anybody knows good places, please let us know. :) There's a small list being built here: https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/GoodBadISPs Another concern is that if we centralize all the exit relays in a few places, we reduce the anonymity that the Tor network can provide. But I don't think we're anywhere near doing that yet, so it's just something to keep in the back of our minds. > I read back about 6 months in the or-talk list and there were a > couple of suggestions inferring that *everyone* should be forced to be > an exit node. I think this is a very bad idea, Me too. Don't worry, we won't do it. But see also https://blog.torproject.org/blog/two-incentive-designs-tor --Roger ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
by Eugene Y. Vasserman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hi, Probabilistic guarantee is a timeliness guarantee - delivery is still guaranteed, but the time within which this delivery is made is not guaranteed. (We could provide a weaker guarantee - say, this will be delivered before the TCP session times out. However, a complex guarantee policy might introduce an unacceptable performance hit.) The point is that round-robin scheduling (as Tor does now) is too easy to predict. What I suggest does not require changing anything expect the mixing strategy (which right now is round-robin - no mixing at all). I still haven't had a chance to look at the mixing code to see if this could be done with low-enough overhead as to not be noticeable by end-users. I don't want to make the argument on the performance/penalty tradeoff yet because I'm hoping there won't be any significant performance hit. I suspect it's possible, and can only be determined through testing. I'll report on my progress, if and when when there is some. Thanks, Eugene Thus spake Paul Syverson: > Hi Andrei, > > Who is this from? > > Question from a two second glance, which is all I can spare at the > moment: probabilistic throughput guarantee? Does this imply > probabilistic guarantee of delivery? If so, you're talking UDP or > something not TCP in any case. In which case you're talking > substantial change from current Tor. Thus maybe an interesting design > theory suggestion, but something that will not be implementable in the > system for years if ever. > > Gotta run, > Paul > > > On Fri, Oct 07, 2005 at 08:08:27PM +0100, Andrei Serjantov wrote: >>> Greetings. Let me introduce myself. I'm a grad student and the U of MN >>> in computer science. I've been working on anonymous network systems. I >>> also had a chance to play with Tor, and read the "Low-Cost Traffic >>> Analysis of Tor" paper (mentioned below). >>> I have a general question: this may or may not decrease performance, but >>> wouldn't locking and/or randomizing bandwidth per flow through a Tor >>> server solve this problem? This attack seem comparable to a variant on >>> SSL (and general crypto) timing attacks. Similar solutions could be >>> applied. Also, since this attack relies on a malicious node being able >>> to estimate its flow's likely performance through an honest node at any >>> given time, Tor could apply a somewhat more complex mixing approach, >>> making this attack more difficult. I was thinking of something like >>> lottery scheduling, which is really easy to implement and, if done >>> right, will not impose any noticeable CPU overhead, and still provide >>> the same (albeit probabilistic, not deterministic) throughput guarantees >>> for every flow. Please let me know your thoughts. I will hopefully have >>> some time to spend implementing this in the near future, if there is a >>> consensus that some of these suggestions would help. >> Before you start hacking, I would advocate writing down your mixing >> strategy and trying to show (or at least argue) that what you are >> doing has a reasonable anonymity/performance tradeoff. It's probably >> worth sticking my nose out and saying that Tor does not really want to >> do any mixing for performance reasons -- lower performance means lower >> number of users and hence lower anonymity sets against weaker >> adversaries..... (hmm is this strictly true?? I suppose the anonymity >> set is the set of all people if you don't observe the entire network) >> >> A. - -- Eugene Y. Vasserman http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDRtV74S3hfPlRZlkRA6KaAJ9v64LJ5OrqA22POcfZGu7gBNtrBQCbBLJ4 ovdIV2Q1EDDKF5G2/Hv9Y3A= =0/lG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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<nettime> US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival
by Frederick Noronha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival 13 Comments An American computer scientist, J Alex Halderman, who had co-authored a study titled b Indiabs EVMs are vulnerable to fraudb, was not allowed to enter the country after landing at the Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport here on Sunday evening. Airport sources said he would be deported, but offered no reason for the action. Speaking to The Indian Express from the airport, Halderman said: b I am about to be thrown out of this country and there is no reason anyone is giving me. There is just no explanation, they are not letting me enter.b Halderman, an assistant professor of electrical engineering and computer sciences at the University of Michigan, was here to attend a technical conference in Gujarat. In February this year, top researchers from India, US and Netherlands, had come up with a study which said that EVMs are prone to tampering. Halderman and his Indian co-author, Hari K Prasad, were part of the group. Earlier, the Election Commission had challenged Prasad to demonstrate how EVMs could be tampered with. The EC, however, withheld access to the EVMs. In his blog about the study, Halderman wrote: b Despite widespread reports of election irregularities and suspicions of electronic fraud, the Election Commission has never permitted security researchers to complete an independent evaluation. Hari and others in India repeatedly offered to collaborate with the Election Commission to better understand the security of the machines, but they were not permitted to complete a serious review.b He added: b Indian election authorities have repeatedly claimed that the machines are btamperproof,b but we demonstrated important vulnerabilities by studying a machine provided by an anonymous source. The story took a disturbing turn when my co-author, Hari Prasad, was arrested by Indian authorities demanding to know the identity of that source.b http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-prof-behind-evm-study-deported-on-arri… # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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<nettime> US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival
by Frederick Noronha 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

US prof behind EVM study deported on arrival 13 Comments An American computer scientist, J Alex Halderman, who had co-authored a study titled b Indiabs EVMs are vulnerable to fraudb, was not allowed to enter the country after landing at the Indira Gandhi International (IGI) Airport here on Sunday evening. Airport sources said he would be deported, but offered no reason for the action. Speaking to The Indian Express from the airport, Halderman said: b I am about to be thrown out of this country and there is no reason anyone is giving me. There is just no explanation, they are not letting me enter.b Halderman, an assistant professor of electrical engineering and computer sciences at the University of Michigan, was here to attend a technical conference in Gujarat. In February this year, top researchers from India, US and Netherlands, had come up with a study which said that EVMs are prone to tampering. Halderman and his Indian co-author, Hari K Prasad, were part of the group. Earlier, the Election Commission had challenged Prasad to demonstrate how EVMs could be tampered with. The EC, however, withheld access to the EVMs. In his blog about the study, Halderman wrote: b Despite widespread reports of election irregularities and suspicions of electronic fraud, the Election Commission has never permitted security researchers to complete an independent evaluation. Hari and others in India repeatedly offered to collaborate with the Election Commission to better understand the security of the machines, but they were not permitted to complete a serious review.b He added: b Indian election authorities have repeatedly claimed that the machines are btamperproof,b but we demonstrated important vulnerabilities by studying a machine provided by an anonymous source. The story took a disturbing turn when my co-author, Hari Prasad, was arrested by Indian authorities demanding to know the identity of that source.b http://www.indianexpress.com/news/us-prof-behind-evm-study-deported-on-arri… # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mail.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] open source hardware exists
by John Gilmore 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> The first step is to ask Marvell. Please do. You don't have to ask Marvell. The info is widely available. The DreamPlug has a JTAG interface that lets an external debugger stop the processor, access memory, etc. The manufacturer (Global Scale Technologies) sells an easy JTAG interface kit for $39. It attaches to USB on one end, and a few wires attach it to the JTAG connector on the DreamPlug. (The same JTAG interface works with the GuruPlug and the D2Plug.) There's a free software debugger (openocd, Open On-Chip Debugger) that works with JTAG interfaces. I have barely scratched the surface of using it. I haven't found a great reference for what it can do, but see: http://openocd.sourceforge.net/ http://openocd.sourceforge.net/2012/04/kernel-debugging/ (2-hr video tutorial on OpenOCD and kernel debugging) http://www.madore.org/~david/linux/dreamplug.html#u-boot In general JTAG is a way to debug chips without removing them from the system. It uses a few wires that are daisy-chained on the board to each complex chip in the system. Software to drive a JTAG port sends commands serially down the "data in" wire and causes a bitstream to be shifted out of the chips and back to the software on the "data out" wire. The interpretation of the bitstream depends on which chips are attached, and there are some standards for identifying them. All chips with JTAG let you read the pins of the chip ("boundary scan"), and often write them as well. Many chips also make internal values accessible (such as, in a processor, the current program counter, registers, etc). In a system-on-chip, the JTAG interface pins will connect up to many different subsystems inside the chip (like the processor, the ethernet, the memory controller, the serial ports, etc), which can each be addressed from the JTAG interface. For more details, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JTAG The JTAG interface doesn't let anybody send an Ethernet or WiFi packet and take over your system. You need to plug a specific hardware connector into a hardware socket designed to fit with it (and on most systems that socket is inside the guts of the system, under the plastic or metal case). But when you have the hardware under your physical control, JTAG is very powerful for accessing and/or reverse-engineering a system. Many free-software folks use JTAG to figure out what a proprietary system's chips are doing, so they can write free software that works with them. Like any tool, it can be used for "good" or "evil"... John _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: Low-Cost Traffic Analysis of Tor
by Eugene Y. Vasserman 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: RIPEMD160 Hi, Probabilistic guarantee is a timeliness guarantee - delivery is still guaranteed, but the time within which this delivery is made is not guaranteed. (We could provide a weaker guarantee - say, this will be delivered before the TCP session times out. However, a complex guarantee policy might introduce an unacceptable performance hit.) The point is that round-robin scheduling (as Tor does now) is too easy to predict. What I suggest does not require changing anything expect the mixing strategy (which right now is round-robin - no mixing at all). I still haven't had a chance to look at the mixing code to see if this could be done with low-enough overhead as to not be noticeable by end-users. I don't want to make the argument on the performance/penalty tradeoff yet because I'm hoping there won't be any significant performance hit. I suspect it's possible, and can only be determined through testing. I'll report on my progress, if and when when there is some. Thanks, Eugene Thus spake Paul Syverson: > Hi Andrei, > > Who is this from? > > Question from a two second glance, which is all I can spare at the > moment: probabilistic throughput guarantee? Does this imply > probabilistic guarantee of delivery? If so, you're talking UDP or > something not TCP in any case. In which case you're talking > substantial change from current Tor. Thus maybe an interesting design > theory suggestion, but something that will not be implementable in the > system for years if ever. > > Gotta run, > Paul > > > On Fri, Oct 07, 2005 at 08:08:27PM +0100, Andrei Serjantov wrote: >>> Greetings. Let me introduce myself. I'm a grad student and the U of MN >>> in computer science. I've been working on anonymous network systems. I >>> also had a chance to play with Tor, and read the "Low-Cost Traffic >>> Analysis of Tor" paper (mentioned below). >>> I have a general question: this may or may not decrease performance, but >>> wouldn't locking and/or randomizing bandwidth per flow through a Tor >>> server solve this problem? This attack seem comparable to a variant on >>> SSL (and general crypto) timing attacks. Similar solutions could be >>> applied. Also, since this attack relies on a malicious node being able >>> to estimate its flow's likely performance through an honest node at any >>> given time, Tor could apply a somewhat more complex mixing approach, >>> making this attack more difficult. I was thinking of something like >>> lottery scheduling, which is really easy to implement and, if done >>> right, will not impose any noticeable CPU overhead, and still provide >>> the same (albeit probabilistic, not deterministic) throughput guarantees >>> for every flow. Please let me know your thoughts. I will hopefully have >>> some time to spend implementing this in the near future, if there is a >>> consensus that some of these suggestions would help. >> Before you start hacking, I would advocate writing down your mixing >> strategy and trying to show (or at least argue) that what you are >> doing has a reasonable anonymity/performance tradeoff. It's probably >> worth sticking my nose out and saying that Tor does not really want to >> do any mixing for performance reasons -- lower performance means lower >> number of users and hence lower anonymity sets against weaker >> adversaries..... (hmm is this strictly true?? I suppose the anonymity >> set is the set of all people if you don't observe the entire network) >> >> A. - -- Eugene Y. Vasserman http://www.cs.umn.edu/~eyv/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.1 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org iD8DBQFDRtV74S3hfPlRZlkRA6KaAJ9v64LJ5OrqA22POcfZGu7gBNtrBQCbBLJ4 ovdIV2Q1EDDKF5G2/Hv9Y3A= =0/lG -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] open source hardware exists
by John Gilmore 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> The first step is to ask Marvell. Please do. You don't have to ask Marvell. The info is widely available. The DreamPlug has a JTAG interface that lets an external debugger stop the processor, access memory, etc. The manufacturer (Global Scale Technologies) sells an easy JTAG interface kit for $39. It attaches to USB on one end, and a few wires attach it to the JTAG connector on the DreamPlug. (The same JTAG interface works with the GuruPlug and the D2Plug.) There's a free software debugger (openocd, Open On-Chip Debugger) that works with JTAG interfaces. I have barely scratched the surface of using it. I haven't found a great reference for what it can do, but see: http://openocd.sourceforge.net/ http://openocd.sourceforge.net/2012/04/kernel-debugging/ (2-hr video tutorial on OpenOCD and kernel debugging) http://www.madore.org/~david/linux/dreamplug.html#u-boot In general JTAG is a way to debug chips without removing them from the system. It uses a few wires that are daisy-chained on the board to each complex chip in the system. Software to drive a JTAG port sends commands serially down the "data in" wire and causes a bitstream to be shifted out of the chips and back to the software on the "data out" wire. The interpretation of the bitstream depends on which chips are attached, and there are some standards for identifying them. All chips with JTAG let you read the pins of the chip ("boundary scan"), and often write them as well. Many chips also make internal values accessible (such as, in a processor, the current program counter, registers, etc). In a system-on-chip, the JTAG interface pins will connect up to many different subsystems inside the chip (like the processor, the ethernet, the memory controller, the serial ports, etc), which can each be addressed from the JTAG interface. For more details, see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JTAG The JTAG interface doesn't let anybody send an Ethernet or WiFi packet and take over your system. You need to plug a specific hardware connector into a hardware socket designed to fit with it (and on most systems that socket is inside the guts of the system, under the plastic or metal case). But when you have the hardware under your physical control, JTAG is very powerful for accessing and/or reverse-engineering a system. Many free-software folks use JTAG to figure out what a proprietary system's chips are doing, so they can write free software that works with them. Like any tool, it can be used for "good" or "evil"... John _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: <nettime> The Monetary Future: How Bitcoin Is Being Destroyed
by Keith Hart 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

I wish I could write like that guy. The article exaggerates the threat posed by Bitcoin and the will/ability of the custodians of state money to shut it down. But the argument prompts a question that has bugged me for a while now. How does it come about that one, but only one online exception to the old regime is allowed to flourish in each sector: Amazon, E-bay, Facebook, Paypal? Is it the logic of winner takes all or because a licence is granted to one exception that can be made to toe the line? I recall once an official of the Fed said they were in two minds whether to classify Paypal as a bank which would of course shut it down since it couldn't afford the overheads imposed as a result. But they didn't.I am sure there is a big fight coming up, but I don't think it will pit the new network economy against old bureaucratic power. We will not build a better worldindependently of the institutions that have organized humanity's leap in 200 years from living off the land to the threshold of global society: states, cities, capitalist markets, corporations, organized science and technology. It is more likely that successful developments will build on selective partnerships between large-scale bureaucracies and self-organized movements. In Latin America from the 90s the idea of "popular economy" sustained a new kind of alliance pushing for social democracy and linking small farmers, urban informal workers, industrial unions and branches of the state. Brazil's government under Lula organized a system of community banks which combined local currencies and microfinance with devolved decision-making. Some governments do play an indispensable role in support of bottom-up initiatives (think Jaures' associationisme). Just as the shipping firms of Bordeaux and Nantes played a major role in the French revolution and the industrialists of Milan and Turin in the Risorgimento, some capitalist firms today may also play a progressive part in bringing about greater economic democracy. Safaricom's sponsorship of mobile banking in Kenya (M-Pesa) is a striking example. So 'old radical' may not have much to offer the young after all, a perspective that reproduces the tired polarities of twentieth century revolutionary discourse. Keith On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 1:40 PM, Nick <nettime(a)njw.me.uk> wrote: > Interesting read. > > States, and traditional financial authorities, seem to be a pretty > good job of ensuring peoples use of bitcoin is outside their remit, > by closing down the practical use of bitcoin exchanges which > consider themselves 'legitimate,' c.f. the closure of intersango & > mtgox's UK bank accounts. # distributed via <nettime>: no commercial use without permission # <nettime> is a moderated mailing list for net criticism, # collaborative text filtering and cultural politics of the nets # more info: http://mx.kein.org/mailman/listinfo/nettime-l # archive: http://www.nettime.org contact: nettime(a)kein.org ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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EDRi-gram newsletter - Number 10.15, 1 August 2012
by EDRi-gram 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

======================================================================= EDRi-gram biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe Number 10.15, 1 August 2012 ======================================================================= Contents ======================================================================= 1. A new Net Neutrality EC consultation delays possible regulations 2. Czech Republic: Data retention - almost back in business 3. Stravos Lambrinidis: EU First Special Representative for Human Rights 4. ETSI standard for lawful interception triggers privacy questions 5. Belarusian journalist detained for showing subway security flaws 6. Google still holds data unlawfully obtained by StreetView 7. France: Update on website blocking without a judicial decision 8. Reporters Sans FrontiC(res follows on the Wikileaks footsteps 9. Recommended Action 10. Recommended Reading 11. Agenda 12. About ======================================================================= 1. A new Net Neutrality EC consultation delays possible regulations ======================================================================= Following BERECbs report in May 2012 on Net Neutrality, the European Commission launched on 23 July 2012 another consultation, open by 15 October 2012, to investigate on whether ISPs are manipulating online traffic management, thus postponing new regulatory laws on Net Neutrality. But this consultation follows a similar one from BEREC that ended just yesterday, 31 July 2012. As BERECb report was revealing, 20-50% of the European ISPs use measures to block or restrict access to web sites and/or products run by their competitors. Although the EU communications rules say that users should be able to choose the applications and services they want without restrictions, the report has shown that a large number of European users are under contracts with their ISPs that limit their access to services such as Voip (Voice over Internet Protocol) or file-sharing sites. Other practices such as bandwidth throttling (deliberate slowing down of the services to certain websites) have been revealed. Digital Agenda Commissioner Neelie Kroes stated that the consultation would be used b to help prepare recommendations that will generate more real choices and end the net neutrality waiting game in Europe. There is a lack of effective consumer choice when it comes to Internet offers," she said. Yet, although Kroes mentioned the introduction of new EU guidelines in 2012 considering b regulatory intervention in competitive markets as inappropriateb, the new consultation opened by the Commission pushes back any possible decision. La Quadrature du Net has published a non-answer to the new consultation considering there is no time for another consultation on the subject. b The only way to protect a free Internet as well as freedoms and innovation online is to clearly enact and protect Net Neutrality in EU law.b It is already clear that European ISPs are applying restrictions to their usersb access and that national regulators cannot investigate and sanction. In UK, for instance, several ISPs such as BT, BSkyB, O2 and TalkTalk have already signed an Open Internet Code of Practice that generally requires them to ensure that they are offering their customers "full and open internet access". The code allows them to restrict open use of the internet through "traffic management" of their services provided they do not use it "in a manner that targets and degrades the content or application(s) of specific providers" and they ensure that a best effort Internet access is a "viable choice" to consumers even where other "managed services" are available. They signatories must also use "clear and transparent traffic management policies". Yet, the code has not been signed by large ISPs such as Virgin Media, Vodafone or T-Mobile and Orange operator Everything Everywhere who consider the text of the code may lead to b misinterpretation and potential exploitation" or have reservations regarding the restrictions on the use of the b internet accessb term. On-line public consultation on "specific aspects of transparency, traffic management and switching in an Open Internet" Deadline for reply: 15 October 2012 http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/digital-agenda/actions/oit-consulta… Public consultation on 'net neutrality' to delay EU rules on ISPs (24.07.2012) http://euobserver.com/871/117055 Non-answer to BEREC's Consultation: We need Net Neutrality Law! (25.07.2012) https://www.laquadrature.net/en/non-answer-to-berecs-consultation-we-need-n… Net Neutrality: Brussels opens an umpteenth public consultation (only in French, 23.07.2012) http://www.numerama.com/magazine/23245-neutralite-du-net-bruxelles-ouvre-un… Ten UK ISPs commit to new 'open internet' code (25.07.2012) http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/july/ten-uk-isps-commit-to-new-open… EDRi-gram 10.11: BERECbs findings on net neutrality (6.06.2012) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number10.11/berec-net-neutrality ======================================================================= 2. Czech Republic: Data retention - almost back in business ======================================================================= Nationwide preventive monitoring of electronic communication finds its way back into the Czech legal system. The original act was repealed in 2011 by the Constitutional Court b however, a new one is waiting only for the President's signature. Privacy campaigners fear possible data abuse given the insufficient regulation provided by the current Police Act as well as monitoring of contents of Internet communications which could potentially be made possible by the implementing decree to the new Act. Not only the Chamber of Deputies, but now also the Senate approved the government draft of the amended Electronic Communication Act, as well as amendments to several other laws reintroducing the obligation of telephone or Internet services providers to monitor the communications of their clients and provide them, upon request, to the police, intelligence services or the Czech National Bank. After the previous legal regulation was repealed by two decisions of the Constitutional Court in March and December 2011, nationwide monitoring of citizensb communications thus finds its way back into the Czech legal system. The government proposal of the Act that was passed in the Senate on 18 July 2012, reacts to the Constitutional Court decision and implements the European Directive which prescribes storing of traffic and localization data on electronic communications. According to EDRi-member Iuridicum Remedium (IuRe), which initiated the March decision of the Constitutional Court and also filed its comments during the preparation phase of the new legal regulation, the new Act is better than the repealed regulation b however it still contains a number of errors that will lead to unconstitutional interference with the privacy of citizens. The major problem, according to IuRe, is the very existence of the obligation of operators to generally monitor the communications of all citizens without any specific suspicion. Thus, a revision of the European Directive which introduced this obligation, and an assessment of its constitutionality by the European Court of Justice is seen by Iure as the key issues in this respect. "As for the Czech implementation of the Directive, when submitting comments during the preparatory phase, we tried to push for maximum limits in terms of monitoring of citizens and possible abuse of such data," says Jan Voboril, lawyer at IuRe. "The original proposal introduced by the Ministry of Interior in the summer of last year was from our perspective entirely unacceptable. During the legislative process, we have stepwise prepared comments for the Ministry of Interior, Members of Parliament as well as Senators. We are pleased that during subsequent discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Interior and other key institutions, we managed to get acceptance for stricter rules regarding the use of such data. For example, what we consider important is the introduction of the obligation to inform the respective persons that their data have been requested under the Criminal Code, highlighting the subsidiarity when using such data in criminal investigation, or the necessity of court permission when the data is requested by intelligence services or the Czech National Bank," adds Voboril. Many crucial issues still remain unresolved, which will, in IuReB4s opinion, lead to further unconstitutional use of such data in the future. "What we consider to be the most serious issue of the new legislation is that it ignores the current situation where the Police Act authorizes the police to use the data outside of criminal proceedings. Under the current Police Act, police officers may require data more or less without any limits, without court supervision and without any clearly defined and controlled processes. It is striking that although the police themselves wanted to define stricter rules for such use of the data during the preparatory phase of the new Act, this was refused by the Ministry of Interior. Not even Deputies or Senators paid attention to this huge gap opening up possibilities for information abuse by individual police officers b and this despite of repeated warnings from our side," explains Voboril. "We also have our concerns regarding the awaited implementing decree of the Act, which will among other things determine which data will be generally stored. This decree can put the new Act into entirely new light, both in respect of the invasion into citizensB4 privacy as well as technical and personnel details necessary - which will be reimbursed by the state. Crucial is the particular question of whether data on the recipientB4s side of Internet communication will be stored as well. Such provisions would mean not only de facto monitoring of the content of what we are surfing through on the Internet, but also a tremendous increase in public expenditures related to such monitoring. It is surprising that such a significant issue which can change the entire meaning of the Act and should be provisioned for directly in the Act, has gone entirely unnoticed by," concludes Voboril. The Act is currently still to be signed by the President. LetB4s wait and see whether, during his decision making, Vaclav Klaus will also think of the fact that, apart from dozens of other persons - not excluding the chairman of the Constitutional Court - also some people from his immediate surrounding appeared among the victims of data abuse resulting from the police authorization to require such data. (Contribution by EDRi-member Iuridicum remedium - Czech Republic) ======================================================================= 3. Stravos Lambrinidis: EU First Special Representative for Human Rights ======================================================================= On 25 July 2012, on a proposal by Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council of the European Union appointed Mr Stravos Lambridinis, former MEP, as EU Special Representative for Human Rights. This appointment is the result of repeated demands from the European Parliament and a recommendation of the Foreign Affairs Committee. On 24 May 2012, indeed, the Foreign Affairs Committee called on the Council to appoint a EU's high-level human rights envoy with an international reputation. The creation of the human rights envoy follows the EU's Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy that was adopted on 25 June 2012. As requested by the European Parliament, Mr. Lambridinis has a long-standing experience in human rights and international relations. In his earlier carrier, he was indeed nominated Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights at the Washington D.C.'s bar association. He also worked at the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs and became the Ambassador at Large of the Hellenic Republic. He was elected Member of the European Parliament in 2006, where he was Vice-Chairman of the Civil Liberties Committee. In 2009, he was elected Vice-President of the European Parliament. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs for Greece from June to November 2011. The task of the EU Special Representative for Human Rights is to ensure the promotion of EU human rights policy worldwide. The mandate will be broad and flexible in order to give Mr Lambridinis the ability to adapt to different situations. He will work closely with the European External Action Service. He will in particular represent the EU at the international level, be responsible for the interactions with the UN and chair human rights dialogues with third countries. Mr Lambridinis' initial mandate will run until 30 June 2014. The goal is to enhance the effectiveness and consistency of EU policy. The news was broadly appreciated by the MEPs, and b warmlyb welcomed by the President of the European Parliament Martin Schulz (Germany, S&D), and by the chairwoman of the EP human rights subcommittee Barbara Lochbihler (Germany, Groups of the Greens). This appointment shows the willingness of the European Union to make human rights one of its strategic priorities and to give the EU a united voice on human rights issues. Mr Lambridinis said that he would b ensure the Human Rights gets integrated into all EU external policyb. Stavros Lambrinidis appointed first EU Special Representative for Human Rights (25.07.2012) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/132… Stavros Lambrinidis appointed EU Special Representative for Human Rights (26.07.2012) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches… MEPs congratulate new EU human rights envoy, Stavros Lambrinidis (25.07.2012) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+IM-PRESS+2… EC press briefing (25.07.2012) http://ec.europa.eu/avservices/audio/audioDetails.cfm?ref=87254&sitelang=fr (Contribution by Marie Humeau - EDRi) ======================================================================= 4. ETSI standard for lawful interception triggers privacy questions ======================================================================= The draft UK Communication Bill raises new privacy concerns after it has been revealed that the UK has also been driving the development of a European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) standard framework that allows interception of the content of communication as well. The Bill will allow the government to compel service companies like Google and Facebook to provide information to the police and intelligence services, while the framework sets out the technical standards for this. The draft Communication Bill is supposed to deal only with traffic data, according with the Government position: b The changes we are making only relate to the who, where and when of communications data. The interception of the content of any communications is a completely separate matter and continues to be strictly controlled by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, requiring a warrant signed by the secretary of state" said a Home Office spokesman. But an April 2012 draft report from ETSI on Lawful Interception (LI) and Cloud/Virtual Services explains that an electronic communication provider that offers cloud services must maintain its obligation to LI. This means that "the cloud service provider must implement a Cloud Lawful Interception Function (CLIF). This can be by way of Applications Programming Interface (API) or more likely ensuring presentation of information in a format recognisable to interception mechanisms." The Guardian explains it as being measures to monitor "nomadic access", which means surveillance of an individual whether they go online from their home computer, mobile or an Internet cafC). "They are saying this is only about communications data, but in fact it is not. If you build the infrastructure that ETSI have agreed, it can be used for interception. The documents show that there is a clear and continuing intention to use it for interceptionb, explains Prof. Ross Anderson, from the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, "We're seeing moves at an international level to make it easier for the content of communications to be intercepted. For Home Office officials behind the communications data bill, spying on who we are emailing or Skyping is not their final objective. Officials from Britain are working internationally to force service providers to ensure that their systems are easy to tap into," concluded Nick Pickles, from Big Brother Watch. Security services to get more access to monitor emails and social media (28.07.2012) http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/jul/28/isecurity-services-emails-… Draft ETSI DTR 101 567 V0.0.5 (2012-04) - Lawful Interception (LI); Cloud/Virtual Services (CLI) http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/TSGS3_LI/2012_45_Bratislava/SA3… EDRi-gram 10.10: Concerns over the proposed Communication Bill in UK (23.05.2012) http://edri.org/edrigram/number10.10/draft-communications-bill-uk ======================================================================= 5. Belarusian journalist detained for showing subway security flaws ======================================================================= Several Belarusian journalists have been lately arrested for having shown flows in the security system of Belarus. The latest arrest, on 25 July 2012, was that of Vital Ruhayn on charges of hooliganism and obscene language in public. In fact, he became infamous for publishing a video online showing a lack of security on the Minsk subway although it was the target of a deadly bombing in April 2011. The video was clearly showing the journalist carrying a large bag into the Minsk metro and following the same route as the 2011 bomber - the police did not react in any way. Although the court released Ruhayn, he is still under prosecution and the hearing was only postponed for five days in order to allow the police to correct the inconsistencies in their testimonies and written reports. b Vital Ruhaynbs arrest is indicative of the regimebs sensitivities about matters related b closely or otherwise b to the Minsk bombing and national security. A journalist should not be arrested for highlighting police violations of security regulations. We call for the withdrawal of the trumped-up charges brought against him,b was the reaction of Reporters Without Borders. Also, in June, ERB reporter Pavel Svyardlow was arrested on similar obscene language charges, and was given a 15-day jail sentence and on 13 July journalist Anton Surapin was arrested for having posting on the Internet photos of the action of a Swedish advertising agency of 4 July - the agency people flew a light aircraft into the Belarusian airspace dropping hundreds of teddy-bears with messages supporting free speech in Belarus. Surapin is still held by the Committee for State Security on the charge of helping foreigners to cross the border illegally and is facing a three to seven years prison sentence. Journalist facing jail sentence for exposing Minsk metro security flaws (27.07.2012) http://en.rsf.org/belarus-journalist-facing-jail-sentence-28-07-2012,43120.… Ruhain's case to be revised due to witnesses' confusion (26.07.2012) http://euroradio.fm/en/report/ruhains-case-be-revised-due-witnesses-confusi… Euroradio journalist Vital Ruhain is released (26.07.2012) http://euroradio.fm/en/report/euroradio-journalist-vital-ruhain-spend-night… ======================================================================= 6. Google still holds data unlawfully obtained by StreetView ======================================================================= Google admitted, in a letter addressed on 27 July 2012 to UK Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) as well as to the Irish Data Protection Commission office that it had not yet deleted all the data unlawfully obtained in UK by its Street View cars. After the discovery in May 2010 that Google had scanned, by means of its Street View cars, the airwaves to identify and map WiFi thus unlawfully obtaining private data, the company was instructed to delete all data thus gathered. According to the present Googlebs letter, a b small portionb of the respective data is still in the companybs possession. Google also asked in its letter for instruction on how to proceed in deleting the rest of the data. "In recent months, Google has been reviewing its handling of Street View disks and undertaking a comprehensive manual review of our Street View disk inventory. That review involves the physical inspection and re-scanning of thousands of disks. In conducting that review, we have determined that we continue to have payload data from the UK and other countries. We are in the process of notifying the relevant authorities in those countries," said Google's privacy counsel Peter Fleischer. ICO answered the letter on 28 July saying Google should promptly supply the remaining data to the ICO which would "examine the contents" warning at the same time the company that it might be in breach of the terms previously agreed following the investigation into the issue in 2010. Billy Hawkes, the Irish Data Protection Commissioner, said Google was supposed to have deleted all the data and considered the situation "clearly unacceptable". ICO stated that it would coordinate its further actions in the matter with other data protection authorities through the Article 29 Working Party and the GPEN network. Google admits not all unlawfully-collected Street View data has been deleted (27.07.2012) http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/july/google-admits-not-all-unlawful… Google warned on data deletion delay (28.07.2012) http://www.independent.ie/national-news/google-warned-on-data-deletion-dela… EDRi-gram 10.12: Googlebs Street View privacy breach again in the public eye (20.06.2012) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number10.12/google-steet-view-identification-a… ======================================================================= 7. France: Update on website blocking without a judicial decision ======================================================================= Fleur Pellerin, the French State Secretary for Digital Economy announced on 24 July 2012 the intention of the French Government to give up the Decree on the application of a very controversial Article of LOPPSI 2 law which allowed online filtering of websites with child pornographic content without a court decision. Article 4 was stipulating that when b the necessities of the fight against broadcasting of images representing minors as per article 227-23 of the Criminal Code justify it, the administrative authority notifies (the ISPs) the electronic addresses of public electronic online communication services which contravene the provisions of this article that these must block or delay access to them.b One of the main concerns regarding this article is that the blocking could be done without the intervention of a court order. The draft decree for the entering into force of Article 4 from LOPPSI 2 (6 months after its publication) was to be published on 15 March 2012, after a consultation with CNN (Conseil National Numerique b National Digital Council) which never happened. However, the text of article 4 is still in the text of the law, so in order to solve the problem, it is necessary to change the law itself. Loppsi: the decree on site blocking without judge is abandoned (only in French, 25.07.2012) http://www.numerama.com/magazine/23260-loppsi-le-decret-sur-le-blocage-des-… Loppsi: the government abandons blocking without judge (only in French, 25.07.2012) http://www.pcinpact.com/news/72658-loppsi-gouvernement-abandonne-blocage-si… EDRi-gram 9.4: France: Loppsi 2 adopted - Internet filtering without court order (23.02.2011) http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number9.4/web-blocking-adopted-france-loppsi-2 ======================================================================= 8. Reporters Sans FrontiC(res follows on the Wikileaks footsteps ======================================================================= Reporters Sans FrontiC(res (RSF) is looking to take the Wikileaks path and will start accepting the publication of censured documents in October 2012 on a new dedicated platform. Called b We Fight Censorshipb, the RSF platform will distribute censored documents received from journalists, bloggers or political dissidents in order to offer a b digital shelterb for those who, by revealing such documents, might be persecuted, condemned, imprisoned or even assassinated. b Thanks to a digital ultra-secured safe, the Internet users will be able to provide the organisation, anonymously, with documents affected by censorship or interdicted for publicationb stated RSF who also added that the documents will not be published as such but put into context and the contents included will be verified to ensure the accuracy and correctness of the shared information. RSF already organised in 2010 an b anti-censure shelterb space for the protection of political dissidents, journalists and bloggers threatened by authorities, which allows them to surf and communicate rather safely by using various ciphering and anonymization tools. On 21 July 2012, the association organised a hackathon in order to test the reliability of the platform and the security of the document transmission system. RSF wants to fight censorship by publishing banned documents (only in French, 25.07.2012) http://www.numerama.com/magazine/23261-rsf-veut-combattre-la-censure-en-pub… We fight censorship http://wefightcensorship.org/en.html Hackathon "We fight censorship" on 21 July (20.07.2012) http://fr.rsf.org/france-hackathon-we-fight-censorship-05-07-2012,42964.html ======================================================================= 9. Recommended Action ======================================================================= Call for Papers for a special edition of IEEE Internet Computing on Internet Censorship and Control. The editors are looking for short (up to 5,000 words) articles on the technical, social, and political mechanisms and impacts of Internet censorship and control.They are soliciting both technical and social science articles, and especially encourage those that combine the two. Deadline for a brief description of the article: 15 August 2012 http://www.computer.org/portal/web/computingnow/iccfp3 Commission consults on a future EU Network and Information Security legislative initiative (27.07.2012) Deadline: 15 October 2012 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/818&format=HT… ======================================================================= 10. Recommended Reading ======================================================================= Online traceability: Who did that? (27.07.2012) http://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2012/07/27/online-traceability/ http://www.consumerfocus.org.uk/files/2012/07/Online-traceability-Who-did-t… Big data at your service http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/dae/itemdetail.cfm?item… Linked Open Government Data http://www.computer.org/portal/web/csdl/doi/10.1109/MIS.2012.56 European Telco Proposal to ITU: A Threat to the Open Web? (27.07.2012) http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/07/27/european-telco-proposal-t… ======================================================================= 11. Agenda ======================================================================= 25-26 August 2012, Bonn, Germany Free and Open Source software conference (FrOSCon) http://www.froscon.de/en/program/call-for-papers/ 6-7 September 2012, Cluj-Napoca, Romania CONSENT policy conference: Perceptions, Privacy and Permissions: the role of consent in on-line services http://conference.ubbcluj.ro/consent/ 8-9 September 2012, Vienna, Austria Daten, Netz & Politik 2012 https://dnp12.unwatched.org/ 12-14 September 2012, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium Building Institutions for Sustainable Scientific, Cultural and Genetic Resources Commons. http://biogov.uclouvain.be/iasc/index.php 14-17 September 2012, Brussels, Belgium Freedom not Fear 2012 http://www.freedomnotfear.org/ http://www.freedom-not-fear.eu 7-10 October 2012, Amsterdam, Netherlands 2012 Amsterdam Privacy Conference http://www.apc2012.org/ 25-28 October 2012, Barcelona, Spain Free Culture Forum 2012 http://fcforum.net/ 6-9 November 2012, Baku, Azerbaijan Seventh Annual IGF Meeting: "Internet Governance for Sustainable Human, Economic and Social Development" http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/ 9-11 November 2012, Fulda, Germany Digitalisierte Gesellschaft - Wege und Irrwege FIfF Annual Conference in cooperation with Fuldaer Informatik Kollquium http://www.fiff.de/2012 ============================================================ 12. About ============================================================ EDRi-gram is a biweekly newsletter about digital civil rights in Europe. Currently EDRi has 32 members based or with offices in 20 different countries in Europe. European Digital Rights takes an active interest in developments in the EU accession countries and wants to share knowledge and awareness through the EDRi-grams. All contributions, suggestions for content, corrections or agenda-tips are most welcome. Errors are corrected as soon as possible and are visible on the EDRi website. Except where otherwise noted, this newsletter is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. See the full text at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Newsletter editor: Bogdan Manolea <edrigram(a)edri.org> Information about EDRI and its members: http://www.edri.org/ European Digital Rights needs your help in upholding digital rights in the EU. If you wish to help us promote digital rights, please consider making a private donation. http://www.edri.org/about/sponsoring http://flattr.com/thing/417077/edri-on-Flattr - EDRI-gram subscription information subscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request(a)edri.org Subject: subscribe You will receive an automated e-mail asking to confirm your request. Unsubscribe by e-mail To: edri-news-request(a)edri.org Subject: unsubscribe - EDRI-gram in Macedonian EDRI-gram is also available partly in Macedonian, with delay. Translations are provided by Metamorphosis http://www.metamorphosis.org.mk/mk/vesti/edri - EDRI-gram in German EDRI-gram is also available in German, with delay. Translations are provided by Andreas Krisch from the EDRI-member VIBE!AT - Austrian Association for Internet Users http://www.unwatched.org/ - Newsletter archive Back issues are available at: http://www.edri.org/edrigram - Help Please ask <edrigram(a)edri.org> if you have any problems with subscribing or unsubscribing. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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