- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

None
by science-feedback＠forsythe.stanford.edu 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> NEW Password: 858548 > (Your password is case-sensitive. Please type > it in _exactly_ as it appears above.) LOL... Mark

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None
by science-feedback＠forsythe.stanford.edu 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> NEW Password: 858548 > (Your password is case-sensitive. Please type > it in _exactly_ as it appears above.) LOL... Mark

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None
by science-feedback＠forsythe.stanford.edu 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> NEW Password: 858548 > (Your password is case-sensitive. Please type > it in _exactly_ as it appears above.) LOL... Mark

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Re: [tor-talk] Is this a practical vulnerability?
by Anon Mus 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 19/10/2012 04:12, Lee Whitney wrote: > I was reading a paper on discovering hidden service locations, and couldn't find any reason it shouldn't work in principle. > > However being that I'm a Tor novice, I wanted ask here. > > In a nutshell they propose throwing some modified Tor nodes out there that modify the protocol enough to track down the location. It does take some time, but it doesn't seem like years. > My experience is that there s already an easy method of identifying Tor hidden service nodes and this takes little time to do. Let me explain why I come to that opinion. Having a static IP net connection, I set up a test web site as a Tor service on a Tor middleman server. That server had been a middleman server for about a year, no problems, no attempts to hack it in all that time. Within 24hrs of making that Tor hidden service live I could see, in my firewall logs, hundreds of repeated attempts trying to hack my server, directly from the internet, not via my hidden Tot service. All were attempting to access various types of services/permissions which were mainly focused on attempting to gain control of a "web page server". All attacks were from US based places of higher education (colleges and universities), most from establishments where Tor servers were situated but not from Tor servers themselves. Now bearing in mind that I had only EVER requested 1 web page (a blank test page - requested about 4 times) from my own Torrified web browser (out and back so to speak), and no OTHER (external) page requests were EVER received via the Tor hidden service, as shown by its log. Then someone must have been able to immediately see the service enter and track its source, who then attempted to hack the web server itself and it appeared to be a group of about 3 or 4 persons, each trying different attack strategy over a 12 hour period. Hundreds of commands were sent, many in quick succession as if they were in some sort of script file, but some were live, at one point I even watched them live as they were coming in as I countered their hack attempts. As a result of this I did some serious thinking about Tor and came to the conclusion that someone out there and I believe it is THE global adversary (USA mil/sec) is able see with perfect transparency all Tor traffic. Consider.: Most Tor users see the Tor connections as merely a set of 3 or 4 connected nodes over which their traffic is routed, e.g. Tor1 - US, Tor 2 - Germany, Tor 3 France - EXIT. But in reality then internet is not like that, this is only the UPPER structure level. At the lower level the packets are routed over many dozens of sub-nodes, these nodes are invisible to the Tor map of your traffic. You can find out this info yourself if you wish to test out a single ROUTE to another IP address just by doing a traceroute url (tracert url for windows) command from a command line prompt window. As you will see this is about a dozen hops to the average local url. But this is not the end of the problem, as some hops are hidden and they report only a virtual hop back to you. e.g. lets say a node is in a server in an IBM/US telecoms company based in France, then that server will almost certainly be routing ALL its traffic through the USA and back to itself (or another node in the same company) before sending it on to the next external node. This diversion is NEVER reported as ONLY a single "virtual node ip" is quoted. The only way you can ever tell its been done is by looking at the time delay, however this is also often difficult/impossible to spot because these routes are often the fastest on the internet. OK - I know this goes on for certain because there are internal tools used within these companies to trace the TRUE route and I have seen such servers send their traffic in this manner 24/7 - 365. Having discussed this as "wasted effort" with a network engineer I was told there is a "payment" made somewhere to compensate. At the same time all of this is camouflaged in apparently nice and legitimate reasons for it being that way, but when you pull it apart you see the lie, but you can't PROVE it. As about 70% of Europe's internet traffic passes through an IBM/US telco's servers then it almost certain that in any one of these Tor node to Tor node connections there is at least one sub-nodes that passes the traffic through the USA, who is the global adversary using Total Traffic Timing Tracking. You should be able to work the rest out for yourself. > Any comment appreciated, here's a link to the paper: > > http://www.cs.uml.edu/~xinwenfu/paper/HiddenServer.pdf > > _______________________________________________ > tor-talk mailing list > tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org > https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk > _______________________________________________ tor-talk mailing list tor-talk(a)lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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CFP: Financial Cryptography '02
by Matt Blaze 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Call for Papers Financial Cryptography '02 March 11-14, 2002 Sonesta Beach Resort Southhampton, Bermuda Sponsored by the International Financial Cryptography Association Original papers are solicited on all aspects of financial data security and digital commerce for submission to the Sixth Annual Conference on Financial Cryptography (FC '02). FC '02 brings together researchers in the financial, legal, cryptologic, and data security fields to foster cooperation and exchange of ideas. Relevant topics include: Anonymity Infrastructure Design Audit Legal and Regulatory Authentication and Issues Identification Loyalty Mechanisms Certification and Peer-to-Peer Systems Authorization Payments and Commercial Transactions Micropayments and Contracts Privacy Digital Cash Risks Management Digital Rights Secure Banking Management Smart Cards Electronic Purses Trust Management Implementation Issues Watermarking Information Economics Instructions for Authors: Complete papers (or complete extended abstracts) must be at most fifteen (15) single-spaced standard pages in length and must be received before 23h59 UTC on November 4, 2001. All papers must be submitted electronically. (In exceptional circumstances, paper submissions can be accepted, but special arrangements must be made with the program chair prior to October 31, 2001.) Papers must be in either standard PostScript or PDF format, and should be submitted via electronic mail to fc02submit(a)crypto.com prior to the deadline. Note that submissions in formats other than PostScript or PDF, including word processor source formats such as MS Word or LaTeX, will be rejected. Submitted papers should include on the first page the title, all authors and their affiliations, a brief abstract, and a list of topical keywords. Papers must be original; submission of previously published material or papers under consideration in other conferences or journals is not permitted. Proposals for panels are also solicited, and should include a brief description of the panel as well as prospective participants. Panel proposals should be submitted by electronic mail to the same address, in plain ASCII format. Important Dates: Submissions due: November 4, 2001 Notifications to authors: December 23, 2001 Camera-ready papers due: February 4, 2002 General Chair: Nicko van Someren (nCipher) Program Committee: Matt Blaze, Program Chair (AT&T Labs) Dan Boneh (Stanford University) Stefan Brands (Zero Knowledge) Dan Geer (@stake) Ian Goldberg (Zero Knowledge) Angelos Keromytis (Columbia University) Paul Kocher (Cryptography Research) Ron Rivest (MIT) Tomas Sander (Intertrust) Rebecca Wright (AT&T Labs) --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)wasabisystems.com --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Protecting Privacy, SIGN THIS LETTER
by Hannah Woody 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Matt, I am the coordinator of the Coalition for Constitutional Liberties and we are currently circulating a letter to organizations about the privacy violations involved in the drug war. This letter does not call for legalization at all, it simply brings forth important privacy related issues. With this letter, we are calling for the Senate Judiciary Committee to ask the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy nominee, John Walters, if he will protect privacy. Please consider signing on and perhaps sending it to your list. Thanks! Email Hannah Woody at hwoody(a)freecongress.org <mailto:hwoody@freecongress.org> with your name and business/organization. Coalition for Constitutional Liberties A project of the Free Congress Foundation's Center for Technology Policy 717 Second Street NE * Washington, DC 20002 * (202) 546-3000 * Fax (202) 543-5605 http://www.freecongress.org/ September 3, 2001 Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Ranking Member Senate Judiciary Committee United States Senate 224 Dirksen Office Building Washington, DC 20510 Re: Nomination of John Walters Dear Chairman Leahy, Senator Hatch and Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee: We are part of a broad coalition of groups concerned that the War on Drugs has degraded our privacy and civil liberties. We respectfully ask that the members of Committee consider raising the following privacy and civil liberties issues in connection with the nomination of John Walters to be the Director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (Office of the White House). We intend by issuing this letter to signal neither support nor opposition to Mr. Walters' nomination. Rather, we hope are issuing the letter to urge members of the Committee to explore these issues in connection with Mr. Walters' nomination. As we set forth below, these issues include the use of new surveillance and investigative technologies, including the Carnivore/DCS1000 and Echelon systems, the "Know Your Customer" proposal of the Financial Action Task Force, asset forfeiture abuses, wiretaps and the drug war's sometimes corrupting influence on law enforcement itself. Rapid advances in technology have unfortunately brought with them new opportunities for the invasion of privacy in the form of programs like Carnivore, a system designed to allow the FBI to sift through vast quantities of Internet communications, or "Know Your Customer," -a proposed regulation requiring banks to collect personal financial information about their customers, "profile" them, and report "suspicious activities" to the Government. The misguided drug war is often a driving force behind these initiatives. "Know Your Customer" was prompted largely to further the drug war by combating drug-related money laundering. The FBI claims that Carnivore helps in narcotic investigations. We are concerned that "profiling," including racial profiling, appears to be an accepted component of the federal government's war on drugs. As noted by Georgetown University Law professor David Cole, characteristics of "drug courier profiles" used by U.S. Customs at airports have included: * Arrived late at night. * Arrived early in the morning. * Arrived in afternoon ... * One of first to deplane. * One of last to deplane. * Deplaned in the middle ... * Bought coach ticket. * Bought first class ticket ... * Used one-way ticket. * Used round-trip ticket ... * Traveled alone. * Traveled with a companion ... * Wore expensive clothing. * Dressed casually ... * Suspect was Hispanic. * Suspect was black female. In short, everyone anywhere at any time could fit the profile of a drug courier according to U.S. Customs officials. Court records confirm that highway patrol officers both in California and in New Jersey were taught to profile automobile drivers using minority status as an excuse to stop them, search their car, and in some cases, find drugs, a process known as racial profiling. In fact, civil rights organizations have charged that the DEA's own Operation Pipeline actually trains state and local law enforcement agents to engage in racial profiling. The extent to which our drug policy drives government surveillance and invasion of privacy is especially clear in the case of wiretaps. Three quarters of all wiretaps are authorized for narcotics investigations. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts reports that annually approximately 80 percent of conversations intercepted on wiretaps are innocent communications. In addition to government surveillance, there has been an increasing effort to have private businesses monitor their customers in order to fight the drug war. In the case of the "Know Your Customer" proposal now being resurrected by the FATF, the government attempts to force customer monitoring through regulation. More and more often, the DEA is using financial incentives to induce businesses to report personal information about their customers to the government. This undermines both consumer privacy and businesses' relationships with their customers. In April, the Albuquerque Journal reported that Amtrak was providing access to its ticketing database to the Drug Enforcement Administration. Amtrak provided agents with information such as passengers' last names, their destinations, their method of payment, and whether they were going on a round trip or only one-way. In return, Amtrak was given 10% of anything the government seized. Although controversy led Amtrak to discontinue the DEA's computer access, the company still provides information gleaned from the ticketing system to law enforcement officers and continues to receive a portion of assets seized on trains by agents. Several airlines reportedly have similar "cash for snooping and snitching" programs. The Amtrak case demonstrates the degree to which forfeiture laws are giving an incentive for law enforcement and private businesses to focus on seizing property supposedly related to drug crimes. The system is still very susceptible to abuse and one does not have to be convicted of a crime before their property is taken. Before the passage of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Act of 2000, which addressed some of the more egregious abuses, eighty percent of people who had property forfeited were never charged with a crime. While this number will likely become lower because of the reforms, the abuse of forfeiture laws continues. As reports (some of which were initiated by members of this Committee), have shown, the war on drugs has had a corrupting influence on the professionalism of law enforcement; one March 1999 GAO report described the problem as a "serious and continuing threat." We urge you to raise these issues with Mr. Walters and ask for assurances that he will reform the conduct of the drug war in order to address these problems and ensure that drug policies respect the privacy and other civil liberties of all Americans. If you have any questions or would like to discuss these issues further, please contact J. Bradley Jansen of the Free Congress Foundation at 202-204-5324 or by email at bjansen(a)freecongress.org <mailto:bjansen@freecongress.org> . Respectfully, Paul M. Weyrich Founder and President Free Congress Foundation Lisa S. Dean Vice President for Technology Policy Free Congress Foundation Grover Norquist Karen Kerrigan President Chairman Americans for Tax Reform Small Business Survival Committee Tom DeWeese David Banisar President Deputy Director American Policy Center Privacy International, London Amy Ridenour Chuck Muth, Chairman President Michael D. Ostrolenk, Capital Hill Liason The National Center for Public Policy Research Republican Liberty Caucus Gordon S. Jones Eric E. Sterling President Association of Concerned Taxpayers The Criminal Justice Policy Foundation Dr. Jane Orient, M.D. Carol W. LaGrasse Executive Director President Association of American Physicians and Surgeons Property Rights Foundation of America, Inc. Larry Cirignano Joseph Eldred President President and Founder CatholicVote.org God Bless America Dr. Alexander Tabarrok,Vice James Landrith Vice President and Director of Research Editor and Publisher The Independent Institute The Multiracial Activist & Abolitionist Examiner Benjamin Crocker Works Hank Whitmore Executive Director Chairman The Strategic Issues Research Institute of the United States People Against Church Taxation Eric Johnson Audrey Mullen Chairman Consultant Young Americans for Freedom Advocacy Ink Dottie Feder Miriam Archer Vice President Director of Operations Eagle Forum of Wisconsin Christian Coalition of California Ronald D. Bain Robert D. Lonn Former Chairman Consultant/Planner Libertarian Party of Colorado NW Council of Government & Associates Patricia J. Owens Peter J. LaGrasse Executive Director Chairman Wisconsin State Sovereignty Coalition Board of Assessors (New York) Duane Royal Galen E. Alexander Sampson County Republican Executive Committee (North Carolina) Founder & Chairman Ohio Conservative Alliance Victoria T. DeLacy Prince William & Manassas Family Alliance (Virginia) Warren Nelson Founder & Commander Helen E. Farson Ector County Volunteers (Tennessee) Phonetic Bible Printing Committee Roy S. Gillinson, M.D. ************************************************************************** Subscribe to Freematt's Alerts: Pro-Individual Rights Issues Send a blank message to: freematt(a)coil.com with the words subscribe FA on the subject line. List is private and moderated (7-30 messages per week) Matthew Gaylor, (614) 313-5722 ICQ: 106212065 Archived at http://groups.yahoo.com/group/fa/ **************************************************************************

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Re: [gsc] Fwd: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon
by info 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear Robert, > mailing list. In fact, as I recall I once discussed with John Gilmore > after a Bay Area Cypherpunks Physical Meeting whether he would pay > me to > implement some sort of solution to spam, but we didn't agree on a > strategy. Damnit, Zooko, it's all your fault! (I'll try to resist forwarding my next thousand spams received to you. lol) Friend Venkat and I wrote a paper on self-extending wireless networks based on the concept of micro (or perhaps nano) payments for moving digits across a given router. Setting payments very high would reduce traffic, of course. There's also the concept of charging to receive e-mails. A person could have a fee, say, $100 for receiving e-mails from unknown third parties. I can white list friends and family (well, some family) and charge them nothing. People who really want me to see something can pay the fee. People with a lot of time can set the fee very low, perhaps make some money. > Hey, the future is long. (We hope.) The future is long and mankind's ingenuity is infinite. Life is good while the bad times come not. >> One of the larger reasons is that despite a lot of smart people >> working on micropayments, we have nothing approaching a system that >> will work for billions of tranactions per day, where 90% of the >> purported payments are bogus, along with the lack of any interface to >> the real world financial system that would scale and withstand the >> predictable attacks. Actually, we had such a system, and we called it e-gold. It could offer a millionth of a yen's worth of gold as a micropayment. It had great payment validity. And there were many people providing interfaces to the real world financial network. The government came in and broke it in December 2005, couldn't figure out why they were there, and came back and broke it again in April 2007. It remains broken, and the government people involved (some of whom are reading this list) are despicable thugs who should be ashamed of themselves and commit suicide to regain some semblance of honor. Nevertheless, it worked. Sidd, what's the micro-est payment I can make on Pecunix? I know you support currencies like the Yen, but how many digits after the decimal? Obviously, there's no reason you couldn't make an arbitrarily large number, like ten, or twelve available. I should note that Pecunix has a proven interface with Goldmoney, via bailment and redemption. > Coincidentally, I just blogged today about how we are much closer to > this now than we were then, even though none of the smart people that > you were probably thinking of are involved in the new deployments: > http://testgrid.allmydata.org:3567/uri/URI:DIR2-RO:j74uhg25nwdpjpacl6rkat2y… That's a very, very long URL. > WoW-gold, for example, appears to have at least millions of > transactions > a day. Does anyone have more detail about the scale and scope of > these > currencies? Worlds of Warcraft gold is a virtual only currency, though various secondary markets exist for things one might want in the game. The only thing that would scare me away from checking it out is reading that Graham Kelly loves it, is selling lots of it, has checked out the owners through his private investigators, and is meeting with them soon. He said much the same about OSGold, INTgold, Stormpay, Brightpay, Notsobrightpay, Reallyquitedullpay, but I exaggerate. >> My white paper could use a little updating, but the basic conclusions >> remain sound: >> >> http://www.taugh.com/epostage.pdf > Thanks! I'll read this. Me, three. Can you feed this message back their way, Robert? Kevin, is Comoro.net ready for prime time? Regards, Jim

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[Dewayne-Net] Airport ID checks legally enforced?
by Dewayne Hendricks 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Airport ID checks legally enforced? By Declan McCullagh <http://news.com.com/Airport+ID+checks+legally+enforced/ 2100-7348_3-5987820.html> Story last modified Thu Dec 08 12:40:00 PST 2005 SAN FRANCISCO--A federal appeals court wrestled Thursday with what seems to be a straightforward question: Can Americans be required to show ID on a commercial airline flight? John Gilmore, an early employee of Sun Microsystems and co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, says the answer should be "no." The libertarian millionaire sued the Bush administration, which claims that the ID requirement is necessary for security but has refused to identify any actual regulation requiring it. A three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals seemed skeptical of the Bush administration's defense of secret laws and regulations but stopped short of suggesting that such a rule would be necessarily unconstitutional. "How do we know there's an order?" Judge Thomas Nelson asked. "Because you said there was?" Replied Joshua Waldman, a staff attorney for the Department of Justice: "We couldn't confirm or deny the existence of an order." Even though government regulations required his silence, Waldman said, the situation did seem a "bit peculiar." "This is America," said James Harrison, a lawyer representing Gilmore. "We do not have secret laws. Period." Harrison stressed that Gilmore was happy to go through a metal detector. Gilmore sued the federal government after being told he could not fly without ID from Oakland, Calif., to Washington, D.C., which he said he was doing to exercise his First Amendment right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. U.S. District Judge Susan Illston dismissed (PDF) his case in March 2004, ruling that Gilmore had "numerous other methods of reaching Washington." Oral arguments on Thursday, which lasted about 40 minutes, returned repeatedly to that point. Judge Richard Paez suggested that when your ID is requested at an airport, "You can always leave." Waldman, the Justice Department attorney, said that as long as no commercial airline flight is required, Americans "can assemble wherever they want. They can petition wherever they want." He added, "I'm not aware of any right to travel anonymously." Two cases that were mentioned on Thursday could provide a glimpse into how the appeals court will rule. In one, decided in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that police could arrest anyone they stopped who refused to show ID. In the other, U.S. v. Davis, the 9th Circuit said in 1973 that airport searches were permissible as a form of administrative screening. It's unclear what will happen next. Because of a procedural twist involving lawsuits against federal agencies, the district court concluded that only an appeals court enjoys authority to resolve some aspects of the dispute. But the 9th Circuit judges also could, if they side with Gilmore, send the case back to the lower court for a full trial. On the courthouse steps after the arguments, Gilmore said he felt confident about the case and welcomed a verbal concession from the Justice Department. "I was glad the government admitted it was 'peculiar' and Orwellian to make secret laws," Gilmore said. The Justice Department has said it could identify the secret law under seal, which would be available to the 9th Circuit but not necessarily Gilmore's lawyers. But any public description would not be permitted, the department said. Weblog at: <http://weblog.warpspeed.com> ------------------------------------- You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org To manage your subscription, go to http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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[IP] Airport ID checks legally enforced?
by David Farber 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Begin forwarded message:

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Re: [gsc] Fwd: Proof of Work -> atmospheric carbon
by info 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear Robert, > mailing list. In fact, as I recall I once discussed with John Gilmore > after a Bay Area Cypherpunks Physical Meeting whether he would pay > me to > implement some sort of solution to spam, but we didn't agree on a > strategy. Damnit, Zooko, it's all your fault! (I'll try to resist forwarding my next thousand spams received to you. lol) Friend Venkat and I wrote a paper on self-extending wireless networks based on the concept of micro (or perhaps nano) payments for moving digits across a given router. Setting payments very high would reduce traffic, of course. There's also the concept of charging to receive e-mails. A person could have a fee, say, $100 for receiving e-mails from unknown third parties. I can white list friends and family (well, some family) and charge them nothing. People who really want me to see something can pay the fee. People with a lot of time can set the fee very low, perhaps make some money. > Hey, the future is long. (We hope.) The future is long and mankind's ingenuity is infinite. Life is good while the bad times come not. >> One of the larger reasons is that despite a lot of smart people >> working on micropayments, we have nothing approaching a system that >> will work for billions of tranactions per day, where 90% of the >> purported payments are bogus, along with the lack of any interface to >> the real world financial system that would scale and withstand the >> predictable attacks. Actually, we had such a system, and we called it e-gold. It could offer a millionth of a yen's worth of gold as a micropayment. It had great payment validity. And there were many people providing interfaces to the real world financial network. The government came in and broke it in December 2005, couldn't figure out why they were there, and came back and broke it again in April 2007. It remains broken, and the government people involved (some of whom are reading this list) are despicable thugs who should be ashamed of themselves and commit suicide to regain some semblance of honor. Nevertheless, it worked. Sidd, what's the micro-est payment I can make on Pecunix? I know you support currencies like the Yen, but how many digits after the decimal? Obviously, there's no reason you couldn't make an arbitrarily large number, like ten, or twelve available. I should note that Pecunix has a proven interface with Goldmoney, via bailment and redemption. > Coincidentally, I just blogged today about how we are much closer to > this now than we were then, even though none of the smart people that > you were probably thinking of are involved in the new deployments: > http://testgrid.allmydata.org:3567/uri/URI:DIR2-RO:j74uhg25nwdpjpacl6rkat2y… That's a very, very long URL. > WoW-gold, for example, appears to have at least millions of > transactions > a day. Does anyone have more detail about the scale and scope of > these > currencies? Worlds of Warcraft gold is a virtual only currency, though various secondary markets exist for things one might want in the game. The only thing that would scare me away from checking it out is reading that Graham Kelly loves it, is selling lots of it, has checked out the owners through his private investigators, and is meeting with them soon. He said much the same about OSGold, INTgold, Stormpay, Brightpay, Notsobrightpay, Reallyquitedullpay, but I exaggerate. >> My white paper could use a little updating, but the basic conclusions >> remain sound: >> >> http://www.taugh.com/epostage.pdf > Thanks! I'll read this. Me, three. Can you feed this message back their way, Robert? Kevin, is Comoro.net ready for prime time? Regards, Jim

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