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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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[WIKILEAKS] Change you can download: a billion in secret Congressional reports
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[the first sentence of the previous message was cut off; this is a resend] WIKILEAKS PRESS RELEASE Sat Feb 8 02:27:22 GMT 2009 For immediate release. "Change you can download" Wikileaks has released nearly a billion dollars worth of quasi-secret reports commissioned by the United States Congress. The 6,780 reports, current as of this month, comprise over 127,000 pages of material on some of the most contentious issues in the nation, from the U.S. relationship with Israel to abortion legislation. Nearly 2,300 of the reports were updated in the last 12 months, while the oldest report goes back to 1996. The release represents the total output of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) electronically available to Congressional offices. The CRS is Congress's analytical agency and has a budget in excess of $100M per year. Open government lawmakers such as Senators John McCain (R-Arizona) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vermont) have fought for years make the reports public, with bills being introduced--and rejected--almost every year since 1998. CRS reports are highly regarded as non-partisan, in-depth, and timely. The reports top the list of the "10 Most-Wanted Government Documents" compiled by the Washington based Center for Democracy and Technology[1]. The Federation of American Scientists, in pushing for the reports to be made public, stated that the "CRS is Congress' Brain and it's useful for the public to be plugged into it,"[2]. While Wired magazine called their concealment "The biggest Congressional scandal of the digital age"[3]. Although all CRS reports are legally in the public domain, they are quasi-secret because the CRS, as a matter of policy, makes the reports available only to members of Congress, Congressional committees and select sister agencies such as the GAO. Members of Congress are free to selectively release CRS reports to the public but are only motivated to do so when they feel the results would assist them politically. Universally embarrassing reports are kept quiet. Each time the topic of opening up the reports comes up, it runs into walls erected by opposing lawmakers such as Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), who "like many members of Congress, views CRS as an extension of his staff,". If the reports were made public, "every time a member requests a particular document, the public may infer that he's staking out a particular policy position." (Aaron Saunders, Stevens' spokesman, Washington Post, 2007)[4]. However that hasn't stopped a grey market forming around the documents. Opportunists smuggle out nearly all reports and sell them to cashed up special interests--lobbyists, law firms, multi-nationals, and presumably, foreign governments. Congress has turned a blind eye to special interest access, while continuing to vote down public access. Opposition to public availability comes not only from members of Congress but, also, from within the CRS. One might think that the CRS, as an agency of the Library of Congress, would institutionally support having a wider audience. But an internal memo reveals the CRS lobbying against the idea and opposing bills (S. Res. 54 and H.R. 3630) which would have given the public access to its reports (Project on Government Secrecy, FAS, 2003)[5]. The first line pushed by the CRS is the one that appeals most to Congressional members--open publication would prevent spin control. The memo states this in delicate terms, referring to such spin failures as "Impairment of Member Communication with Constituents". Of course the CRS doesn't really care about politicians facing much needed voter discipline, but it does have reasons of its own to avoid public oversight. Institutionally, the CRS has established an advisory relationship with members of Congress similar to the oversight-free relationship established between intelligence agencies and the office of the President. Free from meaningful public oversight of its work, the CRS, as "Congress's brain", is able to influence Congressional outcomes, even when its reports contain errors. Arguably, its institutional power over congress is second only to the parties themselves. Public oversight would reduce its ability to exercise that influence without criticism. That is why it opposes such oversight, and that is why such oversight must be established immediately. In 1913 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, a forceful proponent for open government, stated "Sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman". Those wise words are still true today. Welcome, Congress, to our generation's electric sun. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Change_you_can_download:_a_billion_in_secret_Cong… +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[WIKILEAKS] Change you can download: a billion in secret Congressional reports
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

[the first sentence of the previous message was cut off; this is a resend] WIKILEAKS PRESS RELEASE Sat Feb 8 02:27:22 GMT 2009 For immediate release. "Change you can download" Wikileaks has released nearly a billion dollars worth of quasi-secret reports commissioned by the United States Congress. The 6,780 reports, current as of this month, comprise over 127,000 pages of material on some of the most contentious issues in the nation, from the U.S. relationship with Israel to abortion legislation. Nearly 2,300 of the reports were updated in the last 12 months, while the oldest report goes back to 1996. The release represents the total output of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) electronically available to Congressional offices. The CRS is Congress's analytical agency and has a budget in excess of $100M per year. Open government lawmakers such as Senators John McCain (R-Arizona) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vermont) have fought for years make the reports public, with bills being introduced--and rejected--almost every year since 1998. CRS reports are highly regarded as non-partisan, in-depth, and timely. The reports top the list of the "10 Most-Wanted Government Documents" compiled by the Washington based Center for Democracy and Technology[1]. The Federation of American Scientists, in pushing for the reports to be made public, stated that the "CRS is Congress' Brain and it's useful for the public to be plugged into it,"[2]. While Wired magazine called their concealment "The biggest Congressional scandal of the digital age"[3]. Although all CRS reports are legally in the public domain, they are quasi-secret because the CRS, as a matter of policy, makes the reports available only to members of Congress, Congressional committees and select sister agencies such as the GAO. Members of Congress are free to selectively release CRS reports to the public but are only motivated to do so when they feel the results would assist them politically. Universally embarrassing reports are kept quiet. Each time the topic of opening up the reports comes up, it runs into walls erected by opposing lawmakers such as Sen. Ted Stevens (R-Alaska), who "like many members of Congress, views CRS as an extension of his staff,". If the reports were made public, "every time a member requests a particular document, the public may infer that he's staking out a particular policy position." (Aaron Saunders, Stevens' spokesman, Washington Post, 2007)[4]. However that hasn't stopped a grey market forming around the documents. Opportunists smuggle out nearly all reports and sell them to cashed up special interests--lobbyists, law firms, multi-nationals, and presumably, foreign governments. Congress has turned a blind eye to special interest access, while continuing to vote down public access. Opposition to public availability comes not only from members of Congress but, also, from within the CRS. One might think that the CRS, as an agency of the Library of Congress, would institutionally support having a wider audience. But an internal memo reveals the CRS lobbying against the idea and opposing bills (S. Res. 54 and H.R. 3630) which would have given the public access to its reports (Project on Government Secrecy, FAS, 2003)[5]. The first line pushed by the CRS is the one that appeals most to Congressional members--open publication would prevent spin control. The memo states this in delicate terms, referring to such spin failures as "Impairment of Member Communication with Constituents". Of course the CRS doesn't really care about politicians facing much needed voter discipline, but it does have reasons of its own to avoid public oversight. Institutionally, the CRS has established an advisory relationship with members of Congress similar to the oversight-free relationship established between intelligence agencies and the office of the President. Free from meaningful public oversight of its work, the CRS, as "Congress's brain", is able to influence Congressional outcomes, even when its reports contain errors. Arguably, its institutional power over congress is second only to the parties themselves. Public oversight would reduce its ability to exercise that influence without criticism. That is why it opposes such oversight, and that is why such oversight must be established immediately. In 1913 Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis, a forceful proponent for open government, stated "Sunlight is the best disinfectant; electric light the most efficient policeman". Those wise words are still true today. Welcome, Congress, to our generation's electric sun. http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Change_you_can_download:_a_billion_in_secret_Cong… +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[liberationtech] On satellite phones
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, We've talked a bit about sat phone security on this list - I'm glad that these guys have made their research public: http://cryptanalysis.eu/blog/2012/02/02/dont-trust-satellite-phones-the-gmr… "In a nutshell, they were able to reverse engineer and to break the secret ciphers used in many satellite phone systems, namely the GMR-1 and the GMR-2 ciphers." I hope that their research helps to put these questions about sat phone security to rest. They did an amazing job. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

1 0

Call for input to President's Commission on Enhancing Cybersecurity - bridging the trust gap between the IT community and the US government
by Herb Lin 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Dear IPers - You may know that President Obama has established a commission to consider how to strengthen cybersecurity in both the public and private sectors while protecting privacy, ensuring public safety and economic and national security, fostering discovery and development of new technical solutions, and bolstering partnerships between Federal, State, and local government and the private sector in the development, promotion, and use of cybersecurity technologies, policies, and best practices. (See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/02/09/executive-order-comm….) I am one of the 12 designated commissioners. Recognizing that trust is hard to build and easy to destroy (and a variety of things have happened over the last 20 years have occurred to do the latter), one issue that has come up is the enormous gap of trust between the U.S. government and the information technology (IT) community, from which many IPers are drawn. This rift is not helpful to either side, and I'd like to solicit input from the IP community about what you think the government can do or refrain from doing to help bridge that gap. It would be most helpful if you could three things in your response: 1 - Your best examples of things the government (and what part of the US government) has done to alienate the IT community specifically. (Or, at the very least, show how the examples you provide connect to the interests of the IT community.) 2 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the short and medium term (i.e., 0-10 year time frame) that would help bridge the trust gap. If your answer is "Don't do dumb things!", it would be better and more useful to provide *examples* of what not to do. 3 - Things that the U.S. government could realistically do in the longer term to do the same. Please send your responses to CENCinput1(a)gmail.com. (I set up this email address, but I'd like to keep the traffic separate from my non-Commission work email.) I promise to read as many as I can individually and share what I learn with the commission membership. Also, feel free to circulate this call for input to anyone else you feel would want to comment. Thanks much Herb ======================================================================= Herb Lin Senior Research Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation Research Fellow, Hoover Institution Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 USA herblin(a)stanford.edu 650-497-8600 office || 202-841-0525 cell || 202-540-9878 fax AIM herblin (any time you see me) Skype herbert_lin (usually by appointment) Twitter @HerbLinCyber This message was sent to the list address and trashed, but can be found online. - - - End forwarded message - - -

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[liberationtech] On satellite phones
by Jacob Appelbaum 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hi, We've talked a bit about sat phone security on this list - I'm glad that these guys have made their research public: http://cryptanalysis.eu/blog/2012/02/02/dont-trust-satellite-phones-the-gmr… "In a nutshell, they were able to reverse engineer and to break the secret ciphers used in many satellite phone systems, namely the GMR-1 and the GMR-2 ciphers." I hope that their research helps to put these questions about sat phone security to rest. They did an amazing job. All the best, Jacob _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list liberationtech(a)lists.stanford.edu Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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