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Matt Blaze blog entry about NSA warrantless wiretapping
by Perry E. Metzger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Interesting reading: http://www.crypto.com/blog/metatapping/ -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[WIKILEAKS] Big Trouble in Little Paradise: the Turks and Caicos Islands takeover
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

WIKILEAKS PRESS RELEASE Sun Jul 19 20:28:57 GMT 2009 "Big Trouble in Little Paradise: the Turks and Caicos Islands takeover" WikiLeaks has released a suppressed report laying at the center of UK plans to seize direct control of the Turks & Caicos Islands, a popular Caribbean tourist destination and tax haven. A British warship on patrol in the Caribbean sea, the HMS Iron Duke, is expected to support the takeover once the report is released.[1] Following corruption allegations last year made against the Islands' political elite, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) commissioned Sir Robin Auld to head up a Turks & Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry. Come March this year, and the release of an interim report, the Commission found itself in court, with the release of the full findings injuncted. As a conclusion to that action, yesterday, the Commission briefly released on its website what it called its Redacted Final Report[2]. According to the Commission's accompanying press release, the- Governor's redaction results from the direction of the Hon Chief Justice Gordon Ward in the current litigation between Mario Hoffmann and Cem Kinay against the Governor and me (and an assurance given by the Hon Attorney General in proceedings brought by Jak Civre). Yet only hours later, the 266 page report was removed. WikiLeaks has obtained the full report-and restored the redacted text. Included in the redactions are the findings relating to ex-Premier Misick, Hall and Hanchell. Based on the report there does appear to be genuine grounds for the corruption allegations. Yet it is not clear that the Turks & Caicos Islands is an exceptional case. Many British protectorates have corrupt leadership, which means that the FCO can pick and choose its interventions at whim, something that corrupt but assertive leadership in British protectorates such as Bermuda must be noting with alarm. Whether the leaders of such former colonies choose to stop looting their countries or choose to placate the U.K. government in other ways remains to be seen, but it is clear which way the incentives lay. Source document: * Turks and Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry into grand corruption, Final Report, unredacted, 18 Jul 2009: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Turks_and_Caicos_Islands_Commission_of_Inquiry_in… References: 1. -^ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6626641.ece 2. -^ http://www.tci-inquiry.org/ Online at: http://tinyurl.com/wlislands Enquiries: julian(a)ljsf.org +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [Mac_crypto] MacOS X (Panther) FileVault
by Nicko van Someren 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 13 Nov 2003, at 5:12, David Shayer wrote: > I was told that FileVault replaces your home directory with an > encrypted disk image, much like PGP Disk, so its probably blockwise > underneath the file system layer. Files in your home directory are > copied into the disk image, and some file system links redirect calls > to the home directory to the disk image, and keep the user from seeing > it as another mounted disk. This is basically correct. FileVault uses an auto-mounting version of the encrypted disk image facility that was in 10.2, tweaked to allow the image to be opened even before your main key chain is available (since the key chain is stored inside your home directory). The standard encrypted image format uses a random key stored on your key chain, which is itself encrypted with a salted and hashed copy of the keychain pass phrase, which defaults to your login password. My suspicion is that for the FileVault there is some other key chain file in the system folder which stores the key for decrypting your home directory disk image and that the pass phrase for that is just your login password. > File Vault will automatically expand or contract the disk image at > certain points. It creates a new image, copies everything over, and > deletes the old image. Yup, it essentially does an "hdiutil compact" command when you log out. > I don't know what mode of AES-128 it uses. I believe that it uses counter mode, since it's efficient when doing random access to the encrypted data. Nicko _______________________________________________ mac_crypto mailing list mac_crypto(a)vmeng.com http://www.vmeng.com/mailman/listinfo/mac_crypto --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Matt Blaze blog entry about NSA warrantless wiretapping
by Perry E. Metzger 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Interesting reading: http://www.crypto.com/blog/metatapping/ -- Perry E. Metzger perry(a)piermont.com --------------------------------------------------------------------- The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo(a)metzdowd.com ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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[WIKILEAKS] Big Trouble in Little Paradise: the Turks and Caicos Islands takeover
by Wikileaks Press Office 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

WIKILEAKS PRESS RELEASE Sun Jul 19 20:28:57 GMT 2009 "Big Trouble in Little Paradise: the Turks and Caicos Islands takeover" WikiLeaks has released a suppressed report laying at the center of UK plans to seize direct control of the Turks & Caicos Islands, a popular Caribbean tourist destination and tax haven. A British warship on patrol in the Caribbean sea, the HMS Iron Duke, is expected to support the takeover once the report is released.[1] Following corruption allegations last year made against the Islands' political elite, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) commissioned Sir Robin Auld to head up a Turks & Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry. Come March this year, and the release of an interim report, the Commission found itself in court, with the release of the full findings injuncted. As a conclusion to that action, yesterday, the Commission briefly released on its website what it called its Redacted Final Report[2]. According to the Commission's accompanying press release, the- Governor's redaction results from the direction of the Hon Chief Justice Gordon Ward in the current litigation between Mario Hoffmann and Cem Kinay against the Governor and me (and an assurance given by the Hon Attorney General in proceedings brought by Jak Civre). Yet only hours later, the 266 page report was removed. WikiLeaks has obtained the full report-and restored the redacted text. Included in the redactions are the findings relating to ex-Premier Misick, Hall and Hanchell. Based on the report there does appear to be genuine grounds for the corruption allegations. Yet it is not clear that the Turks & Caicos Islands is an exceptional case. Many British protectorates have corrupt leadership, which means that the FCO can pick and choose its interventions at whim, something that corrupt but assertive leadership in British protectorates such as Bermuda must be noting with alarm. Whether the leaders of such former colonies choose to stop looting their countries or choose to placate the U.K. government in other ways remains to be seen, but it is clear which way the incentives lay. Source document: * Turks and Caicos Islands Commission of Inquiry into grand corruption, Final Report, unredacted, 18 Jul 2009: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Turks_and_Caicos_Islands_Commission_of_Inquiry_in… References: 1. -^ http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article6626641.ece 2. -^ http://www.tci-inquiry.org/ Online at: http://tinyurl.com/wlislands Enquiries: julian(a)ljsf.org +-------------------------------------------------- | Why you receive this mail and what to do with it: | | You are receiving this mail because you were invited to | the Wikileaks Press Release list run by the transparency group Sunshine Press. | | Releases ensure you are aware, before the rest of the world, | of significant geopolitical and other disclosures released | by Wikileaks, an international platform for the first release of | of classified, confidential or censored materials of political, | diplomatic, ethical or historical interest. | | We rely on you to distribute the content of this mail to your | community, industry, press and regulators, to defend us in your | country and to invite people of integrity and commitment via | via https://lists.riseup.net/www/subscribe/wl-press | | Our materials range from secret Guantanamo documents to political | assassinations to confidential reports of children's hospital | corruption, and have spawned tens of thousands of press articles, | many reforms and changed electoral outcomes. | | Releases average one per week but can be higher or lower depending on | events. You can easily set the frequency to monthly or change your | subscription via https://lists.riseup.net/www/sendpasswd/ | | If you know people that have access to sensitive documents of public | interest, tell them about us. We have an unbroken record of protecting | sensitive sources and defeating censorship attacks from all corners of the globe. | See https://secure.wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Submissions | | If you are about to release an investigative report or article, we can release the | underlaying source material concurrently to substantiate the allegations, | draw attention away from the true source, deflect legal or censorship | attacks and promote secondary investigations and public awareness. | | Live bank-grade encrypted chat to the office is available via | https://secure.wikileaks.org/chat/irc2.cgi (multiple languages spoken) | | Inquiries for speaking engagements, comment, interventions, | investigations, source-protection and censorship consultations | may be addressed to http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | If you are serious about analysis, translation, | legal, coding, network, financial or other contributions, please contact | us via: http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Wikileaks:Contact | | See http://wikileaks.org for all other information and | https://secure.wikileaks.org for secure access. ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [Mac_crypto] MacOS X (Panther) FileVault
by Nicko van Someren 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

On 13 Nov 2003, at 5:12, David Shayer wrote: > I was told that FileVault replaces your home directory with an > encrypted disk image, much like PGP Disk, so its probably blockwise > underneath the file system layer. Files in your home directory are > copied into the disk image, and some file system links redirect calls > to the home directory to the disk image, and keep the user from seeing > it as another mounted disk. This is basically correct. FileVault uses an auto-mounting version of the encrypted disk image facility that was in 10.2, tweaked to allow the image to be opened even before your main key chain is available (since the key chain is stored inside your home directory). The standard encrypted image format uses a random key stored on your key chain, which is itself encrypted with a salted and hashed copy of the keychain pass phrase, which defaults to your login password. My suspicion is that for the FileVault there is some other key chain file in the system folder which stores the key for decrypting your home directory disk image and that the pass phrase for that is just your login password. > File Vault will automatically expand or contract the disk image at > certain points. It creates a new image, copies everything over, and > deletes the old image. Yup, it essentially does an "hdiutil compact" command when you log out. > I don't know what mode of AES-128 it uses. I believe that it uses counter mode, since it's efficient when doing random access to the encrypted data. Nicko _______________________________________________ mac_crypto mailing list mac_crypto(a)vmeng.com http://www.vmeng.com/mailman/listinfo/mac_crypto --- end forwarded text -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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Re: [cryptography] "Meet the groundbreaking new encryption app set to revolutionize privacy..."
by Thierry Moreau 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

ianG wrote: > > [Hushmail design] isn't > perfect but it was a whole lot better than futzing around with OpenPGP > keys and manual decrypting. And it was the latter 'risk' view that won, > Hushmail filled that niche between the hard core pgp community, and the > people who did business and needed an easy tool. > > Don't be suspicious, be curious -- this is where security is at. > > Human rights reporters already put their life on the line. Your mission > is not to protect their life absolutely, One design aspect seems missing from the high-level discussion: how do you define the security mechanism failure mode? You have basically two options: connect with an insecure protocol, or do not connect at all. If it's a life-preserving application, this question should be addressed explicitly. A "fail safe" system may be either way, but stakeholders should know which way. Airplane pilots are trained according to the failure mode of each aircraft subsystem. E.g. if two-way radio fails, the pilot may remain confident (from an indication on the cockpit) that the air traffic controller (ATC) still sees the aircraft identifier on the radar (see Wikipedia entry for transponder) during the emergency landing. Thus the decision to land at the major airport (instead of a secondary airport with less traffic in conflict but lower grade facilities) is taken based on the "fail-safe" property of the aircraft-to-ATC communications subsystem. Regards, -- - Thierry Moreau _______________________________________________ cryptography mailing list cryptography(a)randombit.net http://lists.randombit.net/mailman/listinfo/cryptography ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Some legal trouble with TOR in France
by Olivier Barbut 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Hello dear tor talkers, I'm running the tor router "mini", located in paris, france, and I believe I have to share with you what happened to me last wednesday,the 10th of May. My router was an outside gateway, doing request for tor anonymous users. Last wednesday morning, at 7:45, three cops did knock at my door. They suspected me to have downloaded some child porn videos. As I was waking up, I understood it was tor-related. I did explain them I was a TOR outside gateway, but they didn't knew about it. They searched everywhere in my small home and took every support they could find: hard drives they removed from computers, cds, disks, and then they took me to the police station, at the child protection service, jailing me the whole day while they was searching my hard drives and cds for traces of the video they was looking for. They did asked me if they was a way to trace back to the criminal who downloaded this child abuse video, but I told them "not in my knowledge" and "the tor network is designed to make this impossible, keeping no log of traffic". At 19:00, having not found these video, having learned more about tor and confirmated I was running it, they freed me, giving me back my cds and hard drives. It's sad the way some people use their freedom, e.g. participating in child abuse, but I'm still a strong believer in the necessity of anonymity on the internet. As I asked them, they did assure me they accessed my hard drives read-only, using hardware write disabler, but I still prefer not to run it straight from the hard drive they had in hand for the whole day as I know cops are not that trustable. The "mini" router will be back in a few days. Not getting paranoid, but using paranooa to make sane decisions ! Do you know if similar things did happenned to other routers ? If you wants some more details, or have advice for me please ask and /or give. Thanks everyone for making this possible ! Olivier Barbut ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE [demime 1.01d removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature which had a name of signature.asc]

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] distributed DNS
by Boaz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Okay, so the people who are working on various aspects of the problem of decentralized replacement for DNS can keep working, and the people who think that decentralized replacement for DNS is not possible or not worthwhile can keep thinking that. If there's something by way of decentralized DNS replacement good enough early enough to be included in the first release of freedom box, great, if not, fine. If not, then whenever (if ever) a decentralized DNS replacement emerges, it can be integrated into freedom box. In the meanwhile, we can implement a decentralized non-memorizeable system of addressing based on public keys, and use that optionally in parallel with regular DNS. I really think that non-memorizeable addresses are fine for most purposes, though clearly less than ideal. Since the address itself doesn't make representations about the person behind it, those claims are made in the actual body of the publicly accessible page. And these unwieldy names can be unauthenticated initially, until they are authenticated by a web of trust or ZRTP-style voice authentication. You can still send someone such an address electronically no problem. Also, you can find it by search. Imagine that you're looking for someone named John Doe. You type John Doe into the person search bar of the interface you use to interact with your freedom box. It contacts a web search engine and does a search for John Doe and the appropriate markup. It displays the results, you pick out the one claiming to be the John Doe you're looking for, and you contact him. Authentication can take place at a later time. And a human meaningful name can be assigned (by the person or by you) which your local agent can map to the unwieldy address (the petname approach). Realistically, we already rely on this all the time; a cellphone for example gives you a menu to choose between people whose actual routing addresses (phone numbers) it has remembered for you. Optionally, John Doe might also have a plain old domain name, which he can give you on a slip of paper at a party, which points to the same place as the non-memorizeable address. Again, since you don't trust the DNS provider as far as you can throw it, you'll authenticate in some way outside of the addressing. If we are going to place reliance on DNS, we would do well to make some arrangements for some DNS providers that are friendly to our needs (as people have been talking about what those are). I see these as being at least a subset of the desirable attributes for a "freedom-friendly" DNS provider: 1. Is incorporated and physically served out of a jurisdiction with relatively friendly laws. 2. Is committed to continue operating long haul. 3. Keeps no logs at all for longer than say, a week. 4. Will respond to any request for either information or denial of service which is not legally compulsory by saying shove off and informing the customer. 5. Will respond to any request for either information or denial of service which is legally compulsory by waiting the longest legal amount of time before complying and immediately informing the customer, unless not able to legally inform the customer. 6. If not able to legally inform the customer, will fight in legal channels for the freedom to inform the customer. 7. All of this is spelled out in a legally binding service agreement. But additionally, in order for people to have their own domains, it needs to cost way less in terms of both money and, more importantly, hassle than it currently does. Whatever arrangements we make for freedom box friendly DNS service should involve costing almost no to no money ($15 per year or whatever isn't a lot, but it is a lot compared to the unfree services which people are currently using completely free of charge). Maybe the cost of the first 10 years of DNS service from one of a whole list of participating service providers should be rolled up into the price of the device? Just a thought. Appropriate arrangements should also involve extremely low hassle domain registration. Something like, you choose a provider from a pull down menu, or type in one that you know about, type in your desired second (or lower) level domain, and hit enter, and it automatically contacts the provider, registers the domain, and points it to your box. Do people think that could be possible? Perhaps using lower level domains, as some have suggested? But more important, I think, than trying to find a good provider is to make it as easy as possible for people to switch from misbehaving providers. One feature that would help tremendously (especially if we're going to create a system of almost or completely free of charge, easy to register subdomains), one feature which a few people have already proposed, is a machine language for your box, using the proper cryptographic credentials, to inform your friends that you, who used to be found at foo.example.com, will now be found at foo.bar.net. In other words, your real identity as far as your friends are concerned is your key. Your domain name is just a way for your friends to find you in the network. If your domain name has changed, why should you need to tell your actual human friends about this. Just tell their boxes and let them take care of it. I wish I already had this feature for email. If I have an email address boaz(a)example.com, and example.com does something to upset me, and I hate example.com, and I never want to have any further dealings with those bastards at example.com, there's nothing I can do. I've already told three hundred people who I want to be able to contact me for all time, that my address is boaz(a)example.com. I'll have to keep monitoring boaz(a)example.com forever. Unless I want to do one of these terrible mass mailings that everyone hates (I've received several of these, and it's a sorry sight). _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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Re: [Freedombox-discuss] distributed DNS
by Boaz 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

Okay, so the people who are working on various aspects of the problem of decentralized replacement for DNS can keep working, and the people who think that decentralized replacement for DNS is not possible or not worthwhile can keep thinking that. If there's something by way of decentralized DNS replacement good enough early enough to be included in the first release of freedom box, great, if not, fine. If not, then whenever (if ever) a decentralized DNS replacement emerges, it can be integrated into freedom box. In the meanwhile, we can implement a decentralized non-memorizeable system of addressing based on public keys, and use that optionally in parallel with regular DNS. I really think that non-memorizeable addresses are fine for most purposes, though clearly less than ideal. Since the address itself doesn't make representations about the person behind it, those claims are made in the actual body of the publicly accessible page. And these unwieldy names can be unauthenticated initially, until they are authenticated by a web of trust or ZRTP-style voice authentication. You can still send someone such an address electronically no problem. Also, you can find it by search. Imagine that you're looking for someone named John Doe. You type John Doe into the person search bar of the interface you use to interact with your freedom box. It contacts a web search engine and does a search for John Doe and the appropriate markup. It displays the results, you pick out the one claiming to be the John Doe you're looking for, and you contact him. Authentication can take place at a later time. And a human meaningful name can be assigned (by the person or by you) which your local agent can map to the unwieldy address (the petname approach). Realistically, we already rely on this all the time; a cellphone for example gives you a menu to choose between people whose actual routing addresses (phone numbers) it has remembered for you. Optionally, John Doe might also have a plain old domain name, which he can give you on a slip of paper at a party, which points to the same place as the non-memorizeable address. Again, since you don't trust the DNS provider as far as you can throw it, you'll authenticate in some way outside of the addressing. If we are going to place reliance on DNS, we would do well to make some arrangements for some DNS providers that are friendly to our needs (as people have been talking about what those are). I see these as being at least a subset of the desirable attributes for a "freedom-friendly" DNS provider: 1. Is incorporated and physically served out of a jurisdiction with relatively friendly laws. 2. Is committed to continue operating long haul. 3. Keeps no logs at all for longer than say, a week. 4. Will respond to any request for either information or denial of service which is not legally compulsory by saying shove off and informing the customer. 5. Will respond to any request for either information or denial of service which is legally compulsory by waiting the longest legal amount of time before complying and immediately informing the customer, unless not able to legally inform the customer. 6. If not able to legally inform the customer, will fight in legal channels for the freedom to inform the customer. 7. All of this is spelled out in a legally binding service agreement. But additionally, in order for people to have their own domains, it needs to cost way less in terms of both money and, more importantly, hassle than it currently does. Whatever arrangements we make for freedom box friendly DNS service should involve costing almost no to no money ($15 per year or whatever isn't a lot, but it is a lot compared to the unfree services which people are currently using completely free of charge). Maybe the cost of the first 10 years of DNS service from one of a whole list of participating service providers should be rolled up into the price of the device? Just a thought. Appropriate arrangements should also involve extremely low hassle domain registration. Something like, you choose a provider from a pull down menu, or type in one that you know about, type in your desired second (or lower) level domain, and hit enter, and it automatically contacts the provider, registers the domain, and points it to your box. Do people think that could be possible? Perhaps using lower level domains, as some have suggested? But more important, I think, than trying to find a good provider is to make it as easy as possible for people to switch from misbehaving providers. One feature that would help tremendously (especially if we're going to create a system of almost or completely free of charge, easy to register subdomains), one feature which a few people have already proposed, is a machine language for your box, using the proper cryptographic credentials, to inform your friends that you, who used to be found at foo.example.com, will now be found at foo.bar.net. In other words, your real identity as far as your friends are concerned is your key. Your domain name is just a way for your friends to find you in the network. If your domain name has changed, why should you need to tell your actual human friends about this. Just tell their boxes and let them take care of it. I wish I already had this feature for email. If I have an email address boaz(a)example.com, and example.com does something to upset me, and I hate example.com, and I never want to have any further dealings with those bastards at example.com, there's nothing I can do. I've already told three hundred people who I want to be able to contact me for all time, that my address is boaz(a)example.com. I'll have to keep monitoring boaz(a)example.com forever. Unless I want to do one of these terrible mass mailings that everyone hates (I've received several of these, and it's a sorry sight). _______________________________________________ Freedombox-discuss mailing list Freedombox-discuss(a)lists.alioth.debian.org http://lists.alioth.debian.org/mailman/listinfo/freedombox-discuss ----- End forwarded message ----- -- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> http://leitl.org ______________________________________________________________ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820 http://www.ativel.com http://postbiota.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE

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