- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

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by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

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by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

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by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0

None
by Greg Broiles 06 Jul '18

06 Jul '18

> I don't follow the other list you mentioned, so I don't know what the > actual problem to solve is - my guess is that this is an anti-bot > protection measure, intended to make sure that only human participants can > engage in a conversation. Yep, that's it. > If that's the problem - or if it's similar - you'll also need to make the > puzzle difficult enough that > it's hard to brute-force or solve statistically - let's say you provide the > other party with 20 images, > 19 cats and 1 dog, and ask them to identify the dog. > > What keeps a bot from answering the question 20 times? Let's assume the > first arms-race countermeasure prevents answering the question more than > once by generating puzzles on-the-fly from known cat and dog images - so > the bot just picks an answer randomly, and keeps doing that until they hit. Oops... never thought of that. > Can God create a rock so big he can't lift it? No, just as he can't create round squares. What's that got to do with anything? > This sounds like maybe it's essentially a credentialling/ID problem, where > you're generating credentials on the fly based on a short-form Turing test. > Can you restate the problem so that instead of a Turing test it's a more > familiar multi-channel authentication process? (e.g., require new > participants to have "introductions" from existing participants, track > introductions, and remove the access for accounts found to be bots, or > found to have introduced bots .. or similar.) Well... one of the points of Freenet is to have anonymity (even if not cryptographically strong, just statistical anonimity). I don't know how well that can work with "introductions". [Maybe the public / private key proposals - which I haven't followed up closely - could me modified to be used as some sort of a pseudonym.] Mark

1 0