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Для импортеров: Оптимизация налога на прибыль
by Оптимизация затрат 14 Apr '12

14 Apr '12

26 мая 2012 г. Оптимизации налога на прибыль и НДС для импортеров +7 499 445*40_95 <<<>>> +7 499 - ЧЧ5-40_95 Цель: Курс посвящен изучению основных практических методов оптимизации налога на прибыль и (в той степени, в которой это возможно) НДС с учетом специфики импорта. Рассматриваются низконалоговые субъекты, способы переноса на них налогооблагаемой базы и пути безналогового рефинансирования (возврата) выведенных сумм. Участники получат краткие индивидуальные консультации по тематике Курса. Программа: 1. Понятие и принципы налогового планирования: платить налоги, но не переплачивать. Специфика импорта. "Прямой" и "непрямой импорт". 2. "Черные", "серые" и "белые" схемы. Принципиальная невозможность экономии НДС "белыми" схемами и случаи, когда это все же возможно. Незаконные варианты псевдооптимизации таможенного и внутреннего НДС, пошлин, налога на прибыль: "недобросовестные налогоплательщики" и контактирующие с ними риск-структуры ("белая" - "серая" - "черная" фирмы). Примеры "серых" схем "непрямого импорта" (как нельзя "оптимизировать"!). 3. "Своя" компания-поставщик за границей с использованием или без использования трансфертных цен. Грамотное обоснование трансфертных цен, учет нового антитрансфертного законодательства, способы ухода от контроля за сделками. Иностранные низконалоговые компании, выбор юрисдикций. Другие способы их использования при проведении импортных операций (проценты, дивиденды, роялти, логистический аутсорсинг за границей и т.п.). 4. Низконалоговые субъекты: * субъекты специальных налоговых режимов, в т.ч. патентная система, субъекты УСН из "низконалоговых" регионов, где введена минимальная ставка единого налога при объекте "доходы минус расходы" (5-10%) на все или почти на все виды деятельности, а также простое товарищество с их участием; * оффшоры или связанные с ними компании-нерезиденты из респектабельных юрисдикций; * экзотические варианты: ИП на общей системе, физлица (при условии несистематичности извлечения дохода), убыточные предприятия и фирмы, имеющие переплату НДС. 5. Способы переноса налогооблагаемой базы по налогу на прибыль на низконалоговых субъектов √ механизм трансфертных цен и затратные механизмы для импортеров: * нефиктивные услуги/работы, связанные с импортом товаров и их продажей в России; * выплата процентов по долговым обязательствам. Включение процентов в расходы в любом размере; * платежи за использование и обслуживание объектов основных средств и нематериальных активов, в т.ч. лицензионные и франчайзинговые; * штрафные санкции, возмещение убытков, включая демередж/простой; * плата за залог или поручительство, делькредере; * платежи за увеличенный срок и/или объем гарантийных обязательств. 6. Условия применения всех схем: Непритворный характер заключаемых сделок. Экономическая целесообразность расходов ("деловая цель", "легенда", отсутствие дублирующихся функций). Неаффилированность, прямые и косвенные признаки аффилированности, ее негативные последствия и когда она допустима; "искусственное дробление бизнеса с целью уклонения от уплаты налогов" (подход "как к ЮКОСу"); "деловые цели", обосновывающие деление бизнеса. Самостоятельность низконалоговых субъектов. 7. Экономия НДС через разделение доходов и перераспределение расходов "с НДС" и "без НДС". Ограничение использования: покупатели, не нуждающиеся в вычете НДС, как их выявить/создать. 8. Посреднические договоры в схемах импорта: * агентский договор с нерезидентом-принципалом на реализацию в России, импорт по такому договору вместо обычного контракта купли-продажи; * агентский договор на закуп товаров за границей с нерезидентом-агентом. Как избежать уплаты НДС и таможенных пошлин с агентского вознаграждения; * комбинация двух предыдущих вариантов; * импортер √ агент на закуп конечных покупателей или низконалогового субъекта. 9. Простое товарищество с участием нерезидента и/или субъектов упрощенной системы налогообложения, в т.ч. из "низконалоговых" регионов, в схемах импорта: * в роли иностранного поставщика; * импорт по товаров договору простого товарищества вместо обычного контракта купли-продажи; * в роли импортера. 10. Пример налогового планирования с переходом на "прямой" импорт, расчет налоговой нагрузки. Каковы будут (и будут ли) потери при отказе от "непрямого импорта" и "черных" схем. Когда при этом можно даже сэкономить. 11. Как можно и как нельзя оптимизировать налоги импортерам с учетом изменений законодательства, тенденций правоприменения, судебной и таможенной практики. Ответы на вопросы. По желанию √ индивидуальное экспресс-моделирование схем налогового планирования для компаний-участниц Курса. Стоимость участия: 9 000 рублей Вся информация по тел: 8 Моск. код: 792*21.2/2 <<<>>> код (499) - 4Ч5\ЧО95

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CISPA, Cybersecurity, and the Devil in the Dark
by lauren＠vortex.com 14 Apr '12

14 Apr '12

Lauren Weinstein's Blog Update, April 14, 2012 CISPA, Cybersecurity, and the Devil in the Dark http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000947.html The threat of "cyberattacks" is real enough. But associated risks have in many cases been vastly overblown, and not by accident of chance. The "cybersecurity" industry has become an increasingly bloated "money machine" for firms wishing to cash in on cyber fears of every stripe, from realistic to ridiculous. And even more alarmingly, it has become an excuse for potential government intrusions into Internet operations on a scope never before imagined. There are warning signs galore. While we can all agree that SCADA systems that operate industrial control and other infrastructure environments are in need of serious security upgrades -- most really never should have been connected to the public Internet in the first place -- "war game" scenarios now being promulgated to garner political support (and the really big bucks!) for "cyber protection" have become de rigueur for agencies and others hell bent for a ride on the cybersecurity gravy train. Phony demos purporting to illustrate mass cyber attacks are more akin to Fantasyland than reality, and the turf war between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and intelligence agencies such as CIA and NSA in this sphere should give all of us cause for significant concern. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA - H.R. 3523) has become the embodiment of hopes for those entities who hope to turn overblown fears of cyber attacks into a pipeline for potentially massive access by government into the private data of Internet users. Sponsors of the legislation tout its relative shortness and generality, but those are precisely among the aspects that make this legislation so problematic. CISPA effectively overrides virtually all existing laws related to Internet privacy protections. And since CISPA offers firms access to government cybersecurity "threat data" in exchange for ostensibly voluntary feeding of data back from those firms to the government, and provides for broad protective immunity for companies that choose to do so, a pantheon of tech heavyweights have lined up in support. Just a few of the firms who have to various extents professed direct support of CISPA include Facebook, Symantec, Verizon, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and Oracle. There are many others. Notably absent from this list is Google, who has not taken a formal position on the existing CISPA legislation and apparently is unlikely to do so. Google's current approach to CISPA seems particularly prescient. While it would be absolutely incorrect to attribute bad motives to the firms supporting CISPA, the legislation itself is in my view so vague and general that it represents largely an "empty vessel" capable of enormous potential damage if deployed and then subjected to the inevitable stream of court interpretations. CISPA claims to ban using data collected under its authority for other than cyber threat activities. But we've seen such data compartmentalization bans fall many times before in other data collection contexts. Since the legislation creates such a broad override of existing privacy protections, and such encompassing immunities for firms that provide associated data to the government, the lack of specificity in so many aspects of CISPA creates what could be the opportunity for a "perfect storm" of abuses down the line. There are indeed genuine risks of serious attacks on the Internet and connected infrastructural systems. But in the fog of the military-industrial complex's rapid push into this area, it has become obvious that realistic assessments are being shoved aside in favor of scare tactics, agency power struggles, and "get rich quick" scheming. This entire area has become a quintessential example of sowing F.U.D. -- Fear, Uncertainly, Doubt -- while legitimate questions of privacy and individual rights are purposefully being marginalized. We saw much the same thing happen after 9/11, with the knee-jerk rush to pass the PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Act, with a range of profiteering and abuses against individual liberties that then resulted -- even leading the U.S. down the evil path of torture. We must avoid a repeat of this madness. Information sharing can be a crucial element of cybersecurity, but for legislation addressing this area, the devil is very much in the details, and the lack of details in CISPA is an invitation to possible privacy disasters. To the extent that cybersecurity threats do exist, the desire to quell them must not be permitted to run slipshod over our personal privacy, liberties, and associated protections in existing laws. We can work together to help protect ourselves from actual cyber threats, without allowing ourselves to become cyber schnooks in the process. ------------------------------

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CISPA, Cybersecurity, and the Devil in the Dark
by lauren＠vortex.com 14 Apr '12

14 Apr '12

Lauren Weinstein's Blog Update, April 14, 2012 CISPA, Cybersecurity, and the Devil in the Dark http://lauren.vortex.com/archive/000947.html The threat of "cyberattacks" is real enough. But associated risks have in many cases been vastly overblown, and not by accident of chance. The "cybersecurity" industry has become an increasingly bloated "money machine" for firms wishing to cash in on cyber fears of every stripe, from realistic to ridiculous. And even more alarmingly, it has become an excuse for potential government intrusions into Internet operations on a scope never before imagined. There are warning signs galore. While we can all agree that SCADA systems that operate industrial control and other infrastructure environments are in need of serious security upgrades -- most really never should have been connected to the public Internet in the first place -- "war game" scenarios now being promulgated to garner political support (and the really big bucks!) for "cyber protection" have become de rigueur for agencies and others hell bent for a ride on the cybersecurity gravy train. Phony demos purporting to illustrate mass cyber attacks are more akin to Fantasyland than reality, and the turf war between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and intelligence agencies such as CIA and NSA in this sphere should give all of us cause for significant concern. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA - H.R. 3523) has become the embodiment of hopes for those entities who hope to turn overblown fears of cyber attacks into a pipeline for potentially massive access by government into the private data of Internet users. Sponsors of the legislation tout its relative shortness and generality, but those are precisely among the aspects that make this legislation so problematic. CISPA effectively overrides virtually all existing laws related to Internet privacy protections. And since CISPA offers firms access to government cybersecurity "threat data" in exchange for ostensibly voluntary feeding of data back from those firms to the government, and provides for broad protective immunity for companies that choose to do so, a pantheon of tech heavyweights have lined up in support. Just a few of the firms who have to various extents professed direct support of CISPA include Facebook, Symantec, Verizon, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, and Oracle. There are many others. Notably absent from this list is Google, who has not taken a formal position on the existing CISPA legislation and apparently is unlikely to do so. Google's current approach to CISPA seems particularly prescient. While it would be absolutely incorrect to attribute bad motives to the firms supporting CISPA, the legislation itself is in my view so vague and general that it represents largely an "empty vessel" capable of enormous potential damage if deployed and then subjected to the inevitable stream of court interpretations. CISPA claims to ban using data collected under its authority for other than cyber threat activities. But we've seen such data compartmentalization bans fall many times before in other data collection contexts. Since the legislation creates such a broad override of existing privacy protections, and such encompassing immunities for firms that provide associated data to the government, the lack of specificity in so many aspects of CISPA creates what could be the opportunity for a "perfect storm" of abuses down the line. There are indeed genuine risks of serious attacks on the Internet and connected infrastructural systems. But in the fog of the military-industrial complex's rapid push into this area, it has become obvious that realistic assessments are being shoved aside in favor of scare tactics, agency power struggles, and "get rich quick" scheming. This entire area has become a quintessential example of sowing F.U.D. -- Fear, Uncertainly, Doubt -- while legitimate questions of privacy and individual rights are purposefully being marginalized. We saw much the same thing happen after 9/11, with the knee-jerk rush to pass the PATRIOT Act and Homeland Security Act, with a range of profiteering and abuses against individual liberties that then resulted -- even leading the U.S. down the evil path of torture. We must avoid a repeat of this madness. Information sharing can be a crucial element of cybersecurity, but for legislation addressing this area, the devil is very much in the details, and the lack of details in CISPA is an invitation to possible privacy disasters. To the extent that cybersecurity threats do exist, the desire to quell them must not be permitted to run slipshod over our personal privacy, liberties, and associated protections in existing laws. We can work together to help protect ourselves from actual cyber threats, without allowing ourselves to become cyber schnooks in the process. ------------------------------

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Why one in five U.S. adults don't use the Internet (CNN)
by Lauren Weinstein 14 Apr '12

14 Apr '12

"Even though the Internet has become a key tool for accessing services, getting an education, finding jobs, getting the news, keeping up with people you know and much more, one in five U.S. adults still does not use the Internet at all, according to a new Pew report. Why? Mostly they're just not interested -- not in the Web, e-mail, YouTube, Facebook or anything else that happens online." http://j.mp/HSPgL7 (CNN) ------------------------------

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Why one in five U.S. adults don't use the Internet (CNN)
by Lauren Weinstein 14 Apr '12

14 Apr '12

"Even though the Internet has become a key tool for accessing services, getting an education, finding jobs, getting the news, keeping up with people you know and much more, one in five U.S. adults still does not use the Internet at all, according to a new Pew report. Why? Mostly they're just not interested -- not in the Web, e-mail, YouTube, Facebook or anything else that happens online." http://j.mp/HSPgL7 (CNN) ------------------------------

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ICANN data breach exposes gTLD applicant data ... (ars technica)
by Lauren Weinstein 13 Apr '12

13 Apr '12

ICANN data breach exposes gTLD applicant data, leads to deadline extension http://j.mp/IlHuaN (ars technica) "The group that oversees the Internet's address system has extended the application deadline for new generic top level domains (TLDs) and warned that a glitch in its processing system exposed potentially sensitive applicant information to competitors." They can't even get the basic application security right. ------------------------------

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ICANN data breach exposes gTLD applicant data ... (ars technica)
by Lauren Weinstein 13 Apr '12

13 Apr '12

ICANN data breach exposes gTLD applicant data, leads to deadline extension http://j.mp/IlHuaN (ars technica) "The group that oversees the Internet's address system has extended the application deadline for new generic top level domains (TLDs) and warned that a glitch in its processing system exposed potentially sensitive applicant information to competitors." They can't even get the basic application security right. ------------------------------

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UK Government to give consumers control over smart meter data amidst privacy concerns
by Robert (Bob) Waixel 13 Apr '12

13 Apr '12

Outlaw, the blog of the respected UK IT law firm Pinocent Masons has a thorough article on the risks of installing 'smart' utility (Gas and/or electricity) meters at: http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/april/government-to-give-consumers-… <http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/april/government-to-give-consumers-…> It refers to a paper by Ross Anderson and Shailendra Fuloria ("Who controls the off switch?") http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/meters-offswitch.pdf Both are well worth reading. There are risks to switching to computerised metering / systems including * unwanted intruders to the data held your house, in transit or at the utility, accessing when you are in/out or being able to have a good guess at when you are watching TV, or even using the bedroom? * various other privacy beaches involving an individual or household's personal data There are an additional set of risks if such a meter incorporates an 'off' switch to the supply at your location. especially if unauthorised access to such functionality is a possibility. I know the suppliers will claim their security is (will be) so perfect that it is ridiculous to consider this as feasible. If it is a business of course, it might be a ripe source of potential blackmail (greenmail or any colour of your choice). I'm sure the data will be a tempting target at all stages of its journey from home or business to utility's database. Robert (Bob) Waixel, MBCS, MCInstM, FHEA, CITP RW Systems, Cambridge, UK, r.waixel(a)bcs.org.uk ------------------------------

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UK Government to give consumers control over smart meter data amidst privacy concerns
by Robert (Bob) Waixel 13 Apr '12

13 Apr '12

Outlaw, the blog of the respected UK IT law firm Pinocent Masons has a thorough article on the risks of installing 'smart' utility (Gas and/or electricity) meters at: http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/april/government-to-give-consumers-… <http://www.out-law.com/en/articles/2012/april/government-to-give-consumers-…> It refers to a paper by Ross Anderson and Shailendra Fuloria ("Who controls the off switch?") http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/Papers/meters-offswitch.pdf Both are well worth reading. There are risks to switching to computerised metering / systems including * unwanted intruders to the data held your house, in transit or at the utility, accessing when you are in/out or being able to have a good guess at when you are watching TV, or even using the bedroom? * various other privacy beaches involving an individual or household's personal data There are an additional set of risks if such a meter incorporates an 'off' switch to the supply at your location. especially if unauthorised access to such functionality is a possibility. I know the suppliers will claim their security is (will be) so perfect that it is ridiculous to consider this as feasible. If it is a business of course, it might be a ripe source of potential blackmail (greenmail or any colour of your choice). I'm sure the data will be a tempting target at all stages of its journey from home or business to utility's database. Robert (Bob) Waixel, MBCS, MCInstM, FHEA, CITP RW Systems, Cambridge, UK, r.waixel(a)bcs.org.uk ------------------------------

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CIA’s Secret Fear: High-Tech Border Checks Will Blow Spies’ Cover
by Eugen Leitl 13 Apr '12

13 Apr '12

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/04/cia-spies-biometric-tech/all/1 CIAbs Secret Fear: High-Tech Border Checks Will Blow Spiesb Cover By Jeff Stein April 12, 2012 | 5:30 am | Categories: Spies, Secrecy and Surveillance An iris scanner from Senex Technologies on display at the CeBIT trade show. Photo: Fabian Bimmer/AP When Tom Cruise had to break into police headquarters in Minority Report, the futuristic crime thriller, he got past the iris scanners with ease: He just swapped out his eyeballs. CIA agents may find that just a little beyond the call of duty. But meanwhile, theybve got to come up with something else: The increasing deployment of iris scanners and biometric passports at worldwide airports, hotels and business headquarters, designed to catch terrorists and criminals, are playing havoc with operations that require CIA spies to travel under false identities. Busy spy crossroads such as Dubai, Jordan, India and many E.U. points of entry are employing iris scanners to link eyeballs irrevocably to a particular name. Likewise, the increasing use of biometric passports, which are embedded with microchips containing a personbs face, sex, fingerprints, date and place of birth, and other personal data, are increasingly replacing the old paper ones. For a clandestine field operative, flying under a false name could be a one-way ticket to a headquarters desk, since theybre irrevocably chained to whatever name and passport they used. b If you go to one of those countries under an alias, you canbt go again under another name,b explains a career spook, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he remains an agency consultant. bSo itbs a one-time thing b one and done. The biometric data on your passport, and maybe your iris, too, has been linked forever to whatever name was on your passport the first time. You canbt show up again under a different name with the same data.b The issue is exceedingly sensitive to agency operatives and intelligence officials, past and present. b I think you have finally found a topic I canbt talk about,b said Charles Faddis, a CIA operations officer who retired in 2008. b I canbt help you with this,b added a former intelligence agency chief. b I do think this is a significant issue with great implications for the safety and security of our people, so I recommend you not publish anything on this. You can do a lot of harm and no good.b The UK's new biometric passport. Photo: Manuel Balce Ceneta/AP Other former operatives would not even allow their polite refusals to comment to be quoted. The CIA, naturally, refused to comment for this story. But several intelligence sources speaking on condition of anonymity agreed to discuss the issue with Danger Room, on the grounds that the problem is already well known to foreign spy agencies and terrorist groups, since it effects everyone seeking to operate covertly or illegally across a border. In b the old days,b as one put it b that would be before 9/11 b deep-cover CIA operatives could use and discard false passports like hand wipes. b The only way immigration could tell if the passports were fake was to look at the stamps, paper, photo, and so on,b said another recently retired CIA operative, whose worked on sensitive projects under non-official cover. Operatives could land at, say, Dubai, with a passport with one false name, then pick up another from the local CIA station to register at the hotel and conduct a mission. Then the same operative could return the country several times under different names, repeating the process. Biometrics are making that impossible. Even crossing the border with a real identity, then donning a fake one in-country, presents its own risks. b When you go to check into a hotel room for a meeting with an asset, or even rent a car to drive to the meeting b or hold the meeting in the car b many hotels and car rental agencies upload their customer data, including passport number, to immigration every day,b the former spook notes. b Most countries are looking for visa overstays. But when you show up on the list as never having entered the country b& it brings the police around to ask questions.b If the CIA is working in concert with a local intelligence agency, as it commonly does in E.U. countries, Jordan, Thailand and other spots, undercover entries and exits can be smoothed over. But b unilateral opsb b where the agency is trying to conceal its activities from the host country b b have deteriorated significantlyb because of the new technologies, the career spook said. The agency saw the windows closing, of course: The clamor for new counterterrorism border controls reached high decibels after 9/11. By mid-decade, the E.U. was requiring member states to issue biometric passports and testing iris scanners. Right away, the new world of border controls loomed as a big headache for the CIA. The ability to travel under false identities is as basic to spy work as motor oil is to engines. The day of the trench-coated, fast-talking spy easily slipping in and out of countries on false papers multiple times was coming to an end. Often, a CIA operations officer traveling under nonofficial cover (so-called NOCs) can pick up a new set of documents from a CIA courier or dead drop once he or she is in the country. Therebs nothing new about that. But since the better hotels require guests to present their passports, which are scanned into the system, that ruse is increasingly rendered moot, especially in hostile climes like Iran, where the interior ministrybs computers are assumed to be hard-wired into the airline passenger and hotel guest lists. b Not that they couldnbt duplicate the technology or the bonafides of the passports themselves b watermarks, holograms, et ceterab&b the retired operative added. b Their biggest worry was getting the [false] passport and travel data into the countrybs databases.b One obvious workaround is for operatives to book one-star hotels where such impediments are less likely. But if theybre traveling undercover as, say, a prosperous Western business executive, booking a room in a seedy joint only raises red flags with the desk clerks and local gendarmes. So after 9/11, intelligence sources said, CIA ops managers began putting renewed emphasis on recruiting spies in foreign border-control agencies b people with access to the electronic files, who can change, add or eliminate documents. b Just before I left, they were gearing up to make a request for CIA officers to recruit foreigners with access to immigration databases,b said the retired NOC. b Ibm sure that several people made careers out of just this kind of operation, much as some officers did when the NSA suddenly lost millions of access points to intelligence when the world switched from microwave towers to fiber optic lines b whole departments were formed to recruit telephone company assets in foreign countries.b The challenge isnbt just the CIAbs, of course. Every intelligence agency faces it. The problem is especially acute for Israelbs Mossad. b Thatbs right,b says former Mossad operative Michael Ross. b I remember discussions about that in the latter part of my career, just before 9/11. Obviously for Mossad the issue of documents and identity are an ongoing huge, huge projectb&. You canbt go into Syria, say, or basically anywhere in the Middle East, with an Israeli passport, for obvious reasons, so we have to use other documents.b Mossad puts its documents through test runs, said Ross, who retired in 2001. b We get into, say, France, with a document, then change our appearance, then go into Germany and see if they pick up the physical change, to see if the two speak to each other and say, bWait a minute, is this the same guy? Before he had a beard and glasses, and now hebs clean-shaven and wears contacts.bb b There are some very smart people in Mossad who spend a lot of time and energy ensuring that we can get our people in and out of countries without a document flap,b Ross added. But something went wrong in a Dubai hotel in January 2010. A Hamas official was assassinated, almost certainly at the hands of Mossad. As it turned out, Israeli operatives, who entered Dubai on forged passports from the United Kingdom, Ireland, France and Germany, were videotaped in the hotel by its security cameras. The resulting dust-up mystified longtime intelligence observers, who thought Mossad incapable of such sloppy tradecraft. Either Mossad hadnbt locked down its relations with Dubai authorities as tightly as it thought, Ross speculated, or an Iranian mole leaked the surveillance tapes. For day-in, day-out CIA espionage operations abroad, b biometrics is a problem only if you have the same case officer traveling into the country multiple times with multiple aliases,b said the former NOC. bThe easy fix to that is to break up the workload among several case officers who only travel to that country under one alias.b Or to meet your spies someplace else, others suggested, where border controls are looser, such as Cyprus. Or better yet, introducing malware into the computers of foreign immigration and border control services, to change data on demand. But the electronic curtain is descending all over the world. All EU countries are now required to issue second-generation biometric passports, however, the EU does not require foreign visitors to present a biometric passport. By last September, only Belgium had not complied, according to a scolding press release by the European Commission. At most American airports and seaports, foreign nationals have to produce biometric passports to submit to a fingerprint check before entering the country. Meanwhile, a business newsletter anticipated last year that b Research analysts predict that in five years, iris scans will be commonly used for airport security and border control.b That might be a little ambitious. Britainbs groundbreaking iris-scanning system is being quietly scaled back, according to reports from last November. Itbs not that the machines werenbt accurate. They just didnbt work as fast as planned. Lines were long. b We currently do not have any iris scanners in use,b said Customs and Border Protection spokeswoman Stephanie Malin. Testing continues. One company alone, Eyelock Corp., has deployed machines in some U.S. ports, as well as Mexico, Singapore and Columbia, a company spokeswoman said. It has pilot programs running in Brazil, Chile, France, Spain, the U.K. and unspecified b Middle Eastb ports. Dubai loves it. In 2009, Ministry of Interior officials claimed its iris scans had netted 54,000 criminals and 1,088 forged passports the previous year. Did they catch any CIA operatives in their biometric dragnet? If so, no one is talking. Jeff Stein Washington investigative reporter Jeff Stein writes the SpyTalk blog. He served as a military intelligence case officer in Vietnam. Read more by Jeff Stein Follow @SpyTalker on Twitter.

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