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re: Rander box and other stuff
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

U> A lab proven method: Take CD-ROM. Place in standard U> kitchen microwave. Set on high power cook for 5 U> seconds. Press start. Watch the action. If its a CD ROM, then there's a bunch of them. Someone else will have a copy. Aternately, Iif you mark which keys are used, then it will be detectable which keys were used (sic). It would be better to have all of the CD ROMs laying about, untouched, and secret the key-selection elsewhere. PS: I get lots of really bad CDs in the mail, from the days when I was doing HOMOCORE zine. I used to save up big stacks of them and try to trade them in at used record stores. They are all so awful (eg. bottom-rotation gunk on "modern rock" stations.) that the stores won't take them! I now nuke 'em. Far more fun! --- ReadMail * Origin: tomj(a)fidosw.fidonet.org / World Power Systems (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET - Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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re: Why remailers...
by Tom.Jennings＠f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

U> From: 74076.1041(a)CompuServe.COM (Hal) re: why remailers aren't as exciting as RNG's. Well, remailers are working, admittedly a bit clunky at the moment, and RNGs being talked about aren't. And we're primarily hackers. Once something's working, it's less interesting, no? :-) The next step for remailers is to make them actually *usable*, routinely. Their current status is no fault of the implementors, it's a first pass and a test bed (I ain't complaining!) I just don't think it's a big secret, nor a big problem. Development is always slow and boring... :-) --- ReadMail * Origin: tomj(a)fidosw.fidonet.org / World Power Systems (1:125/111) -- Tom Jennings - via FidoNet node 1:125/555 UUCP - ...!uunet!hoptoad!kumr!fidogate!111!Tom.Jennings INTERNET - Tom.Jennings(a)f111.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Re: Rander box and other stuff
by oren＠apple.com 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

>I have a question regarding the ideas which have been circulating about >using CD ROMs as key storage. How does one go about rapidly and effectively >erasing everything on a CD ROM? The reason I ask is, in the case of OTPs >you want to cancel your key as it's used, to prevent accidental double-use >of key; and of course in any system you want to make sure that all your >crypto material can be wiped squeaky clean in the event of a barbarian >invasion. > >-gg A lab proven method: Take CD-ROM. Place in standard kitchen microwave. Set on high power cook for 5 seconds. Press start. Watch the action. Hang resulting artifact on wall as curiosity, which is all it's good for now. Let the wave air out a little (this won't fry it). A great way of trashing obsolete but confidential CD's, and perhaps the cypherpunk equivalent of flushing the dope stash. Tim O.

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Extortion Explosion
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Cheer up, Cassandra! Things aren't all that bad. > New opportunities in the extortion industry: > > Old problem: the victim may inform the police, making it risky to pick up the > money, which will likely be watched. > New solution: demand payment via cryptomoney. Many forms of electronic money can be traced if there is cooperation between the payer and the bank. For example, in "Untraceable Electronic Cash", by Chaum, Fiat, and Naor, in Crypto 88, we find Alice withdrawing money from the bank, re-blinding it, and developing a "digital coin", C. She then pays that to Bob, who deposits C in the bank. The protocol goes to great length to protect Alice, so that the bank can't link C with her account. However, if she simply _tells_ the bank the value of C, then when Bob goes to deposit it, he can get caught. > Old problem: if you build a reputation for carrying out your threats, > parasitic competitors can issue threats in your name, collecting while your > reputation is good but destroying your reputation by not following through on > threats. > New solution: authenticate your threats and demands with digital > signatures. I can't imagine that this is a big problem right now - people falsely claiming to represent Big Willie when they actually don't, and trying to extort money based on Willie's fearsome reputation. That sounds like a dangerous business. So reducing this "problem" won't make much of a difference. > Old problem: you may be caught firebombing the house, shooting the victim, > slashing the victim's daughter's face, or whatever; if you subcontract to a > thug, the thug may be caught and inform on you. > New solution: use cryptomoney (and a reputation for paying) to hire thugs > while maintaining anonymity. Well, if thugs know that they are now going to be taking the sole responsibility for their actions, without the safety of knowing that they can rat on their employer if worse comes to worst, then they'll charge more to make up for the greater risk. This will make extortion less profitable. > Old problem: providing protection, so that you keep a supply of economically > viable victims from whom to extort. > New solution: Please find one! If the government can't protect victims > from you, how can you protect them from competitors? This is the key point. What stops protection rackets now? Is it really the points listed above: that the money may be traced, that others may falsely benefit from my reputation, that thugs may inform on me? What about simple physical surveillance of property? What about revenge on the transgressors? (As above, the revenge would be restricted to the thugs who did the job, but if it was bad enough it would still have a strong deterrent effect.) > Wishful thinking in the pursuit of liberty is no virtue; realism in the > defense of imperfect liberty is no vice. Free-lance oppression isn't freedom, > and I don't want it. > > Cassandra > 9531290065272860 It makes more sense to have good fire and police forces to deal with the bad guys than to get all in a tizzy because the bad guys can talk to each other now without getting caught. Polyanna --- Undressed PGP public key. Dress it up yourself. --- mQA9AisGm6sAAAEBgLsub7XIi32DjNFKJmGFajDNNIeql4RBmHG/mh9Ns58aBgMv wGRi0KkZ0YIYZZnLpwAFEbQkUG9seWFubmEsIGMvbyA8Y3lwaGVycHVua3NAdG9h ZC5jb20+ =uoWN

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Chaum's papers
by Karl L. Barrus 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Hal Finney writes: > This got me interested in crypto in general, so I started doing some > library research. When I found Chaum's stuff, it just blew me away. What else has Chaum written about? I saw his Scientific American cryptomoney article, and have heard of his dc-nets, but what other protocols has he discussed? Any pointers on journal articles would be appreciated - I think tomorrow I'll hit the library and go sifting for everything Chaum has written! /-----------------------------------\ | Karl L. Barrus | | barrus(a)tree.egr.uh.edu (NeXTMail) | | elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu | \-----------------------------------/

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Extortion Explosion
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 16 Nov '92

16 Nov '92

Extortion Explosion Introduction: Governments are in the extortion-and-protection racket, as are some well-known smaller ventures. Why do these major organizations spend effort on protecting, instead of just extorting? Current protection rackets maintain a monopoly and manage "their" resources for sustained yield. Without protection, their revenues would decline through a tragedy of the commons mechanism. Other rackets would threaten the same victims, piling extortion on extortion, until the economic field is bare. Crypto technologies promise to liberate us from government extortion and the "protection" of victimless crime laws by enabling the growth of a new sphere of economic activity based on voluntary, secret transactions. But are these technologies so limited in their power? New opportunities in the extortion industry: Old problem: the victim may inform the police, making it risky to pick up the money, which will likely be watched. New solution: demand payment via cryptomoney. Old problem: if you build a reputation for carrying out your threats, parasitic competitors can issue threats in your name, collecting while your reputation is good but destroying your reputation by not following through on threats. New solution: authenticate your threats and demands with digital signatures. Old problem: you may be caught firebombing the house, shooting the victim, slashing the victim's daughter's face, or whatever; if you subcontract to a thug, the thug may be caught and inform on you. New solution: use cryptomoney (and a reputation for paying) to hire thugs while maintaining anonymity. Old problem: providing protection, so that you keep a supply of economically viable victims from whom to extort. New solution: Please find one! If the government can't protect victims from you, how can you protect them from competitors? If this analysis is correct, then crypto technologies will make extortion a highly profitable growth industry, making the security of property and persons (outside tightly-knit walled communities?) incompatible with the continued existence of free computer networks as we know them. Rather than suffering from a single oppressor with an incentive to keep us productive, we would become prey to an unbounded number, each competing to strip our assets before they vanish. Society will surely suppress free networks once this starts to happen; the harder it is to suppress free networks, the greater the oppression will be. Some objections and answers: Q:Isn't it too bleak and pessimistic to believe that the best we can do is to help our oppressors to maintain their monopoly on oppressing us? A1: The Soviet Union was established as a result of a movement that aimed to overthrow an oppressive order. Millions then died under an even more oppressive order. This was bleak, but it happened anyway. A2: Better one oppressor than many, all competing to be the first to kill and eat the goose, knowing that they can't get the golden eggs anyway. A3: Profit is a powerful motive, and conventional profitable activities are imitated and expanded until demand saturates. Crypto-extortion should be highly profitable, but the "supply" is delivered by force, so there is no problem with competitors saturating the "demand" until the victims are drained quite dry. This gives grounds for pessimism. Q: Doesn't the enormous potential of this technology for expanding liberty outweigh these theoretical dangers? What about our hopes and dreams, our vision of a better world? A: These hopes spring from a theoretical social and economic analysis of the impact of crypto technologies, and cryptomoney in particular. The above line of reasoning extends the same analysis. I hope it is wrong, and would be greatly relieved to hear a convincing reason for dismissing it. If it stands, the prospect seems to be either the destruction of society by free networks, or the destruction of free networks by society. The longer we can postpone this choice, the better. Q: Won't cryptomoney be so hard to establish that there's no point in worrying about this? A: If so, then there is equally well no benefit in attempting to implement it. The question is, are there any conditions for "success" that don't generate disaster? Saying the gun probably isn't loaded isn't an argument for putting it to your head and pulling the trigger. Q: Isn't it too late to stop these technologies? A: For public key communication (secrecy and authentication), probably yes. For cryptomoney, possibly no. Most of the benefits of crypto technology seem to come from the former, and most of the danger of an extortion explosion seems to come from the latter. Wishful thinking in the pursuit of liberty is no virtue; realism in the defense of imperfect liberty is no vice. Free-lance oppression isn't freedom, and I don't want it. Cassandra 9531290065272860 P.S. Your neighbor didn't pay me, and his house is ash. Will you pay me? All I ask this month is $100, which you can well afford. (Next month is negotiable, and I can't speak for my competitors.)

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Re: Apple including PKS?
by karn＠qualcomm.com 15 Nov '92

15 Nov '92

After reading the details of that (formerly) secret back-room agreement between NSA and SPA, I don't think I'll *ever* trust a commercial encryption package, especially one for which source code is unavailable for scrutiny. I've learned an important lesson in this business. You can never depend on someone else to ensure your privacy. You have to do it yourself. Phil

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Re: Apple including PKS?
by oren＠apple.com 15 Nov '92

15 Nov '92

>Re: Apple include a PKS with their Macs > >Well, Apple does have a site license for RSA. Tim Oren, who's on the >list, knows more about this than I. I ask him to respond. > >Maybe Apple could license the PGP code as a system utility? > >Eric Apple does have a license from RSA, which includes both site and redistribution rights. The intent is to make security-enhanced features available in something called OCE (Open Collaboration Environment) which is to be Apple's entry in the E-mail / user directory / etc. marketplace. OCE is likely to be an add-on, that is, something not shipped with every Mac, but available at extra cost. Since I'm under NDA for the details of OCE, I will simply quote what MacLeak says: According to MacWeek, Apple is using RSA software with 150-200 digit primes for Digital Signatures. They are using "RSA's RC4 algorithm [which will] provide encryption of the fly for data transmitted across an OCE (open Collaboratioon Environment) network. Each message will be scrambled using a unique 64-bit key. BTW, notice that's decimal digits, not bits, in the signature length. Apple is set up as a certifying authority, but I don't know any details of the plans on how to certify keys. It's a far from simple problem to work out something that will work in the current personal computer market structure and isn't subject to spoofing. Re Apple licensing PGP code: While Apple could presumably do so without violating any laws, so long as any copyright holders in PGP granted appropriate rights, I don't think it's very likely. OCE is a package to be differentiated by its user interface, and apparently MacPGP's (though I haven't tried it myself yet) is rather crufty from the Mac point of view. Also, Apple traditionally wants very tight control over its source code, and is unlikely to adopt something that arrives in such a (shall we say) 'informal' fashion from outside. Finally, as a dose of preventive medicine, I should mention that all of the above is my best interpretation of Apple policy and probable action, with which I don't necessarily agree personally. Flameage ignoring this statement will be routed appropriately. Tim Oren

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test message
by nobody＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 15 Nov '92

15 Nov '92

This is an un-encrypted test message. Please ignore.

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Re: What's More Important?
by George A. Gleason 15 Nov '92

15 Nov '92

I suspect the reason why anon remailers haven't gotten their due, and OTPs are getting so much press here, is that anon remailers are being developed locally and the development problems for these are straightforward, whereas good RNGs for OTPs are a sort of sticky technical issue which seems to call for a lot of debate. You don't see anyone debating the **software** for OTPs now, do you...? And I do agree, anon remailers are absolutely vital in the overall scheme of things. If for no other reason, to stop or hinder traffic analysis, which is a way more powerful form of signals intelligence than most people realise. -gg

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