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Article from Knight/Ridder Wire
by matt＠oc.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I hadn't seen this article fly by yet, so... ----- New Scrambler Designed to Protect Privacy, But Allow Police Monitoring By Christopher Drew, Chicago Tribune Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News WASHINGTON--Apr. 19--As a step toward the development of vast new data "superhighways," the federal government has designed a powerful device that would protect the privacy of electronic communications by encoding them but still allow police to eavesdrop. Critics say the project, announced Friday by the Clinton administration, raises serious questions about the protection of civil liberties as more people use cellular and cordless phones and computer-based communications. They also warned that the device is not likely to help law-enforcement agents foil high-tech criminals unless it becomes the most widely used commercial encryption system - and drives private competitors out of the business. "'A.k.a. Big Brother,' that's what I call it," said Stephen Bryen, a former Pentagon official who runs a company developing a rival encryption system. Bryen said it was "very disturbing" that the government has gone so far with the previously classified project "without consulting with experts in the industry" whose investments could be wiped out. One high-ranking federal official, Raymond Kammer, acknowledged that such concerns are part of an "appropriate debate" that needs to be held over the project. "Maybe it turns out that society, as it debates this, finds it unacceptable," said Kammer, acting director of the National Institute for Standards and Technology. "I'm not sure. This is the start of that debate." Millions of people who exchange information via computers and make calls from cordless and cellular phones, which are especially vulnerable to interception, could be affected. Experts say an era is dawning in which traveling executives exchange electronic memos and negotiate sensitive deals via hand-held communicators using vulnerable wireless transmitters. In endorsing the plan, the White House described it Friday as an outgrowth of federal efforts to capitalize on advances in telephone and computer technology while preventing drug dealers and terrorists from finding new ways to mask their misdeeds. In last year's campaign, President Clinton pledged to invest billions of dollars in faster and more secure data links to enhance the standing of U.S. firms in the global economy. But as the computer industry has developed systems to enable businesses to scramble data transfers and telephone conversations as a safeguard against industrial espionage, a growing number of criminals also have begun using them to foil court-authorized wiretaps. Under the new plan, engineers at the National Security Agency invented a new coding device, called the "Clipper Chip," which is said to be much harder to crack than encoding systems now on the market. The government licensed two California companies - Mykotronx and VLSI Technology - to make the computer chips. The chips will form the "brains" inside small scrambling devices that can be attached to individual telephones. To spur the venture, the Justice Department will soon purchase several thousand of the devices. Military and spy agencies also are expected to use them. Private businesses would not be required to use the technology. But federal officials hope their sponsorship will establish the Clipper chips as the new industry standard and crowd out competing systems. Indeed, AT&T announced Friday that it will use the new chips in a desktop device for encrypting telephone conversations that it expects to sell for $1,195. But in return for gaining the extra encoding power built into the new system, users would have to accept the fact that government code-breakers would always hold the keys to tap into the information. In an effort to prevent abuses of civil liberties, federal officials said, they will set up a system in which they would have to match two coding keys held by different officials to unscramble any communications. National-security and law-enforcement officials could bring the keys together only under court- authorized operations. But Bryen said it is hard to see how the Clipper chips project will provide much help to the FBI. Even if the new coding devices drove others off the U.S. market, Bryen said, sophisticated criminals would simply buy encoding devices overseas, as many already do. Multinational and foreign-based companies also could prove leery of a system that has a built-in point of entry for U.S. authorities. The FBI separately is seeking legislation that would force telephone companies to modify their equipment to keep other advances in technology from hampering its ability to perform wiretaps. AT&T and other phone companies have opposed this idea. END!B&?TB-SCRAMBLER Transmitted: 93-04-18 23:12:00 EDT

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AT & T Contact Point
by dstalder＠gmuvax2.gmu.edu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I talked to Herb Linnen at AT & T. He talked to me some but kept harping on the point of how ATT is devoted to customer privacy and that the ATT Vice-President of Information Systems (I forget his name) is an expert on cryptography and he obviously can't be wrong when he says that the wiretap chip is robust. He asked that I call David Arneke or Bill Jones at 919-279-7680 to discuss this since his department wasn't involved in the wiretap chip. The ATT operators dealing with calling cards and residential phone service have had other people cancelling their accounts because of this... Think free, -- Defeat the Torin/Darren Stalder/Wolf __ Big Brother Internet: dstalder(a)gmuvax2.gmu.edu \/ PGP2.x key available. Proposal! Bitnet: dstalder@gmuvax Finger me. Write me for Sprintnet: 1-703-845-1000 details. Snail: 10310 Main St., Suite 110/Fairfax, VA/22030/USA DISCLAIMER: A society where such disclaimers are needed is saddening.

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Subscription request
by ERIC "Thin 'n Crispy" SPAULDING 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I wish to subscribe to the mailing list. Thank you.

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Do it yourself voice encryption CELP
by grady＠netcom.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

For those interested in off-the-shelf vocoders that implement the high-compression CELP algorithms, you might be interested in the ZyXEL model U1496E+ modem (about $400) that offers 19.8(and maybe v.fast when specified)/14.4 kbps fax/ CELP (subscribe to comp.dcom.modems for more info). For those interested in the CELP algorithm directly here is some specific directions on getting your own copy:

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more specific address for 'agrep'
by grady＠netcom.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I've been asked to supply more specific directions for automated fetching of the source and documentation for "agrep," the powerful similarity pattern matching tool. It is at cs.arizona.edu 192.12.69.5 in directory /agrep/README /agrep/agrep-2.04.tar.Z /agrep/agrep.ps.1.Z /agrep/agrep.ps.2.Z (The .ps suffixed files are the optional postscript docs; a reasonably good research report with benchmarks is included.) Note for Macintosh MPW users: after a few hours of drudgery, I ported the tool to MPW 3.2.3 running under System 7.1. If you would like me to e-mail a binhexed copy of the tool suitable for dropping in to your MPW/tools folder, please write... I've been having lots of fun picking up the "lost" references to things I'm interested in. For example, starting a search like: agrep -1 -i 'Burning Chrome' cyberpunkspool immediately finds references like 'burning crome' that I have always missed before. See how many times John Gilmore's name is mentioned in the CUD archives (and how often misspelled). How about _your_ name? As usual, I will e-mail the uuencoded tar.Z upon request if you cannot do anonymous FTP.

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Hellman's Hints
by norm＠netcom.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

I presume that Hellman meant to say "K1 and K2, and thence UK" in place of "K1 and K2, and thence K" at least it makes sense that way. A later posting from Hellman (I think) emmended the description of the transmitted message from E{ E[M; K], E[K; UK], serial number; SK} to E[M; K], E{ E[K; UK], serial number; SK} If you know SK then you can compute (E[K; UK], serial number) Then knowing UK (= K1+K2) you can compute K from which you get M via E[M; K].

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Amiga Crypto
by Haywood J. Blowme 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Return-Path: <newsham(a)wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu> >> The basic idea I think would need the following: >> >> - A sound digitizer >> - High speed modem >> - 68020 or above processor (for speed purposes) >> - Good encryption algorithm (IDEA for example) >> >> Implementing the system would involve using the digitizer to digitize the >> voice. Then processing the sample (in real time) through the encryption >> algorithm and sending the output to the modem for transmission. The process >> would be repeated on the other end. >> >> The problems I see occurring are the following >> >> - Speed of the computer affecting real time encryption >> - Synchronizing the data packets for accurate decryption on the other side. >> - simultaneous I/O on the serial and parallel ports(for modem and digitizer) >> - outputing to speakers on receiving end. >> - having the whole process operate in a full duplex mode (ie. both people >> can talk at the same time). >> >> >> I think the majority of functions can be handled by the system libraries and >> outside sources (such as xpkidea.library for encryption). >> >> Does this sound feasible?? newsham(a)wiliki.eng.hawaii.edu Writes: >From what I gather CELP takes about 10 to 15 MIPS and LPC takes >somewhere under 5 MIPS on DSP chips. Instructions including >fixed point multiplies and accumulations (not counting divisions). >Thats quite a load for a 68020 to bear and still do encryption >and communications isnt it? [Stuff deleted] This is true. But if a sampling rate of about 9000-10,000 samples per second are used this will allow for good voice quality and the encryption algorithm should be able to handle it. The IDEA implementations I have seen for the Amiga run about 30-50K per second on my Amiga 1200 with 68020. This should be fast enough. If you then can send that data directly to the serial port with a fast modem 14.4K it should work. But it might sound choppy (haven't done the figures yet on how much data would be going to the modem while the person speaks, but it may be substantial enough to make the use of a high speed modem not feasible. Also I have to consider that data compression in the form of LAP/M or MNP will be ineffective against the encrypted data as it will appear as white noise and will be largely uncompressable.. ============================================================================= /// | psionic(a)wam.umd.edu | Q: How did the govt. decide to use an 80 __ /// C= | Craig H. Rowland | bit key for the new clipper chip? \\\/// Amiga| PGP Key Available | A: They combined Bill and Hillary \/// 1200 | by finger. | Clintons' IQ's. =============================================================================

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subscribe
by Kaya Bekiroglu 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

subscribe me.

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Request
by Lestat 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

Please add me to your mailing list; as a passionate support of freedom of speech and expression of all kinds in all mediums, I'm concerned about the ClipperChip and interested in what you have to offer. Thanks, Lestat, aka Howard S. Jones 72(a)arms.uucp

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Re: Fighting the Wiretap Chip Plan
by hkhenson＠cup.portal.com 19 Apr '93

19 Apr '93

When this "Clipper chip" story broke, I was off on an extropian (if not cypherpunk) activity--helping freeze Alcor's 27 patient (another HIV+ case.) I doubt I am the strongest hardware person on these groups, but nobody else has commented on this aspect. You just *can't* make chips entirely resistant to reverse engineering. I know, I have spent close to 10% of my engineering career reverse engineering things. Given time and a few samples, *any* chip can be reverse engineered. This is especially true with tools such as SEM stimulator/state readers and Focused Ion Beam chip slicers and dicers widely available. *Somebody* will dig out every gate in their spare time. Thus the following statement looks very odd: >Q: How strong is the security in the device? How can I be sure > how strong the security is? > >A: This system is more secure than many other voice encryption > systems readily available today. While the algorithm will > remain classified to protect the security of the key escrow > system, Say what? Does this mean that if somebody slices up a chip and publishes the algorithm the "security of the key escrow system" is broken? Can a representative of the government say why, or if, this is the case? If it is not the case, why not publish the algorithm and be done with it? Because, soon as the chip can be bought over the counter or stolen, the algorithm will be deduced. > we are willing to invite an independent panel of > cryptography experts to evaluate the algorithm to assure all > potential users that there are no unrecognized > vulnerabilities. Well, unless the "independent panel" includes people who can follow the algorithm all the way through to silicon, I would not trust their report even if I trusted the experts, and that goes double for the next set of masks. Keith Henson

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