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Report on Adi Shamir talk
by fnerd＠smds.com 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

Last Friday, the 23rd, Adi Shamir (the S of RSA) gave a talk at MIT about some recent crypto results of his. (He was introduced by Ron Rivest, the R of RSA.) Shamir is in the country to give a talk about the history of crypto, in Washington DC, I think. It was actually two related talks, one on each of two papers of his: "On the Generation of Multivariate Polynomials which are Hard to Factor" and "Efficient Signature Schemes Based on Birational Permutations" Any misrepresentations and misunderstandings here are mine. The first paper is about factoring polynomials that are products of two polynomials, F = PQ where all these polynomials are on numbers that are mod the product of two primes. n = pq There are a lot of cases where F is easy to factor, and sometimes the easy cases seem to be only slightly different from the hard cases, but Shamir has found a large, easy-to-specify class of forms of (P, Q) where factoring their product is as hard as factoring n (the notorious hard problem that's the basis for the supposed strength of RSA). The second paper is about looking for public key crypto methods that are as strong as RSA but don't require such large amounts of computing on one end. In regular RSA, for instance, the number of multiplications for decrypting (for the legitimate key owner) goes up with key size, and so does the difficulty of multiplication. Shamir has found a scheme that takes about 20 multiplies on each side, period. However, it would be easily breakable as a crypto scheme, so he shows a variation that doesn't give as much info to an attacker, but works as a signature scheme. It *looks* secure to him and others he's shown it to, but it isn't proven as hard as factoring big numbers. The tie between the two papers is that the keys used in the scheme in the second paper are polynomials of the form discussed in the first paper. --fnerd(a)smds.com (FutureNerd Steve Witham)

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MYK-78
by Arthur Abraham 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

26-Apr-93 For those awaiting my promised comments regarding this chip, I have the disappointing report that the individual I anticipated talking to was out of his town, and so not available today. If you have the data sheets for this chip, and have read them, I would be very interested to see your comments. Please respond to me directly, rather than the list at large, since my intent in this exercise it to replace deduction with disclosure, and avoid spreading any mis- or partial information. -a2.

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Re: Privacy International (fwd)
by whitaker＠eternity.demon.co.uk 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

Nick Szabo writes: > > The following forwarded from alt.privacy. Anybody have experience > with this group? Have they taken a position on the wiretap chip? > > Subject: Group Info: Privacy International > Message-ID: <1993Apr12.184129.11455(a)mont.cs.missouri.edu> > Originator: rich(a)pencil.cs.missouri.edu > Organization: Privacy International > PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL > > A WATCHDOG ON SURVEILLANCE > > GENERAL INFORMATION > > PRIVACY INTERNATIONAL - THE BIRTH OF A WORLDWIDE MOVEMENT > > [Text elided for brevity] > If you are interested in getting involved in the work of > Privacy International, please contact Simon Davies, Marc > Rotenberg, or David Banisar at : > Simon Davies is in London now. He will have an email account soon. However, anyone who needs to contact him - on non-confidential matters - can send email to privacy(a)eternity.demon.co.uk. This is my machine; Simon will have his own soon. Russell Russell Earl Whitaker whitaker(a)eternity.demon.co.uk Communications Editor AMiX: RWhitaker EXTROPY: The Journal of Transhumanist Thought Board member, Extropy Institute (ExI) ================ PGP 2.2 public key available =======================

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MacWeek article on Clipper/Capstone
by matt＠oc.com 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

MacWEEK 04.26.93 Page 1 SECURITY CHIPS TRIGGER ALARM Clipper and Capstone open digital back door. By Mitch Ratcliffe Washington -- The White House and National Security Agency, as part of a wide-ranging retooling of U.S. privacy policies, are preparing two encryption chips for use in the computer and telecommunications industries. Privacy advocates cried foul last week because the chips include a back door that allows police to monitor communications. The Clipper chip announced this month can encrypt voice and data communications at up to 16Mbps. Clipper is due to debut in secure telephones from AT&T Co. this summer. The second chip, called Capstone and currently under development at the NSA, is a superset of Clipper that will implement the much-criticized Digital Signature Standard to add authentication capabilities. Its existence was revealed during a briefing at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge last week. President Clinton ordered the National Institute of Standards and Technology to establish Clipper as a federal standard. Since the government is the largest computer customer in the world, its Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) often are imposed on the industry as de facto standards. If Capstone follows Clipper into the FIPS requirements, DSS could usurp RSA Data Security Inc.'s public-key encryption scheme, which Apple licensed for AOCE (Apple Open Collaboration Environment). But Apple's representative at the NSA briefing, Gursharan Sidhu, technical director of collaborative computer and leader of the AOCE project, said he is not worried that the government will force an encryption scheme on the industry. "We were given the impression that they are very open to suggestions," Sidhu said, adding that the government is faced with a growing conundrum as it tries to simultaneously protect privacy and maintain its ability to tap lawbreakers' communications. "People have the idea that in cellular the security of communications had gone away, so there is pressure to encrypt. [Without a back door], even the casual criminal would be able to communicate with invincible security," Sidhu said. "Law-enforcement agencies wouldn't be able to collect intelligence." A spokesman for NIST said Capstone will not be introduced unless the president's review of national encryption policy conclueds it is needed. But he also said the Department of Defense and NSA are already working to develope a PCMCIA card-based implementation of Capstone for a classified defense messaging system. The NSA confirmed it is working on Capstone but could not confirm the Capstone PCMCIA card project. Clipper and Capstone use a "key escrow" technology that lets law-enforcement agencies with a court order unscramble conversations and documents. To reduce the potential for wiretap abuse, two agencies to be named by Attorney General Janet Reno will hold half of each key. The NSA said the key escrow agents will not be law-enforcement agencies. Privacy advocates complained that the algorithms that perform Clipper scrambling functions will remain classified. Encryptin technologies typically gain acceptance only after cryptographers pore over the component algorithms and key management systems. "We can't protect the key escrow features if we reveal the algorithm to the public ... that's caused some heartburn," said John Podesta, staff secretary to President Clinton. "I'm not suggesting that the public should trust us any more than any other government agency, but we are doing a more comprehensive review [than any previous administration]." Podesta said the Clinton team is taking a free-market approach to encryption, in contrast to the previous administrations, which tried to legislate simplified approaches. "In the wireless communications environment, we have to more the ball forward on security and privacy," Podesta said. "The jury's still out on whether [Clipper] is the answer." Jim Bidzos, president of RSA Data Security of Redwood City, Calif., said the NSA is using Clipper and Capstone in an attempt to confuse the market for privacy-enhancing technologies. "It takes three or four years fo rthis kind of proposal to die." Bidzos said. Computer and communications companies might withhold support for any standard, giving the NSA more time to prepare for the encrypted world, he said. Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, a Washington, D.C. based public-interest group, has filed 11 Freedom of Information Act requests for access to Clipper development records. The group suspects the NSA and NIST violated the Computer Security Act of 1987, whic limits the NSA's role in development of public encryption technologies to providing advice and assistance. NSA said it developed both chips.

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apology
by Ed Mehlschau 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

Damn! I forgot to put the "-request" in the address. My sincere apologies; you know, it's Monday. -- Ed

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subscribe
by Ed Mehlschau 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

subscribe (please) Thanks, -- Ed

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CASH: Disney Dollars...
by Hal 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

I know we're all focused pretty closely on Clipper right now, but as time goes on we will pay attention to other things, and one of those is digital cash. We've had a lot of debate here about whether it would be legal to issue private cash. I went to Disneyland last week, and discovered that they are issuing their own form of cash: "Disney Dollars" (presumably a Disney trademark). Disney Dollars come in at least three denominations: $1.00, $5.00, and $10.00. They are very attractively printed notes, about the size and shape of American dollars. They're quite a bit more colorful but the layout of the bills is similar to other forms of currency. Disney Dollars can be exchanged with U.S. dollars on a one-for-one basis at the park. No sales tax is involved in the transaction. I saved a $1.00 Disney Dollar, a special issue to commemorate Mickey Mouse's 65th anniversary this year. Here is what it says: On the face: "Disney Dollars" "Mickey's 65th". In the fine print: "May be used as legal tender only at Disneyland park, Disneyland Hotel, Walt Disney World resort and the Disney Store (U.S.A. & Puerto Rico)." Another block of fine print: "Disney Dollars may be spent or collected and saved as souvenirs and are redeemable at any time before or after any period of inactivity." At the bottom: "A00651375A" "Series 1993" "One Disney Dollar". There is a picture of Mickey Mouse in the middle with the word "Mickey" under it. "Scrooge McDuck" has signed the bill above the word "Treasurer". On the back: "Disney Dollars" at the top; "One Disney Dollar" at the bottom, and a large colorful picture of Mickey in a car filling most of the middle. "(C) The Walt Disney Company" in fine print. If Disney can issue its own currency, maybe other people can, too. These are basically gift certificates. If somebody had some goods or services to sell, they could issue their own "dollars" which would be good for purchasing their things, but which could also be exchanged back for U.S. dollars if needed. Hal Finney 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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REMAIL: Anonymous postin
by Hal 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

The message forwarded by Mark Ringuette was apparently posted to sci.crypt by using a cypherpunks remailer followed by a mail-to-news gateway. To recap on how to do this, put :: Request-Remailing-To: sci-crypt(a)cs.utexas.edu then a blank line at the front of your message, and mail to one of the remailers (Karl Barrus posts a list every month). For more security and in-practice untraceability, use one of Karl's scripts to set up a chained request with encryption. By bouncing your message around the country like this, decrypting at each stage, you get much better security than with just one hop. Change "sci-crypt" in the address above to the name of the newsgroup you want to post to, replacing the "." in the name with "-". (No, I don't know how you post to a newsgroup with a "-" in it. Maybe it just works.) I notice that the Comment field I put out on remailed message cautioning that it is coming from an anonymous remailer did not get passed through the mail-to-news gateway software at utexas. This leaves little clue about where it came from. It does make it pretty clear that you can't reply to it since it comes from "nobody(a)alumni.caltech.edu". As an aside, I'd like to encourage people not to use hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu so much and to use one of the others more. I have one at hfinney(a)shell.portal.com which I think may be more immune to political pressure. Unlike the alumni account, I'm paying for this one, which should give me some clout; and also, I remember hearing that at the hackers conference the head of Portal offered some support to the idea of anonymous remailers, so I'm hoping that management won't be quick to shut me down when people complain. Hal 74076.1041(a)compuserve.com

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FWD: Jerry Berman, Mitch Kapor
by Marc.Ringuette＠GS80.SP.CS.CMU.EDU 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

A couple of interesting messages from sci.crypt: an anonymously forwarded letter from 1985 from Jerry Berman (Exec Director of EFF) to David Chaum, and a response to the posting from Mitch Kapor. To sum up: Berman suggested to Chaum (in '85) that he prefers legal remedies to technological ones, and doesn't like the idea of a society where people routinely hide from the law. The anonymous reposter is concerned with the discrepancy between EFF policy and these sentiments from Berman. Kapor responds to his concerns by saying that Berman now recognizes the role of technological solutions in the privacy equation. The EFF continues to be the best representative of hacker culture in Washington. -- Marc Ringuette (mnr(a)cs.cmu.edu) From: nobody(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu Subject: Jerry Berman on pseudonymous privacy Date: 24 Apr 1993 10:38:38 -0500 Sender: daemon(a)cs.utexas.edu Hello all, I thought you all might like to see this. It's a letter from Jerry Berman to David Chaum from November of 1985, in response to information that Mr. Chaum sent to Mr. Berman. While I have to congratulate EFF for its prompt response to the Clipper Chip announcement from the White House, I think it's important to recognize the philosophy of their Executive Director, as explained below. I agree that legal remedies are important, but when pressed, I'd prefer to retain the ability to use purely technical solutions to preserve my privacy, because they'll hold up under fire. Mr. Chaum has consented to the publication of this letter on the Net. I don't work for, nor am I a member of EFF, ACLU, or any similar organizations, but I do agree with them on a great many things. --Aristophanes ---------- AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION WASHINGTON OFFICE 122 Maryland Avenue, NE November 1, 1985 Washington, DC 20002 -------------------- National Headquarters Mr. David Chaum 132 West 43rd Street Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science New York. NY 10036 P.O. Box 4079 (212) 944-9800 19O9 AB Amsterdam Norman Dorsen President Dear Mr. Chaum: Ira Glasser Executive Director Eleanor Holmes Norton CHAIR National Advisory Council Thank you for sending me a most interesting article. A society of individuals and organizations that would expend the time and resources to use a series of 'digital pseudonyms' to avoid data linkage does not in my opinion make big brother obsolete but acts on the assumption that big brother is ever present. I view your system as a form of societal paranoia. As a matter of principle, we are working to enact formal legal protections for individual privacy rather than relying on technical solutions. We want to assume a society of law which respects legal limits rather than a society that will disobey the law, requiring citizens to depend on technical solutions. e.g. require a judical warrant for government interception of data communications rather than encrypt all messages on the assumption that regardless of the lawt the government will abuse its power and invade privacy. As a matter of practicality, I do not think your system offers much hope for privacy. First, the trend toward universal identifiers is as much.-a movement generated by government or industry's desire to keep track of all citizens as it is by citizens seeking simplicity and convenience in all transactions. At best, your system would benefit the sophisticated and most would opt for simplicity. The poor and the undereducated would never use or benefit from it. Finally where there's a will, there's a way. If government wants to link data bases, it will, by law, require the disclosure of various individual pseudonyms used by citizens or prohibit it for data bases which the government wants to link. Since corporations make money by trading commercial lists with one another, they will never adopt the system or if it is adopted, will use "fine printn contracts to permit selling various codes used by their customers to other firms. The solution remains law, policy, and consensus about limits on government or corporate intrusion into areas of individual autonomy. Technique can be used to enforce that consensus or to override it. It cannot be used as a substitute for such consensus. Sincerely Yours, /Sig/ Jerry J. Berman Chief Legislative Counsel & Direrector ACLU Privacy Technology Project cc: John Shattuck From: mkapor(a)eff.org (Mitch Kapor) Subject: Re: Jerry Berman on pseudonymous privacy Originator: mkapor(a)eff.org Sender: usenet(a)eff.org (NNTP News Poster) Date: Sat, 24 Apr 1993 17:16:28 GMT nobody(a)alumni.cco.caltech.edu correctly states Jerry Berman's 1985 view on privacy, but he mistakenly assumes that this represents Berman's 1993 view as EFF Executive Director. As one of the people who convinced Jerry that legal protections for privacy are insufficient, and that technical measures, especially public key cryptography, are also vitally necessary, I can tell you that Jerry and EFF are fully committed to this position. The previous poster is apparently unaware of a long series of EFF positions in support of this view. I suggest those interested read EFF's position on Clipper or our other work in digital privacy. Check ftp.eff.org for more details. One of the great things about human beings is that they are capable of change and evolution in their thinking. The idea that crypto is critical to privacy is one which is no longer limited to certain net afficianados, but is spreading to parts of the public policy community in Washington. Mitch Kapor co-Founder, EFF

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ADMIN: ftp usage statistics
by Eric Hughes 26 Apr '93

26 Apr '93

I get weekly statistics on the ftp usage at soda. We've been up at about near the top of the usage frequency for a while, but this week we hit number one, with over one third of the total ftp traffic here. We've even passed sfraves, which also runs on this machine. Hoo! Things are hoppin'. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- TOTALS FOR SUMMARY PERIOD Sat Apr 17 1993 TO Sun Apr 25 1993 For directory pub/cypherpunks: number of files: 1161 number of bytes: 180752541

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