- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Crypto anarchy in a VW? (not the bug)
by poier＠sfu.ca 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

Has there been any discussion of anonimity / crypto anarchy in a virtual world such as the ones described in _Snow Crash_ or _Neuromancer_? When the nets to support these technologies come into place (and I have no doubt that they will), perhaps a form of anonimity could be written into the architechture, instead of having to add it on later as is the case now.... I would certainly be very interesting, especially with the work being done on creating alternate personas (or avatars, whatever). Also, a while back someone mentioned in passing buried cables.. this stirred up an old idea I had about server anonimity, that is that the actual physical location of a server would be very difficult to pin down... the only way to do this with any real degree of security would be to bounce signals off a satellite but this would be rather costly... Skye -- -----====> Skye Merlin Poier <====----- Undergrad in CMPT/MATH (Virtual Reality) |||| |||| email: poier(a)sfu.ca p-OO <--> OO-q THINK PGP Public Key available on finger \== ==/

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Verifying Privacy as an Upload/AI?
by fnerd＠smds.com 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

(Posted to both extropians and cypherpunks.) Is there any way for a process running in a computer to verify that it has privacy? How could an AI, for instance, ever know that it had privacy? How could a person preparing to be uploaded provide for their continuing privacy? Assume these things, for the sake of argument: Strong public key crypto. Truly tamper-proof computers. Capability-based operating systems with proven protection between processes. We might ask Norm Hardy for a rundown on some of the wonderful things that are possible in these types of systems. You might even assume that... Humans can memorize things, and these things can't be decoded from their uploads' memory dumps. (See note on torture below). The process/person seeking assurance of privacy is capable of being downloaded into a humanoid robot with enough compute power. Can you prevent the bad guys from copying you and torturing information out of the copy? Can you be secure even if they can do that? Even with the best assumptions, I find this question tough. But then I'm dense sometimes. -fnerd

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ANON/REMAIL: Remailers June 1, 1993
by Karl Barrus 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

...teach me to not read my mail first... :-) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist? A1: 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 4: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 5: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 8: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 10: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 11: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu 12: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 13: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 15: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: #1-#6 remail only, no encryption of headers #7-#12 support encrypted headers #15 special - header and message must be encrypted together #9,#13,#15 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) #14 public key not yet released #9,#13,#15 running on privately owned machines ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files. Mail to me (elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAulOYOA7OpLWtYzAQHLfQP/XDSipOUPctZnqjjTq7+665MWgysE1ex9 lh3Umzk2Q647KyqhoCo8f7nVrieAZxK0HjRFrRQnQCwjTSQrve2eAQ1A5PmJjyiI Y55E3YIXYmKrQekIHUKaMyATfnhNc6+2MT8mwaWz2kiOTRkun/SlNI3Cv3Qt8Emy Y6Zv0kk/7rs= =simY -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Remailers 06/01/93
by Karl Barrus 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Q1: What cypherpunk remailers exist? A1: 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu 4: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 5: remail(a)tamsun.tamu.edu 6: remail(a)tamaix.tamu.edu 7: ebrandt(a)jarthur.claremont.edu 8: hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu 9: remailer(a)rebma.mn.org 10: elee7h5(a)rosebud.ee.uh.edu 11: phantom(a)mead.u.washington.edu 12: hfinney(a)shell.portal.com 13: remailer(a)utter.dis.org 14: 00x(a)uclink.berkeley.edu 15: remail(a)extropia.wimsey.com NOTES: #1-#6 remail only, no encryption of headers #7-#12 support encrypted headers #15 special - header and message must be encrypted together #9,#13,#15 introduce larger than average delay (not direct connect) #14 public key not yet released ====================================================================== Q2: What help is available? A2: Check out the pub/cypherpunks directory at soda.berkeley.edu (128.32.149.19). Instructions on how to use the remailers are in the remailer directory, along with some unix scripts and dos batch files. Mail to me (elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu) for further help and/or questions. ====================================================================== -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAufF4OA7OpLWtYzAQGsEwQAkAcRFuEUBlNVdObcvTMZL3RFsK0MPZXw EyjAKEIkJgScdkeIN8uiN4Glz14+BkiLYWwu9fGRJAhV0ytKx1F/RYNcseXG0Em6 en69SAKrf6rgWMuA3im/k0uWe3FPoCVWyXYU7g9gDxvyQcgBkF1o+Fj4Sr3PtUCR LcIEvwSM+pM= =jIRN -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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crypto '93: deadline for stipend
by Eric Hughes 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

For those of you who want to go to CRYPTO 93 and get paid to do so, the deadline is this Friday. The conference is Aug 22 et seq. in Santa Barbara. Details from the announcement are below. Eric ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- A very limited number of stipends are available to those unable to obtain funding. Applications for stipends should be sent to the General Chair before June 4, 1993. ---------------------- For other information, contact the General Chair: Paul C. Van Oorschot, Crypto '93 Bell-Northern Research (MAIL STOP 000) 3500 Carling Ave. Nepean, Ontario K2H 8E9 Canada Telephone: (613)-763-4199 Fax: (613)-763-2626 Internet: crypto93(a)bnr.ca

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Remailers on networks like Fido or WWIV
by mmidboe＠cs.uah.edu 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

I've seen a lot about remailers on Internet but has anyone done any work with remailers on Fidonet, or WWIVNet style networks? I've been thinking about a WWIVNet anonymous remailer and can easily implement one for email, but the public postings would be much harder although I do have some ideas on that. If anyone else out there has any ideas, or has started on this already I'd really like to hear about it. d. saint

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No Subject
by Eric Hughes 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

>I'm analyzing a piece of encryption shareware advertised on >comp.archives.msdos.announce. Could you post a more complete pointer to this? >PARTICULAR TOOLS I'D USEFUL... >- A binary file editor/composer with hex and ascii displays >- A tool for generating and viewing letter frequencies, digram/ >trigram frequencies Since you are going to be writing some of these, presumably, I take it you'll be sharing your code with us. Yes? >I looked on soda in pub/cypherpunks/cryptanalysis and found >nothing useful. The directory is there as much to inspire the writing of such software as it is to distribute it. Eric

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Clipperpunks Write Code?
by tcmay＠netcom.com 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

(I've taken the liberty of renaming Hal Finney's thread, mainly since I wasn't sure _what_ it was named...it arrived via the -request list and was missing some headers....) Hal Finney writes: > Headline: "Clipper Considered Harmful" > > ...so what else is new, huh? > > But I was thinking specifically of Cypherpunks. Reading the article > about the group in the Whole Earth Review, an article written before > the advent of the Clipper proposal, reminded me of all the things we > were working on before the Clipper forced them onto the back burner. > > Anonymous mail, anonymous posting, steganography, digital cash, whistle- > blowers, encryption itself - all the ingredients of Tim's "crypto anarchy" - > in many of these areas it seemed we had a certain amount of momentum which > has been lost. If "Cypherpunks write code", how much code has been written > lately? Now it seems like our motto is changing to "Cypherpunks write > letters", to their congressmen. ...stuff elided to save space.... > I claim that our best response to the threat posed by Clipper is a hearty > "screw you" and a rededication to the Cypherpunks goals. Let the powers that > be know that we are not intimidated or cowed by their threats. We must > continue to oppose Clipper, but at the same time we must make progress on > the crypto privacy front. Otherwise our opponents are winning, regardless of > the eventual political outcome. I think Hal is right, though the Clipper controversy has generated a lot of new interest in crypto issues and perhaps even in this list. My guess would be that many of today's readers are on this list now because of the rude awakening Clipper gave them. Having said this, I agree that our real strength lies in technical areas (I'm referring to folks like Hal, Eric Hughes, Miron Cuperman, all the others who're writing C and Perl code, and all those running remailers and the like). The anti-Clipper work is related, but probably isn't the core...fortunately, I doubt there's any conflict, as people will work on what interests them, so the Clipper stuff probably isn't affecting work on other core issues. Maybe at the next Cypherpunks physical meeting we can get some idea of what others are doing? For example, perhaps Hal Finney could communicate by phone for a few minutes? (We did this with the Boston and D.C. Cypherpunks at the emergency Clipper meeting and it worked well.) Others could also call in, or vice versa. Things like digital money will require a lot of effort, probably two or three times what PGP took (just a guess). Wide deployment is even more problematic. These are "social" issues, not just technical issues, of course, so progress is hard to predict. It may take a while. -Tim May -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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Re: Electronic Contracts
by jordan＠imsi.com 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

I believe if you really want it to hold up, you should use the Bellcore document signing service. Has anyone heard of a company that would provide this on a non-research basis? /jordan

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No Subject
by root＠extropia.wimsey.com 01 Jun '93

01 Jun '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- As shown in Karl Barrus's very useful monthly postings, several people are running remailers that include encryption. This gives users the ability to send messages for which the destination is not visible even to someone monitoring their outgoing messages. By chaining through two or more remailers, no one site can see the mapping between source and destination. There is a big potential security weakness with most of these systems that people should be aware of. In order to run the decryption program (currently PGP) automatically, the pass phrase must be provided for the remailer's secret key. This means that the pass phrase has to exist, in the clear, in the scripts which implement the remailer. Anyone who has root privileges on the machine which is running the remailer therefore can get access both to the remailer's secret key file, and to the pass phrase that unlocks it. Even momentary acquisition of this power is enough to capture the secret key. Unfortunately, many of the encrypted remailers are running on multi-user systems over which we have only limited control. I believe that Miron's "Extropia" remailer is running on his personal system, so he should be relatively immune to this attack. But I think the others are all vulnerable. People should be aware of this when using the remailers. (This limitation is one reason I made my remailer keys only 512 bits; I felt there was little point in going to 1024 bits since the security of the remailer key can be broken so easily.) Until more of us are able to acquire personal Unix boxes it might be wise to include the Extropia remailer as part of a remailing chain for messages whose security we care about. Perhaps Karl could add a notation in his remailer lists about which machines are public and which are private. Hal -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.2 iQCVAgUBLAqxy6gTA69YIUw3AQG8TgP/eZNHVKw39VQWFK9reR9dFu36yIZtQQ/f wDKfvAPgkzCHxTIv3xrATCpVXd5CCbhWFLgi0/HSD2CV8uwVp5HOenjYnUu0AAZR kV2JYNJ2F2pAajnYnI5hkvDvnm9SUOC4JtNM7lLlNeJVf5hXsMw1YYkEDQfDPafr Yjs8AFodQUw= =5V+X -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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