- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

REMAILER UPDATE
by Rain.Face＠f418.n161.z1.FIDONET.ORG 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

In that I have been off this list for a while, I was wondering if someone could give me a quick update on which anon remailers are still in service and what the current syntax is. Thanks. --------------------------------------------------------------- |<rain.face(a)f418.n161.z1.fidonet.org>|"No apologies, no excuses,| |PGP Key ID # EFAA97 via all servers | no jive and no regrets." | --------------------------------------------------------------- --- Blue Wave/TG v2.12 [NR] * Origin: realitycheckBBS (510)527-1662 (1:161/418.0) -- Rain Face - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!161!418!Rain.Face INTERNET: Rain.Face(a)f418.n161.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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MAIL: logging that happens on soda
by Eric Hughes 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

I was rooting around soda for some other reason and stumbled upon the mail logs (!) for soda. I just sent myself some mail to generate a sample entry. It's got complete traffic analysis data, complete with to/from pairs, time of day, and message size. Jun 11 08:13:35 soda sendmail[11298]: AA11298: message-id=<9306111513.AA11298(a)soda.berkeley.edu> Jun 11 08:13:35 soda sendmail[11298]: AA11298: from=hughes, size=66, class=0, received from local Jun 11 08:13:36 soda sendmail[11300]: AA11298: to=hughes, delay=00:00:01, stat=Sent I would recommend that all remailer operators find out what kind of mail logging, if any, takes place on their machines. If you need a place to start looking, the mail log on soda was in the same directory as the syslog messages. I would also recommend that this information on mail logging by the system be put in Karl's remailer list. Eric

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Pgp v 2.2/8088/V-20
by XXCLARK＠indst.indstate.edu 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

ms>I don't doubt it for a second, but I know it definitely will ms>lock up a real 8088. Grew so accustomed to the NEC V-series I suspect I'd come to think of them as the *real* 8088... and 8080. Uu> Key generation on the XT is as exciting... and as fast... Uu> as a baseball game... ms> Well, more like _cricket_, actually. 8-) There is *nothing* like cricket. Uu> Encryption speed is more than adequate. ms> Considering the math involved, yes. Still even a 20MHz 286 ms> fairly flies doing PGP tasks in comparison, though. Agreed. Just didn't want the potential PGP user with an XT to feel he'd have to settle for a Clipper chip... and had my button pushed by the naif overly impressed with the originovelnew. One wonders what reaction one would elicit were he confronted with an Altair kit and its quarter mile of white wire or MS Basic on paper tape or cassette. --------------------------------------------------------------------- internet : xxclark(a)indst.indstate.edu RelayNet (488) Vanilla BITNET: XXCLARK@INDST FidoNet (1:2230/114) Phone: 911 TechNet 11:800/0 One need not be a weatherman to know which way the wind is blowing. ---------------------------------------------------------------------

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Re: CryptoStacker
by bbyer＠BIX.com 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

If the project is called CryptoStacker, why not use Stacker? Have the program go beneath Stacker (or another disk doubling system) and encrypt/decrypt the actual stacker file as Stacker reads it? It would be a much simpler solution once you found out how te interface with Stacker. Ben Byer <bbyer(a)bix.com>

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PKP sellout?
by hal＠alumni.cco.caltech.edu 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

This was my response on sci.crypt to this announcement that PKP will be supporting DSS, and licensing its technology for use by Clipper phones. Thanks to Lance for alerting us to this announcement. ----- jim(a)rand.org (Jim Gillogly) forwards: >This is to notify the public that the National Institute of >Standards and Technology (NIST) intends to grant an exclusive >world-wide license to Public Key Partners of Sunnyvale, California >to practice the Invention embodied in U.S. Patent Application No. >07/738.431 and entitled "Digital Signature Algorithm." And so it appears that another patent jewel will be added to the crown worn by PKP, the de facto owner of cryptographic technology in the United States. They will have an exclusive license to the DSA, as they already do to RSA and most other worthwhile encryption technologies. This also appears to put to rest the much-publicized feud between RSA and NIST/NSA. Conspiracy theorists can now comfortably return to the position that PKP/RSADSI is actually an arm of the NSA, dedicated to restricting and delaying access to strong cryptography as much as possible. >Notice of availability of this invention for licensing >was waived because it was determined that expeditious granting of >such license will best serve the interest of the Federal Government >and the public. Once again we are presented with a fait accompli; no other organizations were given an opportunity to bid for the licensing of this patent. The government prefers to see PKP holding the keys to all cryptography in the U.S. Remember how Clipper's technology was similarly assigned to particular corporations on a non-competitive basis? >Subject to NIST's grant of this license, PKP is pleased to declare >its support for the proposed Federal Information Processing >Standard for Digital Signatures (the "DSS") and the pending >availability of licenses to practice the DSA. And what of the technical objections to DSA/DSS raised in earlier documents by officials of RSADSI, such as in the recent CACM? No doubt those objections are now moot. >PKP will also grant a license to practice key management, at no >additional fee, for the integrated circuits which will implement >both the DSA and the anticipated Federal Information Processing >Standard for the "key escrow" system announced by President Clinton >on April 16, 1993. So PKP is now supporting key escrow and Clipper. Can anyone seriously argue that this company is a friend to supporters of strong cryptography? These are dark times indeed. PKP has thrown in with the government, getting behind DSS and Clipper in exchange for exclusive licensing rights. Their ownership of DH and RSA will make it that much harder for any competition to Clipper to arise. If the 60-day comment period really means anything, perhaps public criticism can be effective here. There is much to be concerned about in this announcement. Hal Finney hal(a)alumni.caltech.edu

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Nsa/gshq
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS Uu> Good lord, cypherpunks, I wouldn't be surprised if Britain soon Uu> official endorses the Clipper. All our worst paranoia would be Uu> reality. Consider it: the NSA and GCHQ have been in active Uu> collaboration ever since WWII and especially in recent years. Uu> This is all documented by Bamford. To say nothing of Peter Wright's [MI5] revelations, the publication of which I understand was banned in the UK. Very interesting stuff - I hope Britons eventually got the chance to read his book, _Spycatcher_. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Unsubscribe
by Leo Reilly 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

could you please remove me from the mail list. I am on the road for two weeks, without a laptop, and I cannot affored the disk space to be taken up while I am gone. Cheers! Leo Reilly

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Pgp v 2.2/8088
by M..Stirner＠f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

* Reply to msg originally in CYPHERPUNKS > version 2.2 locks up 8088-based computers. Version 2.1 does not. > There is an unauthorized bug fix version, 2.21. I use 2.2 as it Uu> PGP 2.2 runs without a hitch on at least one 10 MHz+ XT Uu> box in which the 8088 was replaced with an NEC V-20 and an 8087 Uu> co-processor added when new... about six years ago. I don't doubt it for a second, but I know it definitely will lock up a real 8088. Also there is a problem with DesqView in some cases. Uu> Probably far more XT boxes running, worldwide, than some Uu> are capable of imagining. I'm sure of that, too. PGP is a worldwide phenomenon, & there are a whole lot of XT-class computers in the outside world. Uu> Key generation on the XT is as exciting... and as fast... Uu> as a baseball game... Well, more like _cricket_, actually. 8-) Uu> Encryption speed is more than adequate. Considering the math involved, yes. Still even a 20MHz 286 fairly flies doing PGP tasks in comparison, though. ********************************************************************* * <m..stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.fidonet.org> - PGP Key D30909 via servers * * > What country can preserve its liberties if its rulers are not <* * > warned from time to time that their people preserve the spirit <* * > of resistance? Let them take arms!" - Thomas Jefferson, 1787 <* ********************************************************************* ___ Blue Wave/QWK v2.12 -- M. Stirner - via FidoNet node 1:125/1 UUCP: ...!uunet!kumr!shelter!28!M..Stirner INTERNET: M..Stirner(a)f28.n125.z1.FIDONET.ORG

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Remailer mail logging:
by The Phantom 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

just for your info: the mead remailer has no logging enabled! :) Matt Thomlinson Say no to the Wiretap Chip! University of Washington, Seattle, Washington. Internet: phantom(a)u.washington.edu phone: (206) 528-5732 PGP 2.2 key available via email or finger phantom(a)hardy.u.washington.edu

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more Clipper proponents on sci.crypt
by L. Detweiler 12 Jun '93

12 Jun '93

Call me paranoid, but I think the NSA has decided that sci.crypt is now a good spot to level propaganda. From: pugh(a)cs.umd.edu (Bill Pugh) Organization: U of Maryland, Dept. of Computer Science, Coll. Pk., MD 20742 >I don't like the Clipper, and don't think it will succeed. However, on the >chance that we get stuck with it, we should figure out ways to solve many >of the concerns people have raised. > >A lot of people have concerns about the key escrow system. There are >good reasons to be worried about a system in which the government can >get a court order to decode your communications. But an even greater >concern to many people is how to make sure that key disclosure is limited >to lawfully authorized cases. The more I see statements like these, the more I suspect that the Clipper has a backdoor besides the key escrow systems. I think the whole escrow issue is a decoy to getting a widespread NSA standard in place. Also, keep in mind it could be the case that NSA builds different versions of the chips over time. How would we ever know? From: rja14(a)cl.cam.ac.uk (Ross Anderson) Organization: U of Cambridge Computer Lab, UK >At Eurocrypt 93 a few weeks ago, the NSA's technical director said that the >key escrow system was still `vaporware' and that they had no objection to >interested parties getting involved in the design, to make sure that it was >`whiter than white'. > >Here's my twopenceworth: you can in fact make an escrow system which will be >goood enough to silence all or most of the reasonable objections, and here is >how to do it. > >1. The International Problem. > >... if clipper is restricted to the US, it will lose a lot of its value. >The bad guys such as the Mafia and the various terrorist groups will just >buy their communications systems in Europe or the Far East. Indeed, >respectable US corporations may end up buying their kit there as this is the >only way in which they can get the same kind of scrambler phone in each of >their offices. This guy then goes on to propose a lot of bizarre international configurations of key escrow. Holy cow-- this guy is advocating *international* key escrow? Good lord, cypherpunks, I wouldn't be surprised if Britain soon official endorses the Clipper. All our worst paranoia would be reality. Consider it: the NSA and GCHQ have been in active collaboration ever since WWII and especially in recent years. This is all documented by Bamford. What if Clipper is not just amenable to the NSA, but was also developed with British input? >The big question of course is whether the Agency would be happy with an >escrow system which really worked, on top of algorithms which were really >hard to break and were implemented well. Perhaps the object of the current >exercise is simply to sow fear, uncertainty and doubt, and thus postpone the >uptake of crypto in the commercial sector, I don't care if `the Agency' is happy or not. I think they would most definitely *not* be happy under such an arrangement and would use any significant Clipper entrenchment as torque to later ban alternative cryptographic schemes. I'm growing desperately weary. I think the tidal wave is approaching.

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