- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

GUI
by nobody＠merde.dis.org 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

> >All GUI versions of the PGP code are somewhat limited in >sophistication by internal organization of PGP code toward the >`teletype output' mindset. A major effort is underway to remodularize >the code to internally encapsulate algorithms from the input & output >(user interface) to make future GUI versions more accessable to >programmers, and ultimately with new versions for users. >A Windows version is in the works. > How about a workbench of reusable components? When will macPGP handle AppleEvents?

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Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by George A. Gleason 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

Re "NY Tel cutting off payphone service in *some areas.*" You can bet those areas are black. You can bet that high up in some corporate office tower, the opinion was voiced, "what the hell do those pickaninnies need phones for anyway?!" Call it Information-Age Apartheid if you wish, you won't be off the mark by much. -gg

5 4

Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by geoffw＠nexsys.net 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

> How about a valid debate being over **how** to best provide universal > service in this day & age of red-lining? Interesting to note that when the > private entrepreneurs open up U.S. versions of the traditional European > "Call Offices," (rows of payphones with a window clerk or other attendant to > help provide service & security), all of a sudden a chorus of voices go up, > "OH NO, the Dope Dealers will use these things!" Well, one excuse or > another, same old racist BS either way. The right to anonymity has got to > be universal, and the right to access has got to be universal, or these > things become mere privileges which can be taken away on a whim. > > -gg > So what if some small time drug dealers are using them. One thing is for sure, the Big Time drug dealers, (the ones with the ships, planes, and enough money to finance the transport of tons of contraband) do not, and will not be using them. As far as dening payphone service in "high crime" (read black areas), well the information kiosk would tend to solve the problem of vandalism, so what's the big deal? An for all you supposed libertarian types, I'm sure there is some enterprising person or family who will be willing to take the perceived risks with operating such an establishment to get the potential financial reward.

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No Subject
by UCX_SMTP＠crc.monroecc.edu 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA21882; Sun, 25 Jul 93 05:57:17 GMT Received: by toad.com id AA18227; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:56 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18185; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:09:45 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA18181; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:09:44 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA17070; Sat, 24 Jul 93 19:49:34 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03528 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:28:50 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA29610 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:20:31 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307250220.AA29610(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:14:16 EDT Resent-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:13:52 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sat, 24 Jul 1993 22:13:47 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA18696 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 18:19:19 -0400 Date: Sat, 24 Jul 93 18:19:19 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307242219.AA18696(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA17170; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:19 GMT Received: by toad.com id AA13070; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:20 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13067; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:03 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13063; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:02 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA15103; Sat, 24 Jul 93 07:52:21 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA27657 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sat, 24 Jul 1993 10:35:54 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA28817 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 10:26:15 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307241426.AA28817(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sat, 24 Jul 93 09:20:26 EDT Resent-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:46 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:36 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA09179 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307230148.AA09179(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA00909; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:41:38 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA14078; Thu, 22 Jul 93 18:01:32 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13842; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:04 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13837; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:03 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA12960; Thu, 22 Jul 93 12:50:15 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA20089 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Thu, 22 Jul 1993 15:25:50 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA07594 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 15:15:19 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307221915.AA07594(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Thu, 22 Jul 93 14:38:30 EDT Resent-Date: Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:57 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:48 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA23297 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307220326.AA23297(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA06943; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:22:44 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA21927; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:16:03 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA21680; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:20 PDT Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA21676; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:19 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA18750; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:00:31 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03218 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:36:21 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA16552 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:27:59 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307220127.AA16552(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:25:09 EDT Resent-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:26 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:18 EDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA12591 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:34:47 -0400 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA14330; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:31:29 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA18642; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:09:44 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18609; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:26 PDT Return-Path: <lock60!snark!boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Received: from gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM ([128.126.220.104]) by toad.com id AA18605; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:15 PDT Received: from lock60.UUCP by gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (4.1/mls/4.0) id AA04653; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:07:13 EDT X-Info: VFL.Paramax.COM is the new name for GVL.Unisys.COM Please change any mailing lists or aliases. Both the old and the new addresses will work for a short time. Received: by lock60.Canal.Org (smail2.5) id AA16551; 21 Jul 93 18:50:24 EDT (Wed) Received: by snark.thyrsus.com (/\==/\ Smail3.1.21.1 #21.19) id <m0oIjLP-00020KC(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:56 EDT Received: by boojum.uucp (Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0oIiVK-000BQZC; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03 EDT Message-Id: <m0oIiVK-000BQZC(a)boojum.uucp> From: <boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Subject: FAQ, round 2 To: boojum!cypherpunks(a)uunet.uu.net Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11] I've written some more material for it. Criticisms and additions welcome. --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- From: esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) Newsgroups: news.answers Followup-To: poster This is the Cypherpunks FAQ. It explains the projects and purposes of the Cypherpunks mailing list. It is also intended to serve as a general introduction to privacy and encryption issues. For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography, see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt. The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including the most up-to-date version of this FAQ. This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; send additions and corrections to that address. Sections contributed by others are credited to individual authors. We gratefully acknowledge, in addition, feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl(a)lehman.com> and Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu>. Here is a table of contents for this FAQ: 1. Why cypherpunks? 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. b. Digital cash. c. Electronic voting. d. Electronic contracts. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. f. <more?> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA b. DES c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS d. PGP e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. b. Expansion of the counter-economy. c. Disempowerment of government. d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. c. Promote the use of encrypted communication. To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother. So if you have skills to contribute, act now. The freedom you save could be your own. 1. Why cypherpunks? Because privacy is essential to freedom. If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them. And it will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more control. The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights. Nor can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that want to know all about you so they can sell you things. Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*. Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools. The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software. Our aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap. 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and a single key. Two users who share a key can exchange private messages. A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public. Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other. For privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private key from the public one. Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among them. The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came from you by decoding with your public key. In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public Key Cryptosystem'. The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES standard, and the government's Clipper proposal. We'll discuss these, and others, in more detail below. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public clear-text message for tampering. To do this, the message must contain a `digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver. For security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash. PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect. Unfortunately, known PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing. Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'. The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS. Snefru, invented by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been broken. MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference implementation in C. As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but has not been *proved* to be secure. DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper proposal. <more needed here> c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. <more needed here> 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key. If you encode it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you. This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public channels. Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it. b. Digital cash. Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash. You could use a PKC to send to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money from your bank account. The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's public keys, can verify that the order is genuine. This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial risk. c. Electronic voting. Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting. If you encode your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it with your public key. d. Electronic contracts. If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it. This is an unforgeable contract. Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. <more needed here> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer scientists who developed the technique. RSA has withstood determined attacks for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure. It has been proposed as an Internet standard. The RSA technique is patented. The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact information should go here>. An implemenation in C called RSAREF is available for research and certain noncommercial uses. b. DES <more needed here> c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS <more needed here> d. PGP <more needed here> e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. <more needed here> 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. <more needed here> b. Expansion of the counter-economy. <more needed here> c. Disempowerment of government. <more needed here> d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. <more needed here> 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? <more needed here> a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. <more needed here> b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. <more needed here> c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. <more needed here> 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. <list of current projects should go here> b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. <more needed here> c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication. <more needed here> You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes). --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- -- >>eric>>

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question
by Mandrake＠f1.n8012.z86.toadnet.org 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

How does one get off the mailing list?

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Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by George A. Gleason 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

Credit card fraud happens almost everywhere. Drawing a circle around a neighborhood and zapping it is what's known as redlining, and when the neighborhood is defined by its racial composition, it's bigotry and discrimination. And did you read Hugh's posting about the 7pm to 8am coin curfew in Czechago? They *allow* credit card calls after those hours, so the credit card fraud issue is at best a red herring. Wake up, how much evidence do you need that it's a simple matter of bigotry and classism? This stuff is real. The bottom line is, in the information age, access is power; hence the continuing little maneuvers to dis-access the disenfranchised. Too much access, like too much democracy, makes some people very nervous. Think about it, stop engaging in denial. If what we're fighting for makes any difference at the bottom level of the grassroots, it's the right to drop a quarter in the slot and make a call without having one's name in a consumer database. That's basic privacy and anonymity for you. And it's all that a whole lot of people can afford. -gg

1 0

TEST
by williacw＠vuse.vanderbilt.edu 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

Could someone E-Mail me a PGP encrypted message, so that I may test out my key. I'll place my public key in this messaege. -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAixv1gEAAAEEAJkpZFvYyCu23f5y7NuMQuEjIZzEbN2trPJJfGO5V8+8RX+V j94S5cx3q5lkOEJz7/YjWx6c0EIU+gEbdQ4Fw/Ar5jOmVJNcCqUHJZlH/eLhVWb2 R5JqNF8FLfFBkBAWCccfPTbccdGFPz6Jjnzn87HJT3r4HKSgKKDQOWvqVsxdAAUR tDJDaGFybGVzIFcuIFdpbGxpYW1zIDxXZXNsZXlAY3RydmF4LnZhbmRlcmJpbHQu ZWR1PokAlQIFECxv2KWg0Dlr6lbMXQEBWgkD/268KxYNV0POptYQJRQKNNaAulCd oaS5oG5EoQSg3mK9HkshWeq6mapk1xs0f2iZEedFqJq8m/oP1BMHM8XQ+uqn+HTp /lsPg1aVqgkBzB3udF755WHf+IlbplnNTdJTqu4gLJKhwlYEEQUcop3KgJ4gh8g+ h/u+O8gpXqSdncS1 =GuoW -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

2 1

No Subject
by UCX_SMTP＠crc.monroecc.edu 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA17170; Sat, 24 Jul 93 22:13:19 GMT Received: by toad.com id AA13070; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:20 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13067; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:03 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13063; Sat, 24 Jul 93 15:04:02 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA15103; Sat, 24 Jul 93 07:52:21 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA27657 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Sat, 24 Jul 1993 10:35:54 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA28817 ; Sat, 24 Jul 93 10:26:15 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307241426.AA28817(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Sat, 24 Jul 93 09:20:26 EDT Resent-Date: Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:46 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Sat, 24 Jul 1993 08:42:36 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA09179 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 Date: Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:48:31 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307230148.AA09179(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA00909; Thu, 22 Jul 93 21:41:38 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA14078; Thu, 22 Jul 93 18:01:32 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA13842; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:04 PDT Return-Path: <UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu> Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA13837; Thu, 22 Jul 93 17:53:03 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA12960; Thu, 22 Jul 93 12:50:15 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA20089 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Thu, 22 Jul 1993 15:25:50 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA07594 ; Thu, 22 Jul 93 15:15:19 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307221915.AA07594(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Thu, 22 Jul 93 14:38:30 EDT Resent-Date: Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:57 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Thu, 22 Jul 1993 14:27:48 EDT Received: from orion.crc.monroecc.edu by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA23297 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:26:36 -0400 From: UCX_SMTP(a)crc.monroecc.edu Message-Id: <9307220326.AA23297(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Apparently-To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> To: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> ---- Transcript of session follows ---- 196608 %NONAME-W-NOMSG, Message number 00000000 -SYSTEM-S-NORMAL, normal successful completion ---- Unsent message follows ---- Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA06943; Wed, 21 Jul 93 23:22:44 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA21927; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:16:03 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA21680; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:20 PDT Received: from decwrl.UUCP by toad.com id AA21676; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:02:19 PDT Received: by uucp-gw-2.pa.dec.com; id AA18750; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:00:31 -0700 Received: from emory.UUCP by merlin.gatech.edu with UUCP id AA03218 (5.65c/IDA-1.4.4 for decvax!decwrl!hoptoad!CYPHERPUNKS); Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:36:21 -0400 Received: from indigo.UUCP by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via UUCP id AA16552 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:27:59 -0400 Resent-Message-Id: <9307220127.AA16552(a)emory.mathcs.emory.edu> Received: by indigo.mese.com (DECUS UUCP /2.0/2.0/2.0/); Wed, 21 Jul 93 21:25:09 EDT Resent-Date: Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:26 EDT Resent-From: <cypherpunks(a)indigo.mese.com> Resent-To: <CYPHERPUNKS(a)toad.com> Received: by INDIGO.MESE.COM (MX V3.1) with UUCP; Wed, 21 Jul 1993 21:21:18 EDT Received: from relay2.UU.NET by emory.mathcs.emory.edu (5.65/Emory_mathcs.3.4.11) via SMTP id AA12591 ; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:34:47 -0400 Received: from toad.com by relay2.UU.NET with SMTP (5.61/UUNET-internet-primary) id AA14330; Wed, 21 Jul 93 20:31:29 -0400 Received: by toad.com id AA18642; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:09:44 PDT Received: by toad.com id AA18609; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:26 PDT Return-Path: <lock60!snark!boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Received: from gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM ([128.126.220.104]) by toad.com id AA18605; Wed, 21 Jul 93 16:07:15 PDT Received: from lock60.UUCP by gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM (4.1/mls/4.0) id AA04653; Wed, 21 Jul 93 19:07:13 EDT X-Info: VFL.Paramax.COM is the new name for GVL.Unisys.COM Please change any mailing lists or aliases. Both the old and the new addresses will work for a short time. Received: by lock60.Canal.Org (smail2.5) id AA16551; 21 Jul 93 18:50:24 EDT (Wed) Received: by snark.thyrsus.com (/\==/\ Smail3.1.21.1 #21.19) id <m0oIjLP-00020KC(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:56 EDT Received: by boojum.uucp (Smail3.1.28.1 #2) id m0oIiVK-000BQZC; Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03 EDT Message-Id: <m0oIiVK-000BQZC(a)boojum.uucp> From: <boojum!esr(a)gvls1.VFL.Paramax.COM> Subject: FAQ, round 2 To: boojum!cypherpunks(a)uunet.uu.net Date: Wed, 21 Jul 93 14:03:02 EDT X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.3 PL11] I've written some more material for it. Criticisms and additions welcome. --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- From: esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com (Eric S. Raymond) Newsgroups: news.answers Followup-To: poster This is the Cypherpunks FAQ. It explains the projects and purposes of the Cypherpunks mailing list. It is also intended to serve as a general introduction to privacy and encryption issues. For details on the technical and theoretical aspects of computer cryptography, see the sci.crypt FAQ, available for FTP from rtfm.mit.edu (18.172.1.27) in the directory pub/usenet-by-group/sci.crypt. The cypherpunks archive is available for FTP at soda.berkeley.edu:pub/cypherpunks This site contains code, information, rants, and other miscellany, including the most up-to-date version of this FAQ. This FAQ is maintained by Eric S. Raymond <esr(a)snark.thyrsus.com>; send additions and corrections to that address. Sections contributed by others are credited to individual authors. We gratefully acknowledge, in addition, feedback and comments from David Mandl <dmandl(a)lehman.com> and Eric Hughes <hughes(a)soda.berkeley.edu>. Here is a table of contents for this FAQ: 1. Why cypherpunks? 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. b. Digital cash. c. Electronic voting. d. Electronic contracts. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. f. <more?> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA b. DES c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS d. PGP e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. b. Expansion of the counter-economy. c. Disempowerment of government. d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. c. Promote the use of encrypted communication. To join the cypherpunks mailing list, send a request to: cypherpunks-request(a)toad.com Working with us could be your best shot at stopping Big Brother. So if you have skills to contribute, act now. The freedom you save could be your own. 1. Why cypherpunks? Because privacy is essential to freedom. If the government (or any other oppressor that behaves like one) can effectively monitor communications, it can control or suppress them. And it will do so, because the natural tendency of controllers is always to seek more control. The government cannot be relied on to protect your privacy rights. Nor can anyone else --- certainly not your employer, or the corporations that want to know all about you so they can sell you things. Given half the chance, governments and corporations will always push for security standards that protect *them*, but not *you*. Computer technology can help protect you against would-be snoopers, but only if somebody is sufficiently smart and dedicated to build the tools. The Cypherpunks list exists to build and propagate privacy software. Our aim is to give you the tools to keep your private information private, and to communicate with other people and computers in ways snoopers cannot tap. 2. What are the essentials of privacy software? a. Public-key cryptosystems for secure communication. A conventional cryptosystem consists of an encoding/decoding method and a single key. Two users who share a key can exchange private messages. A public-key cryptosystem uses a *pair* of keys; one private, one public. Anyone with either key can decode messages encoded with the other. For privacy, it must be impossible (or at least impractical) to deduce the private key from the public one. Public-key cryptosystems imply many exciting things --- unforgeable electronic signatures, digital cash, and secure electronic contracts are among them. The basic idea behind all of these is that, as long as your private key is secure, people can verify that an encoded message containg known text came from you by decoding with your public key. In the remainder of this FAQ we use `PKC' as an abbreviation for `Public Key Cryptosystem'. The best-known PKCs are the RSA system, the Federal Government's DES standard, and the government's Clipper proposal. We'll discuss these, and others, in more detail below. b. Unforgeable electronic signatures for message authentication. There are many circumstances in which you want to be able to check a public clear-text message for tampering. To do this, the message must contain a `digital signature' or `message digest code' or `message hash' derived from its clear text, which can be checked against the clear text by a receiver. For security, the message hash should have the property that no one knows how to modify a message in a way that preserves its hash. PKCs give you unforgeable signatures as a side-effect. Unfortunately, known PKCs are too slow to use practically for message hashing. Thus, there is a separate category of `Digital Signature Systems'. The three major DSS techniques are Snefru, MD5, and DSS. Snefru, invented by Ralph Merkle at Xerox PARC, is of historical interest only as it has been broken. MD5 is described in Internet RFC 1321, which also gives a reference implementation in C. As of July 1993 it is believed to be secure, but has not been *proved* to be secure. DSS is a Federal Government proposed standard associated with the Clipper proposal. <more needed here> c. DC-net or similar protocols to thwart spoofing. <more needed here> 3. What are the potential applications of good privacy software? a. Secure communications. With a PKC, you can send a message that no one but the intended receiver can decrypt by encoding it with the receiver's public key. If you encode it with *your* public key, the receiver can verify that it came from you. This means that it is possible to do secure communications even over public channels. Neither nosy neighbors, business competitors, nor the government or any (other) criminal gang can interfere with it. b. Digital cash. Unforgeable messages also imply digital cash. You could use a PKC to send to the receiver a code permitting them to draw a particular amount of money from your bank account. The bank, with access to both yours and the payee's public keys, can verify that the order is genuine. This means that it is possible to do trade over electronic links, without any part trusting any other party beyond the bounds of normal commercial risk. c. Electronic voting. Unforgeable messages also imply secure electronic voting. If you encode your voting form with a PKC, the vote-collecting authority can verify it with your public key. d. Electronic contracts. If two or more people encode known text with their private keys applied in succession, all their public keys will be required to decode it. This is an unforgeable contract. Furthermore, it is an unforgeable *private* contract. e. Secure anonymous remailers and posters. <more needed here> 4. What are the key algorithms, tools, and implementations for privacy software? a. RSA RSA stands for `Rivest-Shamir-Adelson', the names of the three computer scientists who developed the technique. RSA has withstood determined attacks for over a decade and is widely believed to be secure. It has been proposed as an Internet standard. The RSA technique is patented. The patents are held by RSA, Inc. <contact information should go here>. An implemenation in C called RSAREF is available for research and certain noncommercial uses. b. DES <more needed here> c. Clipper/Capstone/DSS <more needed here> d. PGP <more needed here> e. Possible non-RSA trapdoor functions. <more needed here> 5. What are the social and political implications of good privacy software? a. Drastically lower transaction costs for trade. <more needed here> b. Expansion of the counter-economy. <more needed here> c. Disempowerment of government. <more needed here> d. Anonymity for whistleblowers. <more needed here> 6. What are the legal, political, and technical obstacles? <more needed here> a. The Clipper/Capstone/DSS power grab. <more needed here> b. The RSA patent and the PGP/RSA fight. <more needed here> c. RSA's base problem may not be NP-complete. <more needed here> 7. What can I do to help? a. Work on cryptographic software. <list of current projects should go here> b. Agitate against the Clipper/Capstone/DES proposals. <more needed here> c. Promote the routine use of encrypted communication. <more needed here> You can help spread PGP and other appropriate tools far and wide (both to help get a better foothold to thwart the Clipper proposal and its ilk, and to work towards making crypto as commonplace as envelopes). --- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION ---- DRAFT VERSION --- -- >>eric>>

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MESSAGE
by WESLEY＠ctrvax.Vanderbilt.Edu 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

I don't think my last message worked too well. I am asking that someone reply to this message with a PGP encrypted message, using the following KEY. Thanks -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK----- Version: 2.3a mQCNAixv1gEAAAEEAJkpZFvYyCu23f5y7NuMQuEjIZzEbN2trPJJfGO5V8+8RX+V j94S5cx3q5lkOEJz7/YjWx6c0EIU+gEbdQ4Fw/Ar5jOmVJNcCqUHJZlH/eLhVWb2 R5JqNF8FLfFBkBAWCccfPTbccdGFPz6Jjnzn87HJT3r4HKSgKKDQOWvqVsxdAAUR tDJDaGFybGVzIFcuIFdpbGxpYW1zIDxXZXNsZXlAY3RydmF4LnZhbmRlcmJpbHQu ZWR1PokAlQIFECxv2KWg0Dlr6lbMXQEBWgkD/268KxYNV0POptYQJRQKNNaAulCd oaS5oG5EoQSg3mK9HkshWeq6mapk1xs0f2iZEedFqJq8m/oP1BMHM8XQ+uqn+HTp /lsPg1aVqgkBzB3udF755WHf+IlbplnNTdJTqu4gLJKhwlYEEQUcop3KgJ4gh8g+ h/u+O8gpXqSdncS1 =GuoW -----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----

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Re: Remailers/PayPhones and Today's NYT
by smb＠research.att.com 25 Jul '93

25 Jul '93

A lot of the issue isn't drug dealers using payphones, it's credit card fraud. Ask yourself what hurts phone companies in their bottom lines.

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