- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: InfoWorld Letter
by wcs＠anchor.ho.att.com 05 Aug '93

05 Aug '93

Paul Goggin sent the list a copy of Steven Fisher's letter to InfoWorld about NSA harassment for offering commercial crypto back in 1981. The NSA is supposedly a bit better behaved these days, at least in public :-), but it's no surprise. Sometime around then, they slapped patent secrecy orders on a guy who had designed an analog scrambler for CB radio; a real crypto-system must have been a much more significant threat to them. A couple of comments were interesting: One was the assertion in the letter he received from the BATF that their product, as munition, could not only not be exported, but could also not be sold to *multinational companies*. Was that the law then? Or was the BATF just a bit over-enthusiastic about what they could get away with? It's also interesting that it was the BATF. Another was that the NSA asked them to put in a trapdoor. These days, escrow is the politically correct way of implementing a trapdoor, but - I wonder if it would be possible to make a trapdoor/weak escrow system, which escrows the keys for *some* kinds of keys, enough to make the bureaucrats think it's ok, but which also has a class of keys for which the escrow is non-effective, bogus, or otherwise doesn't let the cops in, which could be revealed to users after the system has been approved and sold? Perhaps a system which requires 2**N steps to retrieve most keys from escrow, but has a small set that can be gotten quickly for demos? Could you do a system like that and hide it from the NSA for a while? Some alternative approaches would be a system that obscured the escrow (easy to build from clipper if you've got a programmable phone; you just encrypt the Wiretap Field with your session key), or worked fine with a bogus Wiretap Field, or a system where the escrow can be made ineffective administratively (either lost by the escrow agents, or requiring the participation of the telephone owner, or tampered by the owner) At the very minimum, having a system that doesn't let the NSA cheat during the escrow process would be a good start - where each part of the escrow key is really installed separately, and verifiable hardwarily-random numbers are used to seed the key generation. Since the NSA\b\b\bNIST hasn't announced their plans for how to select escrow agents, much less who they are, or how they *really* plan to set the keys, I suppose it's premature to ask them to announce what the rules will be for approval of escrow procedures or agencies or guarantee that if you follow them, you'll be allowed to export your products? :-) Bill Bill Stewart wcs(a)anchor.ho.att.com +1-908-949-0705 fax-4876 ROT13 public key available upon request

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Re: Anon remailer to USENET gate bogus
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Paul Ferguson wrote: I have been experimenting the past few days with anon remailer to USENET gateway systems to see what the results would be -- nada. ... My guess is that the usenet gateway at utexas refuses anon e-mail. Anyone got any other suggestions? I haven't tried any other gateways -- yet. I had a similar experience with utexas. It worked the first time I tried it, but failed on a subsequent attempt. I suspect that after some complaint utexas was modified to reject anonymous input. Here is my list of E-mail/Usenet gateways: group-name(a)ucbvax.berkeley.edu * (blocked from non-bky sites) group-name(a)cs.utexas.edu * (was working but now blocked???) group-name(a)pws.bull.com * (Bounced to remailer) group-name(a)demon.co.uk group.name.usenet(a)decwrl.dec.com group.name(a)news.cs.indiana.edu Note that some of these require trans-literation of periods to dashes in the newsgroup name; others do not. Ucbvax is supposed to block mail from non-Berkely sites; it might work from these Cypherpunks remailers (I haven't tried it): 1: hh(a)pmantis.berkeley.edu 2: hh(a)cicada.berkeley.edu 3: hh(a)soda.berkeley.edu Utexas see above, bull bounced to the (wimsey) remailer; I haven't tried the others yet. But I'm afraid that the utexas story will be repeated for any gateway that continues to allow anonymous posting to newsgroups. I see the obvious solution is for the Cypherpunks remailers to support direct anonymous posting. Certainly the programming should be trivial. The "political" risk is something to consider, however. But we are supposed to be the fearless leaders to crypto-anarchy. "If not us, who? If not now, when?" -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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Re: Anon Bank Accounts?
by edgar＠spectrx.Saigon.COM 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Duncan Frissell said: Did you know that it is still possible -- in 1993 -- to open a bank account in the United States in a nome de guerre? No, I sure didn't know that. My wife works in a bank, & she tells me that she needs to see two forms of ID to open a new account. So please, Duncan, elucidate! -- edgar(a)spectrx.saigon.com (Edgar W. Swank) SPECTROX SYSTEMS +1.408.252.1005 Cupertino, Ca

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INSLAW
by DIC1241＠cup.edu 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Ahhh, I was looking around on ftp.eff.org and I found something(a paper) on the INSLAW thingie... So if you want it, ftp ftp.eff.org and get pub/cud/papers/inslw*...

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InfoWorld Letter
by Paul Goggin 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Brought to without permission of anyone in authority. InfoWorld August 2,1993 Section: To the Editor (pg.54) _Big Brother's encryption_ In his Peer to Peer essay on the Clipper data encryption chip (see "Clipper chip won't clip your wings, it will just protect the unprotected," June 21, page 55), A. Padgett Peterson contends that "the government has more to lose by being exposed to world ridicule from a trapdoor or backdoor than it can hope to gain." My direct experience with the National Security Agency indicates otherwise. At the 1981 fall Comdex, Epic computer Corp. unveiled Kryptyk, the only commerical E-mail crypto package for CP/M computers. My software team and I had implemented the first RSA public key cryptosystem for microprocessors. Our booth was swamped with managers from the Fortune 500 and many international firms. Our ecstasy was still strong when a week later we were visited by the NSA. I proudly explained that we could not inject a trapdoor function -- that cracking the algorithm was computationally infeasible, even with the then- recent advances of prime number theory in France. Within a month we received a letter from the Bureau of Tobacco and Firearms the proclaimed our product was "strategic munition" and could not be sold either to multinational companies nor outside the continental United States -- a heavy penalty for not allowing a trapdoor. And we should believe that NIST and NSA did not boobytrap the Clipper chip? I agree with Mr. Peterson that "security by obscurity just does not work." Remember Watergate? Teh Warren Commission's magic-bullet findings? But as long as governments are the only people who can depend on having secrets, they will always view their citizenry as fools to be manipulated. And when governments sanction data security, rest assured they can freely "E-avesdrop" Steven Fisher, CDP Controlled Information Environments Compuserve: 71750,3203 All spelling mistakes my own. Paul -- R O All Comments Copyright by | Technofetisht A N Paul S. Goggin (1993) | Cypher, Cyber, Chaos V Information Broker | Ergoflux, Interzone E chaos(a)aql.gatech.edu | Carpe Diem: Stop the Clipper wiretap chip Finger account for latest _Phrack_ | Public Key: PGP and RIPEM available For anonymous communication:---> anonymus+4744(a)charcoal.com ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Title 18 USC 2511 and 18 USC 2703 Protected -- Monitoring Absolutely Forbidden

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Nice summary of NIST/PKP Deal in sci.crypt
by tcmay＠netcom.com 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Ross Williams has distributed a nice summary of the current NIST/PKP/DSA situation in sci.crypt, entitled "NIST/PKP scandal: All you need to act." It's 2000 lines, so I'm not sending it out to the entire List (and, no, I was not the one Lance said chastised him, at least not so far as I know). Anyone without Usenet access to sci.crypt can mail me and I'll forward to you the Williams article. If enough folks are sci-crypt-deprived, perhaps I'll post the whole thing. Cheers, -Tim -- .......................................................................... Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)netcom.com | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero 408-688-5409 | knowledge, reputations, information markets, W.A.S.T.E.: Aptos, CA | black markets, collapse of governments. Higher Power: 2^756839 | Public Key: PGP and MailSafe available. Note: I put time and money into writing this posting. I hope you enjoy it.

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things that have been on my mind
by bwp＠mindvox.phantom.com 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

Reading Denning's latest remarks about the key generation process of Clipper being classified, and reading the latest tired redundant flame war with David Sternlight in Usenet, I have to wonder why so much energy is being spent trying to discredit these people who are obviously working towards Clipper and against pgp. Denning has her own agenda, Lord knows where it all comes from, and she's apparently listened to in the government. Sternlight, well, I can't get a handle on him, but it seems like his motives are somewhat similar to Denning's except that he hides his statements behind a veil of claiming to want what is "legal." The thing is, why spend any energy on these two at all? CP's write code. If CP's want to exert any political pressure at all, they should be working with CPSR and EFF to mount a public information drive similar to that which was put up against the FBI Wiretap-PBX deal. Making congressmen uncomfortable with Clipper and facilitating the efforts of reporters like those behind more the recent spate of news articles is where CP's can excel. Just my thought for the day. Preserving privacy is a cause worth fighting for, but keep your eyes on the prize. On the other hand, maybe there's nothing here to get upset over; after all, this is the same government that nominated Kimba Woods. ;-) -bwp

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Mulivor's new address
by pmulivor＠eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

To the sizeable group of cypherpunks who have been in contact with me during the last couple weeks concerning my current magazine article: I've just been given a new e-mail address -- pmulivor(a)eckert.acadcomp.monroecc.edu. Please direct all e-mail there from now on. Thanks for the valuable assistance you've provided. I've enjoyed working with you all. Phil Mulivor 716 256-2222 716 244-7212 716 271-4052 (fax)

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"Big Brother Inside" tshirts
by nate＠VIS.ColoState.EDU 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

I regret to inform the group that I cannot make the T-shirts. I have no money to fund them, and even less time. I do, however, encourage anyone else who want to make the shirts to do so. I uploaded the logos to soda this morning, so they should be available soon (if not already). I printed on of the images out (the large one) and it looked great...... I am sorry for this, but I am absolutely financially strapped now. BTW, the images names started with "BigBro" -= and if you want, you can strip off the "Image Edited by Nate Sammons" line I dropped in the lower right corner of the large images (it was in, I think, 12-pixel high letters). Well, for anyone whe makes the T-shirts, put something cool on the back, and sign me up for one, size XL. -nate sammons nate(a)vis.colostate.edu

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Key Generation Scheme...
by Peter Wayner 04 Aug '93

04 Aug '93

According to my latest communication with Dorothy Denning: "The key generation process is not as described in my earlier Clipper paper and is classifed. We did look at it and will come back to it in our Final Report." So don't even bother spending your time thinking about what she wrote before. -Peter

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