- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Who generates AOCE keys?
by collins＠newton.apple.com 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

In the software I used (as recently as last Thursday) the keys are _absolutely_, _positively_ generated locally. Subsequently the public key can be mailed automagically to RSADSI to be incorporated into a certificate which is returned to you. The latest version of RIPEM Mac uses the same procedure for the same functionality. >>[...] users will get certified keys from RSA [...] Yes! _After_ sending RSADSI an uncertified key. >>[the user] can generate a key for use on their network This is the uncertified key. >>Apple believes you'll want publically certified keys Thus, they provide a mechanism to get RSADSI to certify your (self generated) key. Scott Collins | "Few people realize what tremendous power there | is in one of these things." -- Willy Wonka ......................|................................................ BUSINESS. voice:408.862.0540 fax:974.6094 collins(a)newton.apple.com Apple Computer, Inc. 1 Infinite Loop, MS 301-2C Cupertino, CA 95014 ....................................................................... PERSONAL. voice/fax:408.257.1746 1024:669687 catalyst(a)netcom.com

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REMAIL: timestamp
by nobody＠Menudo.UH.EDU 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

Well, I decided to comment out the timestamping (what a short lived feature! :-) I'm starting to work on a caching remailer, and the timestamping info could be used to map input and output mailing pairs - especially since I was going to change the stamps to read "X-Time-In:" and "X-Time-Out:". That would defeat the entire purpose of caching... <klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu>

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REMAIL: timestamp
by nobody＠Menudo.UH.EDU 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- With all the talk of timestamps, I decided to implement a simple timestamp on the remailer at elee9sf(a)menudo.uh.edu. It is by no means a cryptographically secure timestamp. The remailer adds a timestamp header field to outgoing messages. It looks like this: X-Timestamp: hour:min:sec on day:month:year For instance, this message should have one. This nice thing about this is that in the process of stripping mail headers, the remailers will automatically filter the X-Timestamp as well. Thus, if a message is chained through several remailers, only the last remailer's timestamp (if any) will appear in the final message. klbarrus(a)owlnet.rice.edu -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.3a iQCVAgUBLIzEmIOA7OpLWtYzAQFTFwP9F84EDoIh8XmRDuY4463N5U9jAtLeXBnz WtrGuLF10Vngz3GDkGn4BQF4GQfEUgbYFcosZs3bV8/t0SP487PpnvblV7HG3/rO Fs39piJYTVETnBl14Gt8xVic8GxPvKuAatqk+J9rvKpj1eTklxFT2a/bqOCCJ1FK TuhZQHAVR5U= =U47Z -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Re: REMAIL: pasting
by nowhere＠bsu-cs.bsu.edu 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

In-Reply-To: <199309071705.AA02648(a)Menudo.UH.EDU>; from "nobody(a)Menudo.UH.EDU" at Sep 7, 93 12:05 pm > >The cypherpunks remailers to support an outgoing pasting token: the >double hash (##). It will paste text into the outgoing mail header. > >I'm not sure about pasting in reply fields to override behavrior. >That dependes on precedence between "From:" and "Reply-To:", etc. >Basically, I'm not real familiar with the appropriate RFC :-) > My remailer certainly does not support a double hash! If you want to paste something into the header with my remailer, put it in the "::" header block. For example: :: Request-Remailing-To: nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu Subject: blah Reply-To: an1234(a)anon.penet.fi X-Pasted-By: nowhere <body> It will ignore the "##" header block and send it as part of the body. By the way, chaos.bsu.edu is currently down... I screwed up my boot sector. I was going to install NetBSD 0.9 anyway, so that's what I'll do this afternoon or Thursday. Chael -- Chael Hall nowhere(a)bsu-cs.bsu.edu 00CCHALL(a)BSUVC.BSU.EDU nowhere(a)chaos.bsu.edu chall(a)bsu.edu

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Just the faq, jack
by Andrew Corradini/SBDC 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

Hiya, and ad-apologies-vance if this is patently obvious... Just subscribed, and was hoping to find an ftp site associated with the maillist, any faq-like information, whatever... Thanks, Andrew Corradini asc7556(a)u.cc.utah.edu

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news.cs.indiana.edu
by sameer＠netcom.com 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

news.cs.indiana.edu oes not appear to be working as an anonymous news posting gateway. A recent post through my remailer to alt-security didn't work. -- Sameer sameer(a)netcom.com

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Munitions class encryption
by Forrest Aldrich 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

I am curious about what constitutes "Munitions" class cryptography; is there really anything out there available to "us" that is of this "quality" (being unsure of where pgp stands with this). If there were, would it be feasible to have something like this that is software-only-based? If so, and it originated outside of the USA, I wonder what the officials would think of its use. On that line, I wonder if traffic-analysis isn't being performed right now to determine where the heaviest use of PGP exists. Perhaps to some, the idea of traffic-analysis (on the internet, that is) might sound a bit silly; however, I have been assured that this type of activity is none-the-less a regular one, and is used for many purposes. Anyone have more details? I had a friend who worked in the COMM center at a former air force base. He had a top secret clearance, and said that one of his duties was to separate (and deliver?) classified printouts. He said that the stuff he read in there would 'blow your mind'. He said that (this was only a few years ago) the government used encryption cards (computer cards) which were changed on a daily basis. Which makes me wonder if "Munitions" class cryptography would indeed require hardware support.

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Re: Law Review Articles
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

I have two pet issues: 1. Who Owns Cryptography? David Kahn's "The Codebreakers" shows that strong cryptography (as strong as that used by the military of the time) has almost always been invented by and used by private individuals, throughout history. The US Gov't (especially the NSA) has been trying to give the impression that it owns cryptography. The case needs to be made that cryptography inventions occur spontaneously in the minds of individuals and that cryptography is used to guard privacy (of both files and conversations) in a way the government: a. could not control if it tried, short of "1984" style room bugging, informants, ... b. should not control because of the 4000 year history of private ownership of cryptography. 2. Export Laws for Cryptography -- There are three classes of cryptography, logically: i. Munitions ii. Commercial iii. Public Domain Munitions cryptography would include systems using government classified algorithms or incorporated in physical hardware which has been hardened for battlefield use. Commercial would include systems which are proprietary to some company and sold by that company. Public domain would include systems which have been fully published (DES, RSA, DH, IDEA, <many older systems>, ...), have been implemented from those publications and which are effectively already in the hands of any interested high school kid. These are often available on public BBSs, worldwide. (PGP, for example) It makes sense to control munitions via ITAR and commercial systems via the commerce department, while leaving public domain systems uncontrolled c/o freedom of speech. What can be done to make these points? If these are not law review issues, what can I do as a private citizen to put these forth? - Carl

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New BBS Trade Group
by remail＠tamsun.tamu.edu 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

NOMA National Online Media Association Contacts: Phill Liggett LIGGETT(a)delphi.com (203)233-3163 Lance Rose elrose(a)echonyc.com (201)509-1700 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE A new trade association, the National Online Media Association (NOMA), was formed at ONE BBSCON '93 in Colorado Springs on August 27th, 1993. NOMA comprises BBS operators, Internet service providers, and other online media and services. NOMA's mission is to act for the BBS and online service industry on matters of national importance by creating an industry presence in Washington, D.C. and other means; assist its members at the state and local levels; educate the public on the unique social, business and legal roles of BBS's and other online services; establish appropriate industry standards and guidelines; promote business development in the industry; and maintain and provide access to resources and industry information for use by the public and the industry. An 11 person Organizing Committee was elected to develop a proposal for NOMA's charter, bylaws, membership requirements, structure, and form of leadership. The proposal is to be completed and distributed within the BBS and online services industry by November 30th, 1993. Discussion areas are being set up immediately for those interested in participating in NOMA's early development. An Internet mailing list is available to all those interested at natbbs(a)echonyc.com (subscribe to natbbs-request(a)echonyc.com) A conference area is also being made available on the Delphi national information service. The members of NOMA's Organizing Committee are: Phill Liggett - Chairperson LIGGETT(a)delphi.com Joe Balshone BALSHONE(a)delphi.com Celeste Clark BBS #: (805)520-2300 Pat Clawson 76357.3572(a)compuserve.com P. Victor Grambsch - Secretary PVICTOR(a)delphi.com Tony McClenny BBS#: (703)648-1841 Robert Pataki PUGDOG(a)delphi.com W. Mark Richmond BBS#: (209)685-8487 Steve Sprague steve.sprague(a)uboa.org Jim Taylor jim.taylor(a)F5.N310.Z1.FIDONET.ORG Bill Wilt wilt(a)aol.com In addition, three advisors agreed to assist NOMA's Organizing Committee: Mike Godwin, Esq. mnemonic(a)eff.org David Johnson, Esq. djohns06(a)reach.com Lance Rose, Esq. elrose(a)echonyc.com For further information, please contact Phill Liggett, (203)233- 3163 or Lance Rose, Esq., (201)509-1700 Mailing Address: NOMA c/o Phill Liggett Solutions, Inc. 89 Seymour Avenue, West Hartford, CT 06119.

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Re: Remailer Reliability
by cme＠ellisun.sw.stratus.com 07 Sep '93

07 Sep '93

If you want reliability, you can take a page from the fault tolerance business. Replicate the remailers. (There are many papers on this topic. See, for example, ISIS from Cornell and Manetho from Rice.) Example: I send to r1 and r2. Each of r1 and r2 sends to r3 and r4. r3 and r4 each take the first message to arrive and drop the second. at the end of the chain, you have rm and rn. rm and rn each get the message (drop the second) and then decide between them who gets to post it. The one who gets to, does and tells the other that it's all done -- at which time the other drops its copy. Death detection is by time-out (but only rn and rm need to delay operation until the time-out -- to prevent multiple postings from a split-brain network.) Expensive (4x the message traffic) -- but fault tolerant. - Carl

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