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CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
by Trei, Peter 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

> ---------- > From: Jim Choate[SMTP:ravage@ssz.com] > > On Tue, 3 Oct 2000, Trei, Peter wrote: > > > I would like to suggest that a remailer could eliminate nearly all it's > > problems by only sending out encrypted mails - that is, if after > > removing the encryption that was applied using it's own private > > key, it finds that the result is plaintext, it simply drops the message. > > And just exactly what algorithm is that you're using to determine > crypt-v-plaintext? > > Ain't no such beast and won't be until somebody comes up with nearly > infallible translation technology. We're closer to quantum computers and > making the whole thing moot than we are to having near-flawless > translation technology. > > If a bullfrog had wings, it wouldn't bump its butt when it jumped. > > And let's not forget the key managment problem if remailers impliment such > a policy. Without a secure key management scheme then the 'encrypted body' > approach won't work because Mallet has the keys. > > Key management and a billing model are what is required to make anonymous > remailers work. > Jim: We're talking about ways to prevent some of the abuse to which remailers are subject. Not sending out plaintext gets rid of spam, any suggestion that the remailer knows the content of the message, and makes sure that the recipient is a crypto-clueful person. I'm *not* talking about the remailer re-encrypting a message before it's sent off to the recipient. I'm talking about the original sender encrypting the message all the way to the recipient, so the remailer only sees a 'next address' and an encrypted blob. Your note indicates that you have failed to appreciate this simple point. -----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE----- Version: N/A pgAABOL1Mtkh7VXcUuV8Zp8wI5sUCB/qMHZVGHKiaP7uvZhsBjoh13Pvsg6FFxES Yes+its+possible+to+disguise+plaintext+as+cryptotext+but+all+the remailer+really+has+to+do+is+make+sure+that+the+message+being+++ sent+out+complies+with+one+of+the+various+ascii+armouring+++++++ formats+If+so+you+can+be+sure+that+the+message+cannot+be++++++++ confused+with+anything+that+looks+like+regular+plaintext++++++++ GPKInIcic85IcxhTBf1RSSaY9Jbpokwrc3mhFst22kEfm0FcLZCgDuZFCgg+5GLn 9YGBtzNT1A== =5wNL -----END PGP MESSAGE----- This won't solve every problem, but it will solve many, and make running a remailer a much easier choice. BTW, how would you do key management and billing in a system which is supposed to be anonymous? My suggestion could be implemented tommorrow . How long would yours take? Read more carefully before you post. Peter Trei

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Re: CDR: A famine averted...
by Bill Stewart 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

At 07:58 AM 10/3/00 -0500, Jim Choate wrote: >I also thought of an example where a famine was averted due to government >intervention. >The current hurricane in Belize. Had the government not stepped in and >'price fixed' the stores would have been depleted and cached by the few a >week ago. Doesn't make sense. If the government imposed rationing, that would have kept a few people from buying up everything, or if they required the price to be very high, it would do that, but I assume you're saying they artificially kept the price low - in that case, it's *easier* for somebody to buy up everything and hoard it. >Why in major disasters do prices go up, when it is clear this is contrary >to the best interest of the market? Duh - basic supply and demand. Major disasters imply that obtaining more stuff in the near future will be difficult or impossible, so buyers have an incentive to pay more money to get anything they can right now, and sellers have an incentive to ask for more money for the stuff they've got. If the sellers gouge too hard, they risk alienating customers and losing future business to their competitors, but the goods they have are worth more now. >That without price fixing the majority of people will be left without. >Why is this hands-off philosophy not held accountable for its failings? >I must assume that the resultant famine due >to price inflation by the individual resource owners is still a result of >that government interference. ;) > Thanks! Bill Bill Stewart, bill.stewart(a)pobox.com PGP Fingerprint D454 E202 CBC8 40BF 3C85 B884 0ABE 4639

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CDR: RE: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
by Trei, Peter 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

> ---------- > From: R. A. Hettinga[SMTP:rah@shipwright.com] > Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2000 3:59 PM > To: Trei, Peter; Multiple recipients of list > Subject: RE: Anonymous Remailers cpunk > > At 10:48 AM -0400 on 10/3/00, Trei, Peter wrote: > > > > The only bad point: > > > > * All recipients need to have key pairs. Thus, a crypto-only remailer > > can't be a terminal remailer to mailing lists, newsgroups, or > > individuals without keypairs. > > Not a problem, one would think. Just need to have a key-pair for a > list-server or mail-to-news-gateway. If it gets onerous, each mail or > newsgroup on the server can have its own keypair as well. > No, it's still a problem. The goals here are to insulate intermediaries from responsibility for content, and make the intermediaries unfriendly to spammers. With your suggestion, the responsibility for content - and spamming - is dumped on the list-server or gateway owner, which is no better than dumping it on the terminal remailer. I no more want to see a listserv or gateway owner in trouble than I do a remailer operator. Forwarding plaintext, or exploding plaintext to many recipients is what can get you into trouble. [...] Peter Trei > Cheers, > RAH > >

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CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers
by Nomen Nescio 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

On Mon, 2 Oct 2000, Steve Furlong wrote: > Does anyone have any suggestions for setting up an anonymous remailer? You can get the source for the current version of Mixmaster (2.9b23) via anonymous FTP from mixmaster.anonymizer.com. Send mail to remailer-operators-request(a)anon.lcs.mit.edu for info on the remop mailing list. There's also a Mixmaster-specific list: mix-l-subscribe(a)jpunix.com. If you run into trouble during install, mail either of the lists with your questions. > I'd like a HOWTO, suggesting software to use and how to set it up. There isn't one, yet. It's being worked on. Slowly. > I'm pretty clueless as to what would be needed, but I have a FreeBSD box > and a DSL line with no usage restrictions. If need be I can set up > another box, dedicated to this purpose. I should have the means once I > get whapped with a cluestick. You're set with what you have. In theory, maintaining a separate remailer box may insulate the rest of your hardware should LEOs come a'knocking some day, but I wouldn't count on it. (I also wouldn't worry about this scenario too much.) > I'd also like discussions of real-world problems that people have found. > What kind of things cause you to think about shutting down your > remailer? Technical abuse, legal difficulties, or what? Make damned sure you're on good terms with your ISP and whoever handles your DNS. Your remailer may get shut down when you're not looking. That said, I've never given serious consideration to shutting down my remailer. It's certainly been a headache on numerous occasions, but so are many things. Like children. "Technical abuse" has been only a minor annoyance for me. I've received several letters from PIs ranging from demands to reveal a user's identity, to simple inquiries on how remailers work. I also have a small collection of letters from standard lawyers, and from Scientologist ones as well. I frequently receive notes informing me that Such-and-Such Police Department has been informed of my "crimes," but I tend to ignore those. Get used to receiving a lot of hate mail. In all the time I've been running a remailer, I've gotten one thank you note, and countless threats. Of course, said threats are frequently so poorly written, you may find they make an attractive addition to your refrigerator door. The real trick for me has been figuring out when to reply to an inquiry/complaint, and when to forward it to /dev/null.* It's quite possible that you'll receive tens of complaints of "abuse" every day. They'll range anywhere from illiterate demands to cancel "Ann Onymous's subscrivtion" for making an off-topic post in rec.pets.cats, to notification that "Interpol, the FBI, and my brother, the cop," are all coming to get you...for something. I'm particularly fond of the "crimes" of which I'm frequently accused by these complainers. My personal favourite involved an astute AOLer who informed me that "accessory to acomplise harassment" is not looked upon favourably in Washington State. I laughed for days. Separating the kooks and the nitwits from the legitimate (i.e. legal) threats is just something you'll have to learn. It should be fairly easy for you -- you read cypherpunks. * At least two Cypherpunk regulars have suggested piping all abuse@ mail off to /dev/null. While this is nice in theory, it could be disastrous for a DSL subscriber with a toothy ToS agreement.

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CDR: RE: Anonymous Remailers cpunk
by R. A. Hettinga 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

At 10:48 AM -0400 on 10/3/00, Trei, Peter wrote: > The only bad point: > > * All recipients need to have key pairs. Thus, a crypto-only remailer > can't be a terminal remailer to mailing lists, newsgroups, or > individuals without keypairs. Not a problem, one would think. Just need to have a key-pair for a list-server or mail-to-news-gateway. If it gets onerous, each mail or newsgroup on the server can have its own keypair as well. RSA signatures are public domain now, right? :-). Cheers, RAH -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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CDR: UDP Traffic
by Burkhouse, Martin T 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

Can anyone provide me with pointers to materials on the risks of allowing unfiltered UDP traffic into a network. Thanks

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Re: CDR: Re: Anonymous Remailers
by Greg Broiles 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

At 10:08 AM 10/3/00 -0400, Ryan McBride wrote: >Obviously this isn't a perfect solution, but it helps somewhat. It's what >I'm planning on doing until I can familiarize myself with the legal >ramifications of running an "open" remailer. This short discussion <http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Events/dmcaking/index.html> of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act might be helpful in that regard, at least with respect to copyright liability, which seems to be the biggest legal problem. -- Greg Broiles gbroiles(a)netbox.com

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CDR: Re: Gore Office Accused of e-mail Diversion
by Michael Motyka 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

I see no big deal here : you can only produce records that exist. Making the choice to delete e-mails simply means that you want them to be more like a conversation than a printed document. Destroying a document prior having received an order to produce it as far as I know is no crime. Almost like an ISP service having a stated policy of not keeping logs beyond some fixed time period. Next. What I would love to see is one of our sneaky little politicians being ordered to turn over e-mails and offering them in encrypted form. Let's see how they would feel about compelled disclosure of keys. Mike

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CDR: Design Solutions Center e-Capable
by geplastics.e-marketing＠gep.ge.com 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

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CDR: Wired article on P2P
by Steve Schear 03 Oct '00

03 Oct '00

The October issue, page 234, has a good article on the technological underpinnings, social and market impact. It includes a tearout "yellow pages" of file sharing sites (including Mojo Nation). steve

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