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CDR: ezmlm response
by imail-html-help＠lists.ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

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CDR: Your IFILM registration is confirmed!
by registration＠ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Dear cypunks, Welcome to IFILM, the Web's largest film collection and leading entertainment resource. IFILM delivers more than 10,000 Internet films, the latest Industry news and unlimited information about films, filmmaking and the film industry. * Watch, rate and review all of our films! * Check out the daily IFILM Picks! * Read the latest on the new movie releases and box-office hits! * See today's Cool Click or Web Pick! * Take a peek at the new Erotica Showcase! * Prepare yourself for Spike & Mike's Sick and Twisted Festival of Animation! * Watch a film on any of our 11 channels: Action, Animation, Comedy, Drama, Sci-fi, Thriller and more! So...what are you looking at? Questions? Let us know! Send email to info(a)ifilm.com IFILM (www.ifilm.com) The only place to watch every film on the Web

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CDR: Your IFILM registration is confirmed!
by registration＠ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Dear cypunks, Welcome to IFILM, the Web's largest film collection and leading entertainment resource. IFILM delivers more than 10,000 Internet films, the latest Industry news and unlimited information about films, filmmaking and the film industry. * Watch, rate and review all of our films! * Check out the daily IFILM Picks! * Read the latest on the new movie releases and box-office hits! * See today's Cool Click or Web Pick! * Take a peek at the new Erotica Showcase! * Prepare yourself for Spike & Mike's Sick and Twisted Festival of Animation! * Watch a film on any of our 11 channels: Action, Animation, Comedy, Drama, Sci-fi, Thriller and more! So...what are you looking at? Questions? Let us know! Send email to info(a)ifilm.com IFILM (www.ifilm.com) The only place to watch every film on the Web

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CDR: ezmlm response
by imail-html-help＠lists.ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Thanks for signing up to the IFILM Newsletter. However, we've noticed that you already have a subscription. To change any of your personal options, please use the "sign-in" option located in the navigation menu on the top of the IFILM home page. If you feel that you have received this message in error, let us know -- info(a)ifilm.com. Thank you. IFILM -- The Place For Internet Film http://www.ifilm.com

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CDR: Your IFILM registration is confirmed!
by registration＠ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Dear cypunks, Welcome to IFILM, the Web's largest film collection and leading entertainment resource. IFILM delivers more than 10,000 Internet films, the latest Industry news and unlimited information about films, filmmaking and the film industry. * Watch, rate and review all of our films! * Check out the daily IFILM Picks! * Read the latest on the new movie releases and box-office hits! * See today's Cool Click or Web Pick! * Take a peek at the new Erotica Showcase! * Prepare yourself for Spike & Mike's Sick and Twisted Festival of Animation! * Watch a film on any of our 11 channels: Action, Animation, Comedy, Drama, Sci-fi, Thriller and more! So...what are you looking at? Questions? Let us know! Send email to info(a)ifilm.com IFILM (www.ifilm.com) The only place to watch every film on the Web

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CDR: Welcome to IFILM!
by registration＠ifilm.com 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

Dear cypunks, Thank you for registering with IFILM, the only place to watch every film on the Internet. To complete your registration, simply click on the URL below-or reply to this email-and you'll be on your way to enjoying the best entertainment on the Web! Note: If you reply, it may take up to 30 minutes for your account to be activated. http://www.ifilm.com/login/registration_verification?ifilmid=582231 (If clicking on this link doesn't work, try copying and pasting it into your browser's address window instead.) Questions? Let us know! Send email to info(a)ifilm.com. If you choose to reply to this message instead of clicking on the link above, it may take up to 4 hours for your rating and review privileges to be activated. IFILM (www.ifilm.com) The only place to watch every film on the Web id=582231

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CDR: Re: AT&T signs bulk hosting contract with spammers
by Jim Choate 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

On Mon, 6 Nov 2000, Tom Vogt wrote: > Jim Choate wrote: > > > but on the other hand, we *do* want to keep cracking legal (at least to > > > some extend) because otherwise what is left of security in cyberspace > > > will quickly vanish into oblivion, right? > > > > What security? I've never had or made any claims that cyberspace was > > secure. Even in its nascent days. > > you're right. that's why I said "what's left of it". But if it wasn't ever there how can there be any left of it? > > Are you possibly confusing 'privacy' (which has the same issue) and > > 'security'? > > no. the argument is: if you make probing illegal, we'll see even more > (and *much* more) "security through obscurity" - because figuring out > that this crap is insecure will land you in jail. Going to jail won't stop anyone from figuring it out if that's what they want. I would be so bold as to suggest that if they make it illegal then you'll see a significant rise in the behaviour, along with increased use of anonymous remailers and Open Source software than can be kludged. ____________________________________________________________________ He is able who thinks he is able. Buddha The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- --------------------------------------------------------------------

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CDR: Re: PipeNet protocol
by Adam Back 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

[Doh! Did it again from the r00t.besiex.org account. Sorry for the duplicate.] Wei wrote: > > However I think this scheduling algorithm would have the side effect > > of making this variant of PipeNet very vulnerable to DoS attacks. > > Any user can arbitrarily delay packet delivery for the entire > > network by ceasing to send packets. > > > > It would also seem that performance would degrade badly to > > effectively the performance of the worst ping time link. > > That is all true. I guess what you meant by "insufficient" is in terms > of performance and defense against DoS attacks, not defense against > traffic analysis. Adam Shostack made the comment about insufficiency of padding in PipeNet you're referring to. I discussed insufficiency of padding in the _freedom network_ as a traffic analysis countermeasure in email with some folks who can speak up if they wish. This is because freedom does not use the synchronous approach for performance reasons and hence some active attacks remain even if you had end-to-end padding between client and exit node. End-to-end padding in the PipeNet synchronous mix-net does appear to be sufficient to provide good security against traffic analysis, but it has the DoS vulnerability and performance problems we discussed in the last pair of posts. > There is a hope, however, that the performance and DoS problems of > PipeNet could be solved in the future through other means. The > performance issue is easier, since it just requires the underlying > network to have better reliability and guarantee of service. The DoS > problem could be solved if the underlying network is protected > against DoS. Then we can require each user to place a large deposit > on each node, which would be used to compensate everyone else for > any delay caused by that user. It seems to me that with the current internet TCP properties you would have to distinguish network congestion from DoS attempts, which is not generally possible. Even if the Quality of Service (QoS) protocols were implemented and widely deployed, people still put backhoes through cables or have catastrophic equipment failures now and then. I suppose you could have compensation or insurance from the QoS enabled service provider and use that compensation to compensate you for the loss of the anonymity network good behavior bond. > I think a protocol that has good performance, defense against DoS > attacks, and defense against traffic analysis may not exist. There > may not even be a viable protocol that trades off between these > properties. Well if we look at the problem there are three properties we desire the system to have: 1. high security (idealised resistance to traffic analysis) 2. performance (reasonable performance which doesn't degrade as the network grows) 3. DoS resistance (reasonable resistance to DoS -- DoS or network outages should be local and not take out the entire network) It seems to me that we can have at most 2 of those. PipeNet provides 1, but not 2 or 3. Freedom provides 2 and 3, but is vulnerable to some active atacks even with end-to-end link padding. The other thing we could do is move content inside the network -- much of the traffic analysis material comes from the fact the exit traffic is in the clear. For example if many web servers supported connections from the freedom cloud using freedom protocol, and nodes in the network did per hop padding using a modified PipeNet scheduling algorithm where you would try to use PipeNet scheduling, but instead of delaying, if a packet didn't arrive in time, you would send some cover instead on a hop by hop basis. Then you package this thing as an accompanying apache server and encourage lots of people to run it. Obfuscation writes: > What if you eliminated the anonymity of caller to receiver, and only > tried to achieve traffic analysis resistance. That is, a receiver > can find out who is calling him, but if the caller and receiver are > honest and desire privacy, a third party cannot find out they are > communicating. > > Does this allow for a more efficient design? Can the intermediate > switch nodes now handle delays by inserting dummy traffic, which can > only be recognized as such by the other end (caller or receiver)? That coincidentally sounds quite similar to what I described above. However it doesn't seem you gain much from the recipient knowing who the sender is, beyond the change in definition allowing you to define that the class of attacks that require compromise of the recipient moot. The main difference which appears to help is that the recipient is part of the network, and can be relied upon to run software. Adam

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CDR: Re: US report urges Arafat to use torture for peace
by Allen Ethridge 07 Nov '00

07 Nov '00

On Monday, November 6, 2000, at 10:59 PM, Harmon Seaver wrote: > fist sized rocks ... using the old thong slings like David > used to slay Goliath. Now there's an ironic reference.

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CDR: RE: RISKS: New Jersey shuts down E-ZPass statement site after
by David Honig 06 Nov '00

06 Nov '00

At 09:48 AM 11/6/00 -0500, Trei, Peter wrote: >Of course, EZ-Pass could have been designed so that the >device was anonymous, and prepaid stored value (bought >for cash) smartcards used to meter access. > >It would probably have worked out cheaper as well, since the >accounting overhead goes away, and they make intereset on >the float of unused cards.... AAAAGH! PT is channelling RAH!! The horror, the horror... :-) to both

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