- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

CDR: Re: re ICANN Should Approve More Top Level Domains
by Joe Baptista 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

I agree with Judith on this. Seeing the entire internet - instead of the ICANN restricted internet is as simple as point click and reboot. Further data is available at www.youcann.org and instructions are located here http://www.youcann.org/instructions.html and include a link to a downloadable program that fixes your dns to see the whole internet. point, click, reboot - and astalavista ICANN. regards joe On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Judith Oppenheimer wrote: > re ICANN Should Approve More Top Level Domains, > http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=00/11/20/1714249 > > Great article, but Declan and I have a slightly different take on > his mention of alternative servers, as he states it "... requires > tech-savvy users to reconfigure their computers..." > > This is a seemingly minor point, yet it is so significant, > perpetuating this myth that only the "tech-savvy" can access the > entire Internet. Its counterproductive, and simply not true. > > I cannot figure out any advanced features on my microwave, my > organizer, my cell phone - forget about the VCR ... yet it took > me maybe 3 minutes, tops, to upgrade my computer in order to > access all of the net. > > Hardly a "tech-savvy" process, it was more like point, click and > reboot, resulting in immediate access to .com/.net/.org PLUS > .web/.biz etc. > > I've written Declan and the WSJ editors suggesting that we > dispel, finally, this myth of the hard-to-do, beyond-reach > Internet. Telling readers its just point, click, and reboot, > would go a long way toward poking a canon-ball sized hole in the > ICANN facade. > > Judith > > Judith Oppenheimer, 212 684-7210, 1 800 The Expert > Publisher, http://www.ICBTollFreeNews.com > President, http://www.1800TheExpert.com > FREE 800/Domain Classifieds, http://ICBclassifieds.com > Domain Name & 800 News, Intelligence, Analysis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Owner-Domain-Policy > > [mailto:owner-domain-policy@LISTS.NETSOL.COM]On Behalf Of Joe > Baptista > > Sent: Monday, November 20, 2000 12:24 PM > > To: DOMAIN-POLICY(a)LISTS.NETSOL.COM > > Subject: Re: CDR: RE: What got censored today... (fwd) > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 13:43:14 -0500 > > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > To: Joe Baptista <baptista(a)pccf.net> > > Cc: "Carskadden, Rush" <carskar(a)netsolve.net>, > > "'cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com'" > <cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com> > > Subject: Re: CDR: RE: What got censored today... (fwd) > > > > I have an op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal that mentions > > alternative > > DNS schemes: > > > > http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=00/11/20/1714249 (html) > > http://www.politechbot.com/p-01507.html (text) > > > > No response yet from ICANN, Esther Dyson, Vint Cerf, etc. > > > > -Declan > > > > > > > -- Joe Baptista http://www.dot.god/ dot.GOD Hostmaster +1 (805) 753-8697

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CDR: Re: re ICANN Should Approve More Top Level Domains (fwd)
by Jim Choate 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

____________________________________________________________________ He is able who thinks he is able. Buddha The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- -------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 13:35:23 -0500 (EST) From: Joe Baptista <baptista(a)pccf.net> Reply-To: cypherpunks(a)ssz.com To: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> Cc: cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com, DOMAIN-POLICY(a)LISTS.NETSOL.COM, list(a)ifwp.org, ga(a)dnso.org, NCDNHC <NCDNHC-Discuss(a)lyris.isoc.org> Subject: CDR: Re: re ICANN Should Approve More Top Level Domains I agree with Judith on this. Seeing the entire internet - instead of the ICANN restricted internet is as simple as point click and reboot. Further data is available at www.youcann.org and instructions are located here http://www.youcann.org/instructions.html and include a link to a downloadable program that fixes your dns to see the whole internet. point, click, reboot - and astalavista ICANN. regards joe On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Judith Oppenheimer wrote: > re ICANN Should Approve More Top Level Domains, > http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=00/11/20/1714249 > > Great article, but Declan and I have a slightly different take on > his mention of alternative servers, as he states it "... requires > tech-savvy users to reconfigure their computers..." > > This is a seemingly minor point, yet it is so significant, > perpetuating this myth that only the "tech-savvy" can access the > entire Internet. Its counterproductive, and simply not true. > > I cannot figure out any advanced features on my microwave, my > organizer, my cell phone - forget about the VCR ... yet it took > me maybe 3 minutes, tops, to upgrade my computer in order to > access all of the net. > > Hardly a "tech-savvy" process, it was more like point, click and > reboot, resulting in immediate access to .com/.net/.org PLUS > .web/.biz etc. > > I've written Declan and the WSJ editors suggesting that we > dispel, finally, this myth of the hard-to-do, beyond-reach > Internet. Telling readers its just point, click, and reboot, > would go a long way toward poking a canon-ball sized hole in the > ICANN facade. > > Judith > > Judith Oppenheimer, 212 684-7210, 1 800 The Expert > Publisher, http://www.ICBTollFreeNews.com > President, http://www.1800TheExpert.com > FREE 800/Domain Classifieds, http://ICBclassifieds.com > Domain Name & 800 News, Intelligence, Analysis > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Owner-Domain-Policy > > [mailto:owner-domain-policy@LISTS.NETSOL.COM]On Behalf Of Joe > Baptista > > Sent: Monday, November 20, 2000 12:24 PM > > To: DOMAIN-POLICY(a)LISTS.NETSOL.COM > > Subject: Re: CDR: RE: What got censored today... (fwd) > > > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > > Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 13:43:14 -0500 > > From: Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> > > To: Joe Baptista <baptista(a)pccf.net> > > Cc: "Carskadden, Rush" <carskar(a)netsolve.net>, > > "'cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com'" > <cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com> > > Subject: Re: CDR: RE: What got censored today... (fwd) > > > > I have an op-ed in today's Wall Street Journal that mentions > > alternative > > DNS schemes: > > > > http://www.cluebot.com/article.pl?sid=00/11/20/1714249 (html) > > http://www.politechbot.com/p-01507.html (text) > > > > No response yet from ICANN, Esther Dyson, Vint Cerf, etc. > > > > -Declan > > > > > > > -- Joe Baptista http://www.dot.god/ dot.GOD Hostmaster +1 (805) 753-8697

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CDR: Schneier: Why Digital Signatures are not Signatures (was Re: CRYPTO-GRAM, November 15, 2000)
by R. A. Hettinga 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

At 5:58 PM -0600 on 11/15/00, Bruce Schneier wrote: > Why Digital Signatures Are Not Signatures > > > > When first invented in the 1970s, digital signatures made an amazing > promise: better than a handwritten signature -- unforgeable and uncopyable > -- on a document. Today, they are a fundamental component of business in > cyberspace. And numerous laws, state and now federal, have codified > digital signatures into law. > > These laws are a mistake. Digital signatures are not signatures, and they > can't fulfill their promise. Understanding why requires understanding how > they work. > > The math is complex, but the mechanics are simple. Alice knows a secret, > called a private key. When she wants to "sign" a document (or a message, > or any bucket of bits), she performs a mathematical calculation using the > document and her private key; then she appends the results of that > calculation -- called the "signature" -- to the document. Anyone can > "verify" the signature by performing a different calculation with the > message and Alice's public key, which is publicly available. If the > verification calculation checks out then Alice must have signed the > document, because only she knows her own private key. > > Mathematically, it works beautifully. Semantically, it fails > miserably. There's nothing in the description above that constitutes > signing. In fact, calling whatever Alice creates a "digital signature" was > probably the most unfortunate nomenclature mistake in the history of > cryptography. > > In law, a signature serves to indicate agreement to, or at least > acknowledgment of, the document signed. When a judge sees a paper document > signed by Alice, he knows that Alice held the document in her hands, and > has reason to believe that Alice read and agreed to the words on the > document. The signature provides evidence of Alice's intentions. (This is > a simplification. With a few exceptions, you can't take a signed document > into court and argue that Alice signed it. You have to get Alice to > testify that she signed it, or bring handwriting experts in and then it's > your word against hers. That's why notarized signatures are used in many > circumstances.) > > When the same judge sees a digital signature, he doesn't know anything > about Alice's intentions. He doesn't know if Alice agreed to the document, > or even if she ever saw it. > > The problem is that while a digital signature authenticates the document up > to the point of the signing computer, it doesn't authenticate the link > between that computer and Alice. This is a subtle point. For years, I > would explain the mathematics of digital signatures with sentences like: > "The signer computes a digital signature of message m by computing m^e mod > n." This is complete nonsense. I have digitally signed thousands of > electronic documents, and I have never computed m^e mod n in my entire > life. My computer makes that calculation. I am not signing anything; my > computer is. > > PGP is a good example. This e-mail security program lets me digitally sign > my messages. The user interface is simple: when I want to sign a message I > select the appropriate menu item, enter my passphrase into a dialog box, > and click "OK." The program decrypts the private key with the passphrase, > and then calculates the digital signature and appends it to my > e-mail. Whether I like it or not, it is a complete article of faith on my > part that PGP calculates a valid digital signature. It is an article of > faith that PGP signs the message I intend it to. It is an article of faith > that PGP doesn't ship a copy of my private key to someone else, who can > then sign whatever he wants in my name. > > I don't mean to malign PGP. It's a good program, and if it is working > properly it will indeed sign what I intended to sign. But someone could > easily write a rogue version of the program that displays one message on > the screen and signs another. Someone could write a Back Orifice plug-in > that captures my private key and signs documents without my consent or > knowledge. We've already seen one computer virus that attempts to steal > PGP private keys; nastier variants are certainly possible. > > The mathematics of cryptography, no matter how strong, cannot bridge the > gap between me and my computer. Because the computer is not trusted, I > cannot rely on it to show me what it is doing or do what I tell it > to. Checking the calculation afterwards doesn't help; the untrusted > computer can't be relied upon to check the calculations properly. It > wouldn't help to verify the code, because the untrusted computer is running > the code (and probably doing the verification). It wouldn't even help to > store the digital signature key in a secure module: the module still has to > rely on the untrusted computer for input and output. > > None of this bodes well for digital signatures. Imagine Alice in court, > answering questions about a document she signed. "I never saw it," she > says. "Yes, the mathematics does prove that my private key signed the > document, but I never saw it." And then an expert witness like myself is > called to the stand, who explains to the judge that it is possible that > Alice never saw the document, that programs can be written to sign > documents without Alice's knowledge, and that Alice's digital signature > doesn't really mean anything about Alice's intentions. > > Solving this problem requires a trusted signing computer. If Alice had a > small hand-held computer, with its own screen and keyboard, she could view > documents on that screen and sign them with that keyboard. As long as the > signing computer is trusted, her signatures are trusted. (But problems > remain. Viewing a Microsoft Word document, for example, generally involves > the very software most responsible for welcoming a virus into the > computer.) In this case we're no longer relying on the mathematics for > security, but instead the hardware and software security of that trusted > computer. > > This is not to say that digital signatures are useless. There are many > instances where the insecurities discussed here are not relevant, or where > the dollar value of the signatures is small enough not to warrant worrying > about them. There are also instances where authenticating to the signing > computer is good enough, and where no further authentication is > required. And there are instances where real-world relationships can > obviate the legal requirements that digital signatures have been asked to > satisfy. > > Digital signatures prove, mathematically, that a secret value known as the > private key was present in a computer at the time Alice's signature was > calculated. It is a small step from that to assume that Alice entered that > key into the computer at the time of signing. But it is a much larger step > to assume that Alice intended a particular document to be signed. And > without a tamperproof computer trusted by Alice, you can expect "digital > signature experts" to show up in court contesting a lot of digital >signatures. > > Comments on the new federal digital signature law: > <http://www4.zdnet.com:80/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2635346,00.html> > (multipage, don't miss the others) > <http://www4.zdnet.com:80/intweek/stories/news/0,4164,2634368,00.html> > <http://www.infoworld.com:80/articles/hn/xml/00/10/02/001002hnesign.xml> > <http://www.pioneerplanet.com/tech/tcv_docs/028992.htm> > > A survey of laws in various states and countries: > <http://rechten.kub.nl/simone/DS-LAWSU.HTM> -- ----------------- R. A. Hettinga <mailto: rah(a)ibuc.com> The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation <http://www.ibuc.com/> 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA "... however it may deserve respect for its usefulness and antiquity, [predicting the end of the world] has not been found agreeable to experience." -- Edward Gibbon, 'Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire'

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CDR: Re: Carnovore All-Consuming
by batz 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

If this has been covered already, appologies.. In regards to comments about BGP and OSPF being used to re-route traffic, this can be done easily with a TACACS+ or RADIUS profile. These service authenticate users, and allocate netblocks/routes to connections. This means that they alter the routing tables on a per-user basis, as a basic part of their functionality. Sound familiar? If not, I recommend looking at UUNet's presentation of CenterTrack, their tool for tracking DDoS attacks which, with some imagination, could be used for a host of other things. CenterTrack http://www.nanog.org/mtg-9910/robert.html Also, one of the common misconceptions about traffic monitoring is that the sniffer is also a router, or is storing and forwarding the packets in some statefull manner. This is not the case at all. It only requires a simple vlan entry to mirror, or even just put a port the same vlan membership as the link you are monitoring. A CenterTrack-like system makes it easy to monitor on a user by user basis, almost undetectably. With this granularity, the amount of traffic monitored can be substantially reduced by only re-routing single, or blocks of users through a system like CenterTrack, while excluding high bandwidth customers, and non-targets. Carnivore != Echelon. There are serious jurisdictional issues faced by LEA's that discourage direct collaboration between spooks and feds, to say the least. There are rumours that Coral and other flow management tools (found at CAIDA.org) were directly linked to the development of a carnivore-like system. These are unsubstantiated hearsay from irc, and like most great conspiracy stories it hinges on the improbable, but creepily possible. The technology shouldn't be a suprise to anyone with a networking background, or anyone that can legitimately lay claim to the title of BOFH. I think people should be suprised at the grey areas in wiretap laws as they relate to ISP's. There are great people in law enforcement who do phenomenal work. They provide a critical and often thankless job to the public and their country. If they are going to do their jobs as best they know how, alot of red tape is going to have to be cut. Unfortunately, that red tape is also your freedom, your rights, and your quality of life. Regards, -- batz Reluctant Ninja Defective Technologies

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CDR: Going secret again
by Anonymous 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

U.S. Spy Office Dying, Group Says Reuters 1:30 p.m. Nov. 14, 2000 PST WASHINGTON -- A U.S. commission on Tuesday recommended creating an office cloaked in secrecy to pursue innovative technology for spying from space, saying the existing agency was not sufficiently clandestine for the task. The National Commission for the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office said the NRO, the agency that designs, builds and operates U.S. spy satellites, had lost some of its luster since the end of the Cold War due to inadequate funding and declining attention from the president, secretary of defense and CIA director. The commission, established by Congress in legislation that went into effect in December 1999, warned that if current trends continued the NRO might lose its edge in providing the nation its "eyes and ears" for monitoring the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and tracking international "terrorists." "Without bold and sustained leadership, the United States could find itself deaf and blind and increasingly vulnerable to any of the potentially devastating threats it may face in the next ten to twenty years," the report said. Rep. Porter Goss, a Florida Republican, and Sen. Bob Kerrey, a Nebraska Democrat, served as co-chairmen of the 11-member bipartisan commission. The panel did not recommend abolishing the NRO, but said the agency had "become a publicly acknowledged organization that openly announces many of its new program initiatives," which in turn hindered its ability to tackle intelligence problems. The commission recommended creating a new Office of Space Reconnaissance to work on super-secret projects to gain technological advantage in space-related spying. "Evolution is continuously moving forward in technology, and I think that those things should be done very discreetly and with boldness and risk-taking. And we need (is) to create a mechanism that can allow those things to happen," Goss, chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Intelligence Committee, told Reuters. "There are so many new things on the horizon that have such promise and they need to be pursued, but they need to be pursued in a way that we dont give the advantage to others of knowing about them, or sharing some of the things weve learned," Goss added. The National Reconnaissance Office, which marked its 40th anniversary this year, has evolved away from its original mission "to go out and do things that had never been dreamed of before, and we need that," Goss said. It also used to be given the highest level attention from the president and top U.S. officials, the congressman added. "Its been taken for granted and its lost some of its punch," Goss said of the NRO. "We need to get on to the next generation," he added. Budget constraints have delayed modernization while the proliferation of commercial imaging technologies has provided U.S adversaries with "unprecedented insight within our national borders, as well as into our overseas activities," the commissions report said. "Equally problematic, widespread knowledge of the NROs existence and public speculation on how NRO satellites are used has aided terrorists and other potential adversaries in developing techniques of denial and deception to thwart U.S. intelligence efforts," the report added. In addition, other technologies such as fiber-optic communications "render certain NRO capabilities obsolete," the report said. The report warned that the agencys resources were being stretched "and the result is a prescription for a potentially significant intelligence failure." The NRO is overseen by the Defense Department and the CIA director. An NRO spokesman said the commissions recommendations were "valuable" and the agency would look at them. The CIA declined comment.

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CDR: RE: The cause of uncertainty in the election outcome.
by mmotyka＠lsil.com 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

However the recounts work out I think it's pretty clear that in the statitical sense we have a tie. The uncertainties are far larger than the measured difference. Even the national totals are within about 0.1%. This is probably 1 or 2 orders of magnitude less than the percentage of disqualified ballots. So much for the significance of the popular vote. Send the damn thing to Congress already. Mike

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CDR: RE: What got censored today... (fwd)
by Carskadden, Rush 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

I can't read it very well. What does it say? ok, Rush -----Original Message----- From: Jim Choate [mailto:ravage@einstein.ssz.com] Sent: Thursday, November 16, 2000 9:43 PM To: cypherpunks(a)einstein.ssz.com Cc: sci-tech(a)einstein.ssz.com Subject: What got censored today... (fwd) ____________________________________________________________________ He is able who thinks he is able. Buddha The Armadillo Group ,::////;::-. James Choate Austin, Tx /:'///// ``::>/|/ ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com .', |||| `/( e\ 512-451-7087 -====~~mm-'`-```-mm --'- -------------------------------------------------------------------- ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 16 Nov 2000 19:27:13 -0800 From: Simon Higgs <simon(a)higgs.com> Reply-To: orange(a)dns.list To: orange(a)dns.list Subject: What got censored today... http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/scripts/rammaker.asp?s=cyber&dir=icann&file=ica nn-111600&start=0-09-04 Starts at 2:18:20 Lasts about five seconds before Mr Anal-Retentive-Bald-Video-Guy censors it.

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CDR: Re: Is this Reno/wiretap stat true?
by Declan McCullagh 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

On Sun, Nov 19, 2000 at 12:00:29PM -0800, James A. Donald wrote: > -- > > At 01:29 PM 11/19/2000 -0500, George(a)orwellian.org wrote: > > Found in Usenet: > > > > # I don't know if Reno is a traitor, but consider this: > > # Between 1992 and 1997, there were approximately 2,500 > > # national security wiretaps requested by the FBI. Only one > > # of these 2,500 requests was turned down: Wen Ho Lee's! And > > # this turndown took place while Wen Ho Lee was still > > # downloading nuclear secrets from Lost Alamos. > > > > True/False? > > > Any new, important and surprising fact reported on usenet without source or > explanation is almost certainly a lie. In general you'd be right, but this might be an exception. Check out the annual wiretap reports on epic.org. (Admin office of US Courts publishes them.) -Declan

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CDR: Conspiracy Theory #187389 (RE: Carnivore All-Consuming)
by Ernest Hua 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

What is the likelihood that the public just ignores this given the ruckus over the election? Ern -----Original Message----- From: George(a)Orwellian.Org [mailto:George@Orwellian.Org] Sent: Friday, November 17, 2000 10:46 PM To: cypherpunks(a)cyberpass.net Subject: Carnivore All-Consuming EPIC FOIA... http://www.latimes.com/wires/20001117/tCB00V0387.html WASHINGTON--The FBI's controversial e-mail surveillance tool, known as Carnivore, can retrieve all communications that go through an Internet service -far more than FBI officials have said it does -a recent test of its potential sweep found, according to bureau documents [snip]

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CDR: Beware the dust! It has eyes and ears.
by sunder 20 Nov '00

20 Nov '00

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/2000/11/2… Pister is leading a team of researchers at the University of California at Berkeley that is developing tiny, electronic devices called "smart dust," designed to capture mountains of information about their surroundings while literally floating on air. <SNIP> -- ----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--------------------------- + ^ + :Surveillance cameras|Passwords are like underwear. You don't /|\ \|/ :aren't security. A |share them, you don't hang them on your/\|/\ <--*-->:camera won't stop a |monitor, or under your keyboard, you \/|\/ /|\ :masked killer, but |don't email them, or put them on a web \|/ + v + :will violate privacy|site, and you must change them very often. --------_sunder_(a)_sunder_._net_------- http://www.sunder.net ------------

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