- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Talking to the Press Considered Harmful
by drt＠un.bewaff.net 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

Tim May <tcmay(a)got.net> writes: > On Tuesday, October 9, 2001, at 09:12 PM, Declan McCullagh wrote: > > A large portion was B-roll of me typing dummy entries into > > Microsoft Passport, [...] They used about 7 seconds of what > > I said. > > About right. Four hours of your time for 7 seconds of commentary. > > No wonder the networks are gradually going broke. > > "Typing dummy entries." Typical. Faking the news. > > (I had a sort of similar experience in '95 when the BBC wanted > to interview me. [...]) I share Tims experience regarding the impact of interviews. I was doing some presswork for the chaos computer club - http://www.ccc.de/ and found out that especially TV costs you a hell of time and often thorow away everything substantial or even the whole interview at all. TV wants to "visualize", but crypto or hacking can't be visualized in a TV compatible way. While TV is worest the same is true for 98% of the journalists I have met: They don't try to understand the komplex things you are talking about and if they finnally might understand you they still misquote you. This shouldn't supprise you. This shouldn't supprise me because journalists are information dealers trying to get maximum value from minimum effort. Since "trouth" doesn't really attribute to value of an information they sell, why should they care about? The problem is that they are used to people beeing proud to be interviewed. If you consider an interview as buiseness they are totally set up. "Sure I can explain tis DDOS thing to you, my consulting fee is 1000E per day" makes them really angry. On the other hand talking to journalists may help sometimes to influence actions of the goverment. E.g. the Chaos Computer Club got a lot of press coverage in the 80s which lead to involvment of the hacker community in the law-making process for cybercrime and to an 'hacking is not a crime per se' legistation which i consider a good thing. So between writing code and talking to journalists, what are the other choices? drt

2 1

update.560 (fwd)
by Jim Choate 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Tue, 9 Oct 2001 09:31:32 -0400 (EDT) From: AIP listserver <physnews(a)aip.org> To: physnews-mailing(a)aip.org Subject: update.560 PHYSICS NEWS UPDATE The American Institute of Physics Bulletin of Physics News Number 560 October 9, 2001 by Phillip F. Schewe, Ben Stein, and James Riordon THE 2001 NOBEL PRIZE IN PHYSICS goes to Eric Cornell of [SSZ: text deleted] QUANTUM FINGERPRINTING. Imagine two offices, located halfway around the world, and their headquarters wants to make sure that they each have the identical copy of a database. Imagine further that the databases are huge--10^20 bits each. They could transmit the database to the headquarters, and the headquarters could compare them. But transmitting 10^20 bits--equal to about 11 billion gigabytes would take an enormous amount of time. There is a method in which they only need to send 10^10 bits--a little over a gigabyte--and the headquarters still gets enough information to determine that they have the exact same database. This method is called "classical fingerprinting." The idea is that each office independently, without communicating to each other, generates a distinctive number, called a fingerprint, by performing a calculation involving the entire database and locally generated random numbers, called keys. The result of the calculation-a fingerprint of 10^10 bits--is then sent to the headquarters. Now, a Dutch-Canadian team (Harry Buhrman, CWI/University of Amsterdam, 011-31-20-5924076, buhrman(a)cwi.nl) has suggested a "quantum fingerprinting" scheme which would involve an exponentially smaller transmission of information to do the same job. For the 10^20 bit database, each office would only have to transmit a fingerprint of about 70 "quantum bits" (qubits), which could be, for example, specially prepared photons. Such photons could contain the result of a computation between the database and many different random keys simultaneously, rather than a single random key. The researchers say that one could demonstrate this new fingerprinting technique with quantum computers not much more complex than the ones that exist today. Buhrman estimates that quantum fingerprinting becomes more efficient than classical fingerprinting in a quantum computer with 5 to 10 qubits. (H. Buhrman; R. Cleve; J. Watrous; R. de Wolf, Physical Review Letters, 15 Oct. 2001; full text at www.aip.org/physnews/select)

1 0

Re: Talking to the Press Considered Harmful
by drt＠un.bewaff.net 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

Declan McCullagh <declan(a)well.com> writes: > On Tue, Oct 09, 2001 at 07:33:58PM -0700, Tim May wrote: > > Every time I consent to an interview, I regret it. The most recent time > > was earlier this year for a French journalist doing a piece on Freenet, > > Come, now. There are different grades of journalist: Some are reasonably > clueful and write frequently about these topics, and others are dilettantes > told by their editors to "find something new about P2P to write about." If Tim is talking about A. Picard (sp?) from Trasfert, Paris his writngs are quite clueful and he has actually been thinking about Cryptoarnachy. Perhaps the french interview style is different then the US one. drt

1 0

Internet...? Credici!!!
by b2beMarketplace 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

1 0

al Qaeda website?
by Lucky Green 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

Attempting to obtain information from primary sources, I have been trying to track down a bin Laden or al Qaeda website without any success. Does anybody on this list have a URL? I suspect that Afghanistan may not recognize US and EU blind signature patents and thus would be suitable as a jurisdiction to distribute ecash client software to help bypass the unconstitutional ban on American citizens assisting the courageous warriors of Allah in their just fight. --Lucky

2 1

ũ�û�е��ѹ�á��ϴ��ĭ��û��ѹ��
by irene25＠163.net 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

��㣬�ڴ��ǫ�⣡ ��ã� ��һ��̨�̶��ҵ--------��ʢ��ũ��޹�˾��λ�ڽ��ʡ��רҵ��¼� ��Ʒ�� 1��ѹ��ܡ� 2��ѹ��ϴ��ĭ��û� 3��ѹ�� 4�� Ʒ�㷺��ũҵ��ϴ��ҵ�� ˾�ܲ�ƾ��26��ͼ��ƣ�ӵ��Ƚ��豸��ĸ�Ʒ�ʲ�Ʒ��⣬ ��ISO9001��֤�� ӭ��ǵ��վ��ȡ��Ϣ�� http://www.csj-hose.com ��硢��ѯ�� ʢ��ũ��޹�˾ ��ַ�� й��ɽ·��ׯ��ҵ԰ �ʱࣺ 215011 ��ʼ�� csj-wuli(a)pub.sz.jsinfo.net �绰�� 86-512-6610188 6618066 ��棺 86-512-5360646

1 0

CDT: congressional action call - before Friday morning, October 12, 2001
by citizenQ 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

Dear Activist: Things are moving very fast on Capitol Hill. Legislation to expand government surveillance will be considered by the Senate (and maybe the House) on Thursday, October 11. In the Senate, Sen. Russ Feingold is planning to offer amendments Thursday morning that will address some of the privacy concerns raised by the pending bills, by requiring government surveillance to be more focused and subject to meaningful judicial controls. CDT supports the Feingold amendments. You can make a difference. Call your Senators in Washington right away and let them know that you think civil liberties should be part of the balance as we move forward to protect our country from terrorism. Urge them to support the Feingold privacy amendments BACKGROUND Following the horrendous attacks of September 11, it is clear that US anti-terrorism efforts need to be improved. Unfortunately, there has been little time to develop a response that is effective and does not unnecessarily infringe civil liberties. Legislation moving quickly through Congress involves some fundamental changes in the surveillance laws. Most of the changes are not limited to terrorism cases, but concern all crimes and all intelligence investigations. Among other things, the bills would: * Allow FBI to seize any and all stored records (medical records, educational records, stored e-mail) in intelligence cases without a search warrant. * Allow computer system operators to authorize government surveillance without a court order (the computer trespasser provision). * Authorize roving taps in intelligence cases without clear guidelines, allowing government to monitor pay phones, library computers, cell phones without first determining who is using the device. * Allow secret searches (searches without notice at the time of the search) in all criminal cases. * Extend government surveillance under minimal standards to broad categories of Internet data - all "routing, addressing and signaling information" (the "pen register" provision). For full background the current civil liberties issues with the bill, please see CDT's latest policy post -- http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_7.10.shtml Also, the New York Times on October 10 explained the current situation in the Senate and Sen Feingold's concerns-- http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/10/national/10RIGH.html WHAT YOU CAN DO--MAKE YOUR VOICE HEARD 1. Call your your Senators [www.vote-smart.org can tell you who your sens are (duh)] Tell the person who answers the phone that you hope your Senator will support the Feingold privacy amendment to the terrorism bill, so that it adequately protects civil liberties when giving the government new surveillance powers. Use these words if you feel tongue-tied: Staffer: Hello, Sen. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX office. You: Hello. I'm a constituent calling to urge the Senator to support the Feingold privacy amendments to the anti-terrorism bill. Government needs to fight terrorism, but the bill fails to protect privacy. I'm concerned about the provisions on Internet surveillance and roving wiretaps. I support the Feingold amendments setting clear limits on government surveillance. Staffer: I'll tell the Senator. Thanks, bye! 2. Let CDT know how it went! Go to http://www.cdt.org/action/feedback.cgi?membid=casr and use the feedback form to tell us what happened. Or you can send an email back to me at mclark(a)cdt.org. 3. Lastly, please forward this message to other individuals interested in protecting privacy and free expression on the Internet. They can find information about their Senators at http://www.cdt.org/action/. But they need to act right away. Forward this message until Friday morning, October 12, 2001. PLEASE NOTE: We are asking you to call your Senators in Washington because studies have shown that this is the most effective way to make a difference over a short period of time. By the time the office reads your email or letter it will probably be too late and a call into the district office does not have the same impact when the Senator is in Washington. -- To subscribe to CDT's Activist Network, sign up at: http://www.cdt.org/join/ If you ever wish to remove yourself from the list, unsubscribe at: http://www.cdt.org/action/unsubscribe.shtml If you just want to change your address, you should unsubscribe yourself and then sign up again or contact: mclark(a)cdt.org -- Michael Clark, Grassroots Webmaster mclark(a)cdt.org PGP Key available on keyservers Center for Democracy and Technology 1634 Eye Street NW, Suite 1100 Washington, DC 20006 http://www.cdt.org/ voice: 202-637-9800 fax: 202-637-0968

2 1

RE: Google and the Net
by Steve Schear 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

At 09:33 AM 10/10/2001 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote: > > Steve Schear[SMTP:schear@lvcm.com] > > > > > > At 11:40 PM 10/9/2001 +0200, Nomen Nescio wrote: > > > > > > > >It's unfortunate that we have to rely on Google. Imagine an ongoing, > > >distributed project to cache the web. Volunteers could keep tabs on > > >a subset of corporate and personal web pages and cache old versions > > >when changes are made. Rewriting history becomes that much harder. > > >And it's certainly a better use of computers than seti@home. > > > > This is actually an excellent application front end for a Mojo Nation type > > > > system, as the data is redundant and distributed. > > >You get an interesting recursion problem arising - does your 'memory >of the web' site include sites which contain archives for the purpose of >being 'memory of the web'? Shades of Godel.... Since the Mojo space is not included within those of the Web how would this recursion take place? steve

1 0

Larry Ellison pushes national ID registry in WSJ
by Anonymous Coredump 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

October 8, 2001 Commentary Digital IDs Can Help Prevent Terrorism By Larry Ellison, the founder and CEO of Oracle Corp. Since the Sept. 11 attacks, our country has been thrust into a debate over how to root out terrorists while also maintaining our civil liberties. One of the suggestions proposed, though not yet fully debated, is that of national identification cards. Many Americans instinctively fear that a national ID card would sacrifice basic freedoms and compromise personal privacy. On the face of it, issuing ID cards does seem a significant step. Trusting government to maintain a database with our names, addresses, places of work, amounts and sources of income, assets, purchases, travel destinations, and more, seems a huge leap of faith. But we should remember that these databases already exist, and that we willingly helped in their creation. For years, companies like American Express and Visa have been issuing cards and building up information on millions of Americans. The databases they maintain are searched and sold on a daily basis. We should remember, too, that the government already tracks things -- lots of things. Federal, state and local agencies issue Social Security cards, driver's licenses, pilot's licenses, passports and visas. They maintain thousands of databases to keep track of everyone from taxpayers and voters to suspected terrorists. And so the question is not whether the government should issue ID cards and maintain databases; they already do. The question is whether the ones we have can be made more effective, especially when it comes to finding criminals. Do we need one national ID card? No. But the IDs that the government issues -- such as Social Security cards -- should use modern credit card technology. Do we need more databases? No, just the opposite. The biggest problem today is that we have too many. The single thing we could do to make life tougher for terrorists would be to ensure that all the information in myriad government databases was integrated into a single national file. Today, every federal intelligence and law enforcement agency and all manner of state and local bodies maintain their own separate databases on suspected criminals. All these separate databases make it difficult for one agency to know about and apprehend someone wanted by another agency. That's why one of the Sept. 11 hijackers made it through U.S. passport control, even though he had an outstanding arrest warrant in Broward County, Fla. The FBI was searching for several other of the terrorists, because CIA intelligence revealed they had ties to Osama bin Laden. Four more were sought by the Immigration and Naturalization Service because they were in the country illegally. Such a national database, though a large undertaking, is possible. My company, for example, has already offered to provide the necessary software for free, and I'm sure other companies would pitch in with hardware and support. It's important these donations be made with no strings attached: The database would be maintained and run by the government alone, with no question of corporations benefiting. The uses of such a database would be significant. Airlines, for example, could cross-check the names of passengers with names on a watch list. If this had been done, many of the Sept. 11 terrorists would have been caught before they boarded their flights. Another challenge is tracking people with multiple or stolen identities. The good news is that a national database combined with biometrics, thumb prints, hand prints, iris scans, or other new technology could detect false identities. Gaining entry to an airport or other secure location would require people to present a photo ID, put their thumb on a fingerprint scanner and tell the guard their Social Security number. This information would be cross-checked with the database. The government could phase in digital ID cards to replace existing Social Security cards and driver's licenses. These new IDs should be based on a uniform standard such as credit card technology, which is harder to counterfeit than existing government IDs, or on smart-card technology, which is better but more expensive. There is no need to compel any American to have a digital ID. Some Americans may choose to apply for a digital ID card to speed the airport security check-in process. Some states might use digital IDs for their next generation of driver's licenses. Companies might want to replace their current hodgepodge of IDs with the new system. In fact, a voluntary system of standardized IDs issued by government agencies and private companies could prove more effective than a mandatory system. We don't need to trade our liberties for our lives. By law, Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure would govern access to the national security database. The "probable cause" standard will still have to be met. Two hundred years ago, Thomas Jefferson warned us that our liberties were at risk unless we exercised "eternal vigilance." Jefferson lived in an age of aristocrats and monarchs. We live with the threat of terrorists getting their hands on weapons with the capacity to destroy entire cities. Only by giving our intelligence and law enforcement agencies better tools can we expect to save life and liberty together.

4 3

Re: [maxinux@bigfoot.com: Re: Numbers Stations]
by Alex Shiels 11 Oct '01

11 Oct '01

> From: maxinux <maxinux(a)bigfoot.com> > To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com > > if they broadcast over the us, they have to follow air guidlines aswell... > neat how things work... > > All countries license the airwaves.. atleast in this area.. Most numbers stations use shortwave broadcast or amateur bands - roughly 1-30 MHz. Licenses are required in the country where the transmitter is located, not elsewhere. Shortwave stations are almost always intended for international broadcasting. Here's the FCC's application form for a shortwave transmitter: http://www.fcc.gov/ib/pnd/neg/hf_web/appinfo.html "Any qualified US citizen, company, or group may apply to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for authority to construct and operate a high frequency (HF) (shortwave) international broadcasting station. [...] It should be noted that an international broadcasting station is intended for broadcasting to a foreign country and is not intended for broadcasting solely to the United States." More on numbers stations here, including loggings and presumed locations of some transmitters: http://spynumbers.com/ As an aside, this showed up on the spooks list a week or so back, I don't think it made it to cypherpunks: http://www.miami.com/herald/content/news/local/dade/digdocs/053821.htm (Sep 22 2001) "WASHINGTON -- FBI agents on Friday detained a 44-year-old senior analyst with the Defense Intelligence Agency, a vital part of the U.S. national security establishment, and charged her with providing U.S. national secrets to Cuba. [...] Among the contents, it added, were instructions on how to erase material from the computer, tips for radio reception, and references to ``the numbers that you receive via radio.'' A short-wave radio was also found. The complaint said that the FBI identified text consisting of 150 sets of numerical groups. ``The text begins, `30107 24624,' and continues until 150 such groups are listed. The FBI has determined that the precise same numbers, in the precise same order, were broadcast on February 6, 1999, at AM frequency 7887 kHz, by a woman speaking Spanish, who introduced the broadcast with the words `Atencisn! Atencisn!' '' the complaint said." -- mailto:zem@zip.com.au F289 2BDB 1DA0 F4C4 DC87 EC36 B2E3 4E75 C853 FD93 http://zem.squidly.org/ "I'm invisible, I'm invisible, I'm invisible.."

1 0