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Offerta di collaborazione
by info＠bsnguarantee.com 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

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Re: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
by AARG! Anonymous 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

James Donald wrote: > On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote: > > both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict > > what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at > > http://www.trustedcomputing.org/docs/TPM_QA_071802.pdf reads > > They deny that intent, but physically they have that capability. Maybe, but the point is whether the architectural spec includes that capability. After all, any OS could restrict what applications you run; you don't need special hardware for that. The question is whether restrictions on software are part of the design spec. You should be able to point to something in the TCPA spec that would restrict or limit software, if that is the case. Or do you think that when David Wagner said, "Both Palladium and TCPA incorporate features that would restrict what applications you could run," he meant "that *could* restrict what applications you run"? They *could* impose restrictions, just like any OS could impose restrictions. But to say that they *would* impose restrictions is a stronger statement, don't you think? If you claim that an architecture would impose restrictions, shouldn't you be able to point to somewhere in the design document where it explains how this would occur? There's enormous amount of information in the TCPA spec about how to measure the code which is going to be run, and to report those measurement results so third parties can know what code is running. But there's not one word about preventing software from running based on the measurements.

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by BRIDGET 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

1 0

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by --Direct Marketing 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

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Re: Hollywood Hackers
by Steve Schear 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

At 11:01 AM 7/31/2002 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: >On Tue, 30 Jul 2002, James A. Donald wrote: > > > The plan, already implemented, is to flood file sharing systems with > > bogus files or broken files. The solution, not yet implemented, is to > > attach digital signatures to files, and have the file sharing software > > recognize certain signatures as good or bad. > >This is completely unnecessary if you address the document with a >cryptohash. An URI like >http://localhost:4711/f70539bb32961f3d7dba42a9c51442c1218a9100 can only >adress a particular document. > >If you serve broken content your node's reputation falls through the >floor. > >Note that content is distributed, dynamic, and you have no idea what >you're actually serving. Looks amazingly familiar. Could it be, could be, could it be.... Mojo Nation (now MNet http://mnet.sourceforge.net )? steve

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RE: Challenge to David Wagner on TCPA
by Trei, Peter 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

> AARG! Anonymous[SMTP:remailer@aarg.net] writes: > Declan McCullagh writes at > http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1107-946890.html: > > "The world is moving toward closed digital rights management systems > where you may need approval to run programs," says David Wagner, > an assistant professor of computer science at the University of > California at Berkeley. "Both Palladium and TCPA incorporate features > that would restrict what applications you could run." > > But both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict what > applications you run. > [...] > So here is the challenge to David Wagner, a well known and justifiably > respected computer security expert: find language in the TCPA spec to > back up your claim above, that TCPA will restrict what applications > you can run. > AARG!, our anonymous Pangloss, is strictly correct - Wagner should have said "could" rather than "would". However, TCPA and Palladium fall into a class of technologies with a tremendous potential for abuse. Since the trust model is directed against the computer's owner (he can't sign code as trusted, or reliably control which signing keys are trusted), he has ceded ultimate control of what he can and can't do with his computer to another. Sure, TCPA can be switched off - until that switch is disabled. It could potentially be permenantly disabled by a BIOS update, a security patch, a commercial program which carries signed disabling code as a Trojan, or over the net through a backdoor or vulnerability in any networked software. Or by Congress which could make running a TCPA capable machine with TCPA turned off illegal. With TCPA, I now have to trust that a powerful third party, over which I have no control, and which does not necessarily have my interests are heart, will not abuse it's power. I don't want to have to do that. Peter Trei Disclaimer: The above represents my personal opinion only. Do not misconstrue it as representing anyone elses.

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Re: Hollywood Hackers
by Anonymous 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

On Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700, you wrote: > When we approve a file, all the people who approved it already get > added to our trust list, thus helping us select files, and we are > told that so and so got added to our list of people who recommend > good files. This gives people an incentive to rate files, since > rating files gives them the ability to take advantage of other > people's ratings. > > If onr discommendd a file, those who discommend it are added to > our trust list, and those who commended it to our distrust list. > If, as will frequently happen, there is a conflict, we are told > that so and so commended so many files we like, and so many files > we dislike, so how should future commendations and > discommendations from him be handled. Such an approach suffers from the "bad guy" occasionally signing a good file, thus placing himself on the trusted signer list. A better approach is for the downloader to create his own trusted list, along the lines of PGP web of trust. Ideal for exactly this application. The downloader can add and subtract from the trusted signer list at will, with no central control. Since one must expect some trusted signers to get busted and move to the dark side under court order, such downloader control is necessary. Problematic is that mp3 and other compression processes do not generate bit-identical files. Two perfect mp3 files may have different md5 hashes, for example. A tool for making bit-identical mp3 files from the same digital input is needed, so that a single signed hash can verify the same file from multiple origins.

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Weighing the true costs of spam filters (fwd)
by Jim Choate 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

http://www.nwfusion.com/columnists/2002/0729netbuzz.html -- ____________________________________________________________________ When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.org www.open-forge.org --------------------------------------------------------------------

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��ȯ�ڿ�� ʿ�� [��]
by �� 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

1 0

PCWorld.com - Compression Tool Offers Easy Encryption (fwd)
by Jim Choate 31 Jul '02

31 Jul '02

http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,103385,00.asp -- ____________________________________________________________________ When I die, I would like to be born again as me. Hugh Hefner ravage(a)ssz.com www.ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.org www.open-forge.org --------------------------------------------------------------------

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