- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Intel Security processor + a question
by Major Variola (ret) 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

At 05:13 PM 10/21/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: > >So I guess the follow on question is: Even if you can look at the code of a >RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is "usefully random", or are >there certain "Diffie-approved" RNGs that should always be there, and if not >something's up? Start with something analog, where no one knows the initial state perfectly, and the dynamics are dispersive (chaotic). Digitize it. You can use ping pong balls if you like. 1. Measure its entropy (eg see Shannon). Xor values together (xor doesn't generate change (variation), but preserves it). Go to 1 until you find that your measurments have asymptoted. You should then hash ('whiten') your distilled 1bit/baud values, to make it hard to go backwards throught the deterministic iterative "distilling" in the above recipe. In practice, you may feed a hashing digest function directly with your raw measurements and rely on the digest compressing the number of bits in:out to assure 1 bit/baud (even without the hash-whitening). However the output of such a hash function will be noise-like even with very low entropy input, e.g., successive integers. Ergo measuring after hashing is pointless. Discuss the results with your troopleader, and you will receive your crypto merit badge in 4-6 weeks.

1 0

Shop for Free at Perfumania.com
by Perfumania 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

1 0

Viagra - Phentermine - Xenical - Propecia and MORE!
by Confidential Pharma 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

ORDER YOUR NEXT PRESCRIPTION WITH PRIVACY! http://www.partner2profit.com/redir.cfm?ccode=BB12EB7B&pcode=D95F7021 -Weight Loss -Hair Loss -Skin Care -Stop Smoking Benefits Of Ordering: Confidential and Private Secure Online Order Form No Consultation Fee Next Day Shipping Available Easy Refills Discreet Packaging Order Now http://www.partner2profit.com/redir.cfm?ccode=BB12EB7B&pcode=D95F7021 Order Now with Privacy from your own home or office Click Here http://www.partner2profit.com/redir.cfm?ccode=BB12EB7B&pcode=D95F7021 ConfidentialPharmacy.com ==================================================================== This is brought to you by FreeGasDaily. You are receiving this because of your participation in the FREE GAS FOR LIFE sweepstakes. If you feel this has reached you in error or if you would no longer like to be eligible and would like to stop receiving offers from us, please visit http://www.freegasdaily.com and click on unsubscribe. Thank you. c&y&p&h&e&r&p&u&n&k&s&%m&i&n&d&e&r&~n&e&t&

1 0

Re: Intel Security processor + a question
by Major Variola (ret) 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

At 07:40 PM 10/18/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >Well,I disagree about psuedo random number generation, sort of. >First, if I have PSR sequence of the known variety (ie, ANSI or ITU), and if >it's mapped to some telecom standard (DS-1/3, OC-3/12/48/192), then my test >set can and should be able to lock onto that sequence. This is true whether >that telecom signal is raw PRBS, or if it has been mapped into the payload >(you use different test sets). 1. Shift reg sequences are cryptographically weak. 2. Re-synch'ing with a PR stream is useful for some apps, true. 3. In crypto, we consider the adversary who claims to have a true RNG but instead is faking us out with an opaque PRNG. If We are not privvy to the PRNG algorithm (or key) then we can't tell if its truly random or not. >With encrypted info who knows? I would think that testing if there's monkey >business might boil down to algorithms--ie, if certain bit patterns happen >too often, then something's wrong... Bit-bias is trivial to correct (see Shannon). Take a look at Prof. Marsaglia's "Diehard" suite of statistical-structural tests for a real obstacle course. But no such "does it look random" test can tell good PRNG from TRNG. You must peek under the hood.

1 0

Re: palladium presentation - anyone going?
by Tyler Durden 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

<<< No Message Collected >>>

1 0

Re: The Register - UK firm touts alternative to digital certs (fwd)
by Eric Murray 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

On Mon, Oct 21, 2002 at 03:37:33PM +0100, David Howe wrote: > at Monday, October 21, 2002 3:14 PM, Trei, Peter > <ptrei(a)rsasecurity.com> was seen to say: > > I'd be nervous about a availability with centralized servers, > > even if they are "triple redundant with two sites". DDOS > > attacks, infrastructure (backhoe) attacks, etc, could all > > wreck havoc. > Indeed so, yes. > I suspect (if it ever takes off) that they will have to scale their > server setup in pace with the demand, but to be honest I think 600/sec > is probably quite a high load for actual payments - we aren't talking > logins or web queries, but actual real-money-payment requests. Looking at their web site, they seem pretty generic about what it's for, but I did not see any mention of using it for payments. So I assume it's for logins. They do say that their servers are "benchmarked at 300 transactions/sec". That's pretty darn slow for single des. There would have to be an authenticated and probably encrypted session between the server accepting the login (or the merchant if it really does payments) and the back end. But even using SSL/TLS, which would be more than is required but an easy component to plug in, they ought to be able to get at least a true 1000 sessions/sec using one of the current SSL accelerators out there. Maybe they have a bunch of slow database lookups? Perhaps there is a long RTT for the check against the CIA blacklist? If it is for logins, how many sites would be willing to let someone else know when their employees log in? That could be useful competitive intelligence. Eric

1 0

RE: The Register - UK firm touts alternative to digital certs (fw d)
by Trei, Peter 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

> David Howe[SMTP:DaveHowe@gmx.co.uk] writes: > > at Sunday, October 20, 2002 2:22 PM, Jim Choate > <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> was seen to say: > > http://theregister.co.uk/content/6/27659.html > looks like a dumbed-down version of the secureID system. > Basically, it works like this > > 1. user enters five-digit pin code. code is in colours (four choices) > not numbers though. Total pin keylength therefore ten bit. > 2. device increments an internal counter, and generates a composite code > comprising user id, current clock time and the internal counter (number > of times card used, basically) > 3. device uses single-DES to encrypt that data, and then binhexes it to > give a keycode > 4. user types in their username and keycode into website > 5. website contacts quizid authentication server and verifies code is > valid (and that account has enough to cover the transaction) > 6. website completes transaction and bills quizid company > 7. quizid company bills user's credit card. > > the plus side here is that the website never knows the user's credit > card details, and is given a oneshot authentication handle that is > useless once verified. > the downside is that the system has no way to verify an amount, and is > only weakly protected (both in pin (weaker than the usual four digit ATM > pin) and in transit (single-des????) > [Disclosure: I work on SecurID]. This was discussed on Perry's Cryptography list last week. It does look kind of like a "dumbed down SecurID" - but what it looks like even more is an ActivCard keychain token http://www.activcard.com/activ/products/end_user/activ_card_one/index.html repackaged into a bigger form factor. The code generation scheme appears similar as well. The Company Info page reveals that ActivCard actually manufactures the device. I'd be nervous about a availability with centralized servers, even if they are "triple redundant with two sites". DDOS attacks, infrastructure (backhoe) attacks, etc, could all wreck havoc. I also wonder about scalability with centralized servers. A BBC article http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/2334491.stm claims 600 authentications/second, in a system which cost UKP 1M in hardware alone. This is not really good enough if you're trying to cover the world (or even just Britain) from one site. AOL gets about *50,000* login attempts per second at peak times, to give one admittedly extreme example. Disclaimer: The above are my personal opinions only. Peter Trei

1 0

Re: The Register - UK firm touts alternative to digital certs (fwd)
by David Howe 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

at Sunday, October 20, 2002 2:22 PM, Jim Choate <ravage(a)einstein.ssz.com> was seen to say: > http://theregister.co.uk/content/6/27659.html looks like a dumbed-down version of the secureID system. Basically, it works like this 1. user enters five-digit pin code. code is in colours (four choices) not numbers though. Total pin keylength therefore ten bit. 2. device increments an internal counter, and generates a composite code comprising user id, current clock time and the internal counter (number of times card used, basically) 3. device uses single-DES to encrypt that data, and then binhexes it to give a keycode 4. user types in their username and keycode into website 5. website contacts quizid authentication server and verifies code is valid (and that account has enough to cover the transaction) 6. website completes transaction and bills quizid company 7. quizid company bills user's credit card. the plus side here is that the website never knows the user's credit card details, and is given a oneshot authentication handle that is useless once verified. the downside is that the system has no way to verify an amount, and is only weakly protected (both in pin (weaker than the usual four digit ATM pin) and in transit (single-des????)

1 0

福建东南汽车
by classad＠163.com 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

ÕâÊÇÒ»žöHTMLžñÊœµÄÓÊŒþ/This is a html format mail

1 0

((xxxAdultFlixxx)) xhxhr
by Sweetheart 21 Oct '02

21 Oct '02

1 0