- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

Re: Optical Tempest? I have my doubts...
by Major Variola (ret) 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

At 03:15 PM 7/17/03 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote: >I dunno...I'm thinking that optical tempest is probably bullshit 99% of the >time, but what do I know? There was an article on optical tempest based on reading modem-LEDs, which are sometimes modulated with the data stream. For Mhz rates it works. >But I still don't believe that specular reflection of smallish type from a >monitor will have anything that is recoverable. Of course, this is going to >be dependent on the quality of the wall material, but for most not-so-even >plaster/drywall painted surfaces, I just can't believe the appopriate >spacial frequencies of the image are not scattered after that kind of >reflection. The idea of reading the *matte* reflection of the CRT beam is possible. But its not *spatial* frequency, its using intensity vs. time. At any one instant you have a single 1-D measurement. This exploits the fact, as stated, that the phosphor is brightest under the (scanning) beam. There is no spatial info present. You simply need a sensitive (contrast is low) and fast (raster rate) optical measurement. >The conspiracy theorist is telling me there's some reason they floated the >optical tempest story, though I can't quite figure out what that reason >is... Its the Windowshade division of the Anti-Illuminati ---- Irony: Jewish Zealots were famous for offing (Jewish) Roman collaborators. 100 generations later, Arabic Zealots whack (Arabic) ZionistCrusader collaborators. "Pro-American Mayor, Son Killed in Iraq" ---- Of course Iraq isn't another Vietnam. They don't know how to make good pho hoa.

1 0

RE: Sealing wax & eKeyboard
by Sunder 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

On Thu, 17 Jul 2003, Trei, Peter wrote: > Lets not forget optical TEMPEST - remember a few months ago, > when it was demonstrated that the image on a CRT could > be reconstructed just from the light it reflected on walls? The > point where the electron beam is hitting the phosphors is > much brighter than the rest of the screen, and by syncing a > fast photodetector to monitor scan rates, you can reconstruct > the image on a screen in a distant room just by viewing the > backwash light through a telescope. Absolutely. Which is why people worried about security in this manner, should move to LCD's. Not just for weakening TEMPEST signals, but also for defeating optical TEMPEST... (and saving power.) However I have to say that from a purely user point of view, I like the way CRT's look much better than LCD's. CRT's tend to be richer and brighter than LCD's, and their refresh rates are much better... LCD's are still suceptible to TEMPEST monitoring, though there are far less emissions since there isn't this great big nuclear particle accelerator sitting infront of you :) (what? electrons are nuclear particles. :) But the signals from poorly shielded VGA cables can still be picked up (as can those of keyboards, and other hardware.) Other tricks include using more than one monitor (make sure they're all the same brand/model, attached to video cards that are identical and operating at the same resolution, depth, and refresh rate, and displaying random junk, etc. + using tempest fonts on the non-decoy system.) Better yet, use a notebook computer on battery power (so that power saving mode comes intoplay) with several decoys as they'd (generally) dump much less RF. You could also add some shielding, but it's unlikely to help very much... I actually played with a fox & hound kit one day. For those who never had to run ethernet (CAT 3,5,5e,etc.) or phone cable, this consists of a pair of tools: a tone injector that makes lots of noise, and a detector. The detector can pick up not just the signal from the tone injector, but also lovely things such as 60Hz hum, phone conversations (in analog phones anyhow), etc... You can also learn to "hear" the different sounds various things like 100BTx make and distinguish from - say, 10BT, or cable TV, etc... with a cheap proble that doesn't filter... I did find that when used on a keyboard, with some cheaper keyboards anyway, you can "hear" the keystrokes and the key scanning pattern, and that the individual keys are certainly distinctive enough - you could probably hook this thing up to a sound card and figure out which keys send what RF pattern... So with the right recorder/relay/decoder hidden under someone's desk, you could capture their keystrokes without disturbing epoxy or taking the keyboard apart. (As with all bugs, you'd need a power suply, some way to intercept the data, and either some way to record the data, or relay it. Relaying it, and hooking into existing power is better than just recording it or using a battery as a source, because you don't need a 2nd blag bag job to remove your bug and dump the data.) Of course if the bug transmits, it can be picked up in a sweep, but if the PC is on, the guy doing the sweep might not realize that there's a bug since the PC is a noise source... YMMV, etc. So all this talk of expoying keyboards down is somewhat naive in light of this. Not to say that if you, hypothetically speaking, were in a position to have a well funded, and determined set of enemies who were out to get your data, that using expoxy to glue down your keyboard wouldn't frustrate them, but rather to point out that there are other means and methods that would more than ruin your day. :) The path of least resistance, again, is not to attract the attention of such enemies in the first place. But hey, if your threat model is your kid sister or RIAA, then much less thought is perfectly fine. [As with all my posts, "you" is always a fictional character, and in this one, "you" switches from the guy trying to steal data to the guy trying to protect data, YMMV, #include <std_disclaimer.h> ]

1 0

RE: Sealing wax & eKeyboard
by Trei, Peter 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

> ---------- > From: Tyler Durden[SMTP:camera_lumina@hotmail.com] > Sent: Wednesday, July 16, 2003 9:38 PM > To: sunder(a)sunder.net > Cc: shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz; timcmay(a)got.net; cypherpunks(a)minder.net > Subject: Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard > > I don't think a virtual keyboard is necessarily a bad idea in this case. I > > live in a densely populated neighborhood in NYC. SOmeone is ALWAYS in my > home, and in the rare cases nobody's here we turn on our alarm. This does > not mean some visual surveillance of my keyboard is impossible, but it > greatly reduces the number of parties with the desire and resources to > attempt such a surveillance. And the reason this matters is because I can > download such a virtual keyboard for pennies (thus causing the need for > VERY > costly forms of surveillance by nullifying keystroke loggers), and cause > the > cost of surveillance to rise probably far more than exponentially. This is > a > good thing (from my point of view!) in and of itself, but imagine if a > large > number of people thought this way, encrypting even the most trivial of > communications. > > -TD > > Lets not forget optical TEMPEST - remember a few months ago, when it was demonstrated that the image on a CRT could be reconstructed just from the light it reflected on walls? The point where the electron beam is hitting the phosphors is much brighter than the rest of the screen, and by syncing a fast photodetector to monitor scan rates, you can reconstruct the image on a screen in a distant room just by viewing the backwash light through a telescope. Peter

1 0

The Register - Congress threatens two hi-tech Gestapo programs (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/31791.html -- ____________________________________________________________________ We are all interested in the future for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives. Criswell, "Plan 9 from Outer Space" ravage(a)ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.org www.ssz.com www.open-forge.org --------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard
by Tyler Durden 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

"Anything displayed on your screen is visible to the guy across the street with a TEMPEST detector unless you work in a Faraday cage. " No, no you have the whole thing wrong. As May recently stated, "crypto is economics". It's one thing for "them" to set up a camera to look at some Arab guy's computer down on Atlantic Ave in Brooklyn. It's an entirely different thing if, by using a virtual keyboard, "they" have to do the same thing for millions of people. (And in case it's not obvious, the cost probably won' be in the hardware but in the installation costs, and the fact that the probability of detection of such efforts is nonzero, thus nullifying their "investment".) If I have a plan to smash a plane into the Empire State building, I'll probably work harder to hide it. If I'm sharing mp3's on Kazaa or whatever and I don't want to have RIAA make an example out of me, that virtual keyboard may be just right. The real danger of crypto and, I'd argue, a virtual keyboard in this case, is that by spending tiny fractions of money we can make it prohibitively costly for "them" to monitor a large number of transactions. Forget unbreakability. Forget Faraday cages (you don't have anything that important to hide anyway). Cheap, easy and scalable is the only way to bumrush this show. -TD >From: Sunder <sunder(a)sunder.net> >To: Thomas Shaddack <shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz> >CC: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com>, timcmay(a)got.net, >cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard >Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2003 13:23:02 -0400 (edt) > >Geez! You guys have the DUMBEST ideas ever! For fuck's sake, go and >RTFA! (For the dumb: READ THE FUCKING ARCHIVES!) > >Anything displayed on your screen is visible to the guy across the street >with a TEMPEST detector unless you work in a Faraday cage. Failing that a >hidden pinhole camera, or an RF transmitter attached to your cable -- hell >these are available for hobbist use right now: x10.com has small devices >that you can use to broadcast video from one room to another. Getting the >same done for VGA, XVGA, etc. shouldn't be any harder. > >Using IR or RF is one of the stupidest things you could possibly >do. Think! IR and RF are detectable from a distance! > >Ok, some IR auth is ok, provided it's in a sealed chamber and no photons >leak out. i.e. think of a two cylinders, sealed at the ends where the >cables go, where one fits inside the other... sort of like fiber optic >cables and connectors. No leaks. > >Direct contact's obviously fine, so long as your alleged attacker can't >tap into it. > >----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--------------------------- > + ^ + :25Kliters anthrax, 38K liters botulinum toxin, 500 tons of /|\ > \|/ :sarin, mustard and VX gas, mobile bio-weapons labs, nukular /\|/\ ><--*-->:weapons.. Reasons for war on Iraq - GWB 2003-01-28 speech. \/|\/ > /|\ :Found to date: 0. Cost of war: $800,000,000,000 USD. \|/ > + v + : The look on Sadam's face - priceless! >--------_sunder_(a)_sunder_._net_------- http://www.sunder.net ------------ > >On Wed, 16 Jul 2003, Thomas Shaddack wrote: > > > However, this will work around the keyboard loggers, but will cause > > development of eg. programs saving the screenshots at the moment of a > > mouseclick. (Which is definitely more detectable - by storing bulk >amounts > > of data - than just a plain keylogger, disadvantaging the adversary > > somehow.) Also won't protect against ceiling cams, if they'd have enough > > resolution to see the screen clearly enough. > > > > Couldn't there be some challenge-response device, eg. over IrDA or radio > > waves or direct contact (eg, iButton DS1955B or DS1957B), which would be > > unlocked by something like a PIN code? How to avoid the leakage of the >PIN > > and subsequent seizure of the device then? _________________________________________________________________ Tired of spam? Get advanced junk mail protection with MSN 8. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail

3 2

Swiss cheese by Microsoft
by Major Variola (ret.) 17 Jul '03

17 Jul '03

Microsoft Admits Flaw in Windows Software WASHINGTON - Microsoft Corp. acknowledged a critical vulnerability Wednesday in nearly all versions of its flagship Windows operating system software, the first such design flaw to affect its latest Windows Server 2003 software. ... Microsoft said corporate firewalls commonly block the type of data connections that hackers outside a company would need for these attacks. The flaw affects Windows technology used to share data files across computer networks. [Yes but a virus can exploit from *within* the system.] ... But four Polish researchers, known as the "Last Stage of Delirium Research Group," said they discovered how to bypass the additional protections Microsoft added, just three months after the software went on sale. [Gotta love that acronym..] ------ Router attack, ca. 1954: Bikers disable a town's router infrastructure in _The Wild Ones_. Her name is Dorothy, she runs a plugboard, she runs off scared.

1 0

Slashdot | WiFi Hotspots Elude RIAA Dragnet (fwd)
by Jim Choate 16 Jul '03

16 Jul '03

http://yro.slashdot.org/yro/03/07/17/0010225.shtml?tid=141&tid=188 -- ____________________________________________________________________ We are all interested in the future for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives. Criswell, "Plan 9 from Outer Space" ravage(a)ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.org www.ssz.com www.open-forge.org --------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Slashdot | Intrusion Tolerance - Security's Next Big Thing? (fwd)
by Jim Choate 16 Jul '03

16 Jul '03

http://slashdot.org/articles/03/07/17/002250.shtml?tid=126&tid=172 -- ____________________________________________________________________ We are all interested in the future for that is where you and I are going to spend the rest of our lives. Criswell, "Plan 9 from Outer Space" ravage(a)ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.org www.ssz.com www.open-forge.org --------------------------------------------------------------------

1 0

Funding for TIA All But Dead
by Steve Schear 16 Jul '03

16 Jul '03

The controversial Terrorism Information Awareness program, which would troll Americans' personal records to find terrorists before they strike, may soon face the same fate Congress meted out to John Ashcroft in his attempt to create a corps of volunteer domestic spies: death by legislation. http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59606,00.html "There is no protection or safety in anticipatory servility." Craig Spencer

3 2

Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard
by Tyler Durden 16 Jul '03

16 Jul '03

I don't think a virtual keyboard is necessarily a bad idea in this case. I live in a densely populated neighborhood in NYC. SOmeone is ALWAYS in my home, and in the rare cases nobody's here we turn on our alarm. This does not mean some visual surveillance of my keyboard is impossible, but it greatly reduces the number of parties with the desire and resources to attempt such a surveillance. And the reason this matters is because I can download such a virtual keyboard for pennies (thus causing the need for VERY costly forms of surveillance by nullifying keystroke loggers), and cause the cost of surveillance to rise probably far more than exponentially. This is a good thing (from my point of view!) in and of itself, but imagine if a large number of people thought this way, encrypting even the most trivial of communications. -TD >From: Sunder <sunder(a)sunder.net> >To: Tyler Durden <camera_lumina(a)hotmail.com> >CC: shaddack(a)ns.arachne.cz, timcmay(a)got.net, cypherpunks(a)minder.net >Subject: Re: Sealing wax & eKeyboard >Date: Wed, 16 Jul 2003 15:01:22 -0400 (edt) > > >On Wed, 16 Jul 2003, Tyler Durden wrote: > > > "Anything displayed on your screen is visible to the guy across the >street > > with a TEMPEST detector unless you work in a Faraday cage. " > > > > No, no you have the whole thing wrong. As May recently stated, "crypto >is > > economics". > >Well, ok, it "all depends on your security model" is certainly the 1st >factor to consider with how much you're willing to spend on it being a >constraint to that. > >If your threat model is simply to have generic good security incase >someone steals your machine, then so long as all your files are encrypted, >the theif just gets whatever the hardware is worth at "it fell of a >truck" prices, and no more. > >If your threat model is the fully armed and armorded ninja attack at >3:00am -- which was what I gathered was what Sampo's originally presented >question, then you can assume your attacker would have enough resources to >pull off a TEMPEST van across the street, etc. > >So do you want crypto to keep a rogue government out of your fiels, or >keep your kid sister from reading your email? etc... > >An on screen virtual keyboard is much easier to see than a real keyboard >even by a shitty pinhole camera. A real keyboard would have to be viewed >from above, otherwise, all you can do is infer the keystrokes - which >gives you a hint of what they are for a passphrase, but not much else. >On screen keyboard can be seen much easier and your mouse pointer gives >you away. > >So it all depends on who "they" is. Either way, if "they" believe you are >a nice jucy target, and their chances to net lots of data off your machine >are high, they will park the TEMPEST SUV outside your door. Not much >question of that... > >If "they" are watching everyone for patterns and you don't stick out like >a sore thumb, there's not much need for any of the above. > > > Empire State building, I'll probably work harder to hide it. If I'm >sharing > > mp3's on Kazaa or whatever and I don't want to have RIAA make an example >out > > of me, that virtual keyboard may be just right. > >No, virtual keyboard won't save your ass. Your ISP will had it over on a >plate along with trimmings (traffic logs, etc.) If you're sharing MP3's >on Kazaa, you're easy to find, and logs are proof enough. All the RIAA >troll has to do is download one song off your IP, prove it came from >your IP, and get the ISP to give them logs, and you're toast. Doesn't >matter that your hard drive has since been wiped or encrypted or is >unreadable. > >Using crypto to protect files you have already shared with the public is >neurotic as a security measure. > > > The real danger of crypto and, I'd argue, a virtual keyboard in this >case, > > is that by spending tiny fractions of money we can make it prohibitively > > costly for "them" to monitor a large number of transactions. > >And if you do and are noticed, "they" will spend that money because you >will be an obvious and clear target. If they can get away with "why don't >you just show us what you have - what do you have something to hide?" line >to cow sheeple into giving them access, in their mind, you'd be the one to >make their careers. > > > Forget > > unbreakability. Forget Faraday cages (you don't have anything that >important > > to hide anyway). Cheap, easy and scalable is the only way to bumrush >this > > show. > >Again, what's your threat model, who is your attacker, how much are you >willing to spend on it? > > >----------------------Kaos-Keraunos-Kybernetos--------------------------- > + ^ + :25Kliters anthrax, 38K liters botulinum toxin, 500 tons of /|\ > \|/ :sarin, mustard and VX gas, mobile bio-weapons labs, nukular /\|/\ ><--*-->:weapons.. Reasons for war on Iraq - GWB 2003-01-28 speech. \/|\/ > /|\ :Found to date: 0. Cost of war: $800,000,000,000 USD. \|/ > + v + : The look on Sadam's face - priceless! >--------_sunder_(a)_sunder_._net_------- http://www.sunder.net ------------ > > > _________________________________________________________________ Add photos to your e-mail with MSN 8. Get 2 months FREE*. http://join.msn.com/?page=features/featuredemail

1 0