- cypherpunks-legacy - lists.cpunks.org

JBNv2, GPG on XP help
by MrNerdHair 21 Oct '03

21 Oct '03

Does anyone have a link to a current FAQ or something similar describing how to set up Jack B. Nymble v2 on WinXP (yes, I know it _is_ the scourge of the devil, I only use it on my laptop) with GnuPG? I'm an open source buff and have tried to get the combination to work, to no avail. ----------------------------------------------------------- **From the guy whose hair will never go down** Geek Code: GCS/CM/IT/MC/S/O d-(?) s-:+ a! C++ UL++++(+++)>$ P+>+++ L++++>+++++$ E---(-) W+++$ N>++ o? K++ w---(--) O- M(--) V-(--) PS--(+) PE(+) Y+(++) PGP++(+++) t+++* 5-(--) X(-) R-@ tv+@ b-()>+ DI++++ D>++ G++ e->++ h!*>++ r! y?

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[mnet-devel] DOS in DHTs (fwd from amichrisde@yahoo.de)
by Eugen Leitl 20 Oct '03

20 Oct '03

This list is so dead, a few forwards don't hurt. Won't make it a habit, though. ----- Forwarded message from Some Guy <amichrisde(a)yahoo.de> -----

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Re: [IP] FCC readies rule to block Internet piracy (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Tyler Durden 20 Oct '03

20 Oct '03

>The federal government is preparing for the first time to >require that personal computers and other consumer electronics devices >contain technology to help block Internet piracy of digital entertainment. Just wait until MS unleashes a brood of lobbyists when nobody buys the new Palladium-ed operating systems. State control is one thing. State control that will do absolutely nothing is another. This cat's already out of the bag. As far as I'm concerned, the coming collapse of the music industry will be one of the few convincing pieces of evidence that God exists. -TD >From: Eugen Leitl <eugen(a)leitl.org> >To: cypherpunks(a)lne.com >Subject: [IP] FCC readies rule to block Internet piracy (fwd from >dave(a)farber.net) >Date: Mon, 20 Oct 2003 11:54:15 +0200 > >Of course none of the feds would want to mandate Palladiated consumer >hardware, ever. Right. > >----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> ----- > >From: Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> >Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2003 14:52:38 -0400 >To: ip(a)v2.listbox.com >Subject: [IP] FCC readies rule to block Internet piracy >X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 6.0.0.22 > > > >Delivered-To: dfarber+(a)ux13.sp.cs.cmu.edu > >Date: Sun, 19 Oct 2003 08:10:34 -0700 > >From: Dewayne Hendricks <dewayne(a)warpspeed.com> > >= > > > >FCC readies rule to block Internet piracy > > > >By Jonathan Krim, Washington Post, 10/19/2003 > ><http://www.boston.com/business/globe/articles/2003/10/19/fcc_readies_rule_t >o_block_internet_piracy/> > > > >WASHINGTON -- The federal government is preparing for the first time to > >require that personal computers and other consumer electronics devices > >contain technology to help block Internet piracy of digital >entertainment. > >A rule being considered by the Federal Communications Commission is one >of > >a series of proposals pushed by the entertainment industry to help thwart > >copying and online trading of movies and television shows that > >increasingly are being broadcast in digital form with high-quality >picture > >and sound. > > > >But the new rule also would force consumers to purchase new equipment if > >they wanted to record enhanced digital-quality television programs and > >replay them on other machines. > > > >Opponents of the proposed rule, including many technology companies and > >consumer groups, say it won't work. They are especially concerned that >the > >plan might lead to government regulation of how personal computers and > >other devices are built, particularly if hackers crack the system and > >further changes are deemed necessary. > > > >FCC officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said they expect > >the agency to settle on details of the "broadcast flag" rule by the end >of > >the month. The broadcast flag takes its name from the computer code that > >would be embedded in digital television signals and would be read by > >"compliant" devices such as a television or a digital video recorder. > > > >The rule would not affect consumers who record shows with VCRs. Nor would > >it affect programming received on a cable or satellite system, in part > >because consumers pay for that content. > > > >But the entertainment industry does not want digitally enhanced > >"high-value" entertainment sent free over the air to be easily copied and > >distributed on the Internet. > > > >FCC officials said they expect the final rule to enable competition among > >different means of deploying the flag system to protect broadcasts, >rather > >than the government anointing one in particular. > > > >Unlike with recent FCC decisions on high-speed Internet access and media > >consolidation that have deeply split the five-member commission, none of > >the three Republicans and two Democrats has led a public campaign against > >the broadcast flag. > > > >"I'm optimistic we'll have a clean majority," said one senior agency > >official. "The commission has acted in the area of digital television in >a > >very bipartisan fashion." > >------------------------------------- >You are subscribed as eugen(a)leitl.org >To manage your subscription, go to > http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip > >Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/ > >----- End forwarded message ----- >-- Eugen* Leitl <a href="http://leitl.org">leitl</a> >______________________________________________________________ >ICBM: 48.07078, 11.61144 http://www.leitl.org >8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE > >[demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature] _________________________________________________________________ Add MSN 8 Internet Software to your current Internet access and enjoy patented spam control and more. Get two months FREE! http://join.msn.com/?page=dept/byoa

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[mnet-devel] Anonymity and Performance in Peer-to-Peer Systems (fwd from amichrisde@yahoo.de)
by Eugen Leitl 20 Oct '03

20 Oct '03

----- Forwarded message from Some Guy <amichrisde(a)yahoo.de> -----

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[IP] FCC readies rule to block Internet piracy (fwd from dave@farber.net)
by Eugen Leitl 20 Oct '03

20 Oct '03

Of course none of the feds would want to mandate Palladiated consumer hardware, ever. Right. ----- Forwarded message from Dave Farber <dave(a)farber.net> -----

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Cypherpunks List Info
by cpunk＠lne.com 19 Oct '03

19 Oct '03

Cypherpunks Mailing List Information Last updated: Oct 13, 2003 This message is also available at http://www.lne.com/cpunk Instructions on unsubscribing from the list can be found below. 0. Introduction The Cypherpunks mailing list is a mailing list for discussing cryptography and its effect on society. It is not a moderated list (but see exceptions below) and the list operators are not responsible for the list content. Cypherpunks is a distributed mailing list. A subscriber can subscribe to one node of the list and thereby participate on the full list. Each node (called a "Cypherpunks Distributed Remailer", although they are not related to anonymous remailers) exchanges messages with the other nodes in addition to sending messages to its subscribers. A message posted to one node will be received by the list subscribers on the other nodes, and vice-versa. 1. Filtering The various CDRs follow different policies on filtering spam and to a lesser extent on modifying messages that go to/from their subscribers. Filtering is done, on nodes that do it, to reduce the huge amount of spam that the cypherpunks list is subjected to. There are three basic flavors of filtering CDRs: "raw", which send all messages to their subscribers. "cooked" CDRs try to eliminate the spam on that's on the regular list by automatically sending only messages that are from cypherpunks list subscribers (on any CDR) or people who are replying to list messages. Finally there are moderated lists, where a human moderator decides which messages from the raw list to pass on to subscribers. 2. Message Modification Message modification policy indicates what modifications, if any, beyond what is needed to operate the CDR are done (most CDRs add a tracking X-loop header on mail posted to their subscribers to prevent mail loops). Message modification usually happens on mail going in or out to each CDR's subscribers. CDRs should not modify mail that they pass from one CDR to the next, but some of them do, and others undo those modifications. 3. Privacy Privacy policy indicates if the list will allow anyone ("open"), or only list members, or no one ("private") , to retrieve the subscribers list. Note that if you post, being on a "private" list doesn't mean much, since your address is now out there. It's really only useful for keeping spammers from harvesting addresses from the list software. Digest mode indicates that the CDR supports digest mode, which is where the posts are batched up into a few large emails. Nodes that support only digest mode are noted. 4. Anonymous posting Cypherpunks encourages anonymous posting. You can use an anonymous remailer: http://www.andrebacard.com/remail.html http://anon.efga.org/Remailers http://www.gilc.org/speech/anonymous/remailer.html 5. Unsubscribing Unsubscribing from the cypherpunks list: Since the list is run from a number of different CDRs, you have to figure out which CDR you are subscribed to. If you don't remember and can't figure it out from the mail headers (hint: the top Received: line should tell you), the easiest way to unsubscribe is to send unsubscribe messages to all the CDRs listed below. How to figure out which CDR you are subscribed to: Get your mail client to show all the headers (Microsoft calls this "internet headers"). Look for the Sender or X-loop headers. The Sender will say something like "Sender: owner-cypherpunks(a)lne.com". The X-loop line will say something like "X-Loop: cypherpunks(a)lne.com". Both of these inticate that you are subscribed to the lne.com CDR. If you were subscribed to the algebra CDR, they would have algebra.com in them. Once you have figured out which CDR you're subscribed to, look in the table below to find that CDRs unsubscribe instructions. 6. Lunatics, spammers and nut-cases "I'm subscribed to a filtering CDR yet I still see lots of junk postings". At this writing there are a few sociopaths on the cypherpunks list who are abusing the lists openness by dumping reams of propaganda on the list. The distinction between a spammer and a subscriber is nearly always very clear, but the dictinction between a subscriber who is abusing the list by posting reams of propaganda and a subscriber who is making lots of controversial posts is not clear. Therefore, we tolerate the crap. Subscribers with a low crap tolerance should check out mail filters. Procmail is a good one, although it works on Unix and Unix-like systems only. Eudora also has a capacity for filtering mail, as do many other mail readers. An example procmail recipie is below, you will of course want to make your own decisions on which (ab)users to filter. # mailing lists: # filter all cypherpunks mail into its own cypherspool folder, discarding # mail from loons. All CDRs set their From: line to 'owner-cypherpunks'. # /dev/null is unix for the trash can. :0 * ^From.*owner-cypherpunks@.* { :0: * (^From:.*ravage@ssz\.com.*|\ ^From:.*jchoate@dev.tivoli.com.*|\ ^From:.*mattd@useoz.com|\ ^From:.*proffr11@bigpond.com|\ ^From:.*jei@cc.hut.fi) /dev/null :0: cypherspool } 7. List of current CDRs All commands are sent in the body of mail unless otherwise noted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Algebra: Operator: Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)algebra.com Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)algebra.com Help: "help cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)algebra.com Posting address: cypherpunks(a)algebra.com Filtering policy: raw Message Modification policy: no modification Privacy policy: ??? Info: ??? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- CCC: Operator: drt(a)un.bewaff.net Subscription: "subscribe [password of your choice]" to cypherpunks-request(a)koeln.ccc.de Unsubscription: "unsubscribe <password>" to cypherpunks-request(a)koeln.ccc.de Help: "help" to to cypherpunks-request(a)koeln.ccc.de Web site: http://koeln.ccc.de/mailman/listinfo/cypherpunks Posting address: cypherpunks(a)koeln.ccc.de Filtering policy: This specific node drops messages bigger than 32k and every message with more than 17 recipients or just a line containing "subscribe" or "unsubscribe" in the subject. Digest mode: this node is digest-only NNTP: news://koeln.ccc.de/cbone.ml.cypherpunks Message Modification policy: no modification Privacy policy: ??? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Infonex: Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)infonex.com Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)infonex.com Help: "help cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)infonex.com Posting address: cypherpunks(a)infonex.com Filtering policy: raw Message Modification policy: no modification Privacy policy: ??? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lne: Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)lne.com Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)lne.com Help: "help cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)lne.com Posting address: cypherpunks(a)lne.com Filtering policy: cooked Posts from all CDR subscribers & replies to threads go to lne CDR subscribers. All posts from other CDRs are forwarded to other CDRs unmodified. Message Modification policy: 1. messages are demimed (MIME attachments removed) when posted through lne or received by lne CDR subscribers 2. leading "CDR:" in subject line removed 3. "Reply-to:" removed Privacy policy: private Info: http://www.lne.com/cpunk; "info cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)lne.com Archive: http://archives.abditum.com/cypherpunks/index.html (thanks to Steve Furlong and Len Sassaman) --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Minder: Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)minder.net Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)minder.net Help: "help" to majordomo(a)minder.net Posting address: cypherpunks(a)minder.net Filtering policy: raw Message Modification policy: no modification Privacy policy: private Info: send mail to cypherpunks-info(a)minder.net --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Openpgp: [openpgp seems to have dropped off the end of the world-- it doesn't return anything from sending help queries. Ericm, 8/7/01] Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to listproc(a)openpgp.net Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to listproc(a)openpgp.net Help: "help" to listproc(a)openpgp.net Posting address: cypherpunks(a)openpgp.net Filtering policy: raw Message Modification policy: no modification Privacy policy: ??? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Sunder: Subscription: "subscribe" to sunder(a)sunder.net Unsubscription: "unsubscribe" to sunder(a)sunder.net Help: "help" to sunder(a)sunder.net Posting address: sunder(a)sunder.net Filtering policy: moderated Message Modification policy: ??? Privacy policy: ??? Info: ??? --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Pro-ns: Subscription: "subscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)pro-ns.net Unsubscription: "unsubscribe cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)pro-ns.net Help: "help cypherpunks" to majordomo(a)pro-ns.net Posting address: cypherpunks(a)pro-ns.net Filtering policy: cooked Posts from all CDR subscribers & replies to threads go to local CDR subscribers. All posts from other CDRs are forwarded to other CDRs unmodified. Message Modification policy: 1. leading "CDR:" in subject line removed 2. "Reply-to:" removed Privacy policy: private Info: http://www.pro-ns.net/cpunk

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Al Q easy meat for NSA
by Major Variola (ret.) 19 Oct '03

19 Oct '03

http://www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/jihad13chap1.html

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Re: LOCAL Mountain View, California, USA: events this week
by Major Variola (ret) 18 Oct '03

18 Oct '03

At 02:04 PM 10/18/03 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote: >It takes a broken P2P service to be brought down by a few unkosher binaries. >Trust accounting and agoric load levelling don't take Pd hardware. Nice translation. Main Entry: ag7o7ra Pronunciation: 'a-g&-r& Function: noun Inflected Form(s): plural -ras or ag7o7rae /-"rE, -"rI/ Etymology: Greek, from ageirein to gather Date: 1589 : a gathering place; especially : the marketplace in ancient Greec >A palladium-plated turd is still a turd at its heart. A quotable quote. >Look at concentration in scientific publishing. Tell me how Palladium will >reduce the monopolist stranglehold, reduce the prices and make scientific >information available to the largerst possible audience. The Elseviers compete with the xxx.lanls. As do journals that charge the author to publish with those that don't. Etc. >A manipulated market is no longer a competitive market. Producers and >consumers do not have equivalent leverage. The invisible hand is flipping >us the bird. Of course you know that, TCPA >troll. Market manipulation is only done using violence. Only the government or other mafias manipulate markets. The rest (aquisitions, proprietary formats, bundling and giving it away free) is a perhaps more savage ecosystem than you prefer, but that's life. >There is no such thing as a weak DRM. There is no such thing as DRM for analog content. Only for machine-executable interactive content (eg games). The gamer-publisher vs. cracker war has been going on indefinately, even when it was putting a slug into a pinball machine. Either I do have the raw bits of an >open format and the according transducer to render it into direct >monkey-consumables, or not. The rights are volatile, and subject to change. >Everything enforcible will be enforced, and a good hardened Palladium makes a >great many evils possible. So? Think of it as free advertising for *nix. And it works, too, many have $witched. >What's your problem with music industry getting out of business? What's your >problem with a greatly diminished copyright enforcement, and free sharing of >information? I personally have no problem with intermediaries of any form going extinct. I have moral problems with tossing copyright out, but have learned that the only way to prevent their weakening is a police state. Unless 'trusted' stuff is *required*, people will decide, and they need not decide homogenously. If they decide foolishly, well, that's their choice, evolution never sleeps. As Schneier once wrote, offer a free hamburger for DNA samples and they'll line up around the block. >Users don't CHOOSE, you Palladium troll. They didn't knew an open format if >it bit them in the ass. Their bosses choose, the monopolist choses for them >via default-bundle and lock-in. Are there no home-Mac users who work for entities that require PC usage?

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Re: LOCAL Mountain View, California, USA: events this week
by Anonymous 18 Oct '03

18 Oct '03

Seth Schoen writes: > Intel has posted its Policy Statement on LaGrande Technology: > > ftp://download.intel.com/technology/security/downloads/LT_policy_statement_… > 8.pdf > > LaGrande is in the interstices between TCG and NGSCB. Rather, it seems that LaGrande is the hardware component of NGSCB, and that TCG is evolving to be more like NGSCB. > Anyway, Intel wants your comments on the LT policy. The thing that > jumps out at me (as the author of "Trusted Computing: Promise and > Risk") is that Intel thinks that opt-out or opt-in can solve the > problems of attestation. This is the official view of a lot of > trusted computing proponents. The defects of this view are difficult > to describe and are complicated by the fact that some trusted > computing critics don't believe that LT (or TCG or NGSCB) will > actually provide an opt-out. (I do believe this.) It is indeed difficult to discuss these issues dispassionately in the current atmosphere of distrust and suspicion. You and the EFF are doing a good job overall of remaining objective, although as a result some are accusing you of being shills for Microsoft and DRM. > The root of the difficulty is that, in the nature of attestation, you > can be _punished_ for opting out (beyond the scope of simply not > enjoying particular features to which what you opted out of is > technically necessary). The real issue is this. Attestation will allow a service provider to withhold his services unless you are using TC technology and running a particular software program of his choice. Thus you may need to opt in in order to use his services. Now, some people characterize this as a loss of choice, or as you put it, as allowing you to be punished for opting out. Suppose the service being offered is extremely valuable, like cheap movie downloads. And suppose almost everyone opts in to use these services, enabling TC and running the approved clients. Now you can opt out, but only at the expense of cutting yourself off from the flow of information that everyone else is enjoying. The same effect can occur in a decentralized network. If there is some P2P program which uses TC to make sure that people are running kosher clients, and you opt out of TC, you can't participate in the network. This makes it seem that you are being punished for your decision. There are two problems with this analysis. The first is that it overlooks that some of these services will only be provided if TC exists to assure that the data will be handled properly. Without TC there may be no such service. Characterizing TC as limiting choice or punishing those who opt out overlooks the advantages being provided to those who opt in by allowing them access to a service which might not otherwise exist. The more popular a service is, and the more people who opt in as a result, the harder it is to justify opposing the technology that made the service possible and allowed all those people to get access to an information flow which is important to them. By focusing on those who wish to opt out, the analysis overlooks the larger group who benefits by opting in. And second, your analysis overlooks the fact that any economic transaction has two sides: producer and consumer. Both have economic power in a competitive market. Producers are not able to simply set the terms and require consumers to accept them. Rather, there is a constant flow, a give and take, between all sides, evolving to a mutually acceptable condition. Look at what is happening with digital music stores today. Some, like Apple's service, offer music with relatively weak DRM restrictions. Others have offered more limitations and harsher rules. Consumers will soon have a wide range of choices, and this will allow the market to select the best mix of limitations and prices. We are evolving to a state of "DRM lite" which offers mild restrictions that allow people to use their music in the ways they want, but makes it hard to share it with millions of their best friends on the net. Similarly, even though TC in principle allows service providers to impose Draconian restrictions, the marketplace won't just stand by and let it happen. Consumers are not passive sheep; they are active and intelligent, and they usually have a better idea of what is in their own best interests than those of us who are policy activists. We could do a lot worse than to stand aside and let the market decide which technologies solve people's problems. If TC is so bad for consumers, it will fail. (Some cypherpunk types have predicted that TC will be mandated by law, such as the CBDTPA, and certainly I would agree that any such measures should be opposed.) > In the nature of attestation and its effect on interoperability, > though, opting out of attestation might be ruinous for your hopes of > communicating with others. If they can be induced to use proprietary > protocols or file formats, opting out may lead to a permanent > inability to exchange data with them. Of course, we see this already to some extent, with any software program that uses proprietary data formats. Programs using open formats compete with programs that use closed formats, and users can choose which ones to use. You speak of users being "induced" to use proprietary formats, but that disparages their abilities to make choices that reflect their own best interests. It's also not clear how attestation applies to this case. As has been noted elsewhere [1], the protection of proprietary data formats is more due to sealed storage than attestation. The bottom line is that if the person you want to communicate with is using a program that relies on proprietary data formats (one which won't save or present the data in an open format), you either need to run the same program, or else you need to persuade the other guy to switch. That's true today and it will be true tomorrow. The only thing TC adds is to make it more difficult and expensive to reverse engineer the data format, but I believe that even without TC, formats can be designed and software can be written which is extremely expensive to reverse engineer, especially in conjunction with existing legal restrictions. TC will only raise an already very high bar a little higher, as far as this issue goes. It doesn't make any fundamental changes. I believe that open formats are superior and that programs which rely on them will ultimately come to succeed in the marketplace. Consumers want open formats because it saves them from being locked into a single vendor and left orphaned if that company fails. These kinds of pressures will save us from the worst excesses you fear, with or without TC. > Opting in, by the same token, > could lead to a permanent loss of software choice (and the effective > inability to reverse engineer or repair your software) at least during > the particular periods of time when you want to communicate with other > people or manipulate what they sent you. It's somewhat contradictory to speak of a "permanent" loss of choice only during "particular periods of time". Permanent normally connotes a property that applies all the time. But again, what this comes down to is that if everyone else is using a proprietary format, you have to use the same program that they do. I don't think people are going to continue to put up with this indefinitely. > [T]rusted computing systems fundamentally alter trust relationships. > Legitimate concerns about trusted computing are not limited to one > area, such as consumer privacy or copyright issues. Trusted computing systems allow for new forms of trust relationships that are not possible today. === [1] http://invisiblog.com/1c801df4aee49232/

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RE: Inferno: Cold War encryption laws stand, but not as firmly | CNET News.com (fwd)
by Jim Choate 17 Oct '03

17 Oct '03

On Fri, 17 Oct 2003, Trei, Peter wrote: > > Jim Choate[SMTP:ravage@einstein.ssz.com] > > > > Subject: Inferno: Cold War encryption laws stand, but not as firmly | > > CNET News.com (fwd) > > > > This is great news for crypto... > > > > http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-5092154.html?tag=nefd_top > > > > > [Judge Patel throws out Bernstein case after USG 'promises' not > to enforce the laws requiring notification of publication of crypto > source code] There was something else in that story that was even more important than this ruling. What was it Peter? This is a great reason not to rely on other peoples synopsis and read the articles for yourself. Think for yourself. Computer code was found to have 1st Amendment protection. It was a form of communications. -- -- Lo! Men have become the tools of their tools - H.D. Thoreau ravage(a)ssz.com jchoate(a)open-forge.com www.ssz.com www.open-forge.com

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