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Tales from Tech Support
by Chris Claborne 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is just one of the incredible "Tales from Tech Support" you can find on web page: http://128.218.7.140/auricular/homepage/tstales/tstales7.html Enjoy ! SuperMac records a certain number of technical support calls at random, to keep tabs on customer satisfaction. By wild "luck", they managed to catch the following conversation on tape. Some poor SuperMac TechSport got a call from some middle level official...from the legitimate government of Trinidad. The fellow spoke very good English, and fairly calmly described the problem. It seemed there was a coup attempt in progress at that moment. However, the national armoury for that city was kept in the same building as the Legislature, and it seems that there was a combination lock on the door to the armoury. Of the people in the capitol city that day, only the Chief of the Capitol Guard and the Chief Armourer knew the combination to the lock, and they had already been killed. So, this officer of the government of Trinidad continued, the problem is this. The combination to the lock is stored in a file on the Macintosh, but the file has been encrypted with the SuperMac product called Sentinel. Was there any chance, he asked, that there was a "back door" to the application, so they could get the combination, open the armoury door, and defend the Capitol Building and the legitimately elected government of Trinidad against the insurgents? All the while he is asking this in a very calm voice, there is the sound of gunfire in the background. The Technical Support guy put the person on hold. A phone call to the phone company verified that the origin of the call was in fact Trinidad. Meanwhile, there was this mad scramble to see if anybody knew of any "back doors" in the Sentinel program. As it turned out, Sentinel uses DES to encrypt the files, and there was no known back door. The Tech Support fellow told the customer that aside from trying to guess the password, there was no way through Sentinel, and that they'd be better off trying to physically destroy the lock. The official was very polite, thanked him for the effort, and hung up. That night, the legitimate government of Trinidad fell. One of the BBC reporters mentioned that the casualties seemed heaviest in the capitol, where for some reason, there seemed to be little return fire from the government forces. O.K., so they shouldn't have kept the combination in so precarious a fashion. But it does place, "I can't see my Microsoft Mail server" complaints in a different sort of perspective, does it not? ... __o .. -\<, Chris.Claborne(a)SanDiegoCA.ATTGIS.Com ...(*)/(*). CI$: 76340.2422 http://bordeaux.sandiegoca.attgis.com/ PGP Pub Key fingerprint = A8 FA 55 92 23 20 72 69 52 AB 64 CC C7 D9 4F CA Avail on Pub Key server.

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(buyinfo Req:) Stored value card alliances?
by rah＠shipwright.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

--- begin forwarded text Date: Wed, 18 Oct 95 09:03:00 -0400 From: Mark <mark(a)bmainc.com> Sender: Mark <mark(a)bmainc.com> Organization: Bruce Morgan Associates, Inc. To: www-buyinfo(a)allegra.att.com Subject: <None> Would someone be able recommend a table listing all the various store-value card and digital cash strategic alliances? --- end forwarded text ----------------- Robert Hettinga (rah(a)shipwright.com) Shipwright Development Corporation, 44 Farquhar Street, Boston, MA 02131 USA (617) 323-7923 "Reality is not optional." --Thomas Sowell >>>>Phree Phil: Email: zldf(a)clark.net http://www.netresponse.com/zldf <<<<<

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Re: Postscript in Netscape
by patrick＠Verity.COM 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> From: sameer <sameer(a)c2.org> > > In any case, it might be wise for Jeff to get a non-netscape > account to do his cypherpunks posting from, so as to avoid > confusion. (ObPlug: Community ConneXion offers mailboxes for just > $5/month -- shell accounts for $7.50 ;-) Oh that would be silly now wouldn't it? If Jeff wants another account that's his business, but people don't normally expect that you're a spokesman for a company just because you work there. Jeff even has, like most of us, a disclaimer in his sig saying he doesn't speak for the company. Anyone that assumes otherwise is surely a newbie to the net, and just like most bizarre assumptions that newbies make we'll gently correct them, and they'll learn. Patrick p.s. was sameer's post a spam? <snicker;> Please don't take this line seriously, it was said with tongue definately in cheek. _______________________________________________________________________ / These opinions are mine, and not Verity's (except by coincidence;). \ | (\ | | Patrick J. Horgan Verity Inc. \\ Have | | patrick(a)verity.com 1550 Plymouth Street \\ _ Sword | | Phone : (415)960-7600 Mountain View \\/ Will | | FAX : (415)960-7750 California 94303 _/\\ Travel | \___________________________________________________________\)__________/

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by doug＠cdsnet.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Eli Brandt <eli(a)UX3.SP.CS.CMU.EDU> writes: >If you >split the message into shadows, you avoid having anyone in this >position. Hal Finney <hfinney(a)shell.portal.com> responds: >...If the end user is >responsible for reassembly, then that is tantamount to voluntarily >agreeing to receive anonymous messages, and that is no problem... >...And of course anonymous news >postings via shadows would also have the reassembly problem. It seems that there could at least be a hierarchy of shadowed newsgroups, e.g. alt.freespeech.*, requiring the enduser to use special software to reassemble actual postings. This could even be integrated into the newsreaders, or even at a local newserver level. To post to these groups, something like the current Mixmaster remailer network might be used, with extensions for posting "shadows" to these newsgroups. So posting would require slightly more enduser sophistication,and the ability to encrypt. The client posting software would hit ITAR, but presumably not the client reassembly software (newsreader extensions, etc.), since it doesn't need the ability to encrypt. Then the newsgroup hierarchy itself would become the target of control fervor. Perhaps this could be fought with an emphasis on freedom of speech and creation of newsgroups for "political expression", e.g. alt.freespeech.talk.politics, etc. It's unfortunate, but good soundbites can be as important as good protocols: "Freedom of Speech in Cyberspace: Feds want to eliminate so-called "freespeech newsgroups" on the new information superhighway..." I haven't done my homework on protocols for distributing shadows. Are there problems with this, other than the obvious one of actually doing all the work? Doug Cutrell _____________________________________________________________ Doug Cutrell General Partner doug(a)cdsnet.net Open Mind =============================================================

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by David Neal 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

> Date: Wed, 18 Oct 1995 16:01:00 -0400 (EDT) > From: s1018954(a)aix2.uottawa.ca > Reply-to: s1018954(a)aix2.uottawa.ca > Subject: Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal > To: Doug Cutrell <doug(a)cdsnet.net> > Cc: cypherpunks(a)toad.com > > > On Wed, 18 Oct 1995, Doug Cutrell wrote: > > > It seems that there could at least be a hierarchy of shadowed newsgroups, > > e.g. alt.freespeech.*, requiring the enduser to use special software to > > reassemble actual postings. This could even be integrated into the > > newsreaders, or even at a local newserver level. > > There already is. I think the *.test (or at least alt.test) groups have > good propagation. Nobody "reads" anything but their own posts anyway, so the > natives wouldn't be bothered. > YIKES! Think again. Many of the *.test newsgroups have auto-responders that remail the poster assuring them their post was received. This feature is used to make sure your newsfeed is working.

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Oh to be a mouse in the corner...
by Brad Dolan 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

PR 10/17 1720 ABA: TERRORISM EXPERTS TO SPEAK Why is domestic terrorism on the increase? How serious a problem is it? Do we have international terrorism under control? These and other questions will be the focus of a two-day conference sponsored by the ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security at the Hotel Washington in Washington D.C., October 19 and 20. The conference, entitled "National Security Law in a Changing World: The Fifth Annual Review of the Field," features experts in the field of terrorism, including former CIA Director William Colby, former FBI Director William Sessions, and Oklahoma Governor Frank Keating, whose state was the site of the worst domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history. Program highlights include: "The Press and National Security," 10:30 a.m. Thurs., Oct. 19 Panelists: Timothy Weiner, New York Times; Peter Rodman, National Review; Carl Robert Zelnick, ABC-TV; and Carl Stern, Department of Justice. "Reinventing the Intelligence Community," 2 p.m., Thurs., Oct. 19 Panelists: William Colby, Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; William Sessions, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and Admiral William Studeman, Former Acting Director of CIA. "Addressing the Threat of Domestic Terrorism," 8:30 a.m., Fri., Oct. 20 Panelists: Bradley Buckles, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Howard Shapiro, General Counsel FBI; and Professor Stephen Sloan, University of Oklahoma. Luncheon Address, 12 p.m., Fri., October 20 Speaker: The Honorable Frank Keating, Governor of Oklahoma All Conference events will take place in the Ballroom, Lower Lobby Level at The Hotel Washington, 15th St. and Pennsylvania Ave., Washington D.C. For a complete listing of conference programs, please call Holly McMahon at 202-662-1036. CONTACT: Christine Lanier of the American Bar Association, 202-662-1792, or E-Mail: clanier@@attmail.com. -0- 10/17/95

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Re: Anonymity: A Modest Proposal
by tbyfield＠panix.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 9:42 AM 10/18/95, Hal wrote: >I think a remailer which forged headers would get people even angrier >than one which was up front about what it was doing. Forging headers is >really considered antisocial by a lot of people on the net. If you could >do it safely, you wouldn't need remailers. Since you need them, it's not >safe, hence the message will probably get traced back to the remailer. >This is prima facie evidence to get an account yanked at a lot of places. Of course. The problem is that protocols as implemented permit header-forging: it's a practical fact of the net, and one that maybe shouldn't be overlooked on (basically vague) 'moral' grounds, any more than Netscape should say, "Well, you just _shouldn't_ screw someone with a foo.foo.foo.foo... URL." Of course people shouldn't overflow your stack intentionally--but they _can_, and the implications of that fact are shaping the net as we speak. If the headers were forged in such a way as to falsely and _credibly_ attribute a transmission to an actual uninvolved third-party, that's one thing; but the existence of headers that are forged so incompetently as to be traceable to their actual origin suggests that forged headers might be worth meditating on. For example, what if two or three dozen independently maintained Mixmasters in three or four countries randomly forged headers (maybe even actually badly, or maybe craftily "badly") so as to make the last link in a chain look like one (or "one") of the other remailers; how would the Co$ cope with that? Anyway, you get the drift. Ted

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Re: Tales from Tech Support
by blob＠apple.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 12:24 PM 10/18/95, Chris Claborne wrote: >This is just one of the incredible "Tales from Tech Support" you can find on >web page: >http://128.218.7.140/auricular/homepage/tstales/tstales7.html [...] >Some poor SuperMac TechSport got a call from some middle level >official...from the legitimate government of Trinidad. [long story deleted] Nice story, but the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago haven't had a coup since 1990, and that coup attempt was unsuccessful. There was some tension in Trinidad and Tobago last summer due to the speaker of the house refusing to step down over some parlimentary issues, but it hasn't escalated into a coup (yet). If this happened, it happened in 1990. But even then, the legitimate government didn't fall. Several key buildings were occupied by rebels for a couple of weeks, and then the rebels surrendered and were pardoned to great public outrage. --Brian Bechtel, who shouldn't know so much about the Caribbean...

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Re: Netscape rewards are an insult
by tomw＠orac.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <DGnrDy.H3G(a)sgi.sgi.com>, anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com writes: > Is your comment about the "Bugs Bounty" program an official comment, that > you have "no idea how valuable" it will be?? Shall I give you a clue, > as to how valuable the discovery of a flawed algorithm might be?? [ ... ] > Alice de 'nonymous ... I've deleted the rest of your content-free rant. Instead of alluding to some "flawed algorithm", why not tell us about the hole you say you've found in netscape? -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com

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Re: Postscript in Netscape
by tomw＠orac.engr.sgi.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

In article <DGn8F6.50y(a)sgi.sgi.com>, fc(a)all.net (Dr. Frederick B. Cohen) writes: > Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Wrote: > ... >> If a user configures a postscript viewer that has not had the >> file operations disabled as a helper app to any web browser then >> they are opening themselves up for a world of hurt. The same is >> true if they just download the file and run their viewer on it >> manually. The same is true if they configure /bin/sh as an >> external viewer. >> >> Obviously everyone should heed perry's warnings and emasculate >> their postscript interpreters before using them to view files >> of unknown origin. > WRONG!!! Netscape claims to be "secure" - hence it is Netscape's job to > be secure - regardless of the user's use of their product. Otherwise, > the ads should read: > "Netscape can be used securely by sufficiently knowledgeable > users who have emasculated their postscript interpreters before > using them to view files of unknown origin, and who have removed > all other known, unknown, and/or undisclosed security holes from > their systems. Otherwise, Netscape is insecure and should not be > trusted." If the user sets up a postscript viewer as an external viewer for postscript files, it's not Netscape's fault if the viewer does something insecure. -- Sure we spend a lot of money, but that doesn't mean | Tom Weinstein we *do* anything. -- Washington DC motto | tomw(a)engr.sgi.com

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