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Re: Junk E-Mail - Part 4
by James M. Cobb 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Friend, In its NEWS IN BRIEF summary, 11 22 95 Financial Times reports: BRUSSELS/LONDON - SELLING - A ban on telephone "cold calling" throughout the European Union was on Tuesday approved by Euro-MPs, to the consternation of direct mar- keting and distance selling organisations. In a move de- signed to spare people from what MEPs consider to be ir- ritating telephone calls, a key parliamentary committee voted to make prior consent from consumers obligatory before a seller can approach them by telephone. The proposed ban also applies to communications by e- mail, raising fears among publishing organisations that the development of the information society in Europe could be damaged. Ban fear, for we have nothing to fear but fear itself. Cordially, Jim NOTE. The URL of one Financial Times Group website is: http://www.usa.ft.com

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Re: Spam the Sign!
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 04:02 PM 11/22/95 -0800, Jeff Simmons wrote: > and yet the people with the [balls] > to actually challenge it aren't the big companies who stand to gain the > most financially, it's a bunch of guys (a lot of whom hang around here > sometimes) who are successfully giving away 'export controlled' software, If you have looked at court cases recently, you will notice that most juries will find a corporation guilty of anything, no matter how absurd. At a gut level they feel that the pursuit of profit is itself a crime, and that the pursuit of profit in an organized group is a flagrant and terrible crime, deserving of the most savage punishment, unless that pursuit has been thoroughly and carefully supervised and authorized by the state. They are much more reluctant to punish an individual, which is why the government wants to keep Phil in permanent legal limbo. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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Re: towards a theory of reputation
by James A. Donald 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 01:14 PM 11/21/95 -0800, Wei Dai wrote: > The first step toward a theory of reputation is defining what reputation > is. [...] If these interactions are mainly economic in nature, > then we can represent Alice's reputation of Bob by a graph with > the horizontal axis labeled price and the vertical axis labeled > expected utility. Any attempt to discuss and analyze reputations using morally neutral language is bound to wind up as boring long winded meaningless complicated word salad. You will wind up in the same place as the behaviorists did, going in ever diminishing epistemological circles until you vanish into the whichness of why and the whyness of which. Some things, for example reputations, behavior, or the principle of mathematical induction, necessarily involve concepts that are philosophically problematical. Any attempt to discuss these things while avoiding philosophically problematic concepts invariably degenerates into total fog. --------------------------------------------------------------------- | We have the right to defend ourselves | http://www.jim.com/jamesd/ and our property, because of the kind | of animals that we are. True law | James A. Donald derives from this right, not from the | arbitrary power of the state. | jamesd(a)echeque.com

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CJR_war
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

SciAm, December, 1995: "Fighting Future Wars. U.S. military planners may be preparing for the wrong conflict." Policy experts, technical gurus and defense contractors have begun to study a range of other potential threats, from a newly hatched superpower to a regional power with dramatically altered fighting tactics, to legions of mercenary hackers that bring down banks and stock exchanges with computer viruses and other malevolent software. The vast array of scenarios is a measure of the speculative turn that has gripped the military-planning establishment. Debate on high-tech fighting culminates in the question of whether information technologies -- a computer virus, for one -- could make conventional military hardware obsolete and whether they would make possible a virtual invasion of the continental U.S. A battle of the bits would be fought by destroying an enemy's information assets, its financial, electrical, telecommunications and air-traffic-control networks. Direct strikes at the military would not be ruled out: cracking a government computer is already a not infrequent hacker rite of passage. In addition, more than 95 percent of military communications travel over public networks. CJR_war

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Re: crypto for porno users
by E. ALLEN SMITH 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

From: gjeffers(a)socketis.net (Gary Jeffers) The SecureDrive 1.4 disk encryptor system solves their computer site disk storage problem. It also gives them the solution to the "rubber hose" problem. With a "damaged" key file and the use of a password, they have an effective defense against court orders demanding keys. (see the docs for SecureDrive 1.4). Also disk encryptors not only encrypt files but also solve the problem of temporary work files that are used by many software packages (They can be reconstructed). ----------------------- Does anyone know of any strong encryptor systems that encrypt a MS-DOS directory with subdirectories, as opposed to a partition? Aside from convenience, this does have the potential advantage that if you did some FAT, etcetera manipulation, it wouldn't be possible to figure out what was garbage and what was encrypted without the program running properly (i.e., have an emergency hotkey combination that wiped the currently used password/phrase and removed the program and the alterations to the FAT). Also nice would be working off of a key on a 3.5" floppy, so it can be removed when not in use (thus reducing the need for typing in a password/phrase every few minutes). It should be compatible with Stacker and similar compression systems if possible, although it could also be run on the uncompressed drive- that way it'd take up more space, however. -Allen

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Re: [rehash] Re: crypto for porno users
by loki＠obscura.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 6:05 PM 11/24/95, s1113645(a)tesla.cc.uottawa.ca wrote: >Watch the cpunks go round and round and round and... > >On Fri, 24 Nov 1995, Gary Jeffers wrote: > >> I know little of the theory of Dining Cryptographers but I would think >> that a good implementation of it would make infiltrators useless. I will >> leave it for other Cypherpunks to discuss the mechanics (specific and >> general) for actually doing this. > >Dining Cryptographers nets (aka DC-nets) are the whole idea behind the >type 2 anon remailers like Mixmaster, and the remailernet in general. >You'll find a lot on this in the archives, the ftp site (which has Chaum's >DC article and a good explanation by Tim May) and a few peoples' pages. >(I think they're mostly pointed to in the pages I list) > I wish this were the case. Mixmaster is not based on the "Dining Cryptographers" problem, but based on Chaum's "Digital Mixes". Digital mixes hide the fact that A is communicating with B. DC nets allow an individual A in a group of people A' to send a message so that it is impossible to tell who in the group sent it (but it is known to have been one of the members of A'). -Lance ---------------------------------------------------------- Lance Cottrell loki(a)obscura.com PGP 2.6 key available by finger or server. Mixmaster, the next generation remailer, is now available! http://obscura.com/~loki/Welcome.html or FTP to obscura.com "Love is a snowmobile racing across the tundra. Suddenly it flips over, pinning you underneath. At night the ice weasels come." --Nietzsche ----------------------------------------------------------

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Re: PGP Distribution Site at MIT *DOWN*
by carolann＠censored.org 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- On Sat Nov 25th, 1995: >We apologize for the inconvenience and hope to have full service >restored shortly. > -Jeff Can you PLEASE put the .org permissions back in it! Thanks ever so much. censored.org can't get in. Love Always, Carol Anne -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: 2.6.2 iQCVAwUBMLd3ZorpjEWs1wBlAQHQXQP9EzvOuKxWs3f1gLPbhmUC7BMJcHLR8Dfz jeU0AyGsxp9KWvfeut2nNzbSYsAgzLGUwmoQcU66t8iJPCXVW/mCORo5R1tExi+p RFlPrhyfJyDxJfNT/RzRlrQT6KDj5U4AizIliaGdVh3KVHUmOiUNxX/4FAUQTKpl c+kEefbMElI= =9Y9F -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- -- Member Internet Society - Certified BETSI Programmer - Webmistress *********************************************************************** Carol Anne Braddock (cab8) carolann(a)censored.org 206.42.112.96 My Homepage The Cyberdoc *********************************************************************** ------------------ PGP.ZIP Part [017/713] ------------------- M8H,),S$8G>&.WP(8IRA`-M['+`Q%&_C"">5-F%LX@<_Q$;*P'',Q$Z/AA[8M MF=O0H+*%(-S%&>S%+FS&<LS%3(Q&#W1"<]2%`H^;,]^1C$'HBN8PX$4SYAU^ MPGD<Q0ZLA0D+,`MCT!LA**4M[-JPAK9F?40!AJ,CW"'%DR#:'9?Q)3[%<DQ` ------------------------------------------------------------- for next chunk to export --> http://dcs.ex.ac.uk/~aba/export/

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No Subject
by Albert Nanomius 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

------- Forwarded Message From: "LadyNada" <ladynada(a)ix.netcom.com> To: snet-l(a)world.std.com Date: Sun, 26 Nov 1995 13:26:39 +0000 Subject: Post Office to approve some internet email - -- Area : AEN NEWS -----------------------------------------( M-BOARD.SU1 )---- Msg# 22280 Date: 11-18-95 19:01 From: jared(a)alaska.net Read: No Replied: No To: All Mark: Subj: Oh, great. The Post Office is going to certify Internet mail. - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- From: "Jared Armstrong" <jared(a)alaska.net> Originally to: news(a)aen.org Original Date: Sat, 18 Nov 95 18:47 EST http://techweb.cmp.com/techweb/ia/18issue/18post.html > [Image] > Post Office offers Internet digital ID > Certification authority a key enabler of electronic commerce > By Gail Bronson > Side bar WASHINGTON - Come next summer, the U.S. Postal Service > expects to be up and running with a service that will identify > senders and receivers of Internet messages, a critical enabler of > electronic commerce. > Specifically, the Postal Service will operate a certification > authority for public-key certificates used to digitally sign > messages transmitted over the Internet. > The Postal Service expects the service to be of particular interest > to anyone involved in electronic commerce or electronic data > interchange, in which the ability to assure the identity of both > the sender and receiver of information can be crucial. > "Right now there is no way to figure out if messages on the > Internet have been tampered with nor is there any way to > authenticate the genuine identity of a sender," said Paul Raines, > program manager for electronic commerce at the Postal Service. "It > could be a dog on the other end of the Internet now for all you > know." > Limited beta tests of the Postal Service's system already are under > way within the federal government, at the Federal Aviation > Administration, Social Security and the Internal Revenue Service. > "We're eager to work with VeriSign [RSA Data Security Inc. > spin-off] and any other certification authorities to come up with > ways to help with cross certification," Raines said. "We're not in > this to compete with private companies, rather, we're trying to > enable [the electronic commerce] industry." > Some users may find the Postal Service certification authority > service more appealing than private alternatives because its > service will carry the weight of law - tampering with Internet > messages would be as much a crime as tampering with regular U.S. > mail. On the other hand, there is always the lingering concern of > having to deal with a federal bureaucracy. > The Postal Service intends to play two roles in the certification > business. > First, as a certifying service the federal agency will provide the > code, or public-key certificate, necessary for recipients of > digitally signed messages to identify the sender. This service will > be necessary to decrypt mail unless the two correspondents > previously exchanged their keys privately. Second, the Postal > Service will maintain a server to manage a public register of > public-key certificates accessible off the Internet, Raines said. > The Postal Service will conduct market studies to gauge demand > before deciding how much individuals must pay to obtain someone > else's public key certificate. In addition, the Postal Service will > sell for less than a dollar an electronic date-time stamp to prove > the existence of a message in a particular point in time. > "We're taking the same attributes of hard copy that make them > legally binding and transferring them to electronic > correspondence," Raines said. > The Postal Service is working with several companies, including > Premenos Corp., to develop the necessary software, Raines said. The > user agent and interface specifications for designing software to > interface with the Postal Service's server, however, are available > free to any one willing to sign a licensing agreement, Raines said. > Regardless of how such arrangements work themselves out, the Postal > Service intends to operate this business on a nonprofit, > self-supported basis. "We don't intend to have first-class mail > supporting Internet mail," Raines said. > Back to Current Issue ______________________________________________________ Jared Armstrong Anchorage, Alaska, USA Last Free Place On Earth jared(a)alaska.net http://www.alaska.net/~jared For PGP Key, Send E-Mail With Subject:Get PGP Key ______________________________________________________ PGP Key ID E2B22AD1 PGP Fingerprint 38 C7 58 C0 C3 10 E0 9D 51 B2 F4 FA 76 04 47 87 ______________________________________________________ ______________________________________________________ - --- Reply to: news(a)aen.org * Origin: AEN NEWS Internet Gateway (1:231/110.1) ------- End of Forwarded Message

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Re: key for Alice as promised (not)
by anonymous-remailer＠shell.portal.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

On Wed, 22 Nov 1995 anonymous-remailer(a)shell.portal.com wrote: > > As an incentive for Alice to generate herself a PGP key, I hereby > > place Alice on notice that if she doesn't sign her next post, and > > provide a PGP key, I will create one for her, and steal all the > > postive (?) reputation that she has developed so far. Positive reputation?? Me?? Uhhm, thanks, I guess. > > You have 24 hours Alice, otherwise a key gets posted to here, and to > > the keyservers with your nym on it. > > Well 24 hours have passed, and Alice remains unrepentant: Can you imagine?? I'm simply not willing to fool myself into thinking that I ahve security by posting a key and using PGP. I think that's irresponsible. Unless, I have a secure machine dedicated to PGP *which I don't* I don't fool myself into thinking that I have any security, at all. > On Tue, 21 Nov 1995, the old Alice de 'nonymous wrote: > > > Alice here ... > > > > No, *I* am the real Alice, and I refuse to use PGP signing. Yep ... that's right. > So here we go Alice's key: > > Type bits/keyID Date User ID > pub 1024/23292ED1 1995/11/22 Alice de 'nonymous <cypherpunks(a)toad.com> > Key fingerprint = CA 76 81 41 54 CE E7 D6 62 EE 6D 65 EE FB A3 55 Gee, it might even help if you got the address right. Since when is the list address, my address?? cypherpunks(a)toad.com?? Alice de 'nonymous ... ...just another one of those... P.S. This post is in the public domain. C. S. U. M. O. C. L. U. N. E.

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NOF_uss
by John Young 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Science, Nov 17, 1995: "Security Schemes Aspire to No Fuss System Protection." Because of the painful trade offs between security and usability that come with current protective measures, computer scientists have heen investigating new ways to detect and ward off intruders that present fewer obstacles to users and administrators. Two of the most intriguing directions announced at the Baltimore security conference were reported by researchers at Purdue University's Computer Operations, Audit, and Security Technology laboratory (COAST). The first was an attempt to harness techniques from artificial intelligence to detect intrusions; the second, a pilot test of what has been called software forensics -- an effort to recognize malign programs by identifying the fingerprints of their creators. NOF_uss (15 kb)

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