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NSA says strong crypto to china??
by Jeff Weinstein 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

This is a quote from an article by Paul Vallely in The Independent, London, which can be found here: http://nytsyn.com/live/News3/006_010696_101827_2723.html > What one government regards as harmful material is an instrument of freedom > and democracy to another. Officials at the US National Security Agency have > suggested that Internet encryption technology - a sophisticated method of > encoding information - be deliberately exported to Chinese dissidents to > help them in their fight against their government - even though its export > is otherwise banned under US arms control regulations. Does anyone know of real documentation of this "suggestion" from the NSA? It quite telling, though no surprise to any of us I'm sure, that they would think that strong crypto should be a tool of freedom in china, but not in this country. Maybe they should get Microsoft to insert subliminal directions for downloading PGP into a future episode of "My Computer Family". :-) --Jeff Jeff Weinstein - Electronic Munitions Specialist Netscape Communication Corporation jsw(a)netscape.com - http://home.netscape.com/people/jsw/ Any opinions expressed above are mine.

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DC-C'punks meeting
by pfarrell＠netcom.com 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Sorry to waste list bandwidth for the 600 folks too far away to care about this... The next DC-area c'punks meeting will be September 16, it will be at the Digex headquarters offices in Beltsville, probably starting about 3:00 PM. Digital Express Group 6800 Virginia Manor Road Beltsville Maryland 20705 (301) 847-5000 Directions to DIGEX >From the Washington Beltway (I495) in Maryland, take Route 1 North. drive on Route 1 a few miles, maybe as many as three or four. You will see a Ritz Camera Center. Turn left onto Ritz Way. At the second street, turn Right onto Virginia Manor Road. You are now near 6800 Virginia Manor Road. Digex is the last building on the Right. If you need more information, email me, or see my http://www.isse.gmu.edu/~pfarrell/dccp page. Pat Pat Farrell grad student http://www.isse.gmu.edu/students/pfarrell Infor. Systems and Software Engineering, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA PGP key available via finger or request #include standard.disclaimer

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Re: Scientology tries to break PGP - and
by keelings＠wu1.wl.aecl.ca 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Incoming from Henry W. Farkas: > [snip] > When the safety is finally removed from the gun at your head (sorry for > the drama) you hand over your alternate secret key. If decrypted with the > "alternate" or "fake" secret key, the encrypted file is wiped until it > reaches a marker; the remainder of the file is displayed. If you use your > "primary" or "real key", the extraneous text is simply stripped. I would just like to point out that, when a LEA comes to you to get at the contents of your computer, (s)he is not going to patiently wait while your system wipes the offending evidence off your hard disk. The first thing they do is make a copy of everything, so they can work from the copy. Besides, you do have backup tapes laying around all over the place, don't you? -- "Remember, obsolescence (Win95) isn't an accident; it's an art form!" keelings(a)wu1.wl.aecl.ca s. keeling, aecl - whiteshell labs

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When they came for the Jews...
by Duncan Frissell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

********* Citing ``the rapidly expanding presence of organized hate groups on the Internet,'' a leading Jewish human rights group [the Simon Wiesenthal Center] on Tuesday began sending letters to hundreds of Internet access providers and universities asking them to refuse to carry messages that ``promote racism, anti-Semitism, mayhem and violence.'' But Cooper said the ``unprecedented potential and scope of the Internet'' gives people ``incredible power to promote violence, threaten women, denigrate minorities, promote homophobia and conspire against democracy.'' He cited the posting of instructions for making explosive devices, including recipes for Sarin nerve gas and bombs similar to the one that destroyed the Federal Building in Oklahoma City last April 19. *********** In reading the above from today's NYT, I was interested to see the expansion of the protected classes who are not to have unkind things said about them on the Nets. Aside from the usual list of suspects, I noted that *democrats* were also to be protected. I thought that "conspiring against democracy" (something I do daily) was classic political speech and and activity that even the drafters of the American Constitution practiced from time to time. I guess I'm going to have to watch my attacks on democracy if I don't want to get my Net access cut off. DCF "I favor discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color sex, age, alienage, previous condition of servitude, recent interstate travel, handicap, sexual or affectional preference, marital status, Vietnam-era veteran status (or lack thereof), occupation, economic status, and anything else I can think of."

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Re: Netscape to patch shareware version
by Marshall Clow 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>| Meanwhile, in an as yet unannouced move, the company said it would place >| its commercial browser online for free downloading. [..] THe commercial >| version, sold only in the U.S. contains an unbreakable 128-bit >| encryption scheme. > >Hurray! We did it! We did it! :-) Indeed. Congratulations to Damien, Adam, and all the other people who contributed cycles to the "Cypherpunks Key Breaking Ring". > >| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >| U.S. borders. > I suspect Netscape will do the minimum so that they will not be held liable. >Ok, any bet on how long it will take? > Less than 3 hours. >| The cypherpunks forced a situation where Net users now have better >| encryption available to them. I'd say this is a big win. > >The power of the Net is actually quite astonishing at times. The >plotting in Ender's Game isn't all that unrealistic after all. (Oh, >well, ruler of the world is a bit of still. ;-)) > Demosthenes

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Re: Netscape to patch shareware version
by anon-remailer＠utopia.hacktic.nl 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

>| Netscape said it received word last week that the State Department had >| cleared that version for release on the Net, but only within the U.S., >| owing to current export laws banning the export of encryption schemes >| stronger than 40 bits. THe company could provide no details by press >| time on how it would ensure that the 128-bit version wouldn't leak beyond >| U.S. borders. > >Ok, any bet on how long it will take? It's already been exported. Evidently, one of those who bought the commercial version sent it to Europe as soon as it was out. I note the site removed it, however, probably because Netscape Comm. Inc. requested that they do so. Netscape generally objects to anyone else carrying their browser (.edu sites with prior permission excepted).

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Re: [NOISE] Cable-TV-Piracy-Punks
by tcmay＠got.net 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 7:36 PM 3/31/96, Mike Duvos wrote: >We aren't talking about IC masks here. We are talking about >electrostatic charges which would instantly leak away if the >insulation around them were in the least bit compromised. The surface layers above the active portion of a chip can be stripped away and chip remains functional. This includes the outer packaging layers (epoxy, or of course, ceramic with metal lids) and parts of the so-called "scratch protection," usually a type of silicate glass. The active capacitors are not affected by removal of these layers. >Such data wouldn't even survive the preparation for scanning >microscopy, much less the actual inspection process. Actually, we did it all the time in my lab at Intel, and I understand from my former co-workers that the technology has only gotten better. (This does not mean voltage contrast is easy. For one thing, modern chips have 3-5 metal layers, due to spectacular advances in chem-mechanical polishing, and each metal layer acts as a ground plane shielding the lower layers from visibility and inspection with electron beams. And EPROM and EEPROM cells are effectively impossible to analyze, for various reasons.) This does not mean I think reverse-engineering of smart cards or satellite boxes is easy. SQUIDs won't do it, either. --Tim May Boycott "Big Brother Inside" software! We got computers, we're tapping phone lines, we know that that ain't allowed. ---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---------:---- Timothy C. May | Crypto Anarchy: encryption, digital money, tcmay(a)got.net 408-728-0152 | anonymous networks, digital pseudonyms, zero W.A.S.T.E.: Corralitos, CA | knowledge, reputations, information markets, Higher Power: 2^756839 - 1 | black markets, collapse of governments. "National borders aren't even speed bumps on the information superhighway."

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Friday (15 Sep) GAK meeting at NIST
by Jim Gillogly 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

I was hoping to attend and enturbulate, but my schedule doesn't quite wrap around it. Here's the schedule and talking paper they sent when I inquired. Jim Gillogly Hevensday, 21 Halimath S.R. 1995, 21:48 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- WORKSHOP TENTATIVE AGENDA Developing Federal Key Escrow Standards September 15, 1995 Hilton Hotel Gaithersburg, Maryland 9:00 Welcome, Agenda Overview Miles Smid, NIST Goals and Objectives 9:10 Discussion of Goals and Objectives Ray Kammer, Deputy Director, NIST 9:20 Initial Thoughts on Standards Development Miles Smid, NIST 9:30 Industry Perspectives (5-10 min max.) Note: We still have a few slots of 5 min. available. Please let Arlene Carlton (301-975-3240) know if you would like to make a formal presentation. 10:30 Break 10:45 Discussion Technical Considerations 11:00 Identifying Technical Issues Miles Smid, NIST 11:15 Discussion 12:00 Lunch 1:30 Breakout sessions 3:15 Break 3:30 Breakout session reports 4:15 Discussion 4:30 Future Activities (Miles Smid, NIST) 5:00 Close Note: The workshop will be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. (9/6/95) --------------------- Developing Federal Key Escrow Encryption Standards Workshop September 15, 1995 Discussion Paper In announcements made on August 17, 1995, the Government stated its intention to work with industry and other interested individuals to develop federal key escrow encryption standards, including those implementable in software. This standard, when developed and approved, will be used by federal agencies (and others, if they so choose) in conjunction with FIPS-approved encryption techniques. The structure of the envisioned standard(s), its technical specificity, goals and objectives, important technical considerations, and issues of process must be addressed in order to move forward. Some of the more technical issues include: - Is a standard interface for the release of keys desirable? - What documentation is required? - How will operational procedures be developed? - How will conformance be validated? - Will security be evaluated? If so, under what criteria and by whom? - How will configuration control be maintained? - Are new FIPS-approved algorithms necessary? - Should escrowing be built into the Public Key Infrastructure? - Is a standard escrow system identification field needed? - Is split knowledge required? - Do systems which permit data to be encrypted for both storage and transmission need to provide for both types of escrow? - Does the government require special features (e.g., two hour access, continuous real-time decryption, etc.)? - Who will draft the standard? Timeframe? Note: These issues will be discussed at the Key Escrow Standards Development Workshop to be held September 15, 1995 (9:00 a.m. - 5:00 p.m.) at the Gaithersburg Hilton Hotel, 620 Perry Parkway, Gaithersburg, Maryland. The meeting will be open to the public, although seating is limited. Advance registration is requested, please contact Arlene Carlton on 301/975-3240, fax: 301/948-1784 or e-mail: carlton(a)micf.nist.gov. 9/6/95 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Leaked NSI PR About $50-Annual-Fee-for-Domain-Name
by Richard.Johnson＠Colorado.EDU 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

Here's a pointer to a very interesting draft press release, apparently scheduled for release on 18 September 1995. Short version: The article specifies $100 one-time fee for new domain name registrations, and a $50/year annual fee for all .com, .edu, .gov, .net, and .org domains. Long version: > From: rpwhite(a)best.com (rpwhite) > Newsgroups: best.general,best.announce,best.www,ba.internet,comp.protocols.tcp-ip.domains,talk.bizarre > Subject: INTERNET BEGINS FEE-BASED REGISTRATION > Date: 12 Sep 1995 12:18:18 -0700 > Organization: BEST Internet (415) 964-2378 > Lines: 495 > Approved: dillon(a)best.com > Message-ID: <434mdq$c3r(a)shell1.best.com> > NNTP-Posting-Host: shell1.best.com

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Re: An alternative to remailer shutdowns
by jim bell 17 Dec '03

17 Dec '03

At 02:12 AM 5/27/96 -0400, Black Unicorn wrote: >On Sat, 25 May 1996, jim bell wrote: > >> > Why the first in chain? If the anti-traffic-analysis provisions are >> >working properly, it should be impossible to prove that a given first remailer >> >was the first remailer for any particular message. I had thought that even >> >civil courts required that you be the person who committed some act, not the >> >person who _might_ have committed some act. Otherwise, all the remailers are >> >in danger. This is even if someone tries an entrapment by sending through some >> >illegal material - if the courts accept that they should be allowed to do this, >> >then all the remailers they chained are going to be hit. >> >> Likewise, I don't see why the first address in the chain is vulnerable, as >> long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy >> remailer, and probably a temporary output address. > >I repeat, all it takes is one person to send through only one remailer >(perhaps even a Co$ plant) and the first in chain remailer is toasted. > >Think before you type please. You should take your own advice. The mere fact that the first link in the chain is "known" doesn't mean that it is provably involved. Without a substantial amount of bugging that the COS hasn't the resources to do, there is a big difference between them _believing_ that a given message originated there, and being able to prove it in court. And notice my caveat: "As long as the message subsequently passes through at least one trustworthy remailer, and probably a temporary output address." Jim Bell jimbell(a)pacifier.com

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